Mohammed Naushad Saeedmohammed Shaikh v. State Of Gujarat
2024-12-17
NIRZAR S.DESAI
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Nirzar S. Desai, J. 1. With the consent of learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing today itself. Rule. Learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of rule on behalf of respondents. 2. By way of the present petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 8.11.2023 passed by the Director General, Civil Defence and Commandant General, Home Guards, Ahmedabad - respondent No.2 herein by which the appointment of the petitioner was cancelled. The petitioner has also prayed for reinstatement in service with continuity and all other consequential monetary and other benefits. 3. The brief facts as submitted by learned advocate Mr. K. B. Pujara can be summarized as under :- 3.1 Pursuant to an advertisement dated 20.1.2021 by the Gujarat Subordinate Services Selection Board for 25 posts of Hawaldar Instructor, Class 3 in Home Guards organization under Home Department of Government of Gujarat, the petitioner applied for ultimately found his place in the merit-list at Serial No.1. However, the petitioner was not possessing a driving license meant for light motor vehicle since last two years and, therefore, he was lacking in respect of this experience. Therefore, according to the Rules, he could not have been appointed. However, according to learned advocate Mr. Pujara, the Rules provide for relaxation not by the Appointing Authority but by the State Government i.e. Home Department. However, in the instant case, for some reason, the aforesaid condition was relaxed by the Appointing Authority i.e. Director General, Civil Defence and Commandant General, Home Guards, Ahmedabad and the petitioner was appointed on the post in question vide appointment order dated 5.11.2023. The said office order contains conditions of appointment as well whereby it was categorically stated that the petitioner who was at Serial No.1 who does not possess the experience of driving light motor vehicle for the last two years, he shall not be permitted to drive the Government vehicle and the said appointment was for fixed tenure of five years.
The said office order contains conditions of appointment as well whereby it was categorically stated that the petitioner who was at Serial No.1 who does not possess the experience of driving light motor vehicle for the last two years, he shall not be permitted to drive the Government vehicle and the said appointment was for fixed tenure of five years. 3.2 Pursuant to the said appointment order, the petitioner joined the services under the respondent No.2 and immediately upon joining, within a period of three days from the date of his appointment, vide office order dated 8.11.2024, by taking a completely contrary stand, the same Appointing Authority i.e. Director General, Civil Defence and Commandant General, Home Guards, Ahmedabad cancelled the appointment of the petitioner on the ground that he does not possess the experience in respect of light motor vehicle license. 3.3 The same was done without putting the petitioner into notice, without affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard and without following any procedure. Therefore, according to learned advocate Mr. Pujara, once a right is created in favour of the petitioner by relaxing certain conditions like experience of LMV License, the appointment of the petitioner could not have been terminated by taking a totally contrary stand on the ground that the petitioner does not fulfill the requisite experience required for the post in question. Mr. Pujara, therefore, submitted that when some right is created in favour of the petitioner and appointment is granted to the petitioner, such appointment cannot be cancelled on the ground that the petitioner does not possess the required qualification and, therefore, such termination, even if the petitioner is a probationer, is illegal as in such eventuality, the respondents have unilaterally taken a decision without hearing the petitioner and, therefore, such termination is required to be quashed and set aside. 4. Ms. Nirali Sarda, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents from the record pointed out that the petitioner's appointment was for a fixed term of five years with a fixed salary. The petitioner was a probationer and, therefore, the State was within its right to terminate the services of the petitioner upon noticing some irregularities committed in respect of his appointment.
