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2024 DIGILAW 2201 (ALL)

Israr v. State of U. P.

2024-10-15

ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, GAUTAM CHOWDHARY

body2024
JUDGMENT : Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J. 1. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the accused appellant-Israr challenging the judgment and order dated 23.04.2019, passed by the Sessions Judge, Meerut in Sessions Trial No.597 of 2010 (State Vs. Israr), arising out of Case Crime No.83 of 2010, under Section 302 IPC, Police Station–Bhawanpur, District–Meerut, whereby he has been sentenced to life imprisonment along with fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo one year simple imprisonment. 2. Briefly stated the prosecution case is that an incident occurred on 22.02.2010 at about 5.00 p.m. in which the deceased has been done to death by the accused appellant by pouring kerosene and setting her ablaze. The report in respect of the incident has been lodged by the father of the deceased on 7th of March, 2010. This report is the basis of lodging of the first information report as Case Crime No.83 of 2010 on 8th of March, 2010. The written report has been exhibited as Ex.Ka-2, which records that informant’s daughter got married to one Naeem, who is a resident of village Aurangabad, Police Station Bhawanpur, District Meerut. The accused wanted to marry the deceased and was having a bad eye on her on account of which he had earlier abducted the deceased and a complaint in that regard was also lodged. It is for this reason that the accused maintained enmity. The accused had openly claimed that if the deceased is not married to him, he would not allow her to be of someone else. The incident occurred at about 5.00 in the evening when nobody was at home. On hearing scream of the deceased, her husband Naeem rushed to the house and found his wife to be substantially burnt. The deceased was rushed to the Medical College, where she was struggling and the entire family was engaged in her treatment. It is for this reason that the report has been lodged on 7th of March, 2010. The written report is typed on which the informant has put his thumb impression. 3. The prosecution case basically relies upon the dying declaration made by the deceased to implicate the accused, which is exhibited as Ex-Ka15. The contents of the dying declaration are reproduced hereinafter:- 4. The written report is typed on which the informant has put his thumb impression. 3. The prosecution case basically relies upon the dying declaration made by the deceased to implicate the accused, which is exhibited as Ex-Ka15. The contents of the dying declaration are reproduced hereinafter:- 4. The deceased also gave her statement to the I.O. on 8th of March, 2010, which is incidentally the date when the deceased died. There is, however, no recording of the time when such statement was recorded. This statement is on similar lines as that of the dying declaration. Relying upon the dying declaration as well as the statement of witnesses, the prosecution has implicated the accused appellant. 5. It transpires that on 8th of March, 2010, the deceased succumbed to her burn injuries. The inquest was conducted on the same day and in light of the opinion expressed by the inquest witnesses, the body was sent for postmortem. The postmortem report is on record, as per which the deceased was around 25 years of age and she died as a result of septiceamic shock arising out of ante mortem burn injuries. In the opinion of the doctor following injuries were found on the body of the deceased: “Superficial to deep burn all over body except suprapubic area 34 c.m. x 10 c.m. And 14 c.m. x 7 c.m. on xiphisternum area and lower back at the level of lumboscaccral region, a strip 30 c.m. x 2 c.m., would is infected and granulation tissue seen inside superficial to deep sluff present. Both sole and head hair unburned.” 6. The investigation ultimately concluded with submission of a charge-sheet against the accused appellant on 27th of March, 2010. The concerned Magistrate having taken cognizance in the matter committed the case to the Court of Session, where it got registered as Sessions Trial No.597 of 2010 (State Vs. Israr). The concerned Sessions Judge, Meerut framed charges against the accused appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. on 18th of June, 2010. The charges were handed over and explained to the accused appellant in Hindi, who pleaded not guilty and demanded trial. 