JUDGMENT : Divyesh A. Joshi, J. 1. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ applicant has prayed for the following reliefs; “(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow this petition. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari and/or on appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing and setting aside the impugned order Annexure-A dated 24.08.2023 passed by the Ld. Principal Senior Civil Judge, Sanand, Ahmedabad (Rural) below Exh.69 in Special Civil Suit No.407 of 2017; (C ) Pending hearing and till final disposal of this petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the implementation, operation and execution of the impugned order Annexure-A dated 24.08.2023 passed by the Ld. Principal Senior Civil Judge, Sanand, Ahmedabad (Rural) below Exh.69 in Special Civil Suit No.407 of 2017. (D) Any other relief deemed just and proper may please be granted in the interest of justice.” 2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the filing of the present application are as under:- 2.1 The writ applicant herein is the original plaintiff, who instituted the suit being Special Civil Suit No.407 of 2017 (Old Special Civil Suit No.272 of 2013) against the respondent No.1- original defendant, seeking specific performance of contract as well as permanent injunction on the basis of the agreement to sell dated 22.12.2006 as well as on the basis of Memorandum of Understanding entered into between the original plaintiff and the respondent No.1. 2.2 The respondent No.1 herein appeared in the suit proceedings and filed an application Exh.15 under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘CPC’) for rejection of the plaint, which came to be allowed vide order dated 06.07.2022 by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Ahmedabad. 2.3 The writ applicant-original plaintiff assailed the said order dated 06.07.2022 before this Court by way of filing First Appeal No.2320 of 2022, and the Division Bench of this Court, vide order dated 06.10.2022 allowed the first appeal, thereby ordered to restore the suit proceedings. 2.4 Being aggrieved, the respondent No.1 carried the aforesaid order dated 06.10.2022 before the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing Special Leave Petition No.20976 of 2022, wherein while issuing notice, the Hon’ble Apex Court directed the trial court to continue with the suit proceedings, but restrained to pass any final judgment. 2.4 Being aggrieved, the respondent No.1 carried the aforesaid order dated 06.10.2022 before the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing Special Leave Petition No.20976 of 2022, wherein while issuing notice, the Hon’ble Apex Court directed the trial court to continue with the suit proceedings, but restrained to pass any final judgment. 2.5 In the interregnum, the respondent No.1 filed an application Exh.60 dated 01.11.2022 before the learned trial court to reopen the stage of filing of the written statement which was closed earlier, however, the same application was not entertained by the trial court and rejected the same, against which, the respondent No.1 preferred Special Civil Application No.22297 of 2022 before this Court, and this Court, vide order dated 09.11.2022 allowed the petition thereby quashed and set aside the order dated 01.11.2022. 2.6 During the pendency of the aforesaid Special Civil Application No.22297 of 2022, the respondent Nos.2 to 5 herein preferred an application Exh.69 on 15.11.2022 under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC, seeking to be impleaded as the party, wherein the present writ applicant also filed its reply. 2.7. Thereafter, after considering the pleadings of the parties and arguments for both the sides, the learned trial court vide order dated 30.11.2022, allowed the Exh.5 injunction application of the present writ applicant and directed the respondent No.1 to maintain the status quo qua the suit property till the final outcome of the suit, against which, the respondent No.1 preferred Appeal From Order No.203 of 2022 before this Court, and this Court, vide order dated 20.06.2023, allowed the appeal and quashed and set aside the injunction order dated 30.11.2022 passed below Exh.5 application. 2.8 The writ applicant herein carried the aforesaid order dated 20.06.2023 in appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.15426 of 2023, which is pending for final adjudication. 2.9 Thereafter, the trial court, vide impugned order dated 24.08.2023, allowed the application Exh.69 filed by the respondent Nos.2 to 5 herein under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC, whereby they were ordered to be joined as defendant Nos.2 to 5. 2.10 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order dated 24.08.2023, the writ applicant is here before this Court with the present application. 3. Learned advocate Mr. 2.10 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order dated 24.08.2023, the writ applicant is here before this Court with the present application. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Saurabh Amin appearing for the writ applicant submits that the writ applicant is the original plaintiff who preferred Special Civil Suit No.407 of 2017 (Old Special Civil Suit No.272 of 2013) against the respondent No.1- original defendant. Thereafter, vide impugned order dated 24.08.2023, the respondent Nos.2 to 5 were ordered to be joined as defendant Nos.2 to 5, which is under challenge in the present application. The aforesaid suit came to be filed by the writ applicant for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 22.12.2006 as well as the MOU entered into between the writ applicant and the respondent No.1. Learned advocate Mr. Amin submits that after the execution of the aforesaid agreement to sell, the respondent No.1 did not adhere with the terms and conditions of the agreement, which compelled the writ applicant to file the