The petitioner was a probationer and, therefore, the State was within its right to terminate the services of the petitioner upon noticing some irregularities committed in respect of his appointment. She also submitted that the impugned order cannot be termed as a stigmatic order and, therefore, when the State has exercised its powers in respect of a probationer, when no stigma is cast upon the petitioner, such order could not have been questioned by the petitioner by filing the petition and, therefore, the present petition may be dismissed. 5. Learned advocate Mr. K. B. Pujara, in rejoinder, submitted that had any mistake been committed by the Appointing Authority, in that case, why the petitioner is only made a scapegoat and no explanation has also even been called from the Appointing Authority. The petitioner being a new appointee, he has been made a scapegoat at the hands of the Officer who did not follow the procedure prescribed and the Rules prescribed by the State Government which grants relaxation. He further submitted that once the petitioner's qualifications were considered and his experience was relaxed and, therefore, on the same ground, the services of the petitioner are terminated and therefore, in that case, the order can be said to be stigmatic in nature. Lastly, Mr. Pujara relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Binapairi Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 and submitted that once some right is created in favour of the petitioner and if it has any civil consequences, such rights could not have been taken away without hearing the petitioner and, therefore, the petition may kindly be allowed. 6. I have heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the appointment order dated 5.11.2023 as well as impugned order dated 8.11.2023 by which appointment of the petitioner was cancelled. The appointment order dated 5.11.2023 specifically mentions that candidate at serial No.1 is concerned i.e. the petitioner, as he does not possess the requisite driving experience of LMV License for a period of two years, he should not drive the Government vehicle until he completes two years and acquires the experience, which would indicate that conscious decision was taken by the Appointing Authority while appointing the petitioner by order dated 5.11.2023 despite knowing that the petitioner does not possess the requisite qualification.
Further, as the reply is not filed by the State Government despite the fact that notice was issued on 15.12.2023 i.e. exactly more than a year ago, the Court is not in a position to consider as to whether the Rules provides for any relaxation of Rules or not. However, the fact remains that after due deliberation, a conscious decision was taken by the Appointing Authority that despite the fact that the petitioner does not possess the requisite qualification in terms of experience, he was required to be appointed, pursuant to which the petitioner joined the services as well and thereafter, immediately within a period of three days from joining, the services of the petitioner came to be terminated abruptly vide order dated 8.11.2023 without even putting the petitioner to notice about it or affording any opportunity of being heard. 7. Whether the termination order can be said to be stigmatic or not is not the question here. The question here is that once a right is created in favour of an employee and though he is a probationer, whether such order can be recalled by cancelling the order on the ground that he does not possess the qualification once a conscious decision was taken to relax the experience and that also unilaterally. In the opinion of this Court, once such right is created in favour of the petitioner and a conscious decision was taken by the Appointing Authority to relax the criteria in respect of experience qua the present petitioner, unless the higher authority reviews the order and takes some objection, it is not open for the same Appointing Authority to recall its order and more particularly, when reply is not filed by the State Government and it is not pointed out to the Court that under which provision, such order cancelling his own order has been passed. Further, when some civil right is created in favour of the petitioner and when the authority could not find any fault with the petitioner nor the authority has stated in the impugned order that the services of the petitioner are no more required, his services came to be terminated on the grounds that he does not possess requisite qualification. 8.
Further, when some civil right is created in favour of the petitioner and when the authority could not find any fault with the petitioner nor the authority has stated in the impugned order that the services of the petitioner are no more required, his services came to be terminated on the grounds that he does not possess requisite qualification. 8. According to this Court, the same would adversely affect the petitioner and, therefore, either a full-fledged inquiry is required or at least a summary inquiry by hearing the petitioner and observing the principles of natural justice is required as the minimum requirement to pass any adverse order against the petitioner once some right is created against the petitioner. If such orders whereby some mistake is committed, either deliberate or bonafide by the Appointing Authority and the same authority is permitted to recall the order as if it is a routine and without looking at such order seriously, then it will give a leverage such practice that no probationer would find his job to be safe as he will always find that the same authority without any reason by citing a Rule or something, would cancel his appointment. Therefore, when some reason is assigned in the impugned order to terminate the services of the petitioner which is contrary to the reason assigned in the impugned order, according to this Court, at least a summary inquiry or a regular full-fledged inquiry, as the case may be, is required. In the instant case, learned AGP has failed to demonstrate that even the petitioner was heard and, therefore, without entering into any other grounds, only on the ground of non-adherence to the principles of natural justice, the impugned order dated 8.11.2024 of the respondent No.2 i.e. Director General, Civil Defence and Commandant General, Home Guards, Ahmedabad is required to be quashed and set aside and the same is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner immediately forthwith as if no order of termination was ever passed. However, it will be open for the respondents to initiate appropriate proceedings if they feel that the petitioner's appointment was in violation of the Rules for appointment and the respondents can still correct the mistake after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
However, it will be open for the respondents to initiate appropriate proceedings if they feel that the petitioner's appointment was in violation of the Rules for appointment and the respondents can still correct the mistake after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. However, for the interregnum period, the same may be considered as notional for all benefits that may flow in favour of the petitioner and no actual benefits be extended to the petitioner. 9. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the present petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Direct service is permitted.