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2024 DIGILAW 2206 (GUJ)

State Of Gujarat v. Mangabhai Manabhai Bharthari

2024-12-16

HEMANT M.PRACHCHHAK

body2024
JUDGMENT : 1. Present appeal is filed by the appellant – State of Gujarat under Section 378(1)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the impugned judgment and order dated 18.12.2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.5, Palanpur (hereinafter be referred to as “the trial Court”) in Special Case No. 167 of 2007 whereby, the trial Court has acquitted the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504, 506(2) and 325 etc. of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC” for short) read with Section 135 of Bombay Police Act and Sections 3(1), (5) (10) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter be referred to as the “Atrocities Act”). 2. Brief facts of the present case, in nutshell, are as under:- 2.1 The complainant Chamanbhai Bhagvanbhai Parmar registered FIR being I-C.R.No.93/1997 with Chhapi Police Station, at Palanpur, Dist: Banaskantha against the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 325, 504 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1), (5) (10) of the Atrocity Act, mentioning that the complainant is having land admeasuring 4 acres and 9 gunthas and is having land bearing Survey No.27 situated in the sim of Nagpura Village, which has been purchased by sale deed dated 23.10.1996 from Bharthari Mana Shiva, resident of Nagpuravala and since then, complainant is possessing the said land. 2.2 In that year, the said land was given to his nephew of Rajput Javanji Ramaji on crops share basis. Therefore, they cultivated castor and vetch in the monsoon season and they are served some, land for farming of mustard. On 19.10.1997, the complainant and his nephew Sanjaykumar Naranbhai, Sabatkhan Imamkhan and Javanji Ramaji Rajput went to their said field for farming of mustard and for watering of mustard and they saw caster and Bhadred near the well. 2.3 At that time, at about 11:00 hours, Bharthri Mana Shiva of village Nagpura by possessing a stick, Chaman Mana, Dalpat Mana and Jayanti Mana, Gangarana by possessing a stick and Madar Mana by possessing iron pipe came from slope side and they gave filthy abuses to them. 2.3 At that time, at about 11:00 hours, Bharthri Mana Shiva of village Nagpura by possessing a stick, Chaman Mana, Dalpat Mana and Jayanti Mana, Gangarana by possessing a stick and Madar Mana by possessing iron pipe came from slope side and they gave filthy abuses to them. Suddenly, they got provoked and Bharthari Mana Shiva inflicted a stick blow on back of the complainant and Chaman Mana inflicted a stick blow on near the right ear of the complainant and Dalpat Mana inflicted blow on right wrist of the complainant. On hearing that shout his nephew Sanjaykumar and other persons intervened and saved the complainant and Madar Mana inflicted iron pipe blow on wristleft of his nephew Sanjaykumar. Second time, inflicted iron pipe blow on left bavla of his nephew Sanjaykumar and Manga Mana inflicted a stick blow on knee of Sanjay and at the same time, Jayanti Mana inflicted a stick blow on left hand of Sanjay and after shouting, they went with their weapons by giving flighty abuses and threatened to them. Therefore, the complainant registered a complaint against the accused persons. 2.4 After completion of investigation the police has filed chargesheet before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Palanpur for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504, 506(2) and 325 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1),(5)(10) of the Atrocity Act, 1989. Then after, the matter was committed to the Hon'ble Sessions Court and case was registered as Special Case No. 167/2007. 2.5. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. The prosecution, therefore, led evidence. The prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses and also produced documentary evidence. At the conclusion of the trial, and after hearing both the sides the Additional Sessions Judge and Fast Track Court No.5, Palanpur has passed an order dated 18.12.2007 in Special Case No. 167/2007, acquitting all the accused from the charges of offences against the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504, 506(2) and 325 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1), (5) (10) of the Atrocity Act, 1989. 2.6 Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of acquittal the appellant – State of Gujarat has preferred this Appeal. 3. At this juncture it is noted herein that before the trial commenced original accused nos. 2.6 Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of acquittal the appellant – State of Gujarat has preferred this Appeal. 3. At this juncture it is noted herein that before the trial commenced original accused nos. 1 and 2 passed away therefore, trial was abated qua original accused Nos. 1 and 2. Further, during pendency of present Appeal, based upon the report of the Talati-cum-Mantri, which was produced by learned APP Ms. Shah, stating that original accused No.4 Jayantibhai Manabhai Bharthari – present respondent No. 2 passed away and therefore, vide order dated 19.4.2023 present appeal was abated qua the said respondent as well. So now present appeal survives only for present respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4. 4. Heard Yuvraj Brahmbhatt learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant – State of Gujarat and Mr. Harshal S. Patel, learned counsel on behalf of Mr. Tushar M. Chaudhary, learned Counsel for the respondent - accused at length. 