7. The trial commenced in which following documentary evidences of prosecution have been produced:- "i. F.I.R., Ex.Ka.11, dt. 08.03.2010. ii. Written Report, Ex.Ka.2, dt. 08.03.2010. iii. Statement of Sajjo, Ex.Ka.15, dt. 23.02.2010. iv. Statement of injured Sajjo, Ex.Ka.9. v. Recovery Memo of burnt clothes, Ex.Ka.3, dt. 10.03.2010. vi. 7. The trial commenced in which following documentary evidences of prosecution have been produced:- "i. F.I.R., Ex.Ka.11, dt. 08.03.2010. ii. Written Report, Ex.Ka.2, dt. 08.03.2010. iii. Statement of Sajjo, Ex.Ka.15, dt. 23.02.2010. iv. Statement of injured Sajjo, Ex.Ka.9. v. Recovery Memo of burnt clothes, Ex.Ka.3, dt. 10.03.2010. vi. Bed Head Ticket, Ex.Ka14, dt. 08.03.2010. vii. P.M. Report, Ex.Ka.2, dt. 09.03.2010. viii. Panchayatnama, Ex.Ka.3, dt. 09.03.2010. ix. Charge-sheet, Ex.Ka.13, dt. 27.03.2010. x. Charge framed by Sessions Judge, dt. 18.06.2010. xi. Note framed by A.S.J., dt. 18.06.2010." 8. In addition to the above, the prosecution has produced Dr. J.P. Jain as P.W.-1, who has proved the postmortem report. The postmortem report has been exhibited as Ex.Ka-1. The doctor, however, was not cross-examined. Dr. R.P. Gupta(P.W.-2) was also present at the time of conduct of postmortem and has also proved the postmortem. This witness has also not been cross-examined. P.W.-3 is the informant and witness of the fact, who has proved the written report dated 07.03.2010. In the cross-examination, he has explained the relationship between the parties. According to it the deceased was married to Naeem, who happens to be the son of informant’s real sister, namely, Smt. Mahmooda. He claims that the incident was reported to him on phone by Jameel, who is the brother of Naeem i.e. the husband of the deceased. Jameel had informed about the incident on phone to the son of P.W.-3, whereafter he came to the hospital on the next morning and met his daughter. He claims that his daughter informed him that it was the accused Israr, who had poured kerosene on the deceased and she was done to death. He has admitted that the fact about pouring the kerosene and setting the deceased on fire was brought to his notice on the next date of the incident but he made no efforts to lodge the report. The report was got prepared few days prior to it being filed to the Police. He has also stated that about two years after the marriage of his daughter with Naeem, his daughter was enticed by the accused-Israr, in respect of which he had lodged a report at Police Station-Bhawanpur, District-Meerut and accused was later apprehended. The marriage of the deceased was solemnized about 14 years earlier. The deceased was mother of three children. 9. He has also stated that about two years after the marriage of his daughter with Naeem, his daughter was enticed by the accused-Israr, in respect of which he had lodged a report at Police Station-Bhawanpur, District-Meerut and accused was later apprehended. The marriage of the deceased was solemnized about 14 years earlier. The deceased was mother of three children. 9. P.W.-4 is Smt. Mahmooda, who happens to be the sister of the first informant and is mother of Naeem, with whom the deceased was married. She has stated that her statement was never recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. This witness has been declared hostile. P.W.-5 is Jameel, who happens to be the brother of the husband of the deceased. This witness has also been declared hostile. The witness, however, was examined on the directions of the court in which he has admitted that he has not intimated about the incident to the father of the deceased or his brother. He has denied that he ever made any telephone call to the informant. He has also stated that at the time when the deceased was admitted to the hospital she was not in a position to speak. 10. P.W.-6 Anshu was the witness of recovery of the clothes of the deceased. P.W.-7 Naeem (husband) is also the witness of recovery. P.W.-8 Neeraj Kumar is the inquest witness and has proved the inquest proceedings. P.W.-9 Satyaveer Singh is also a Police personnel, who has conducted the inquest. P.W.-10 Bahadur Singh is the first I.O., who has claimed that the statement of deceased was recorded by him under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He has also proved the site plan, which was prepared on the instructions of the informant. 11. P.W.-11 R.B. Kaul is the second I.O., who has filed charge sheet in the case. P.W.-12 is Dr. Sudheer Rathi, who had treated the injured prior to her death. He has clearly stated that the injured remained under his supervision till she died. In the cross-examination, P.W.-12 has clearly stated that at the time when the injured was brought to the hospital, she was completely burnt and only the smell of burn was available. He has also stated that there was no smell of kerosene present on the injured. He also stated that though the injured was speaking but she could not speak clearly. On making questions, the injured was not able to reply. He has also stated that there was no smell of kerosene present on the injured. He also stated that though the injured was speaking but she could not speak clearly. On making questions, the injured was not able to reply. He has also stated that no Police personnel ever came to him for making any inquiry, etc. The cross-examination of P.W.-12 is relevant for the present purposes and is reproduced hereinafter:- 12. P.W.