JUDGMENT : Kshitij Shailendra, J. 1. The appeal is listed for admission under Order 41 Rule 11 C.P.C. 2. Heard Sri M.D. Singh Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri Vaibhav Goswami, for the appellant and Sri Bhanu Bhushan Jauhari, learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The instant second appeal arises out of adjudication of an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC filed by the appellant, that has been rejected by the Executing Court against which a regular civil appeal was filed, which has also been dismissed. CONTENTION OF APPELLANT 4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that an Original Suit No. 323 of 1977 was filed by the respondent against one Prem Chandra claiming a decree for ejectment on the plea of tenancy of the defendant. The said suit was decreed by the trial court and Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1986 arising therefrom was dismissed. The defendant-Prem Chandra filed Second Appeal No.444 of 1996 which is pending before this Court. In so far as the present appellant is concerned, he was plaintiff no.2 in another Original Suit No.216 of 1996 (Nattho Devi and another Vs. Dr. Aditya Kumar Sharma) that was instituted claiming a decree for injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in possession of the plaintiffs and from dispossessing them except in accordance with law. The trial court dismissed the said suit, however, Civil Appeal No.104 of 2000 was allowed and, consequently, the suit was decreed. Second Appeal No.891 of 2002 filed by the defendant-Dr. Aditya Kumar Sharma has recently been dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 09.09.2024 and, therefore, according to Sri Shekhar, the decree has attained finality and, hence, the respondent cannot dispossess the appellant except in accordance with law. 5. As regards the judgments and decrees impugned in the instant second appeal, it is contended by Sri Shekhar that the same have been passed in execution proceedings arising out of a decree drawn against his real brother Prem Chandra in Original Suit No.323 of 1977 in which the appellant was not a party and, hence, he cannot be dispossessed from the property, particularly when he has his own independent decree against the respondent, as drawn in Original Suit No. 216 of 1996. It is further contended that when the first appellate court, at an earlier point of time, dismissed the Civil Appeal No.130 of 2013 against the order dated 06.07.2013 by which the application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC had been rejected by the executing court, the appellant filed Second Appeal No.88 of 2014 before this Court which was allowed by order dated 06.02.2014 and it was held that the appellant having raised an independent right in the property, rejection of his objections under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC on the ground of rejection of objections filed by the judgment debtor under Section 47 CPC, was unjustified. Further submission is that the title of respondent having been dislodged in separate proceedings arising from Original Suit No.309 of 1998, he otherwise cannot dispossess the appellant. Sri Shekhar also referred to the written statement filed by the respondent in Original Suit No.216 of 1996 where he did not recognize the appellant herein as tenant in the property but asserted tenancy rights only in Prem Chandra. The submission, therefore, is that the respondent being bound by his admission, he cannot dispossess the appellant in a proceeding launched against the tenant Prem Chandra and, hence, the impugned judgments and decrees are unsustainable. 6. In support of his submissions on the point that a person, may be a trespasser, cannot be dispossessed except through due process of law, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon following authorities:- (i) Atma Prakash Vs. Raghubir Prasad Goel: 1996 (1) JCLR 622 All); and (ii) Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs., Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao: AIR 1989 SC 2097 . CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT 7. Per contra, Sri Bhanu Bhushan Jauhari, learned counsel for the respondent submits that, admittedly, one Jethwa was tenant in the property and after his death, he was succeeded by his wife Nattho Devi and two sons, namely, Surendra Kumar (present appellant) and Prem Chandra (judgment debtor in Original Suit No.323 of 1977). As regards the decree drawn in Original Suit No. 216 of 1996, it is contended that the said suit was dismissed and while allowing the civil appeal filed by the appellant, the first appellate court recorded a finding that after the death of Jethwa, plaintiffs, i.e. Nattho Devi and Surendra Kumar, had succeeded joint tenancy rights alongwith Prem Chandra. As regards the decree drawn in Original Suit No. 216 of 1996, it is contended that the said suit was dismissed and while allowing the civil appeal filed by the appellant, the first appellate court recorded a finding that after the death of Jethwa, plaintiffs, i.e. Nattho Devi and Surendra Kumar, had succeeded joint tenancy rights alongwith Prem Chandra. The submission is that though Second Appeal No.891 of 2002 filed by the respondent against the said decree has been withdrawn on 09.09.2024, the first appellate court’s judgment has attained finality and, therefore, finding on joint tenancy rights has become final inter se parties to this appeal also. He further submits that both the courts below have rightly held that since execution proceedings arising out of decree drawn in Original Suit No.323 of 1977 are the proceedings in accordance with law, the same would remain maintainable against the appellant, despite a decree existing in his favour arising out of proceedings of Original Suit No. 216 of 1996. Further submission is that once tenancy rights have jointly devolved upon all the legal heirs of Jethwa, irrespective of any contrary admission made in the written statement in Original Suit No. 216 of 1996, finality attached to such devolution of joint tenancy rights under the judgment dated 22.04.2002 passed in