present suit, seeking specific performance of contract, appending therewith the copies of the agreement to sell as well as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Learned advocate Mr. Amin further submits that the present matter has a checkered history and series of litigation have been filed by the applicant and the respondent No.1 against each other, which has been continuing since long, and during this long span of legal raw between the plaintiff and the respondent No.1, the proposed defendant Nos.2 to 5 had never raised any grievance nor had bothered to initiate any proceeding either independently or to be impleaded as the defendants in the present suit. Then, at a very belated stage, i.e., when the suit got dismissed and then restored and then reached upto the Hon’ble Apex Court., the proposed defendant Nos.2 to 5, all of a sudden, woken up from the slumber and filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC to be impleaded them as the party to the suit proceedings, inter alia, stating therein that they are the absolute owner of some portion of the suit property being Survey No.235, as they purchased the said portion of land from the original owner and, therefore, they are the necessary party. Learned advocate Mr. Learned advocate Mr. Amin submits that certain other averments have also been made by the proposed defendant Nos.2 to 5 in the application under Order 1 Rule 10 claiming to be the owner of the some portion of the suit property on the basis of the alleged share certificate said to have been issued by the original owner in their favour. He further submits that the writ applicant has also filed reply to the said application, wherein he has categorically denied all the averments made in the application, inter alia stating therein that the respondent No.1-Society has categorically admitted the entire agreement to sell in its written statement, wherein the description of the property, which the proposed defendant Nos.2 to 5 are claiming to be of their ownership has also been mentioned, which indicates that the respondent No.1-Society had all valuable rights over the suit property including Survey No.235/ P, which was transferred in favour of the applicant in the year 2006 by the respondent No.1-Society. Therefore, when the entire rights over the suit property has already been transferred by the respondent No.1-Society being the lawful owner, then there is no question of claiming any right over the said property by any third party as also to be impleaded as the defendants. Learned advocate Mr. Amin submits that, however, without appreciating and considering the materials available on record in its true perspective, the learned trial court allowed the said application and ordered to implead the respondent Nos.2 to 5 as the party defendants. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Amin further submits that while issuing notice, after thoroughly considering the submissions made on behalf of the writ applicant and the materials placed on record, the Coordinate Bench granted ad-interim relief in favour of the writ applicant, leaving it open for the trial court to proceed with the suit. He also submits that thereafter, the trial court also proceeded with the suit, and after completion of the arguments by the either side, the matter is now kept for pronouncement of judgment. Learned advocate Mr. He also submits that thereafter, the trial court also proceeded with the suit, and after completion of the arguments by the either side, the matter is now kept for pronouncement of judgment. Learned advocate Mr. Amin submits that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court has committed a grave error in allowing the application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, which was at the instance of the defendants, as it is a settled legal proposition that in the suit for specific performance of contract, it is only the parties to the contract who can be joined as the defendants. Admittedly, the respondent Nos.2 to 5 are not the parties to the contract, a specific performance of which is sought for in the suit. He then submits that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and nobody can be permitted to be impleaded as defendants against the wish of the plaintiff. Learned advocate Mr. Amin submits that the suit is for specific performance of contract, and if the relief, as sought for by the respondent Nos.2 to 5 is granted and they may be permitted to be joined, then the entire nature of the suit would be changed, which is not permissible in law, and therefore, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside. Learned advocate Mr. Amin further submits that to establish their rights over some portion of the suit property, the respondent Nos.2 to 5 have not produced any concrete proof in the form of any documentary evidence, except the copy 7/12 extract and the allotment letter purportedly issued by one Aryabhumi Association, wherein the survey number of the property claimed to have been of the ownership of the respondent Nos.2 to 5 is not mentioned. Even in the share certificate produced along with the allotment letter, no survey number has been mentioned. Thus, in the absence of any concrete evidence, establishing their rights over the claimed portion of the suit property, only on the basis of assertion, it cannot be held that they are having any right over the alleged portion of the suit property and, therefore, they are not the proper and necessary party. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Thus, in the absence of any concrete evidence, establishing their rights over the claimed portion of the suit property, only on the basis of assertion, it cannot be held that they are having any right over the alleged portion of the suit property and, therefore, they are not the proper and necessary party. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Amin submits that the case of the respondent Nos.2 to 5 are that they are having some right over the Survey No.235 and they are in possession of their respective plots on the said survey number, and to substantiate their claim, along with other documents, the respondent Nos.2 to 5 have also produced the rough map (brochure) showing their plots, however, in my respectful submission, the said map is not an approved map issued by any government authority, and therefore, when the authenticity of the document, on the basis of which, the entire claim of the respondent Nos.2 to 5 is based, itself is doubtful and not admissible in the eye of law, the claim put forward by the respondent Nos.2 to 5 would not be allowed to stand for a minute. He also submits that the survey number mentioned in the agreement to sell and MOU for which the suit for specific performance is filed is Survey No.235/P and not 235, whereas the respondent Nos.2 to 5 in their application at Exh.69 are claiming their rights over the Survey No.235, which clearly shows that the respondent Nos.2 to 5, raised their claim without verifying the revenue record and any other documents. Learned advocate Mr. Amin also submits that it is the case of the respondent Nos.2 to 5 that they came to know about the pendency of the suit through public advertisement, and if we peruse the said advertisement, it is clear that the suit for specific performance is for Survey No.235/P along with other survey numbers and not for Survey No.235 and, therefore, it can safely be said that the application preferred by the respondent Nos.2 to 5 is wholly misconceived. He submits that considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter, the learned trial court ought not to have come to the conclusion that the respondent Nos.2 to 5 are proper parties. He submits that considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter, the learned trial court ought not to have come to the conclusion that the respondent Nos.2 to 5 are proper parties. Moreover, the learned trial court also failed to consider the relevant aspect of the matter that the writ applicant, being a plaintiff, has not claimed any relief against the respondent Nos.2 to 5 in the suit and, therefore, as per the settled law, the learned trial court ought to have rejected the application at Exh.69. To buttress his submissions, learned advocate Mr. Amin relies upon the following case laws; (I) In the case of Gurmit Singh Bhatia vs. Kiran Kant Robinson & Ors., reported in (2020) 13 SCC 773 ; (ii) In the case of Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal & Ors., reported in (2005) 4 SCC 733; 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, learned advocate Mr. Amin prays that there being merit in this application, the same be allowed and the impugned order be quashed. 7. Learned senior advocate Ms. Trusha Patel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 submits that the impugned order passed by the learned trial court below Exh.69 is erroneous, unjust, perverse and against the settled proposition of law and is required to be quashed and set aside. She further submits that the documents on the basis of which the suit has been filed was executed between the writ applicant-plaintiff and the respondent No.1-defendant in the year 2006, whereas the suit for specific performance of contract was filed somewhere in the year 2013 and the application Exh.69 was filed by the respondent Nos.2 to 5 on 15.11.2022, and therefore, there is a gross delay in preferring the application, and only on this ground alone, the order passed below Exh.69 application is required to be quashed and set aside. She submits that at the time of allowing the application Exh.69, the learned trial court has observed that the defendants are not necessary party to the proceedings, however, looking to the dispute involved in the matter, they are considered to be proper and necessary party, and on the basis of such findings, the application came to be allowed. In fact, the agreement to sell itself is a disputed document, which the respondent No.1 has been challenging since long, and the respondent Nos. In fact, the agreement to sell itself is a disputed document, which the respondent No.1 has been challenging since long, and the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are not even the signatories to the said agreement to sell and they are not directly or indirectly connected with the execution of the said agreement to sell and, therefore, they are not required to be joined as the party defendants. Learned senior advocate Ms. Patel submits that she does not want to argue anything further and is adopting all the arguments canvassed by learned advocate Mr. Amin appearing for the writ applicant, as he has almost covered all the important aspects of the matter during his arguments. However, she would like to rely upon the decision in the case of Anil Kumar Singh vs. Shivnath Mishra @ Gadasa Guru, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 147 . 8. In such circumstance, referred to above, learned senior advocate Ms. Patel submits that the impugned order be quashed and set aside. 9. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. Sandeep Limbani appearing for the respondent Nos.2 to 5 has objected the present application and submits that his clients are the most effected parties. He submits that the order passed below Exh.69, ordering impleadment of the respondent Nos.2 to 5 is neither illegal nor bad in law and, therefore, does not require any interference as the same has been passed by the learned trial court after evaluation and appreciation of the materials available on record and considering the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC. Learned advocate Mr. Limbani further submits that the alleged Survey No.235 is a part and parcel of the suit property, wherein several plotting have been made by one Aryabhumi Association, out of which, Plot No.19 has been allotted to the proposed defendant Nos.1 and 2 and plot No.18 has been allotted to proposed defendant Nos.3 and 4 upon payment of sale consideration in the year 1997 and thus the possession of the said plots has been lying in their favour since 1997. Despite the same, without the knowledge of the respondent Nos.2 to 5, as well as without their consent, parties to the suit entered into transaction which is under challenge in the suit proceedings, and thereby have made a best attempt to prejudice the title of his clients in respect of the Plot Nos.18 and 19 of their ownership. Despite the same, without the knowledge of the respondent Nos.2 to 5, as well as without their consent, parties to the suit entered into transaction which is under challenge in the suit proceedings, and thereby have made a best attempt to prejudice the title of his clients in respect of the Plot Nos.18 and 19 of their ownership. Learned advocate Mr. Limbani further submits that not a single piece of evidence has been produced by the respondent No.1 indicating that he is the owner and occupant of the said property, and how he got the authority to sell the parcel of lands of their share to the writ applicant, without there being any right, title or interest over the said parcels of land. Learned advocate Mr. Limbani also submits that both the parties to the suit had entered into the series of litigation upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court by suppressing the material facts as well as to defeat the interest of the present respondent Nos.2 to 5 in respect to the parcels of land of their ownership. He further submits that the suit for specific performance was preferred in the year 2013, and in the year 2022, notice was published in the daily newspaper, wherein the description of the parcel of land of the ownership of the respondent Nos.2 to 5 have also been mentioned, and as soon as they came to know about the pendency of the present suit, just to secure their right, title and interest over the Plot Nos.18 and 19, which is a part of Survey No.235, they preferred an application Exh.69 under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC, seeking to be impleaded as the party defendants in the suit proceedings. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that there is a delay on the part of the respondent Nos.2 to 5 in filing the Exh.69 application. 10. Learned advocate Mr. Limbani submits that the respondent Nos.2 to 5 are the absolute owners and bonafide purchasers of the plot Nos.18 and 19, situated at Survey No.235 and also the same is not disputed either by the plaintiff or by the defendant in the suit proceedings. Till date, the respondent Nos.2 to 5 are in vacant and peaceful possession of the said plots. Till date, the respondent Nos.2 to 5 are in vacant and peaceful possession of the said plots. Therefore, on the basis of the said facts and circumstances, the alleged pleadings being filed by the writ applicant-plaintiff in the present application are far from truth and the present suit is liable to be dismissed for the sole reason that the writ applicant-plaintiff, knowing fully well that the respondent No.1 is not the owner of the suit property, has instituted suit against him and opted not to join the true owner of Block/Survey No.235, which transpires collusion between the writ applicant and the respondent No.1 and, therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 11. In such circumstances, referred to above, learned advocate Mr. Limbani prays that there being no merit in the present application, the same be rejected. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length and perused the record. 13. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 filed application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and prayed to implead them as party defendants. The suit is filed by the writ applicant-plaintiff for specific performance of contract in the form of agreement to sell entered into between the writ applicant and the respondent No.1 in respect of the suit property. As per the settled position of law, the plaintiff is the domius litis. Unless the court suo motu directs to join any other person, who is not party to the suit for effective decree and/or for proper adjudication as per Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, nobody can be permitted to be impleaded as defendants against the wish of the plaintiff. Not impleading any other person as defendant against the wish of the plaintiff shall be at the risk of the plaintiff. Therefore, the respondent Nos. 2 to 5, claiming to be the owners of some parcel of the disputed property, could not have been impleaded as party defendants on the application submitted by themselves, that too against the wish of the plaintiff. 14. In order to decide the controversy involved in the present matter, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the CPC, which confers power upon the court to add a party in the suit. 14. In order to decide the controversy involved in the present matter, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the CPC, which confers power upon the court to add a party in the suit. I am at one with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the writ applicant and the respondent No.1 that the trial court had acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction in allowing the application of the respondent Nos.2 to 5 for their impleadment as the defendants in the suit. There are certain special statutes which clearly provide as to who are the persons to be made as parties in the proceeding/suit filed under that special statute. Let me, for the sake of example, refer to the provisions of Representation of People Act. Section 82 of the aforesaid Act clearly provides who are the persons to be made parties in Election Petitions. There are other special statutes which also postulate who can be joined as parties in the proceedings instituted under that special statute, otherwise the provisions of the CPC should be applicable. So far as addition of parties under the CPC is concerned, I find that such power of addition of parties emanates from Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC. As the controversy involved in the present application revolves around the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC, I deem it proper not to refer to other provisions of the CPC, excepting Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC which reads as under: “Rule 10.