JUDGMENT : 1. Both these appeals have been preferred by the accused appellants-Mansukh @ Raj Bhadur, Shiv Ram and Kishan Pal challenging the judgment and order of conviction dated 6.6.2012, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 9, Fatehpur, in Sessions Trial No. 35 of 2011 (State Vs. Mansukh @ Raj Bahadur and others), arising out of Case Crime No. 139 of 2010, Police Station–Sultanpur Ghosh, District-Fatehpur, whereby accused appellant Mansukh @ Raj Bahadur has been sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 304-B IPC; one year rigorous imprisonment alongwith fine of Rs.5,000/- under Section 498A IPC and in default of payment of fine to undergo three months additional imprisonment and one year rigorous imprisonment alongwith fine of Rs.3,000/- under Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act and in default of fine to undergo six months additional imprisonment; whereas accused appellants Shiv Ram and Kishan Pal have been sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment alongwith fine of Rs.5,000/- each under Section 498A IPC and in default of fine to undergo three months additional imprisonment each; and seven years rigorous imprisonment alongwith fine of Rs.3,000/- each under Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act and in default of fine to undergo six months additional rigorous imprisonment each. All sentences are directed to run concurrently. 2. Prosecution case is based upon Written Report, dated 15.10.2010 (Ex.ka1) made by Chhote Lal S/o Mangal (PW-1), scribed by Amit Kumar (not produced), stating that he is resident of Village-Godhaiyapar Patti Shah, District-Fatehpur and had married his daughter Belpati with accused five-six years earlier. He had also given dowry as per his ability, but the father-in-law and other family members were demanding gold-chain, a ring and a buffalo. Since dowry demand could not be met by the informant, as such, on 15.10.2010 at 10:00 a.m. the informant's daughter was assaulted by an axe as a result of which, she died. Age of the deceased was stated to be 22 years. On receiving such information, the report has been made on the basis of which, first information report came to be registered as Case Crime No. 139 of 2010, under Sections 498A, 304-B IPC and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. The inquest was conducted on 15.10.2010 at 3:00 p.m. on the basis of information furnished by the PW-1. PW-1 is also a witness of inquest report. 3. The inquest was conducted on 15.10.2010 at 3:00 p.m. on the basis of information furnished by the PW-1. PW-1 is also a witness of inquest report. The dead-body was found on a cot in the courtyard and signs of injury were found on the head of the deceased. The inquest witnesses opined that postmortem be conducted to ascertain the cause of death. The deceased was found to be wearing various jewellery, which have been noticed in the inquest report. The postmortem was conducted on the next day, i.e., 16.10.2010 at 2:30 p.m., wherein following three injuries have been found on the deceased: “(i) Incised wound 6 x 2 cm over middle part of head underline bone fracture into X brain deep as over 9 cm from right ear. (ii) Incised wound 9 x 2 cm over middle par of head above 2 cm from first injury into X brain deep underline bone fracture. (iii) Abrasion 8 x 5 cm parting left arm.” 4. The cause of death is shock and haemorrhage as a result of antemortem injuries. The Investigating Officer also recovered a blood-stained axe, which was sent for forensic examination. The F.S.L. report (Ex.ka15) is also on record, according to which, blood has been found on the axe. The blood-stained earth and plain earth etc. were also sent for forensic examination upon which blood has been found. Various jewellery worn by the deceased were also examined and have been returned after forensic examination. 5. After the investigation was concluded, charge-sheet came to be submitted against the accused persons on 19.11.2010. Cognizance was taken in the matter and the case was committed to the court of session where charges were framed against accused Mansukh @ Raj Bahadur, Shiv Ram and Kishan Pal under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and Section 3/4 D.P. Act. The accused denied the charges and demanded trial. The court of session also framed alternative charge against the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 6. During the course of trial, informant has appeared as PW-1 while brother of the deceased, namely, Jagatpal appeared as PW-2. These two witnesses are witnesses of fact and have stated that the marriage of the deceased was solemnized in the year 2005 and that she was harassed for demand of dowry. 6. During the course of trial, informant has appeared as PW-1 while brother of the deceased, namely, Jagatpal appeared as PW-2. These two witnesses are witnesses of fact and have stated that the marriage of the deceased was solemnized in the year 2005 and that she was harassed for demand of dowry. PW-3 is the autopsy surgeon, who has found existence of two injuries on the head of the deceased, which allegedly was caused by a sharp-edged weapon. The third injury is contusion. In the cross-examination, the doctor has stated that if any injury is caused by the axe, the margins would be clean-cut, which he had not noticed in the present case. If the injury was caused by the blunt side of the axe, the incised wounds could not have been caused on the deceased. He has admitted that the injuries could not have been caused on the deceased by a blunt object. 