Civil Appeal No.104 of 2000 arising out of Original Suit No. 216 of 1996, would render every contention of any party as without any force and, consequently, both the courts below have rightly adjudicated the claim under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon following authorities:- (i) Mohd. Ikrail and 2 others Vs. Naushaba A. Sabri and 7 others: 2016 (3) ARC 489 ; (ii) S. Rajeswari Vs. S.N. Kulasekaran and others: (2006) 4 SCC 412 ; (iii) Ashok Chintaman Juker and others Vs. Kishore Pandurang Mantri and another: (2001) 5 SCC 1 . ANALYSIS OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, first of all, the Court deems it appropriate to refer the provisions of Order 21 Rules 97, 98, 101 and 103 CPC, which are reproduced as under:- “97. Kishore Pandurang Mantri and another: (2001) 5 SCC 1 . ANALYSIS OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, first of all, the Court deems it appropriate to refer the provisions of Order 21 Rules 97, 98, 101 and 103 CPC, which are reproduced as under:- “97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property.- (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. 98. Orders after adjudication.- (1) Upon the determination of the questions referred to in rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such determination and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2),- (a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application; or (b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. (2) Where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment-debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days. 101. 101. Question to be determined.- All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. 103. Orders to be treated as decrees.- Where any application has been adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or Rule 100 the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree.” 9. In paragraph no.11 of the judgment in S. Rajeswari (supra), the Supreme Court observed as under:- “11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that in a case of this nature, Respondent 1 ought to have filed an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 21 Rule 97 clearly provides that where execution of decree is resisted or obstructed by any person, the decree holder may make an application to the court complaining of such resistance or obstruction, whereupon the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with provisions contained in the Code. Rules 98 to 100 are the Rules which provide the manner in which such an application has to be dealt with. Under Rule 101, all questions including the questions relating to right, title and interest of property arising between the parties to the proceeding and relevant to the adjudication of the application, have to be determined by the court dealing with the said application. …………”(emphasis supplied) 10. Therefore, not being a party to the lis giving rise to execution proceedings is not relevant for adjudication of a claim under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. Rather, it can be safely said that such objections are filed by non-parties to such lis. Nature of objections under section 47 is altogether different and that are filed by the judgment debtor and not by a third party. Rather, it can be safely said that such objections are filed by non-parties to such lis. Nature of objections under section 47 is altogether different and that are filed by the judgment debtor and not by a third party. Words, “parties to the proceedings” used in S. Rajeswari (supra) mean “parties to proceedings under order 21 Rule 97 CPC and not parties to suit”. (emphasis supplied) 11. There is no dispute about the fact that the appellant was not a party to Original Suit No.323 of 1977 and, therefore, when his claim under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC was earlier rejected by the first appellate court by order dated 13.01.2014 dismissing Civil Appeal No.130 of 2013 on the ground that the objections under Section 47 CPC preferred by judgment debtor-Prem Chandra had been rejected, he rightly assailed the said order by filing Second Appeal No.88 of 2014. This Court set aside the appellate court’s judgment and held that Order 21 Rule 97 being a provision dealing with independent rights in respect of the property in dispute, mere rejection of objections under Section 47 CPC preferred by judgment debtor or even dismissal of revision arising therefrom would not come in the way of the appellant. No clear finding on merits of the rights claimed by the appellant was recorded by this Court and the matter was remanded to the first appellate court. 12. After this Court revived Civil Appeal No.130 of 2013, the first appellate court has decided the same on merits. It recorded a finding that, admittedly, the appellant being a successor of Jethwa, who was tenant in the property, joint tenancy rights would devolve upon him along with-Prem Chandra. It also observed that irrespective of appellant not being a party to Original Suit No.323 of 1977, his status being that of a joint tenant in view of authorities referred to in the order, the application under Order 21 Rule 97 did not have any force. As far as the executing court’s judgment dated 06.07.2013, though it wrongly emphasized upon rejection of objections of judgment debtor under Section 47 CPC, since the appellate court independently examined the claim raised under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC on merits rightly ignoring the objections under Section 47 CPC, validity of appellate court’s judgment dated 07.05.2014 has to be examined in the instant second appeal. 13. 