JUDGMENT : Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J. 1. This judgment will dispose of the present writ petition and connected Writ-A No.16279 of 2019. 2. The present writ petition is directed against an order dated 29.11.2013 passed by the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Allahabad (now Prayagraj), insofar as it cancels the petitioner's regularization in service as a Lecturer (English) with the Hindu Inter College, Chandpur, District Bijnor. The said order, to the extent it relates to the petitioner, will hereinafter be referred to as 'the impugned order'. The petitioner also seeks consequential reliefs in the nature of directions to the respondents, to which allusion would be made in the course of this judgment. 3. Pending this writ petition, an interim order was granted on 12.02.2014, suspending the operation of the impugned order, and further, directing the respondents not to interfere with the services of the petitioner as the Officiating Principal of the institution last mentioned. And, pending this petition, while functioning as the Officiating Principal of the institution, known as the Hindu Inter College, Chandpur, District Bijnor (for short, 'the Institution'). The petitioner retired from service on 31.03.2019 upon attaining the age of superannuation. The petitioner's claim for payment of his post retiral benefits, including pension, was returned by the Regional Deputy Director of Education (Secondary) vide order dated 25.03.2019, without sanctioning the same, carrying a remark that under Rule 13 of the relevant pension rules, the pensioner must have retired from a substantive and permanent post, whereas the petitioner here was functioning under an interim order of this Court passed in Writ-A No.70175 of 2013, regarding which effective steps need be taken to get the stay order vacated. 4. The relief claimed in Writ-A No.16279 of 2019, which is directed against the order of the Regional Deputy Director of Education (Secondary), 12th Region, Moradabad, is, therefore, dependent upon the outcome of Writ-A No.70175 of 2013. It is for this reason that Writ-A No.16279 of 2019 was connected with Writ-A No.70175 of 2013 vide order dated 14.11.2019, passed in the former writ petition and both were heard together, treating Writ-A No.70175 of 2013 as the leading case. 5. This Court proposes to notice the facts from the leading case. The Institution is a recognized and aided intermediate college, governed by the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. 5. This Court proposes to notice the facts from the leading case. The Institution is a recognized and aided intermediate college, governed by the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Appointments of teachers to the Institution are governed by the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education (Services Selection Boards) Act, 1982 (for short, 'the Act of 1982'). The Institution is in receipt of a maintenance grant from the Exchequer with salaries to its teachers and other employees being paid under and regulated by U.P. Act No.24 of 1971. The petitioner was selected and granted ad hoc appointment as a Lecturer (English) by the Committee of Management in the exercise of their powers under Section 18 of the Act of 1982, as then in force, vide appointment order dated 03.12.1983. The petitioner joined the Institution pursuant to the appointment order. The petitioner's ad hoc appointment was approved by the District Inspector of Schools, Bijnor (for short, 'the DIOS') vide order dated 01.12.1983. Admittedly, approval was granted by the DIOS limited in time until 30.06.1984. The petitioner says that there was no justification for this temporal limitation. The approval order was subsequently modified by the DIOS vide order dated 13.06.1984, which said that the approval stood extended till a candidate recommended by the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board (for short, 'the Board'), joins the post. 6. The petitioner further says that while he was working as an ad hoc Lecturer, by an order dated 19.10.1985, recommendation was made for appointment of one Mahipal Singh on the post which the petitioner held ad hoc from amongst the reserve pool of teachers by the DIOS. The petitioner challenged the order dated 19.10.1985 passed by the DIOS, favouring Mahipal Singh with the Committee of Management of the Institution joining the said writ petition as the first petitioner. The number of the aforesaid writ petition, wherein a Division Bench of this Court passed an interim order dated 05.11.1985, staying the operation of the order dated 19.10.1985 aforesaid, is not available, owing to the practice of the day, where fresh petitions were moved in Court and numbered much later. In compliance with the said interim order dated 05.11.1985, the petitioner continued to function as an ad hoc Lecturer. In compliance with the said interim order dated 05.11.1985, the petitioner continued to function as an ad hoc Lecturer. Next, an objection was taken that the approval of the petitioner's appointment as an ad hoc Lecturer stood lapsed on 30.06.1986, resulting in the petitioner being denied payment of his salary. This compelled the petitioner to move another writ petition in the year 1986, which too came up before a Division Bench of the Court, where their Lordships passed an interim order on 21.10.1986, on an unnumbered writ petition, directing that until further orders or the recommendation made by the Commission for appointment on permanent basis, whichever be earlier, the petitioner shall continue as a Lecturer and paid his salary. 