-13 Praveen Mishra, at the relevant point of time, was posted as Additional City Magistrate-IInd at Meerut. This witness has proved the dying declaration. He has claimed that the dying declaration was recorded by him in his own hand writing. In the cross-examination, however, this witness has stated that he did not remember as to on whose information or instructions he came to the hospital at about 1.20 in the night to record the statement of the injured. He also did not remember the persons who were present along with the injured at the time of recording of the dying declaration. There was no Police Personnel present there. He has, however, stated that a Police personnel had gone with him to the hospital and had identified the injured as Sajjo. P.W.-13, however, did not remember as to who was that Police personnel or what was his rank and he also did not remember that whether he was a Sub-Inspector or a Constable. He stated that the injured was able to speak and he had made inquires from the doctor to certify that she was in a position to make a declaration. He also stated that the doctor had given a certificate for recording of the declaration as per which the patient was fit for making statement. A satisfaction was also recorded by the doctor after the recording of the dying declaration, as per which during recording of the statement the patient remained fit, through out. 13. We have examined the original dying declaration exhibited as Ex.Ka-15 which shows that the certificate of fitness was given by Dr. Rajendra who is shown to be the Casualty Medical Officer. Dr. Rajendra, who has given certificate of fitness, however, has not been produced. 14. The evidence of the prosecution, referred to above, has been confronted to accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The accused has stated that he has not caused any injury to the deceased and has been falsely implicated. Rajendra who is shown to be the Casualty Medical Officer. Dr. Rajendra, who has given certificate of fitness, however, has not been produced. 14. The evidence of the prosecution, referred to above, has been confronted to accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The accused has stated that he has not caused any injury to the deceased and has been falsely implicated. He has also denied all allegations made against him. He also disputed the statement of the injured made before the Chief Medical Officer. In reply to question no.14, the accused has stated that he had given Rs. 15,000/- loan to the husband of the deceased and in lieu thereof certain goods were kept as mortgage which was later taken by Naeem and he had sold it. There were differences between Naeem and his wife (deceased) on account of which the deceased had committed suicide, whereafter Naeem got re-married to the sister of the deceased. The accused also claimed that he has been falsely implicated only in order to save the husband of the deceased. 15. Trial court, however, on the basis of evidence led in the matter has concluded that prosecution has established the guilt of the accused appellant beyond reasonable doubt and has consequently convicted and sentenced accused appellant, as per above. Thus aggrieved the accused appellant is before this Court. 16. Shri N.I. Jafri, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant argues that prosecution evidence is not reliable and the dying declaration cannot be read or relied upon against the accused appellant. Shri Jafri submits that in the event injured had disclosed the family members about the manner in which the incident occurred, there was no reason as to why the husband did not lodge the report immediately or even after some reasonable time. Shri Jafri contends that husband of the deceased has been produced as P.W.-7 but he has not stated a word about the disclosure made to him by the deceased, and his statement is limited to proving the recovery of clothes of deceased. Shri Jafri also contends that dying declaration cannot be relied upon as the doctor who certified the fitness of the deceased has not been produced. It is also submitted that there was no smell of kerosene found on the body of the deceased which demolishes the prosecution case about the accused having poured kerosene and set the deceased on fire. Shri Jafri also contends that dying declaration cannot be relied upon as the doctor who certified the fitness of the deceased has not been produced. It is also submitted that there was no smell of kerosene found on the body of the deceased which demolishes the prosecution case about the accused having poured kerosene and set the deceased on fire. Shri Jafri also argued that the bed head ticket contains name of eight doctors, none of whom has certified the fitness of the injured. It is also submitted that Dr. Rajendra, who has issued the certificate of fitness has not been shown to be a doctor, who ever attended the injured, while she was being treated at the hospital. Various other circumstances are highlighted in order to question the belated lodging of report and it is urged that the accused-appellant has been framed in the matter only in order to save the husband, who apparently was responsible for committing the incident. 