5. Mr. Brahmbhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant – State of Gujarat, while referring to the entire oral as well as documentary evidence, has assailed the impugned judgment and order and has submitted that the trial Court has not taken into consideration the evidence connecting the accused to the alleged offence in its proper perspective. He has submitted that the trial Court ought to have believed that the prosecution has been able to prove the charges levelled against the accused. While referring to the evidence of the witnesses and the material collected against the accused, Mr. Brahmbhatt learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the prosecution has established the case against the accused by examining the witnesses who have supported the case of the prosecution, however, the trial Court has discarded and disbelieved the evidence of the witnesses and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption. 5.1 Mr. Brahmbhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant – State of Gujarat, has submitted that witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and the medical certificate and medical evidence have also supported the case of the prosecution and police witnesses have also supported the case of the prosecution, however the trial Court has completely overlooked oral as well as the documentary evidence and also the evidence of the Investigating Officer while passing the impugned judgment and order. He has submitted that the injured Sanjay Parmar has received a serious injury and having a fracture on his hand the same was corroborated with the evidence of the concerned doctor, however, trial Court has not considered this aspect and has committed serious error of law and on facts. He has also further submitted that the trial Court has ignored the fact that there was an ongoing dispute between the parties and civil as well as criminal proceedings were pending between the parties however, the trial Court has not considered the facts of the present case while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. He has also contended that so far as the offence under Sections 3(1),(5)(10) of the Atrocity Act is concerned, the trial Court has not even discussed at all the evidence or allegation with regard to the said offence. 5.2 According to his submission, the trial Court ought to have convicted the accused and ought to have imposed necessary sentence. He has prayed to allow the present appeal and to quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 6. As against that Mr. Harshal S. Patel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. Tushar Chaudhary, learned Counsel for the respondents accused has submitted that the prosecution measurably failed to establish the charges levelled against present respondents and therefore, trial court has not committed an error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, mainly on the ground that the genesis of the incident was suppressed by the prosecution. He has submitted that neither original informant - complainant was examined by the prosecution nor independent witnesses were examined by the prosecution. He has submitted that the panch witnesses have not also supported and they have declared hostile and even from their cross examinations the prosecution has not culled out any details with regard to the incident. He has submitted that the first doctor who has examined the injured, first in point of time, at chhapi has stated in the evidence that he has examined the injured at 6.00 O’clock at chhapi P.H.C. and has given a preliminary treatment and then he has referred Sanjay Parmar for further treatment at civil hospital, Palanpur, particularity in the orthopedic department. He has submitted that in turn the doctor of Palanpur civil hospital has deposed before the Court that with refer chit and with police yadi, the injured Sanjaybhai Parmar had come to the Palanpur Civil Hospital at 4.00 p.m. and he had examined the Sanjaybhai Parmar. He has submitted that there was material variance which goes to rout of the case and therefore, under such circumstances narrated herein above, he urges that the trial Court has not committed any error while passing impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 6.1 Mr. Harshal S. Patel, learned counsel for the respondents has further contended that in fact though the land was already sold to the present accused, however, they were forcefully entered in to the agriculture land, which is in possession of the original accused and for that four day’s prior to date of incident, also one another complaint was registered by the Chamanbhai Bhagvanbhai Parmar. He has also submitted that before the concerned Civil Court a civil Suit is also pending by and between the parties with regard to cancellation of the sale deed executed by the informant in favour of present respondents and under such circumstances, the trial Court has after appreciating the evidence of all the concerned witnesses has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of present respondents, which is in consonance with the settled legal principal and just and proper. 6.2 In view of the above submissions, learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the impugned judgment and order of trial Court is in consonance with the settled legal principle and the same may be confirmed and present appeal filed against the acquittal of the respondents accused may be dismissed. 7. This Court has perused the judgment and order of acquittal rendered by the trial Court and carefully considered the rival contentions, evidence and material placed on record. 