7. PW-4 is the Naib-Tehsildar, who has proved the inquest report. PW-5 is a Head-Constable, who has proved the G.D. entry and other police-papers. PW-6 is S.I. Ranjit Verma, who had conducted investigation in the present case and had also recovered the blood-stained axe from the place of occurrence. PW-7 is the Circle Officer, who has prepared the site-plan and is a formal witness. He has also proved the charge-sheet. PW-8-Ramkripal is said to be the independent witness of recovery of the axe, who has not supported the recovery by the police personnels. 8. The above evidence has been confronted to the accused, who have denied their implication and have stated that the deceased died on account of an injury caused due to fall of a brick. Apart from the husband, the other two accused have also asserted that they lived in a separate house and that there was no demand of dowry. On the basis of above evidence led in the matter, the court of session has convicted the accused-appellants as per above. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the marriage of the deceased with the accused-husband got solemnized more than seven years back and that there was no demand of dowry. It is further urged that no concrete evidence with regard to any demand of dowry has been placed on record by the prosecution. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the marriage of the deceased with the accused-husband got solemnized more than seven years back and that there was no demand of dowry. It is further urged that no concrete evidence with regard to any demand of dowry has been placed on record by the prosecution. It is further submitted that deceased died on account of accidental fall of a brick from the roof and that the prosecution version that she was assaulted by an axe is not based on any evidence on record. Alternatively, it is argued by counsel for the appellant that the trial court has not accorded any special reasons for awarding maximum sentence of life under Section 304-B IPC and that the accused-appellants are entitled to be released on the period of incarceration undergone by him. A certificate dated 21.8.2022 of the Jail Superintendent, Fatehpur, has been brought on record, according to which, the accused-husband has undergone 11 years, 2 months and 19 days incarceration together with remission on the date of issuance of the certificate. Since more than two years have expired since then, it is urged that the period of incarceration together with remission undergone by the accused-husband is a little less than 14 years. Submission is that the period undergone by the accused is sufficient punishment and, therefore, he is liable to be released on the period of incarceration undergone by him. 10. We have heard Sri Vikas Rastogi, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Surendra Singh, learned AGA for the State and have perused the materials on record. 11. Prosecution evidence is specific on the aspect relating to conduct of marriage between accused-husband and the deceased in the year 2005. The incident has occurred in the year 2010 where the deceased died an unnatural death on account of injuries caused on her head. The postmortem report as well as the inquest report clearly shows that the death of the deceased was homicidal. The two prosecution witnesses of fact, namely, PW-1 and PW-2 have specifically asserted that there was a demand of dowry of gold-chain, a ring and a buffalo, which continued till soon before death. In such circumstances, we find that the ingredient for establishing offence under Section 304-B IPC are clearly made out against the accused-husband. 12. The two prosecution witnesses of fact, namely, PW-1 and PW-2 have specifically asserted that there was a demand of dowry of gold-chain, a ring and a buffalo, which continued till soon before death. In such circumstances, we find that the ingredient for establishing offence under Section 304-B IPC are clearly made out against the accused-husband. 12. So far as the allegation of demand of dowry and causing unnatural death against the other two accused, namely, Shiv Ram and Kishanpal are concerned, the allegations are absolutely vague and general in nature and no specific date, time of incident has been mentioned to implicate them. These two witnesses have otherwise specifically asserted in their defence under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that they had a separate living. The defence evidence has also been led of Maharanideen Yadav, who has clearly stated that the two other accused had a separate living and the deceased along with her husband were living separately. The testimony of Avadhesh has also been placed on record by the defence, which is to the similar effect. There is no serious challenge to the testimony of DW1 and DW2 with regard to separate living of the other two accused. 13. In the absence of there being any specific demand attributed to the two other accused, namely the father-in-law and Dewar, as well as in light of the plea of separate living substantiated on their behalf during the course of trial, we are of the view that the offence under Section 304-B IPC and other sections are clearly not shown to be made out against the other two accused persons, namely, Shivram and Kishanpal, who are the father-in-law and the Dewar of the deceased. Their conviction and sentence, accordingly, cannot be sustained. 