7. The next event is of decisive importance. The DIOS by an order dated 15.07.1993, on the recommendation of the Management of the Institution, regularized the services of the petitioner as a Lecturer, placing him on a year's probation w.e.f. 06.04.1991. The petitioner says that this order was passed by the DIOS in accordance with Section 33-A of the Act of 1982. Since, the petitioner had now acquired a regular appointment, which became permanent in due course, he prayed that the two writ petitions, where he had been granted interim orders dated 5. 11.1985 and 21.10.1986, be dismissed as not pressed. Accordingly, the two writ petitions, which by now had come to be numbered as Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.17128 of 1985 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.18078 of 1986, were ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn by two orders of the same date, to wit, 18.09.1996. By an order of 17.01.1997, the petitioner was sanctioned Selection Grade. And, by a much later order of 3.03.2008, he was also granted the promotion pay scale. 8. The post of Principal of the Institution was vacant and against the vacancy, one Dinesh Chand Gaur was functioning as the Officiating Principal until 30.06.2011. On the said date, Gaur retired upon attaining the age of superannuation, necessitating the appointment of another Officiating Principal. The petitioner, being the senior most Lecturer, was appointed as the Officiating Principal and he assumed that charge on 01.07.2011. The petitioner claims that he has been officiating eversince. The post of Lecturer (Commerce) with the Institution was held by one Deepak Kumar Garg. Garg was initially appointed also on ad hoc basis, and, subsequently, regularized w.e.f. 06.08.1993. The petitioner, being the senior most Lecturer, was appointed as the Officiating Principal and he assumed that charge on 01.07.2011. The petitioner claims that he has been officiating eversince. The post of Lecturer (Commerce) with the Institution was held by one Deepak Kumar Garg. Garg was initially appointed also on ad hoc basis, and, subsequently, regularized w.e.f. 06.08.1993. The petitioner's services were regularized w.e.f. 06.04.1991, rendering him senior to Garg. A seniority list was drawn up by the Management of the Institution in the year 1996-97, relating to Lecturers, where the petitioner was placed at Sr. No.8, followed by Ravindra Kumar Sharma and then by Garg, in that order. The said seniority was objected to by Garg before the Management. Garg's objection was rejected by the Management by their order dated 21.12.2001. Garg appealed this order to the Regional Joint Director of Education, Moradabad Region, Moradabad. His appeal too was rejected by the Joint Director of Education by an order dated 01.03.2005. These orders are on record. Garg challenged the orders adversely determining his seniority, vis-a-vis the petitioner, before this Court by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.34347 of 2005, arraying the Committee of Management, the State Education Authorities and the petitioner, as party-respondents. The said writ petition, according to the petitioner, is still pending without an interim order ever being passed by this Court in Garg's favour. As the record of the last mentioned writ petition would show, Garg's petition was dismissed on 10.05.2019 as no one appeared on his behalf to press it, considering it as infructuous. 9. While seniority was still in issue inter se the petitioner and Garg, he complained against the petitioner to the DIOS in the year 2011. Acting on Garg's complaint, the DIOS directed an inquiry in the matter of validity of the petitioner's appointment to be held by the Finance and Accounts Officer. The Finance and Accounts Officer issued a notice dated 09.06.2011 to the Institution with a copy to the petitioner, besides one each to Ravindra Kumar Sharma and Garg, calling each of them to appear before him on 13.06.2011. Garg's complaints dated 12.05.2010 and 11.06.2010, that are on record, are essentially about securing his seniority above the petitioner, but to that end, he assailed the validity of the petitioner's appointment and regularization in service. Garg's complaints dated 12.05.2010 and 11.06.2010, that are on record, are essentially about securing his seniority above the petitioner, but to that end, he assailed the validity of the petitioner's appointment and regularization in service. There is also on record a communication from the Joint Director of Education dated 10.05.2011, addressed to the DIOS, objecting to the petitioner's regularization in service, on grounds indicated in that memo. The Finance and Accounts Officer submitted an inquiry report to the Joint Director of Education, who in turn by a letter dated 05.07.2012, addressed to the Additional Director of Education (Secondary), forwarded the inquiry report. The Additional Director of Education (Secondary), acting on behalf of the Director of Education (Secondary), issued a notice to the petitioner, calling upon him to appear on 07.01.2013 for hearing. The notice indicates that the objection against the petitioner's appointment was that he had been appointed against a vacancy reserved for the Scheduled Castes. The petitioner says that on 07.01.2013, no hearing took place though he was present, and instead, the hearing was adjourned to 04.02.2013. On 04.02.2013, the petitioner filed a detailed reply. On 29.11.2013, the Director of Education (Secondary) passed the order impugned, cancelling the petitioner's regularization in service made vide order dated 15.07.1993. 