17. Per contra, learned A.G.A. states that there was specific motive for the accused to commit the offence inasmuch as he had earlier enticed the deceased in respect of which a report was earlier lodged against the accused-appellant. Learned A.G.A. further submits that the dying declaration as well as statement of injured recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. tallies with the version of P.W.-3, who is the informant and was intimated about the incident by the deceased herself. Learned A.G.A., therefore, submits that it is not a case in which any interference is called for. 18. In reply, learned counsel for the appellant reiterates his submission and argues that no evidence has been led by the prosecution in respect of alleged lodging of previous report against the accused by P.W.-3 and considering the close relationship between the parties and the natural anxiety of P.W.-3 to save Naeem, who later got married to the younger daughter of P.W.-3 the version of P.W.-3 cannot be relied upon as he is a highly interested witness. 19. It is in this backdrop that we are required to consider the submissions urged in support of the appeal by the counsel for the appellant. We have heard Shri Nazrul Islam Jafri, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Sadrul Islam Jafri, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Nitin Agarwal, learned A.G.A. for the State and have perused the materials on record including the trial Court records. We have heard Shri Nazrul Islam Jafri, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Sadrul Islam Jafri, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Nitin Agarwal, learned A.G.A. for the State and have perused the materials on record including the trial Court records. 20. The prosecution case essentially relies upon the dying declaration of the deceased which has already been extracted above. The thrust of prosecution case is that the dying declaration is reliable and that the contents of dying declaration are otherwise supported by the statement of the injured made to the I.O. under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as the statement of P.W.-3. 21. So far as the statement of the deceased made to I.O. under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is concerned, we find that the contents of such statement although are got exhibited as Ex.Ka-9, which are similar in content to the dying declaration, but there is no material on record to show as to at what time her statement was recorded. 22. Admittedly, the statement of the deceased was recorded on the very same date, when she died. It, therefore, becomes relevant to ascertain as to at what time the statement of the deceased was recorded, particularly, when she died on the very same date, when her statement was recorded. We find substance in the submission of Sri Jafri that the statement of the deceased under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is not reliable for the simple reason that P.W.-3, in his statement has clearly admitted that two days prior to her death the deceased had stopped talking, eating etc. 23. The statement of P.W.-3 has been perused by us in which he has clearly stated that two days prior to her death his daughter Sajjo had stopped speaking and had also stopped eating, etc. If that was so, it would not be safe to rely upon the statement of the deceased recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., particularly, when the exact time of recording of such statement is not mentioned. It is otherwise undisputed that her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded on the very same day, when she died. In such circumstances, we do not find the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to be reliable. 24. It is otherwise undisputed that her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded on the very same day, when she died. In such circumstances, we do not find the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to be reliable. 24. The statement made by P.W.-3 with regard to the deceased having told him about the incident in which the accused appellant poured kerosene on her, and set her ablaze is a statement made by P.W.-3 for the first time before the court. There is nothing on record to show that such a statement was made by P.W.-3 in his statement to the Police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The fact that previous statement of P.W.-3 made to the I.O. does not mention about the disclosure made to him, by the deceased, regarding incident, raises doubt upon the version of P.W.-3, particularly, when we find that he had not lodged any report immediately after the incident. We find it difficult to visualize that a father even after he is informed by his daughter of the incident in which the accused set her on fire, would not lodge a report for 15 days. In such circumstances, the statement made by P.W.