JUDGMENT : M. K. Thakker, J. 1. This petition is filed under Articles 14 and 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Nadiad in Reference (IT) No.37 of 2023 dated 29.03.2024 whereby the Reference was filed by the respondent herein was allowed and the punishment, which was enhanced by the reviewing authority of stoppage of one year increment without future effect came to be set aside. 2. It is the case of the present petitioner that the respondent was serving as a conductor in the petitioner corporation and when he was on duty on 15.08.2021 on rout of Kapadvanj to Surat, at that point of time, he did not issue the ticket of one passenger, who was traveling from Nadiad to Vadodara and not collected the fare. The chargesheet was served to him and the departmental inquiry was initiated wherein the punishment of deduction of Rs.100 from his salary was imposed by the disciplinary authority on 28.08.2021. Feeling punishment is inadequeate, suo motu review was initiated thereby the punishment was enhanced for stoppage of one increment without future effect on 31.12.2021. Against the aforesaid enhancement of punishment, appeal was preferred before the learned appellate authority and learned appellate authority has confirmed the order passed by reviewing authority against which Reference was preferred being Reference I.T. No.37 of 2023 which was awarded in favour of the respondent and the same is subject matter of challenge before this Court. 3. Heard the learned advocate Ms.Sejal Mandavia for the petitioner. 4. Learned advocate Ms.Sejal Mandavia submits that there are past records of the respondents having seven similar types of misconduct and he is habitual for this type of misconduct therefore, reviewing authority has enhanced the punishment of stoppage of one increment without future effect. Learned advocate Ms.Sejal Mandavia submits that without assigning the reasons with regard to the disproportionate or shocking punishment, the learned labour Court has awarded the Reference in favour of the respondent. Learned advocate Ms.Sejal Mandavia submits that as the fare was not collected from one passenger, grave misconduct was committed, and thereafter, the reviewing authority has enhanced the punishment of stoppage of one increment only without future effect. Learned advocate Ms.Sejal Mandavia submits that as the fare was not collected from one passenger, grave misconduct was committed, and thereafter, the reviewing authority has enhanced the punishment of stoppage of one increment only without future effect. Learned advocate Ms.Sejal Mandavia submits that the reviewing authority has issued the show cause notice, however, the respondent did not appear before the reviewing authority, thereafter, reviewing authority has enhanced the punishment recording his absence. Learned advocate Ms.Sejal Mandavia submits that without any cogent reasons assigned, learned labour Court has set aside the punishment of stoppage of one increment without future effect and therefore, this petition is required to be allowed. 5. Considering the submissions made by the Learned advocate Ms.Sejal Mandavia as well as perusing the reasons assigned by the learned labour Court it transpires from the record that, route of the bus where the present respondent was serving as a conductor was from Kapadvanj to Surat on 15.01.2021. There were 64 passengers, who were travelling in the bus and bus was overloaded. As per the submissions of the respondent, one passenger has informed that he is having the pass to travel from Kapadvanj to Surat and he did not procure the ticket from the respondent. The Checking Officer had checked the tickets of the passengers and it was found that the said passenger has not shown any pass. The Checking Officer had collected the fare of Rs.61 as well as the penalty of Rs.500 from the said passenger and without recording any statement to the effect that why the tickets were not procured, the passenger was permitted to go from the bus. Considering this explanation, the disciplinary authority has imposed the punishment of deduction of Rs.100 from his salary, which was reviewed by the authority by initiating the suo motu proceedings. 6. It transpires from the record that disciplinary authority had not recorded the statement of the passenger, who travelled without ticket. As out of 65 passengers only one passenger was found to have travelled without ticket and more particularly in the fact on the background that the bus was overloaded. It cannot be said that there was a bad intention on the part of workman to miss appropriate the fund of corporation. The public exchequer had not caused any loss because of the aforesaid incident as subsequently the fare was recovered along with the penalty of Rs.500/-. It cannot be said that there was a bad intention on the part of workman to miss appropriate the fund of corporation. The public exchequer had not caused any loss because of the aforesaid incident as subsequently the fare was recovered along with the penalty of Rs.500/-. It appears that the disciplinary authority, after considering the above defence, has imposed minor punishment of deduction of Rs.100 from the salary. However, without disturbing the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or without differing the opinion of the disciplinary authority, the punishment was enhanced by initiating suo moto proceedings. 7. This Court has perused the order passed by the reviewing authority, wherein no any reasons assigned for enhancement of the punishment, only it is stated that punishment is disproportionate and the same was enhanced. According to the opinion of this Court, powers of review cannot be exercised in mechanical manner. The reviewing authority without considering the evidence of the workman and without referring with the findings given by the disciplinary authority replaced the order by enhancing the order of punishment. No justification was given by the reviewing authority for enhancement of the punishment and therefore, learned Industrial Tribunal was right in holding that enhancement of punishment by reviewing authority is without any cogent reason. 8. At this stage, this Court would refer the decision rendered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. MAGANBHAI L. MAKWANA, reported in 2008 4 GLR 3219 , wherein this Court has held as under: “10. In this petition, the review authority has not followed legal procedure and differ finding has not been given to the workman and no reasoning has been given by the reviewing authority that on what basis punishment imposed by the competent authority is found to be inadequate or insufficient. 