10. Aggrieved by the said order, the leading writ petition was instituted by the petitioner on 17.12.2013. Apart from a prayer to quash the order impugned, it was also prayed that a direction be issued, restraining the respondents from taking adverse action. On the foot of the impugned order, a further mandamus was prayed, restraining the respondents from interfering with the petitioner working as the Officiating Principal of the Institution and directing them to pay his monthly salary regularly. 11. When this petition came up for admission on 12.02.2014, this Court passed the following order: “The petitioner by this writ petition is challenging the order dated 29.11.2013, whereby the selection of the petitioner and subsequent regularisation order dated 15.7.1993 have been held to be illegal and have been cancelled. I have heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Sunil Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri B.P. Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent no.7 and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents no.1 to 5. I have heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Sunil Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri B.P. Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent no.7 and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents no.1 to 5. The contention of Sri Khare is that the petitioner has been working since 3.12.1983 and his services have also been regularised on 15.7.1993 but by the impugned order, it has been held that the petitioner was not elible for appointment and a further direction has been given to recover the salary of the petitioner. Issue notice to the respondent no.6. All the respondents may file counter affidavit within four weeks. Considering overall aspect of the matter, prima facie, in my opinion, the case of grant of interim relief is made out. Till the next date of listing the impugned order dated 29.11.2013 insofar as it relates to the petitioner shall remain stayed. It is further directed that the respondents shall not interfere with the services of the petitioner on the post of officiating Principal in the Inter College, Chandpur, District-Bijnor.” 12. A counter affidavit on behalf of respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 was filed on 21.10.2016, to which the petitioner filed a rejoinder. A counter was separately filed on behalf of respondent No.7, to 8 wit, Deepak Kumar Garg, also along with a stay vacation application, to which the petitioner has filed a rejoinder. 13. In the connected matter, a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, to which the petitioner has filed a rejoinder. 14. Heard Mr. Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Sunil Kumar Srivastava, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Monika Arya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 5. Though the name of Mr. B.P. Yadav and Mr. Prabhakar Awasthi, Advocates is printed, yet no one appears on behalf of respondent Nos.6 and 7. 15. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the first finding, on the foot of which the Director of Education has concluded against the petitioner is that he was appointed on 03.12.1982 up to 30.06.1984 and the substantive post, that was vacant, had been notified to the Commission, in consequence whereof the Commission had recommended Mahipal Singh and that the DIOS vide his memo dated 7. 11.1985 had directed the Management of the Institution to appoint him as a Lecturer (English). For one, the finding, that the petitioner had been appointed as an ad hoc Lecturer until 30.06.1984, suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record, inasmuch as the order dated 03.12.1982, appointing him as an ad hoc until 30.06.1984, was modified by the DIOS by his order dated 13.06.1984, providing a term to the petitioner until a regularly selected candidate from the Commission joined the post. Again, the finding, that Mahipal Singh was selected by the Commission and directed to be appointed by the DIOS vide his memo dated 07.11.1985, also suffers from an error apparent, because a perusal of a copy of the memo dated 19.10.1985, that is on record, shows that the DIOS addressed the said memo to the Principal of the Institution, clearly saying that Mahipal Singh be appointed to the substantive post of the Lecturer (English) available with the Institution as he was a reserve pool teacher. Mahipal Singh was apparently never recommended by the Commission. 16. The petitioner challenged the order dated 19.10.1985 by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.17128 of 1985, where a stay order, suspending the operation of the order dated 19.10.1985, directing appointment of Mahipal Singh from the reserve pool, was stayed by a Division Bench of this Court. There is absolutely nothing about Mahipal Singh being recommended by the Commission and not being appointed. No material has been placed before the Court to show that in fact the post of Lecturer (English) was a post reserved for the Scheduled Castes. A copy of the requisition sent to the Commission/ Board under the Act of 1982, or a record from the Commission/ Board, would have proved the fact for the respondents, but in the order impugned, there is not even a mention of the date of the requisition, about which it is said that the requisition mentioned a post reserved for Scheduled Castes with the Institution in the subject of English to be filled up by a candidate recommended by the Commission. An averment in the writ petition or a plea by the petitioner, when he challenged the reserve