-3 that he was informed about the incident by the deceased also loses its sheen. 25. This takes us to the dying declaration recorded by the P.W.-13 at about 1:40 a.m. on the very same night after the incident occurred. The contents of the dying declaration have already been extracted above. The dying declaration contains an endorsement by the Casualty Medical Officer of the Hospital, according to which the injured was fit for making the statement. An endorsement has also made at the foot of the dying declaration stating that patient Sajjo was fit throughout the making of her statement to give her statement. This endorsement on the dying declaration apparently is made by one Dr. Rajendra, who admittedly has not been produced. The bed head ticket which containing the clinical history of the patient contains names of eight doctors, who had attended to the patient while she remained admitted in the hospital. These doctors, namely, are Dr. Shalu, Dr. Mukesh, Dr. Rishi, Dr. Jitendra, Dr. Atul, Dr. Praveen and Dr. Manideep. Dr. Rajendra, however is not shown to be a doctor, who had ever treated the deceased. These doctors, namely, are Dr. Shalu, Dr. Mukesh, Dr. Rishi, Dr. Jitendra, Dr. Atul, Dr. Praveen and Dr. Manideep. Dr. Rajendra, however is not shown to be a doctor, who had ever treated the deceased. The certificate by the doctor moreover contains no satisfaction recorded about the patient being mentally alert or fit to make a conscious statement. In the absence of production of doctor in evidence, we are not inclined to place much reliance on the certificate of fitness particularly when we find that the treating doctor i.e. Dr. Sudheer Rathi, has specifically stated that the patient was not able to speak clearly and on making questions, she was not responding. Once the treating doctor asserts that the patient was not in a position to speak and none of the other treating doctors have been produced in evidence, it would be difficult for the Court to rely upon the certificate issued by a doctor, who had not been treating the patient or had not attended her. There are other reasons also for us to doubt the dying declaration. 26. The dying declaration has been recorded almost at about 1.30 in the night. The Magistrate, who has recorded the dying declaration has not been able to explain as to how he gathered the information about the fact that the injured was admitted to the hospital particularly when no first information report was lodged in the matter, by then. The F.I.R. admittedly is lodged after the death of deceased. 27. Curiously, no first information report was lodged by the Police even after such statement of the injured was recorded. It is not clear as to where this declaration was kept particularly when the Police had not registered any first information report nor any G.D. entry, etc., has been produced of the concerned Police Station with regard to any information having been received by the Police of admission of the patient in the Hospital. In the event, dying declaration of the victim was recorded, it was expected that this declaration would be kept in safe custody. There is nothing on record to show as to who was in possession of this statement (the dying declaration) from the date of its making i.e. 23rd of February, 2010 till the lodging of the report in the matter on 8th of March, 2010. There is nothing on record to show as to who was in possession of this statement (the dying declaration) from the date of its making i.e. 23rd of February, 2010 till the lodging of the report in the matter on 8th of March, 2010. The treating doctor, moreover, has categorically stated that his statement was never recorded by any Police personnel. Once that be so, it would be difficult to rely upon the dying declaration when the chain of custody of the dying declaration itself is not established by the prosecution for almost 15 days. P.W.-13 has otherwise not been able to explain as to how he came to know about the admission of the victim at the hospital or who was the Police personnel who had even identified the patient as Sajjo. In the context of the above discussion, we find ourselves not in agreement with the view expressed by the trial Judge in holding that the dying declaration is entirely reliable. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Irfan alias Naka Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1060, wherein the Court has made following observations: “60. Since time immemorial, despite a general consensus of presuming that the dying declaration is true, they have not been stricto-sensu accepted, rather the general course of action has been that judge decides whether the essentials of a dying declaration are met and if it can be admissible, once done, it is upon the duty of the court to see the extent to which the dying declaration is entitled to credit. 