13. Placing reliance upon a celebrated judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Harish Tandon Vs. A.D.M., AIR 1995 SC 676 , a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of Mohd. Ikrail (supra), held that the decree of eviction passed against joint tenants would also be binding upon the claimants under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC when they are also joint tenants. In paragraph no.14 of the report in Ashok Chintaman Juker (supra), the Supreme Court about joint tenancy held as under:- “14. This Court in the case of H.C. Pandey vs. G.C. Paul, (1989) 3 SCC 77 : AIR 1989 SC 1470 taking note of the settled position that on the death of the original tenant, subject to any provision to the contrary either negativing or limiting the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant, held that it is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs. There is no division of the premises or of the rent payable thereafter and that is the position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. This Court further held that the respondent acted on behalf of the tenants; he paid rent on behalf of his father and he accepted notice on behalf of all; in the circumstances the notice served under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the respondent was sufficient and it was a valid notice.” (emphasis supplied) 14. As far as judgments in Atma Prakash (supra) and Krishan Ram Mahale (supra) relied upon from the appellant side are concerned, there is no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the said authorities to the effect that a person in settled possession of the property cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by taking recourse of law. However, in the instant case, the appellant shall not be benefited by these authorities, inasmuch as the said cases were decided when the attempts were made to forcibly dispossess the concerned party in possession of the property without taking recourse to law. However, in the instant case, the appellant shall not be benefited by these authorities, inasmuch as the said cases were decided when the attempts were made to forcibly dispossess the concerned party in possession of the property without taking recourse to law. In the instant case, as discussed above, the appellant, being one of the sons of tenant Jethwa, is being dispossessed in the execution proceedings arising out of decree drawn in Original Suit No.323 of 1977 on the ground that he has succeeded joint tenancy rights alongwith his brother Prem Chandra, i.e. the judgment debtor. Even proceedings under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC are statutory proceedings recognized by the Code where the claim raised by the present appellant has been adjudicated upon by two courts of competent jurisdiction. There is nothing like forcible or unlawful dispossession of the appellant herein and, hence, it cannot be accepted that if the appellant is being dispossessed in the aforesaid execution proceedings, the same is without following due process of law. 15. While above is the settled legal position as regards devolution of joint tenancy rights and there being no dispute that the appellant is son of late Jethwa, this Court cannot take a different view as regards independent rights of the appellant in the property. As far as admission of the respondent contained in the written statement filed in Original Suit No.216 of 1996 that he did not recognize the appellant as his tenant but asserted only Prem Chandra as tenant, the Court may observe that whatever objections are raised before a court of law, it is the decree that prevails upon the contentions and finality attached to adjudication of rights would determine the real controversy. Admittedly, the decree drawn in Civil Appeal No.104 of 2000 has attained finality in terms of dismissal of Second Appeal No.891 of 2002. Therefore, the findings recorded in first appellate court’s judgment have also attained finality unless the same are set aside on cross objections preferred by the respondent in the said second appeal, who is the appellant in the instant second appeal. In this regard, reference to Order 41 Rule 22 CPC can be made that reads as under:- “22. Therefore, the findings recorded in first appellate court’s judgment have also attained finality unless the same are set aside on cross objections preferred by the respondent in the said second appeal, who is the appellant in the instant second appeal. In this regard, reference to Order 41 Rule 22 CPC can be made that reads as under:- “22. Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred a separate appeal.- (1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. Explanation. - A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent. (2) Form of objection and provisions applicable thereto.-Such cross-objection shall be in the form of a memorandum, and the provisions of rule 1, so far as they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, shall apply thereto. (3) xxxx (4) Where, in any case in which any respondent has under this rule filed a memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit. (5) The provisions-relating to appeals by indigent persons shall, so far as they can be made applicable apply to an objection under this rule.” (emphasis supplied) 16. (5) The provisions-relating to appeals by indigent persons shall, so far as they can be made applicable apply to an objection under this rule.” (emphasis supplied) 16. It is not in dispute that no cross objections were filed by the present appellant, being a respondent in Second Appeal No.819 of 2002, against the finding of the first appellate court regarding joint tenancy rights of the present appellant with Prem Chandra. The said cross objections, if filed, could have been considered on merits irrespective of withdrawal of Second Appeal No. 891 of 2002 as per sub-rule (4) of Rule 22 of Order 41 but, in absence of such cross objections having been filed, no contrary view can be taken as regards the finding recorded in judgment dated 22.04.2002 passed in Civil Appeal No.104 of 2000 inter se parties. (emphasis supplied) 17. For all the aforesaid reasons, having found no fault in the judgment dated 07.05.2014 passed in Civil Appeal No.130 of 2013, this Court does not find any merit in the instant second appeal. Consequently, the second appeal stands dismissed at the admission stage itself. 18. Office is directed to send the record of both the courts below to the District Judge, Hapur for being preserved and maintained in accordance with General Rules (Civil), 1957.