JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. All these appeals are being decided by a common judgment, as these arise from the same accident and also involve common questions of facts and law. 2. On 3.11.2014, Tractor bearing Registration No. HP 67- 1789 met with an accident-causing death of five persons namely Tek Chand, Nagender Pal, Nanak Chand, Meena Devi and Surahi. One person namely Dinesh Kumar survived. 3. The tractor was owned by Sher Singh one of the respondents in these appeals (hereinafter referred to as the owner) and was insured with the appellants herein. 4. Claim Petitions No. 42 of 2015 Navratri Devi & others vs. Sher Singh & another and 56 of 2015 titled as Krishna Devi & others vs. Sher Singh & another were preferred by the legal representatives of deceased Nagender Pal and Tek Chand. In both these petitions, stand taken by the claimants was that deceased Nagender Pal and Tek Chand were pedestrians. Tractor bearing Registration No. HP 67-1789 rolled down from the road in such a manner that the deceased were injured and consequently died. 5. Claim Petition Nos. 20 of 2015 and 21 of 2015 were filed by the legal representatives of deceased Meena Devi and Nanak Chand. In fact, both the deceased persons Nanak Chand and Meena Devi were husband and wife, therefore, they had common legal representatives. In these petitions it was averred by the claimants that deceased Meena Devi and Nanak Chand were occupants travelling on the tractor being driven by a person named Surahi. 6. The cause of accident in all above claim petitions was attributed to the rash and negligent driving of said Surahi. 7. The owner of the vehicle contested the claim petitions by alleging that Surahi was not employed as driver by him. The owner had employed another person as driver, who was on leave. Deceased Surahi without his consent and knowledge had driven the tractor which met with an accident. The owner also claimed indemnification from the insurer on the basis of comprehensive insurance policy purchased by him. 8. The insurer also contested the claim petitions by alleging that the deceased persons including Nagender Pal and Tek Chand were occupants travelling on the tractor. Since the tractor was not meant to carry passengers, the deceased persons were gratuitous passengers and the insurer was not liable to indemnify the insured/owner. 8. The insurer also contested the claim petitions by alleging that the deceased persons including Nagender Pal and Tek Chand were occupants travelling on the tractor. Since the tractor was not meant to carry passengers, the deceased persons were gratuitous passengers and the insurer was not liable to indemnify the insured/owner. It was also alleged that the person who was driving the tractor at the time of accident was not having any driving license. 9. Learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short, “the Tribunal” allowed all the claim petitions. In MAC Nos. 42 of 2015 and 56 of 2015, the deceased have been held to be the pedestrians. The claimants in the said petitions were held entitled for compensation on the premise that the deceased persons were third parties. The liability has been fastened upon the Insurer. In MAC Nos. 20 of 2015 and 21 of 2015, the learned Tribunal held that the deceased were travelling with their goods and as such, had the capacity of being owner of goods. The right of claimants to have compensation on account of deaths of Meena Devi and Nanak Chand was upheld and again the insurer has been made liable to satisfy the award. 10. By way of following appeals, the insurer has assailed the aforesaid awards: FAO 352/2016 (MAC 42 of 2015) FAO 61/2017 (MAC 56 of 2015) FAO 261/2016 (MAC 20 of 2015) FAO 253 of 2016 (MAC 21 of 2015) 11. In respect of awards passed in MAC Nos. 42 of 2015 and 56 of 2015, learned counsel for Insurer has submitted that the deceased Nagender Pal and Tek Chand were the occupants/gratuitous passengers on the vehicle. The story that both the deceased persons were pedestrian is alleged to have been fabricated with a purpose to make the insurer liable. The findings recorded by the learned Tribunal holding deceased Nagender Pal and Tek Chand as pedestrian have also been alleged to be contrary to the evidence on record. 12. In respect of Awards passed in MAC Nos. 20 of 2015 and 21 of 2015, it has been alleged that the tractor is a special type of vehicle and does not qualify the definition of a goods carrier. Thus, the deceased persons were unauthorized/gratuitous passengers and the insurer was not liable to indemnify the owner. 13. 12. In respect of Awards passed in MAC Nos. 20 of 2015 and 21 of 2015, it has been alleged that the tractor is a special type of vehicle and does not qualify the definition of a goods carrier. Thus, the deceased persons were unauthorized/gratuitous passengers and the insurer was not liable to indemnify the owner. 13. The impugned awards have also been assailed on the ground that the factum of tractor being driven by deceased Surahi at the time of accident was duly proved. It was also proved that deceased Surahi did not hold or possess a valid driving license. On this count also, the insurer has sought to be absolved from its liability. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record carefully. 15. The first issue that needs consideration is whether deceased Nagender Pal and Tek Chand were occupants of the vehicle or were pedestrian? 16. The accident was reported to the police and an FIR No. 94 of 2014 was registered and Police Station, Padhar, District Mandi. All the parties in above claim petitions have placed reliance on the same FIR.As per the contents of FIR, its informant was Dinesh Kumar, who was the lone survivor in the accident. As per the version of Dinesh Kumar in his statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C. given to the police, he along with Tek Chand, Nagender Pal, Nanak Chand and Meena Devi were occupants of the tractor at the time of accident. The tractor was being driven by deceased Surahi. He also attributed the cause of accident to the rash and negligent driving of deceased Surahi. 