61. In India too, a similar pattern is followed, where the Courts are first required to satisfy themselves that the dying declaration in question is reliable and truthful before placing any reliance upon it. Thus, dying declaration while carrying a presumption of being true must be wholly reliable and inspire confidence. Where there is any suspicion over the veracity of the same or the evidence on record shows that the dying declaration is not true it will only be considered as a piece of evidence but cannot be the basis for conviction alone. 62. Thus, dying declaration while carrying a presumption of being true must be wholly reliable and inspire confidence. Where there is any suspicion over the veracity of the same or the evidence on record shows that the dying declaration is not true it will only be considered as a piece of evidence but cannot be the basis for conviction alone. 62. There is no hard and fast rule for determining when a dying declaration should be accepted; the duty of the Court is to decide this question in the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case and be fully convinced of the truthfulness of the same. Certain factors below reproduced can be considered to determine the same, however, they will only affect the weight of the dying declaration and not its admissibility: - (i) Whether the person making the statement was in expectation of death? (ii) Whether the dying declaration was made at the earliest opportunity? “Rule of First Opportunity” (iii) Whether there is any reasonable suspicion to believe the dying declaration was put in the mouth of the dying person? (iv) Whether the dying declaration was a product of prompting, tutoring or leading at the instance of police or any interested party? (v) Whether the statement was not recorded properly? (vi) Whether, the dying declarant had opportunity to clearly observe the incident? (vii) Whether, the dying declaration has been consistent throughout? (viii) Whether, the dying declaration in itself is a manifestation / fiction of the dying person’s imagination of what he thinks transpired? (ix) Whether, the dying declaration was itself voluntary? (x) In case of multiple dying declarations, whether, the first one inspires truth and consistent with the other dying declaration? (xi) Whether, as per the injuries, it would have been impossible for the deceased to make a dying declaration? 63. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the charge against the accused beyond the reasonable doubt. The benefit of doubt must always go in favour of the accused. It is true that dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind. It is just not enough for the court to say that the dying declaration is reliable as the accused is named in the dying declaration as the assailant. 64. It is just not enough for the court to say that the dying declaration is reliable as the accused is named in the dying declaration as the assailant. 64. It is unsafe to record the conviction on the basis of a dying declaration alone in the cases where suspicion, like the case on hand is raised, as regards the correctness of the dying declaration. In such cases, the Court may have to look for some corroborative evidence by treating the dying declaration only as a piece of evidence. The evidence and material available on record must be properly weighed in each case to arrive at an appropriate conclusion. The reason why we say so is that in the case on hand, although the appellant-convict has been named in the two dying declarations as a person who set the room on fire yet the surrounding circumstances render such statement of the declarants very doubtful. ” 28. In the facts of the case, we have our doubts as to whether the deceased was in a fit mental state to have made a statement or the dying declaration had been voluntarily made and recorded and that it was kept in safe custody so that it could be relied upon as a substantive piece of evidence. The dying declaration, therefore, cannot be accepted as being entirely reliable. 29. We also find some substance in the argument of Shri Jafri, learned Senior Counsel, that the contents of the dying declaration are recorded with the intent to protect the husband and other in-laws of the deceased and to ensure that no possible action be initiated against them. 30. The motive for the offence, as per the prosecution, is that the accused appellant wanted to marry the deceased and since she got married to Naeem, as such the incident was caused by the accused appellant. It is further submitted that earlier also the deceased was enticed by the accused appellant in respect of which a Police report was lodged and the accused was apprehended. Though, it was specifically asserted by P.W.-3 but there is no evidence led by the prosecution in that regard. No details with regard to such previous incident or lodging of the report has been brought on record. It is otherwise admitted that the deceased was married to Naeem about 11 years prior to the incident. Though, it was specifically asserted by P.W.