11. In this petition, the review authority has not followed legal procedure and differ finding has not been given to the workman and no reasoning has been given by the reviewing authority that on what basis punishment imposed by the competent authority is found to be inadequate or insufficient. 11. In case of Babban Ram v. UCO Bank & Ors., reported in 2005 (2) CLR 449 (Cal.), it has been observed by the Calcutta High Court in the Head Note-I as under : "I. Disciplinary Proceedings : Petitioner employee exonerated in the enquiry of charges against him - Reviewing authority suo motu issued show-cause notice - Then passed order of penalty, lowering basic pay of petitioner by two stages for two years, with no increments during that period - Impugned order of penalty challenged - Held that infringement of fundamental principles of natural justice impermissible - State action or executive action - No discrimination for want of fair-play - Bias - Not to prevail after any decision - Reviewing authority virtually exercised powers of appellate authority - Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 14, 16, 21 and 226." 12. Thereafter, in Paras 16 and 23 of the same decision, it has been observed by the Calcutta High Court as under: "16. If I am right in my finding already recorded, then, I must accept the contention of Counsel for the petitioner that the power was wrongly exercised by the second respondent. From the provisions of Amended Regulation 18, it is clear that he could impose the penalty only if new material or evidence, which would not be produced by the bank previously, were produced before him. Admittedly, this is not the basis on which he proceeded. He proceeded on the basis that on the evidence on record the decision of the disciplinary authority was wrong; virtually he exercised the power of the appellate authority. 17 to 22. xxx xxx xxx 23. That was a case regarding charge-sheet and I am inclined to agree with Counsel for the respondents that will not be an authority for deciding the issue raised in this case. Here the notice was issued by the reviewing authority after forming the tentative opinion that the petitioner should be punished. So, he was necessarily required to say what penalty he proposed to impose; I would say that the action rather showed his open mindedness. Here the notice was issued by the reviewing authority after forming the tentative opinion that the petitioner should be punished. So, he was necessarily required to say what penalty he proposed to impose; I would say that the action rather showed his open mindedness. However, nothing turns on this point, since I have already found that the impugned order cannot be sustained." 13. In case of Ranjit Singh v. Union of India reported in 2006 AIR SCW 2177, it has been observed by the Apex Court in Head Note- A and Paras 20, 21 and 22 as under : “20. In Punjab National Bank and Others v. Kunj Behari Misra [ (1998) 7 SCC 84 ], this Court has clearly held that the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with by the Disciplinary Authority in the event he intends to differ with the findings of the Enquiry Officer observing: "The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer." 21.The said decision has been followed by this Court in State Bank of India and Others v. K.P. Narayanan Kutty [(2003) 2 SCC 447], wherein it was clearly held that in such an event the prejudice doctrine would not be applicable stating: "6. In para 19 of the judgment in Punjab National Bank case extracted above, when it is clearly stated that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2) [Rule 50(3) (ii) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules, is identical in terms applicable to the present case] and the delinquent officer will have to be given an opportunity to persue the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer, we find it difficult to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that unless it is shown that some prejudice was caused to the respondent, the order of dismissal could not be set aside by the High Court." 22.In view of the aforementioned decisions of this Court, it is now well settled that the principles of natural justice were required to be complied with by the Disciplinary Authority. He was also required to apply his mind to the materials on record. The Enquiry Officer arrived at findings which were in favour of the Appellant. Such findings were required to be over turned by the Disciplinary Authority. It is in that view of the matter, the power sought to be exercised by the Disciplinary Authority, although not as that of an appellate authority, but akin thereto. The inquiry report was in favour of the Appellant but the Disciplinary Authority proposed to differ with such conclusions and, thus, apart from complying with the principles of natural justice it was obligatory on his part, in absence of any show cause filed by the Appellant, to analyse the materials on records afresh. It was all the more necessary because even the CBI, after a thorough investigation in the matter, did not find any case against the Appellant and thus, filed a closure report. It is, therefore, not a case where the Appellant was exonerated by a criminal court after a full fledged trial by giving benefit of doubt. It was also not a case where the Appellant could be held guilty in the disciplinary proceedings applying the standard of proof as preponderance of the probability as contrasted with the standard of proof in a criminal trial, i.e., proof beyond all reasonable doubt. When a final form was filed in favour of the Appellant, the CBI even did not find a prima facie case against him. When a final form was filed in favour of the Appellant, the CBI even did not find a prima facie case against him. The Disciplinary Authority in the aforementioned peculiar situation was obligated to apply his mind on the materials brought on record by the parties in the light of the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer. He should not have relied only on the reasons disclosed by him in his show cause notice which, it will bear repetition to state, was only tentative in nature. As the Appellate Authority in arriving at his finding, laid emphasis on the fact that the Appellant has not filed any objection to the show cause notice; ordinarily, this Court would not have exercised its power of judicial review in such a matter, but the case in hands appears to be an exceptional one as the Appellant was exonerated by the Inquiry Officer. He filed a show cause but, albeit after some time the said cause was available with the Disciplinary Authority before he issued the order of dismissal. Even if he had prepared the order of dismissal, he could have considered the show cause as it did not leave his office by then. The expression "communication" in respect of an order of dismissal or removal from service would mean that the same is served upon the delinquent officer. [See State of Punjab vs. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 ]” 14.In the matter of S. Goparam v. Inspector General Central Industrial Security Force, South West Sector Mumbai and others reported in 2006 4 MLJ 274 , Division Bench of Madras High Court observed as under in para: “10. Coming to the second contention, we have already extracted the conclusion of the Disciplinary Authority holding that the only charge levelled against the petitioner has not been proved, in such circumstances, we are of the view that there is no question of imposing punishment either leniently or moderately. Even if the second respondent or any other authority having jurisdiction wants to impose a higher punishment before setting at motion any of their proceedings in that regard, the petitioner must be afforded an opportunity with reference to the same by way of show cause notice. Even if the second respondent or any other authority having jurisdiction wants to impose a higher punishment before setting at motion any of their proceedings in that regard, the petitioner must be afforded an opportunity with reference to the same by way of show cause notice. Here in the show cause notice issued by the second respondent, the only reason made (that is available at page 59 of the typed set) is that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary authority is lenient and is not commensurate to the gravity of the offence committed by the petitioner. The same proceeds as if the Disciplinary Authority has accepted the finding of the Enquiry Officer, took a lenient view and imposed a lesser punishment. In the absence of any reason based on which the second respondent differed from the decision of the Disciplinary Authority, the show cause notice, dated 14.3.2001, which speaks only about 'lesser punishment' cannot be held to be a valid notice in the eye of law. As rightly pointed out, the second respondent failed to appreciate that the finding was in favour of the petitioner and the charge was not proved and that punishment cannot be enhanced merely because the charge is serious. Punishment can only be imposed on the basis of the material evidence in support of the charge and inasmuch as the finding of the Disciplinary Authority clearly states that the charge is not proved, we are of the view that enhancement of the punishment by the second respondent cannot be accepted. IN view of the above infirmities, in the order of the second respondent, the subsequent order of the first respondent, proposing to enhance the punishment to that of dismissal from service, cannot be sustained.” 15.In case of Lav Nigam v. Chairman & MD ITI Ltd. And another reported in 2006 SCC L/S 1835, the apex court has observed as under in para 10,11 and 12: “10. The conclusion of the High Court was contrary to the consistent view taken by this court that in case the disciplinary authority differs with the view taken by the inquiry officer, he is bound to give a notice setting out his tentative conclusions to the appellant. It is only after hearing the appellant that the disciplinary authority would at all arrive at a final finding of guilt. It is only after hearing the appellant that the disciplinary authority would at all arrive at a final finding of guilt. Thereafter, the employee would again have to be served with a notice relating to the punishment proposed. 11. In Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra [ (1998) 7 SCC 84 : 1998 SCC (L&S)1783], a bench of this court considered Regulation 7(2) of the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977. The Regulation itself did not provide for the giving of any notice before the disciplinary authority differed with the view of the enquiry officer. This Court held; (SCC p.97,para 19) “The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry officer on any article of charge, then, before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its finding will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charge framed against the officer.” 12.This view has been reiterated in Yoginath D.Bagde v. State of Maharashtra[ (1999) 7 SCC 739 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1385]. In this case also, Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 did not specifically provide for a disciplinary authority to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer before differing with the view of the enquiry officer. The court said; (SCC p. 758 para 29). In this case also, Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 did not specifically provide for a disciplinary authority to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer before differing with the view of the enquiry officer. The court said; (SCC p. 758 para 29). “But the requirement of 'hearing' in consonance with the principles of natural justice even at that stage has to be read into Rule 9(2) and it has to be held that before the disciplinary authority finally disagrees with the findings of the enquiring authority, it would give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer so that he may have the opportunity to indicate that the findings recorded by the enquiring authority do not suffer from any error and that there was no occasion to take a different view. The disciplinary authority at the same time has to communicate to the delinquent officer the 'TENTATIVE' reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry authority so that the delinquent officer may further indicate that the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority proposes to disagree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority are not germane and the finding of 'not guilty' already recorded by the enquiring authority was not liable to be interfered with.” 16. In case of Mathura Prasad v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2006 AIR SCW 6277, the Apex Court observed as under in Paras 17, 18 and 19 : “17.The Inquiry Officer in his first report might not have specifically recorded his findings with reference to each of the charges levelled against Appellant but he arrived at a finding on analysis of the materials on record. If he was to differ with the said findings on the basis of any fresh materials, he was enjoined with a duty to grant another opportunity of hearing to Appellant. 