17. Admittedly, none of the claimants were present on the spot. In Claim Petitions No. 42 of 2015 and 56 of 2015, the claimants examined one Mohinder Kumar as a witness, who deposed that immediately before the accident, he had noticed that Nagender Pal and one other person were walking on the road in front of his house. He had gone inside the house to change the clothes and in the meanwhile, he heard noise and when he rushed outside, he found that a tractor had fallen on the backside of his house and the deceased Nagender Pal and other pedestrian had become victims. He had gone inside the house to change the clothes and in the meanwhile, he heard noise and when he rushed outside, he found that a tractor had fallen on the backside of his house and the deceased Nagender Pal and other pedestrian had become victims. In cross-examination, this witness clearly admitted that he had not seen the deceased Nagender Pal and another person having been hit by the tractor. 18. Smt. Navratri Devi wife of deceased Nagender Pal (MAC 42 of 2015) while deposing as a claimant admitted in the cross-examination that deceased Nagender Pal was also occupant of the vehicle. Similarly, in (MAC 56 of 2015) Smt. Krishna Devi wife of Late Shri Tek Chand could not deny in cross examination that all five persons were occupying the Tractor at the time of accident which had caused their deaths. 19. Owner Sher Singh in his deposition maintained that all the deceased were occupants of the vehicle. He also examined the investigating officer as one of the witnesses, who also deposed that during the investigation, the version of informant Dinesh Kumar was found to be genuine and all the deceased persons were found to be occupants of the vehicle. 20. In Claim Petitions No. 20 and 21 of 2015, the claimants examined Dinesh Kumar as their witness. He deposed on oath that he along with deceased Tek Chand, Nagender Pal, Nanak Chand and Meena Devi were travelling in the tractor at the time of accident. The tractor was being driven by deceased Surahi and it was on account of rash and negligent driving of deceased Surahi that the accident had taken place. 21. In Claim Petitions No. 42 and 56 of 2015, the witness Dinesh Kumar was not examined, however, the FIR recorded on his statement was proved on record as Ext. PW-2/A. The investigating officer had also stepped into the witness box to verify the contents of FIR. 22. Though the FIR is not substantive evidence of facts stated therein by itself. However, when a party to litigation relies upon the contents of FIR, it cannot subsequently turn around to show that the contents thereof were not correct. In 2009 (2) ACJ 925, National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Rattani & others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “7. However, when a party to litigation relies upon the contents of FIR, it cannot subsequently turn around to show that the contents thereof were not correct. In 2009 (2) ACJ 925, National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Rattani & others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “7. We are not oblivious of the fact that ordinarily an allegation made in the first information would not be admissible in evidence per se but as the allegation made in the first information report had been made a part of the claim petition, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Tribunal and consequently the appellate courts would be entitled to look into the same. 13. The question as to whether burden of proof has been discharged by a party to the lis or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. If the facts are admitted or, if otherwise, sufficient materials have been brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a definite conclusion, it is idle to contend that the party on whom the burden of proof lay would still be liable to produce direct evidence to establish that the deceased and the injured passengers were gratuitous passengers. As indicated hereinbefore, the First Information Report as such may or may not be taken into consideration for the purpose of arriving at a finding in regard to the question raised by the appellant herein, but, when the First Information Report itself has been made a part of the claim petition, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the same can be looked into for the aforementioned purpose.” 23. Similarly, in Oriental Insurance Company vs. Premlata Shukla& others, reported in 2007 (13) SCC 476 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “12. In Narbada Devi (supra) whereupon reliance has been placed, this Court held that contents of a document are not automatically proved only because the same is marked as an Exhibit. There is no dispute with regard to the said legal proposition. 13. However, the factum of an accident could also be proved from the First Information Report. In Narbada Devi (supra) whereupon reliance has been placed, this Court held that contents of a document are not automatically proved only because the same is marked as an Exhibit. There is no dispute with regard to the said legal proposition. 13. However, the factum of an accident could also be proved from the First Information Report. It is also to be noted that once a part of the contents of the document is admitted in evidence, the party bringing the same on record cannot be permitted to turn round and contend that the other contents contained in the rest part thereof had not been proved. Both the parties have relied thereupon. It was marked as an Exhibit as both the parties intended to rely upon them. 14. Once a part of it is relied upon by both the parties, the learned Tribunal cannot be said to have committed any illegality in relying upon the other part, irrespective of the contents of the document been proved or not. If the contents have been proved, the question of reliance thereupon only upon a part thereof and not upon the rest, on the technical ground that the same had not been proved in accordance with law, would not arise. 