-3 but there is no evidence led by the prosecution in that regard. No details with regard to such previous incident or lodging of the report has been brought on record. It is otherwise admitted that the deceased was married to Naeem about 11 years prior to the incident. Three children were born out of the wedlock of the deceased and Naeem. It would not be natural to expect a person to commit such an incident after 11 years of the marriage to the lady to whom he wanted to marry, and the version that accused stated that, if the deceased is not married to him he would not allow her to marry someone else, to be logical or natural after 11 years of marriage. 31. One of the reason for us to doubt the prosecution case is the act of informant in not lodging a report in the matter for almost 15 days. Even if the husband was busy attending to his injured wife, it was at least expected that a report would be lodged in the matter by the husband with some reasonable delay, after he came to know that his wife has been set ablaze by the accused appellant. The fact that husband did nothing for almost 15 days raises a question on his conduct and the fact that husband has otherwise not deposed even during trial about the incident raises further doubt on his conduct. The father of the deceased also did not lodge any report for almost two weeks. The possibility of the entire written report having been lodged based on deliberation and consultation cannot be ruled out. It is in this context that we find some substance in the statement of the accused appellant recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he has stated that the informant has married his younger daughter to Naeem after the death of the deceased. The possibility of family members having connived to save Naeem also cannot be treated to be a figment of imagination. The possibility of family members having connived to save Naeem also cannot be treated to be a figment of imagination. In the light of the fact that conduct of the husband is unnatural and specific motive is otherwise attributed by the accused appellant, it would have been appropriate for the court of Session to examine with greater care and caution the defence of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. We also find substance in the argument of Shri Jafri that the specific contents of the dying declaration were otherwise not confronted to the accused for recording his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It is by now well settled that recording of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality and the version of accused is entitled to due examination in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The above view have been followed in the recent judgment of this Court in Shahrukh Khan and another Vs. State of U.P. (Criminal Appeal No.6151 of 2022) Neutral Citation No.-2024:AHC:152205-DB. 32. The recent judgments of the Supreme Court in Nababuddin alias Mallu alias Abhimanyu Vs. State of Haryana 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1534 and in Criminal Appeal No. 1471 of 2023 (arising out of SLP (Crl) No.11256 of 2018) Raj Kumar @ Suman Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) dated 11th of May, 2023 clearly comes to the aid of the accused appellant. The fact that contents of the dying declaration have not been specifically put to the accused and his defence has not been carefully examined clearly amounts to prejudice being caused to the accused appellant in the matter. 33. Having given our careful consideration to the entire facts and circumstances brought on record, we find that the trial court was not justified in relying upon the dying declaration to convict the accused appellant or to sentence him in the above matter. For the detailed reasons and deliberations made above, we reverse the finding of the Sessions Judge contained in his judgment and order dated 23.04.2019 that prosecution has succeeded in establishing its case beyond reasonable doubts. In our assessment, on the basis of evidence led before us by the prosecution in the matter the accused appellant-Israr is clearly entitled to get the benefit of doubt. Consequently, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. In our assessment, on the basis of evidence led before us by the prosecution in the matter the accused appellant-Israr is clearly entitled to get the benefit of doubt. Consequently, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order dated 23.04.2019, passed by the Sessions Judge, Meerut in Sessions Trial No.597 of 2010 (State Vs. Israr), arising out of Case Crime No.83 of 2010, under Section 302 IPC, Police Station–Bhawanpur, District–Meerut of the accused appellant is hereby set aside. 34. The accused-appellant, namely, Israr would be released, forthwith, unless he is wanted in any other case, subject to compliance of Section 437-A Cr.P.C.