pool teacher's appointment against the post of the Lecturer (English) with the Institution, would not make it a post reserved for the Scheduled Castes. An averment in the writ petition or a plea by the petitioner, when he challenged the reserve pool teacher's appointment against the post of the Lecturer (English) with the Institution, would not make it a post reserved for the Scheduled Castes. The plea may work as an estoppel to shut the petitioner's mouth, if the issue arose for determination in contemporary time, when matters were still alive. The impugned order was passed 20 years after the petitioner's regularization in service when permitting an estoppel to be pleaded against the petitioner, would be most inequitable. There is no other firm evidence to show that indeed the post was a reserved one. 17. Again, it may be noticed that to limit the petitioner's appointment up to 30.06.1984, which on facts stands dispelled looking to the modification of his own order by the DIOS vide order dated 13.06.1984, would in any case be contrary to the law laid down by a Bench decision of this Court in Murli Prasad and another v. State of UP. and others, 1986 UPLBEC 274 . In Murli Prasad (supra), it has held: “4. …. It appears that when the legislature had enacted Section 18 of the Act it was not anticipated that the process of selection would be unduly delayed and would not be concluded even upto 30th June followed the date of such ad hoc appointments. However, as it is frequently happening the commission is unable to complete the selection or recommend a candidate for substantive appointment against the post held by the ad hoc appointee even after 30th June following the date of ad-hoc appointment. In some cases, we have noticed that 30th June following the date of ad hoc appointment has intervened more than once as a regular candidate was not selected for upto nearly two years or so. In all such cases the District Inspector of Schools stops paying salary to teachers on the ground that the ad-hoc appointment does not survive after 30th June following the date of appointment relying on clause (c) of Section 18 (3). In Committee of Management of Sanatan Dharam Intermediate College, Daulatpur. District Mainpuri versus District Inspector of Schools, Mainpuri and another, reported in 1985 U. P. Local Bodies and educational Cases 496, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the legal implications of such a situation. In Committee of Management of Sanatan Dharam Intermediate College, Daulatpur. District Mainpuri versus District Inspector of Schools, Mainpuri and another, reported in 1985 U. P. Local Bodies and educational Cases 496, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the legal implications of such a situation. It observed that the legislature could not have intended that the management should respect the exercise of making an ad hoc appointment of a teacher under Section 18 on the expiry of 30th June following the date of such ad hoc appointment even though the Commission has not recommended the same of any candidate for substantive appointment. We also think that if the services of a teacher validly appointed under Section 18 have not been terminated after such ad hoc appointment or if the Commission has not recommended the name of any candidate for substantive appointment the initial appointment made by the management with the approval of the District Inspector of Schools under Section 18 should be deemed to have been renewed by the management upon the expiry of 30th June following the date of appointment on each occasion. We are clearly of the opinion the legislature cannot have intended that the same exercise as was involved in the initial ad hoc appointment under Section 18 should be repeated on the expiry of 30th June following the date of appointment. The District Inspector of Schools will, therefore, not be justified in stopping payment of salary to a teacher validly appointed under Section 18 merely because of the fact that 30th June following the date of appointment has elapsed even though the Commission may not have, in the meantime recommended the candidate for appointment to the post held by the ad hoc appointee. This is the only way in which sub-section (3) of Section 18 can be reasonably construed and the various clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (3), reconciled. Any other construction would clearly lead to wholly unnecessary harassment to the teachers validly appointed under Section 18 of the Act.” 18. Again, the finding in the impugned order that the appointment was contrary to the Directorate of Education (Secondary)’s Circular dated 26.04.1991 is utterly flawed, because this is not a case where the petitioner by any means was appointed dehors the rules and continued only on the basis of an interim order granted by this Court. Again, the finding in the impugned order that the appointment was contrary to the Directorate of Education (Secondary)’s Circular dated 26.04.1991 is utterly flawed, because this is not a case where the petitioner by any means was appointed dehors the rules and continued only on the basis of an interim order granted by this Court. Instead, it is apparent that the petitioner was appointed in accordance with Section 18 of the Act of 1982, as these provisions then stood, because a duly selected candidate by the Commission/ Board was not sent within the prescribed time. The petitioner's appointment was regularized by the DIOS after a recommendation by the Management in accordance with Section 33-A of the Act of 1982. Therefore, the findings that the petitioner