15. A party objecting to the admissibility of a document must raise its objection at the appropriate time. If the objection is not raised and the document is allowed to be marked and that too at the instance of a party which had proved the same and wherefor consent of the other party has been obtained, the former in our opinion cannot be permitted to turn round and raise a contention that the contents of the documents had not been proved and, thus, should not be relied upon. In Hukam Singh (supra), the law was correctly been laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court stating; "8. Mr. G.C. Mittal, learned counsel for the respondent contended that Ram Partap had produced only his former deposition and gave no evidence in Court which could be considered by the Additional District Judge. I am afraid there is no merit in this contention. The Trial Court had discussed the evidence of Ram Partap in the light of the report Exhibit D.1 produced by him. I am afraid there is no merit in this contention. The Trial Court had discussed the evidence of Ram Partap in the light of the report Exhibit D.1 produced by him. The Additional District Judge, while hearing the appeal could have commented on that evidence and held it to be inadmissible if law so permitted. But he did not at all have this evidence before his mind. It was not a case of inadmissible evidence either. No doubt the procedure adopted by the trial Court in letting in a certified copy of the previous deposition of Ram Partap made in the criminal proceedings and allowing the same to be proved by Ram Partap himself was not correct and he should have been examined again in regard to all that he had stated earlier in the statement the parties in order to save time did not object to the previous deposition being proved by Ram Partap himself who was only cross-examined. It is not a case where irrelevant evidence had been let in with the consent of the parties but the only objection is that the procedure followed in the matter of giving evidence in Court was not correct. When the parties themselves have allowed certain statements to be placed on the record as a part of their evidence, it is not open to them to urge later either in the same Court or in a court of appeal that the evidence produced was inadmissible. To allow them to do so would indeed be permitting them both to appropriate and reprobate." 24. As compared to this piece of evidence, learned Tribunal had the version as given by PW Mohinder Kumar. Interestingly, this witness did not say anything regarding the other occupants of the vehicle. It is admitted case of the parties that one person i.e. Dinesh Kumar is a survivor in the accident and two more persons viz Nanak Chand and Meena Devi besides driver of the Tractor had also died. What was stated by Mohinder Kumar is that he had seen Nagender Pal walking on the road with another person. He had further stated that he had seen both the persons in front side of his house. In the next breath he said that the accident had taken place at the backside of his house. It was not explained as to how the pedestrian could be involved. He had further stated that he had seen both the persons in front side of his house. In the next breath he said that the accident had taken place at the backside of his house. It was not explained as to how the pedestrian could be involved. In such circumstances, the statement of Mohinder Kumar was full of suspicion and was not of such nature which could have precedence over the other evidence on record. 25. The material on record heavily weighs in favour of the hypothesis that the deceased Nagender Pal and Tek Chand were occupants of the tractor, whereas, there was almost no evidence to suggest the fact that they were merely pedestrian and were hit by a rolling tractor. In such view of the matter, the deceased persons in MAC Nos.42 and 56 of 2015 were gratuitous passengers and in their case the insurer could not have been made liable. 26. Another aspect of the matter that cannot be ignored is that the same Tribunal with same Presiding Officer decided two more claim petitions being MAC Nos. 20 and 21 of 2015, titled Manish Kumar & others vs. United Insurance Company Limited. The claimants in both these petitions were same as they had lost both their parents namely Meena Devi and Nanak Chand in the accident. In these cases, the claimant had admitted that Nanak Chand and Meena Devi were occupants of the tractor. They had also relied upon the FIR No. 94 of 2014. In addition, they had examined Sh. Dinesh Kumar as their witness, who had disclosed that at the time of accident, he was also one of the occupants of the tractor and besides Sh. Nanak Chand, Meena Devi, Tek Chand and Nagender Pal were travelling in the tractor. 27. Learned Tribunal should have decided all the four claim petitions arising out of the same accident together by consolidating such petitions, which would have helped the Tribunal in appreciating material facts of the case on the basis of evidence, which was consistent. In absence what has happened is before us. 28. In MAC Nos. 20 and 21 of 2015, there was no escape from the conclusion that deceased Nanak Chand and Meena Devi were travelling on the tractor at the time of accident. In absence what has happened is before us. 28. In MAC Nos. 20 and 21 of 2015, there was no escape from the conclusion that deceased Nanak Chand and Meena Devi were travelling on the tractor at the time of accident. Though, the insurer had taken a specific objection that the deceased persons were gratuitous passengers, learned Tribunal rejected the same by holding that the deceased Nanak Chand and Meena Devi were owners of the goods. Learned Tribunal, in my considered view has clearly erred in fastening the liability on the insurer. The view taken by learned Tribunal is in the teeth of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2007 (7) SCC 56 , titled as, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Brij Mohan & others as under:- “10. Furthermore, respondent was not the owner of the tractor. He was also not the driver thereof. He was merely a passenger travelling on the trolley attached to the tractor. His claim petition, therefore, could not have been allowed in view of the decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani wherein the earlier decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. v. SatpalSingh was overruled. In Asha Rani it was, inter alia, held:- "25. Section 147 of the 1988 Act, inter alia, prescribes compulsory coverage against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of "public service vehicle". Proviso appended thereto categorically states that compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors of public service vehicle and employees carried in a goods vehicle would be limited to the liability under the Workmens Compensation Act. It does not speak of any passenger in a "goods carriage". 