14. Coming to the question of sentence of the accused-husband Mansukh @ Raj Bahadur, we find that no specific reasons have been assigned by the trial court to award maximum punishment of life to him in the facts of the case. There is admittedly no eye-witness of the incident. The prosecution case is that the deceased was done to death on account of assault by the accused of axe. This version is based upon the statement of PW-1 and PW-2 as well as recovery of the axe. There is admittedly no eye-witness of the incident. The prosecution case is that the deceased was done to death on account of assault by the accused of axe. This version is based upon the statement of PW-1 and PW-2 as well as recovery of the axe. So far as the version of PW-1 and PW-2 is concerned, they are not the eye-witnesses and their deposition is based upon the information received by them from other villagers. The statement of PW-1 and PW-2 in that regard is hearsay and cannot be relied upon, particularly, when the person from whom such information has been received has not been produced in evidence. 15. So far as recovery of axe is concerned, the only independent witness, in that regard, i.e. PW-8 has clearly not supported it. The autopsy surgeon in his report has also stated that the injuries on the deceased could not have been caused by an axe, inasmuch as, there are no clean-cut margins which were expected, if the injury is caused by the axe upon the deceased. In the report of autopsy surgeon, no clean-cut margins have been shown to exist. The prosecution, therefore, has not succeeded in establishing that it was by the assault of axe that the deceased actually died. 16. Notwithstanding the above, it is admitted that the deceased died in unnatural circumstance. We are not impressed by the defence case that it was on account of fall of a brick that the deceased sustained the injuries, inasmuch as, the autopsy surgeon has clearly opined that the injuries on the deceased were not caused by any blunt object. Brick, at best, would fall in the category of a blunt object and the defence version that it was on account of fall of a brick on the head that deceased sustained such injuries also cannot be accepted. 17. In Hem Chand Vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the Supreme Court has observed that though punishment under Section 304-B IPC varies from 7 years to life but award of extreme punishment should not be as a matter of course and must be awarded in rare cases. In Para 7 and 8, the Supreme Court observed as under: “7. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the Supreme Court has observed that though punishment under Section 304-B IPC varies from 7 years to life but award of extreme punishment should not be as a matter of course and must be awarded in rare cases. In Para 7 and 8, the Supreme Court observed as under: “7. Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be seen that Section 304-B IPC lays down that: “Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The point for consideration is whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the instant case. A reading of Section 304-B IPC would show that when a question arises whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a woman what all that is necessary is it should be shown that soon before her unnatural death, which took place within seven years of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused the dowry death. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether such person is directly responsible for the death of the deceased or not by virtue of the presumption, he is deemed to have committed the dowry death if there were such cruelty or harassment and that if the unnatural death has occurred within seven years from the date of marriage. Likewise there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. It lays down that the court shall presume that the person who has subjected the deceased wife to cruelty before her death caused the dowry death if it is shown that before her death, such woman had been subjected, by the accused, to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. Practically this is the presumption that has been incorporated in Section 304-B IPC also. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct connection with the death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned above are satisfied. Practically this is the presumption that has been incorporated in Section 304-B IPC also. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct connection with the death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned above are satisfied. In the instant case no doubt the prosecution has proved that the deceased died an unnatural death namely due to strangulation, but there is no direct evidence connecting the accused. It is also important to note in this context that there is no charge under Section 302 IPC. The trial court also noted that there were two sets of medical evidence on the file in respect of the death of the deceased. Dr Usha Rani PW- 6 and Dr Indu Lalit PW- 7 gave one opinion. According to them no injury was found on the dead body and that the same was highly decomposed. On the other hand, Dr Dalbir Singh PW- 13 who also examined the dead body and gave his opinion, deposed that he noticed some injuries at the time of re-post-mortem examination. Therefore at the most it can be said that the prosecution proved that it was an unnatural death in which case also Section 304-B IPC would be attracted. But this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that the death was unnatural and the aspect of cruelty has been established and therefore the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 201 IPC have been established. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that it was fully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home was a dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of cruelty meted out to her and therefore an offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case. 8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' RI would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' RI. The other conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are, however, confirmed. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to the above modification of sentence.” 18. In Kashmira Devi Vs. The State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2020 SC 652 , the principle laid down in Hem Chand (supra) has been reiterated and the Court observed as under in Para 24: “24. Having arrived at the above conclusion the quantum of sentence requires consideration. The High Court has awarded life imprisonment to the appellant on being convicted under Section 304-B IPC. The minimum sentence provided is seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. In fact, this Court in Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 36 has held that while imposing the sentence, awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life under Section 304-B IPC should be in rare cases and not in every case. Though the mitigating factor noticed in the said case was different, in the instant case keeping in view the age of the appellant and also the contribution that would be required by her to the family, while husband is also aged and further taking into consideration all other circumstances, the sentence as awarded by the High Court to the appellant herein is liable to be modified.” 19. In light of the observation made in Para 24 (reproduced above), the Court modified the sentence to a period of 7 years. Para 25 of the judgment in Kashmira Devi (supra) is, thus, reproduced hereinafter: “25. In the result, the following: Order 25.1. In light of the observation made in Para 24 (reproduced above), the Court modified the sentence to a period of 7 years. Para 25 of the judgment in Kashmira Devi (supra) is, thus, reproduced hereinafter: “25. In the result, the following: Order 25.1. The conviction of the appellant recorded by the High Court under Section 304-B IPC and Section 498-A IPC through its judgment dated 29-6-2017 [State v. Govind Singh, 2017 SCC Online Utt 1932] is upheld and affirmed. 25.2. The sentence ordered by the High Court through its order dated 10-7-2017 [State of Uttarakhand v. Govind Singh, GA No. 42 of 2010, decided on 10-7-2017 (Utt)] is modified and the sentence of imprisonment for life is altered by ordering the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years which shall include the period of sentence already undergone by the appellant. The fine as imposed and the default sentence is sustained. 25.3. The appeal is allowed in part, in the above terms. 25.4. The parties to bear their own costs.” 20. Once, we come to the conclusion that the deceased died in unnatural circumstances, the presumption would be upon the husband by virtue of Section 113 (b) to explain the circumstances in which the incident occurred. The explanation offered in that regard is not acceptable in view of the evidence on record. However, we are of the view that the minimum punishment prescribed for the offence under Section 304-B IPC is seven years. In the facts of the present case, the accused-appellant has already undergone incarceration of more than 13 years. No special reasons are assigned by the Trial Judge for award of maximum punishment of life to the accused-husband. 21. In our assessment, the period of incarceration undergone by the accused-husband would be sufficient punishment for the offence proved against the accused-husband. 22. The criminal appeal No. 5013 of 2021 of accused appellant Mansukh @ Raj Bahadur (husband) consequently succeeds and is allowed in part, while his conviction under Section 304-B IPC and in other sections is maintained, but the sentence of life imprisonment is substituted by the sentence already undergone by him. The direction to pay fine as well as default sentence, however, are maintained. 23. For the reasons recorded above, the Criminal Appeal No. 2639 of 2012 of accused appellants Shiv Ram and Kishan Pal succeeds and is allowed. The direction to pay fine as well as default sentence, however, are maintained. 23. For the reasons recorded above, the Criminal Appeal No. 2639 of 2012 of accused appellants Shiv Ram and Kishan Pal succeeds and is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the two accused appellants, vide judgment and order dated 6.6.2012, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 9, Fatehpur in Sessions Trial No. 35 of 2011 (State Vs. Mansukh @ Raj Bahadur and others), arising out of Case Crime No. 139 of 2010 is set aside. The accused appellants Shiv Ram and Kishan Pal shall be released from Jail, forthwith, unless they are wanted in any other case, subject to compliance of Section 437-A Cr.P.C.