withdrew the writ petitions, taking advantage of the interim order, is besides the point. The petitioner's services were apparently regularized under Section 33-A of the Act of 1982 and his ad hoc appointment is traceable to Section 18. The two interim orders, that were granted by this Court in the writ petitions, that were subsequently withdrawn, protected him from emergent displacement in the first case when a reserve pool teacher was sought to be appointed by the Management, acting upon a direction by the DIOS under Section 21-B of the Act of 1982, and, in the other, when the respondents attempted to throw out the petitioner from service by a manifestly illegal construction of his tenure of ad hoc appointment as one limited to 30.06.1986. It has been shown that the petitioner could not be removed till a regularly selected candidate by the Board or the Commission joined in view of the law laid down in Murli Prasad. These threats to the petitioner's ad hoc appointment disappeared when the ad hoc appointment became a permanent one owing to regularization under Section 33-A of the Act of 1982 vide order dated 15.07.1993 passed by the DIOS. Therefore, there is nothing blameworthy about the petitioner withdrawing the two writ petitions, that were filed in the context of an ad hoc tenure after it matured into a regular one. The petitioner was permitted to continue from 15.07.1993 until time when the impugned order was passed on 29.11.2013, a period of 20 years, during which he earned his selection grade and promotion pay scale. He also became the Officiating Principal. The petitioner was permitted to continue from 15.07.1993 until time when the impugned order was passed on 29.11.2013, a period of 20 years, during which he earned his selection grade and promotion pay scale. He also became the Officiating Principal. The petitioner has put in a total 30 years service taking into account the 10 years rendered prior to regularization since the year 1983. To exercise powers at this distance of time by the Director of Education and cancel the petitioner's regularization, would indeed be unsettling affairs that have gone past the stage of being unsettled at all. Even if by some remote logic it were held that the petitioner's regularization was questionable under Section 33-A of the Act of 1982, the invocation of power to rectify the error after a lapse of 30 years since the petitioner's initial appointment and 20 years after regularization, renders exercise of the power unreasonable. After all such an administrative power is required to be exercised within a reasonable period of time and not after a delay so long that human affairs fundamentally change. 19. This Court takes note of the fact that the petitioner has retired from service, serving until the last as the Officiating Principal of the Institution, assuming that he served until his retirement on 31.03.2019 with the aid of the interim order dated 12.02.2014 passed in the present writ petition, there was delay enough on the respondents' part by the time the impugned order was passed to forbid them from raising issues that they have done to disentitle the petitioner and denounce his appointment as invalid fundamentally. The petitioner's ad hoc appointment followed by a regularization is in no way void apparently, so as to confer no right upon the petitioner at all. To the contrary, it is an appointment made under Section 18 of the of the Act of 1982 on an ad hoc basis way back in the year 1983, when the statute permitted it, followed by regularization under Section 33-A vide order dated 15.07.1993 w.e.f. 6.04.1991. 20. In the circumstances, we are of clear opinion that the petitioner's appointment and services cannot now be disowned by the respondents, who must acknowledge it all and pay the petitioner his post retiral benefits, including pension, gratuity and other similar benefits unlawfully withheld, citing the pendency of the leading petition, being decided by this judgment. 21. 20. In the circumstances, we are of clear opinion that the petitioner's appointment and services cannot now be disowned by the respondents, who must acknowledge it all and pay the petitioner his post retiral benefits, including pension, gratuity and other similar benefits unlawfully withheld, citing the pendency of the leading petition, being decided by this judgment. 21. In the result, both the petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned order dated 29.11.2013 passed by the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Prayagraj is hereby quashed. A mandamus is issued to the respondents to treat the petitioner in lawful service until the date of his retirement and pay him all his post retiral benefits, including his pension and gratuity in the same manner as any other teachers similarly circumstanced, retiring from lawful service of the Institution, serving on a sanctioned post, funded by the State. This mandamus shall be carried into execution by the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Prayagraj, the Regional Deputy Director of Education (Secondary), 12th Region, Moradabad, the DIOS and the Finance and Accounts Officer in the office of the DIOS, amongst themselves. 22. Let a copy of this judgment be communicated to the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Prayagraj, the Regional Deputy Director of Education (Secondary), 12th Region, Moradabad, the District Inspector of Schools, Bijnor and the Finance and Accounts Officer in the office of the District Inspector of Schools, Bijnor by the Registrar (Compliance). 23. There shall be no order as to costs.