(1) "Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong persons as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just. (2) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. (3) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (4) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (5) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" 15. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision indicates that sub-rule (1) of Order 1 Rule 10 is specifically meant for the addition of the plaintiff in the suit and, therefore, while deciding a question whether a stranger or a third party to the contract is entitled to be added in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale as a defendant, it is not necessary to go much into the scope of Order 1 Rule 10 subrule (1) of the CPC. 16. Therefore, I confine myself to the provision of Order 1 Rule 10 sub-rule (2) of CPC which has already been quoted hereinabove. From a bare perusal of sub-rule (2) of Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC, I find that power has been conferred on the Court to strike out the name of any party improperly joined whether as plaintiff or defendant and also when the name of any person ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant or in a case where a person whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. In the present case, since I am not concerned with striking out the name of any plaintiff or defendant who has been improperly joined in the suit, I will therefore only consider whether the second part of sub-rule(2) Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC empowers the Court to add a person who ought to have been joined or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 17. 17. In the aforesaid context, I would like to refer to and rely upon the decision in the case of Kasturi (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held thus; “6. In our view, a bare reading of this provision namely, second part of Order 1 Rule 10 sub-rule (2) of the CPC would clearly show that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale are the parties to the contract or if they are dead their legal representatives as also a person who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor. In equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also regulates the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased with notice of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are - (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. 7. We may look to this problem from another angle. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act provides relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. 7. We may look to this problem from another angle. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act provides relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. Except as otherwise provided by Chapter II, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against :- (a) either party thereto; (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract; (c) any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant; (d) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation; (e) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation, entered into a contract for the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the company; Provided that the company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other party to the contract. 8. We have carefully considered sub-sections (a) to (e) of Section 19 of the Act. From a careful examination of the aforesaid provisions of sub-sections (a) to (e) of the Specific Relief Act we are of the view that the persons seeking addition in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale who were not claiming under the vendor but they were claiming adverse to the title of the vendor do not fall in any of the categories enumerated in sub-sections (a) to (e) of section 19 of the Specific Relief Act. 9. That apart, from a plain reading of section 19 of the Act we are also of the view that this section is exhaustive on the question as to who are the parties against whom a contract for specific performance may be enforced. 10. As noted hereinearlier, two tests are required to be satisfied to determine the question who is a necessary party, let us now consider who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. 10. As noted hereinearlier, two tests are required to be satisfied to determine the question who is a necessary party, let us now consider who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. For deciding the question who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance the guiding principle is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. Thus, the question is to be decided keeping in mind the scope of the suit. The question that is to be decided in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is to the enforceability of the contract entered into between the parties to the contract. If the person seeking addition is added in such a suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged and it would be practically converted into a suit for title. Therefore, for effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit, presence of such parties cannot be said to be necessary at all.” 18. Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Tasker Vs. Small, 1834 (40) English Report 848 made the following observations: "It is not disputed that, generally, to a bill for a specific performance of a contract for sale, the parties to the contract only are the proper parties; and, when the ground of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in suits of that kind is considered it could not properly be otherwise. The Court assumes jurisdiction in such cases, because a Court of law, giving damages only for the nonperformance of the contract, in many cases does not afford an adequate remedy. But, in equity, as well as in law, the contract constitutes the right and regulates the liabilities of the parties; and the object of both proceedings is to place the party complaining as nearly as possible in the same situation as the defendant had agreed that he should be placed in. It is obvious that persons, strangers to the contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor subject to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much strangers to a proceeding to enforce the execution of it as they are to a proceeding to recover damages for the breach of it." [Emphasis supplied ] 19. It is obvious that persons, strangers to the contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor subject to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much strangers to a proceeding to enforce the execution of it as they are to a proceeding to recover damages for the breach of it." [Emphasis supplied ] 19. The aforesaid decision in Tasker (supra) was noted with approval in (1886 ) 2 Ch. 164 (De Hogton v. Money ) at page 170 Turner, L.J. observed: "Here again his case is met by (1834) 40 E.R. 848 in which case it was distinctly laid down that a purchaser cannot, before his contract is carried into effect, enforce against strangers to the contract equities attaching to the property, a rule which, as it seems to me, is well founded in principle, for if it were otherwise, this Court might be called upon to adjudicate upon questions which might never arise, as it might appear that the contract either ought not to be, or could not be performed." 20. From the aforesaid tenets of law, it is clear that necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the Court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings and proper parties are those whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person. 21. Keeping the principles as stated above in mind, let us now, on the admitted facts of this case, first consider whether the respondent Nos.2 to 5 are necessary parties or not. In my opinion, the respondent Nos.2 to 5 are not necessary parties as effective decree could be passed in their absence as they had not purchased the contracted property from the vendor after the contract was entered into. They were also not necessary parties as they are not the parties to the contract under challenge entered into between the writ applicant and the respondent No.1. They were also not necessary parties as they are not the parties to the contract under challenge entered into between the writ applicant and the respondent No.1. That apart, the application for impleadment at the instance of the respondent Nos.2 to 5 is filed at a much belated stage, i.e., can be said to be at the stage of de novo trial after the suit came to be dismissed and then restored by the order of this Court. Even otherwise, the documents produced by the respondent Nos.2 to 5 along with the Exh.69 application, i.e., 7/12 extract as well as the allotment letter is not the tangible piece of evidence as it is well settled law that the revenue records do not confer any title over the suit property, and therefore, the submission of the respondent Nos.2 to 5 that they purchased the alleged plots from original owner, i.e, Aryabhumi Association, whose name is reflecting in the 7/12 extract and thus become the absolute owner of the suit land could not be accepted. In the case of Anil Kumar Singh Vs. Shivnath Mishra Alias Gadasa Guru, reported in 1995(3) SCC 147 , it has been held that since the applicant who sought for his addition is not a party to the agreement for sale, it cannot be said that in his absence, the dispute as to specific performance cannot be decided. In this case in Para-9, the Supreme Court while deciding whether a person is a necessary party or not in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale made the following observation: "Since the respondent is not a party to the agreement of sale, it cannot be said that without his presence the dispute as to specific performance cannot be determined. Therefore, he is not a necessary party." [Emphasis supplied] 22. For the aforesaid reasons, in my view, the stranger to the contract, namely, the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are neither necessary nor proper parties, and therefore, not entitled to join as party defendants in the suit for specific performance of contract for sale. 23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and with the aforesaid observations, the present application is allowed. 2 to 5 are neither necessary nor proper parties, and therefore, not entitled to join as party defendants in the suit for specific performance of contract for sale. 23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and with the aforesaid observations, the present application is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Sanand, Ahmedabad dated 24.08.2023, allowing application Exh.69 under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC is hereby quashed and set aside. It is made clear that this Court has not decided in this judgment as to the title and possession of respondent Nos.2 to 5 over the claimed suit property and all such questions are kept open in the event any approach is made either by the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 or by the writ applicant or the respondent No.1 in any appropriate court. No order as to costs.