8. It appears from the record that on 19.10.1997 as per the case of the prosecution, P.W. 6 Jawanuj Ramaji Rajput Exh.32 has deposed that he was cultivating the land on behalf of the complainant and therefore, he went to the agriculture field and at that time Sanjay Narandas Parmar and Sabatkhan Imamkhan also accompanied to him. 8. It appears from the record that on 19.10.1997 as per the case of the prosecution, P.W. 6 Jawanuj Ramaji Rajput Exh.32 has deposed that he was cultivating the land on behalf of the complainant and therefore, he went to the agriculture field and at that time Sanjay Narandas Parmar and Sabatkhan Imamkhan also accompanied to him. When they reached to the agriculture filed to see the agriculture crop, at that time, six accused persons in connivance with each other joined an unlawful assembly and have tried to raise quarrel and in the spur of that moment, all the accused persons have used their weapons and caused the injuries to the informant Chamanbhai Bhagvanbhai Parmar and his nephew Sanjaybhai Parmar. How and in what manner the accused have assaulted also mentioned. In the same breath, in cross examination, P.W. 6 Jawanuj Ramaji Rajput Exh.32 has stated that he was not aware that whether this land was sold to the present respondents accused by the informant. He has stated that for the same, the co-sharer of the said agriculture land namely the sons of Chamanbhai Bhagvanbhai Parmar have raised objection and therefore, a civil suit for cancellation of the said sale deed executed by Chamanbhai Bhagvanbhai Parmar in favour of present respondents was under challenge. He has also admitted that prior to the date of incident, before four day’s also one another FIR was registered by the Chamanbhai Bhagvanbhai Parmar wherein he was witness to the incident. Even, in the said sale deed also he was one of the witnesses to the sale transaction. So meaning thereby he was aware that the subject parcel of land was already sold by Chamanbhai Bhagvanbhai Parmar to the present respondents, however he has stated incorrect facts in his chief examination. 9. So the said witness being P.W. 6 Jawanuj Ramaji Rajput Exh.32 has no regard to the truth and he has stated incorrect story before the Court and therefore, while appreciating the evidence of this witness, the trial Court has rightly discarded and dislodged the evidence of the prosecution. 10. Even in the same manner, the doctor of the Palanpur Hospital P.W. 8 - Dr. Babulal Kantilal Solanki Exh. 35 has deposed before the Court in his chiefexamination that he was treating the injured viz. 10. Even in the same manner, the doctor of the Palanpur Hospital P.W. 8 - Dr. Babulal Kantilal Solanki Exh. 35 has deposed before the Court in his chiefexamination that he was treating the injured viz. Sanjaybhai Parmar on reference by the P.H.C. Chhapi and with the refer note, the injured Sanjaybhai was referred to the Civil Hospital, Palanpur on 28.10.1997 i.e. on next day and at 4.00 p.m. on next day, he has examined the Sanjaybhai, wherein he has found one fracture injury received on the hand of the injured Sanjaybhai Parmar. In fact, the very doctor who has recorded the said fact while recording history, has mentioned that the assault caused by “Bharthari” but not mentioned the full name of "Bharthari" because all the six accused are Bharthari. In fact, at the first instance, the injured before the First doctor at P.H.C. Chhapi, had not stated anything with regard to the name of the assailants and it was merely stated before the doctor that he was assaulted. 11. However, while referring the injured Sanjaybhai Parmar to the Palanpur Civil Hospital, the Civil Hospital in turns recorded that history of assaulted at 10.30 a.m. by Bharthari. In fact, in that history, the doctor has not stated that yesterday i.e. on 19.10.1997 the assault was made and he was examined the injured on the next day. 12. So all these details create serious doubts of the veracity in the depositions of both the doctors and therefore, under such circumstances, the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal while appreciating the evidence produced by the prosecution in a nature which does not inspire any confidence. 13. It is also relevant to note herein that the manner in which the incident explained by the informant and the injured Sanjaybhai Parmar Ex.33, P.W. 6-Javanji Ramaji Rajput being an interested person and P.W. 9-Sabatkhan Imamkhan at Exh.39, their depositions do not inspire any confidence and therefore, under such circumstances the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 14. 14. In fact, P.W.9 - Sabatkhan Imammkhan was tried to corroborate the case of the prosecution neither he is resident of village Pilucha nor he is having any agriculture land in village Pilucha and he is resident of village Bokhala however, how he has reached to village Pilucha and for what reason he accompanied to the injured, the said fact does not inspire any confidence and therefore, trial Court has rightly discarded and dislodged the evidence of P.W.9. Except these two independent witnesses, no other independent witnesses have been examined by the prosecution. Under such circumstances, the prosecution measurably failed to produce any cogent and reliable evidence before the Trial Court and thus, in my opinion, under the circumstances, narrated herein above, present appeal is devoid of any merits and the same deserve to be set dismissed. 15. It is also relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shajan Skaria Vs. State of Kerala reported in AIR 2024 SC 4557 for the purpose of considering the provision of Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocity Act. The relevant paragraph of this decision are as under:- “56. It is relevant to note that Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is similarly worded as the erstwhile Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 which was in force prior to its substitution with effect from 26.01.2016. 58. We say so for the reason that all insults or intimidations to a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe will not amount to an offence under the Act, 1989 unless such insult or intimidation is on the ground that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. There is nothing in the transcript of the uploaded video to indicate even prime facie that those allegations were made by the appellant only on account of the fact that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste. From the nature of the allegations made by the appellant, it appears that he is at inimical terms with the complainant. His intention may be to malign or defame him but not on the ground or for the reason that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste. 59. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hitesh Verma (supra). The relevant observations are reproduced below: “13. His intention may be to malign or defame him but not on the ground or for the reason that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste. 59. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hitesh Verma (supra). The relevant observations are reproduced below: “13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste. xxx xxx xxx 17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of M.P. [Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104], this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under: “15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under: “15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar” Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” 18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1) (r) of the Act is not made out.” (Emphasis supplied) 60. Thus, the dictum as laid aforesaid is that the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established merely on the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member for the reason that he belongs to such community. In other words, it is not the purport of the Act, 1989 that every act of intentional insult or intimidation meted by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because it is committed against a person who happens to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the person who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. We say so because the object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted towards persons belonging to the SC/ ST communities for the reason of their caste status. a. Meaning of the expression “intent to humiliate” appearing in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 61. The words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in the text of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to the caste identity of the person who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Not every intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation. It is only in those cases where the intentional insult or intimidation takes place either due to the prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce the historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the “upper castes” over the “lower castes/untouchables”, the notions of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of the type envisaged by the Act, 1989. 62. We would like to refer to the observations of this Court in Ram Krishna Balothia (supra) to further elaborate upon the idea of “humiliation” as it has been used under the Act, 1989. It was observed in the said case that the offences enumerated under the Act, 1989 belong to a separate category as they arise from the practice of ‘untouchability’ and thus the Parliament was competent to enact special laws treating such offences and offenders as belonging to a separate category. Referring to the Statements of Objects and Purposes of the Act, 1989 it was observed by this Court that the object behind the introduction of the Act, 1989 was to afford statutory protection to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, who were terrorised and subjected to humiliation and indignations upon assertion of their civil rights and resistance to the practice of untouchability. For this reason, mere fact that the person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would not attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) unless it was the intention of the accused to subject the concerned person to caste-based humiliation. 70. In our considered view, it is in a similar vein that the term ‘humiliation’ as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members. 73. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya (supra) explained that for an act of intentional insult to attract the offence under erstwhile section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 (which is identical to Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989) it was necessary that the insult is laced with casteist remarks. Relevant observations is extracted hereinbelow: “18. […] The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. […]” 16. In view of the above, the allegation made by the prosecution that the accused persons have intentionally humiliate and insulted the informant by his community does not inspire any confidence because from the oral evidence of the relevant wittiness, nothing come on record to establish that the accused have insulted and humiliate the informant by his community and caste. 17. In view of the above, the allegation made by the prosecution that the accused persons have intentionally humiliate and insulted the informant by his community does not inspire any confidence because from the oral evidence of the relevant wittiness, nothing come on record to establish that the accused have insulted and humiliate the informant by his community and caste. 17. Therefore, the story put forward by the prosecution was rightly disbelieved by the trial Court and after examining oral as well as documentary evidence and going through the evidence of the witnesses, the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case and perusing the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, it transpires that the trial Court has not committed any error of facts and law in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 18. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 19. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 20. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraph Nos. 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court. 21. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:- “20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka, regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: “42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. The principles read thus: “42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.” 22. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record. 23. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them. Even on reappreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 24. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.