26. In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words "any person" must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used i.e. "a third party". Keeping in view the provisions of the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefor. 27. Keeping in view the provisions of the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefor. 27. Furthermore, sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 147 speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, whereas sub-clause (ii) thereof deals with liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place." 11. Although the effect in 1994 amendment in the Motor Vehicles Act did not call for consideration in Asha Rani a three Judge Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the said question in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Baljit Kaur in the following terms: "17. By reason of the 1994 amendment what was added is "including" owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle. The liability of the owner of the vehicle to insure it compulsorily, thus, by reason of the aforementioned amendment included only the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle besides the third parties. The intention of Parliament, therefore, could not have been that the words any person occurring in Section 147 would cover all persons who were travelling in a goods carriage in any capacity whatsoever. If such was the intention, there was no necessity of Parliament to carry out an amendment inasmuch as the expression any person contained in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147 would have included the owner of the goods or his authorised representative besides the passengers who are gratuitous or otherwise. 18. The observations made in this connection by the Court in Asha Rani case2 to which one of us, Sinha, J., was a party, however, bear repetition: (SCC p. 235, para 26) ‘26. 18. The observations made in this connection by the Court in Asha Rani case2 to which one of us, Sinha, J., was a party, however, bear repetition: (SCC p. 235, para 26) ‘26. In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words any person must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used i.e. a third party. Keeping in view the provisions of the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefor. 19. In Asha Rani it has been noticed that sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risks of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorised representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.” 29. The judgment in Brij Mohan (supra) was thereafter followed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2008, ACJ 254, titled as, United India Insurance co. Ltd. vs. Serjerao & others, in the following manner: “So far as the question of liability regarding labourers travelling in trollies is concerned, the matter was considered by this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Brij Mohan and Ors. 2007 ACJ 1909 (SC) and it was held that the Insurance Company has no liability. Ltd. vs. Serjerao & others, in the following manner: “So far as the question of liability regarding labourers travelling in trollies is concerned, the matter was considered by this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Brij Mohan and Ors. 2007 ACJ 1909 (SC) and it was held that the Insurance Company has no liability. In view of the aforesaid two decisions of this Court, we set aside the impugned order in each case and remit the matters to the High Court to consider the matters afresh in the light of what has been stated by this Court in Smt. Yallwwa’s case, 2007 ACJ 1934 (SC) and Brij Mohan’s case, 2007 ACJ 1909 (SC).” 30. Lastly, the learned Tribunal has simply brushed aside an objection of the insurer to the effect that the driver was not holding a license at the time of accident. Learned Tribunal held that since the insurer has failed to prove this fact, it cannot be absolved from liability. 31. The owner was categoric that the person, who was driving the tractor at the time of accident, had not been authorized by him. Though, as per owner, the person driving the tractor was his employee but not as driver. It is not the case of owner that the person driving the tractor was holding any license. In fact, no material had been placed on record either by the claimants or owner to suggest even remotely that the person driving the tractor was holding some kind of license to drive the vehicle. This onus prima-facie was on the owner. Had the owner produced any material to show existence of a license in the name of person driving the tractor, the onus definitely would have shifted upon the insurer to prove its objection. Thus, the findings returned by the learned Tribunal on the issue regarding existence and validity of driving license of the person driving tractor are also not sustainable. 32. In light of above discussion all the appeals are allowed. The Awards, passed by the learned Tribunal in MAC Nos. 20 of 2015, 21 of 2015, 42 of 2015, and 56 of 2015 are set aside to the extent these bind the insurer/ appellants with liability to indemnify the owner. The liability in all the cases to pay compensation shall be that of the owner without having any right to claim the indemnification from the insurer. 33. 20 of 2015, 21 of 2015, 42 of 2015, and 56 of 2015 are set aside to the extent these bind the insurer/ appellants with liability to indemnify the owner. The liability in all the cases to pay compensation shall be that of the owner without having any right to claim the indemnification from the insurer. 33. The appeals are accordingly disposed of, so also the pending applications, if any. Record be sent back forthwith.