18. Even if the Inquiry Officer had, in his first report, proceeded on surmises and conjectures as was observed by the High Court, the disciplinary authority could disagree with the said finding but it was, therefor, required to record its reasons. No reason was recorded. Sub-Rules (2) and (3) of Rule 10 aim at achieving the same purpose. 18. Even if the Inquiry Officer had, in his first report, proceeded on surmises and conjectures as was observed by the High Court, the disciplinary authority could disagree with the said finding but it was, therefor, required to record its reasons. No reason was recorded. Sub-Rules (2) and (3) of Rule 10 aim at achieving the same purpose. If sufficient materials are not available on record, a direction for holding a further inquiry may be issued in terms of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 so as to enable the department to lead further evidence before him. For the said purpose also, reasons are required to be recorded by the disciplinary authority. An opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer is required to be given. However, in the event, the disciplinary authority comes to the conclusion that the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer on the basis of materials placed by the parties are incorrect, he may disagree with the said findings but even, therefor, he is required to record reasons in support thereof. The requirement of sub-Rule (2) or sub-Rule (3) having not been complied with, the Inquiry Officer could not have arrived at a different finding. The High Court unfortunately did not consider this aspect of the matter. 19. When an employee, by reason of an alleged act of misconduct, is sought to be deprived of his livelihood, the procedures laid down under sub-Rules are required to be strictly followed. It is now well settled that a judicial review would lie even if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If statutory authority uses its power in a manner not provided for in the statute or passes an order without application of mind, judicial review would be maintainable. Even an error of fact for sufficient reasons may attract the principles of judicial review.” 17. In case of Suresh C. Shah v. Food Corporation of India, & Anr. Reported in 2007 I CLR page 880, it has been observed by this Court as under in para 14: “14. Reading the above Regulation, it is very clear that powers of review are only with the Corporation, and not with the disciplinary authority. In case of Suresh C. Shah v. Food Corporation of India, & Anr. Reported in 2007 I CLR page 880, it has been observed by this Court as under in para 14: “14. Reading the above Regulation, it is very clear that powers of review are only with the Corporation, and not with the disciplinary authority. Even clause (c) provides that reviewing authority can remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper. Under the proviso to the said Regulation it is also provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by the reviewing authority unless the employee concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed. The said Regulation also provides that no proceeding for review shall be commenced until after the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal or disposal of the appeal where such appeal has been preferred, meaning thereby that when the appeal is pending, even the Corporation also cannot review the original order, and it is also clear from the said Regulation that review is to be dealt with in the same manner as if it were an appeal under these regulations. Reading the aforesaid Regulation, it is even otherwise clear that even the reviewing authority which has the power to review cannot review the order when an appeal is pending and even the reviewing authority which is empowered to review cannot enhance the penalty without giving reasonable opportunity. In the circumstances even if the Corporation itself has passed an order enhancing penalty, that order would be also bad if the same was passed without giving reasonable opportunity to the delinquent / employee concerned and even that could not have been done when an appeal was pending. As against that, in the instant case, in a proceedings initiated for imposing minor penalty, the very same authority, which was disciplinary authority, has reviewed its own order and awarded a major penalty during the pendency of the appeal and that too without giving any notice or opportunity to the delinquent employee. As against that, in the instant case, in a proceedings initiated for imposing minor penalty, the very same authority, which was disciplinary authority, has reviewed its own order and awarded a major penalty during the pendency of the appeal and that too without giving any notice or opportunity to the delinquent employee. In that view of the matter, the only conclusion which can be reached is that the order of the disciplinary authority enhancing the penalty is passed without any authority of law, and contrary to the Regulations, and, therefore, the same is not sustainable.” 9. Considering the above decisions and the overall circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the learned Industrial Tribunal has rightly allowed the Reference filed by the respondent by setting aside the order of enhancement of punishment passed by the reviewing authority. Therefore, no error has committed by the learned Industrial Tribunal requiring interference of the Court under the writ jurisdiction. 10. Resultantly, this petition stands dismissed accordingly. The impugned award passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Nadiad in Reference (IT) No.37 of 2023 dated 29.03.2024 is hereby confirmed.