JUDGMENT : R. Sakthivel, J. This Second Appeal is directed against the Judgment and Decree dated January 30, 2018 made by the Subordinate Judge, Coonoor' [First Appellate Court' for short] in A.S.No.57 of 2017, reversing the Judgment and Decree dated July 24, 2017 made by the District Munsiff, Coonoor' ['Trial Court' for short] in O.S.No.8 of 2015. 2. The appellant herein is the 1 st defendant, while the respondents 1 & 2 herein are the plaintiffs 1 & 2 and the respondents 3 & 4 herein are the defendants 2 & 3 in O.S.No.8 of 2015 respectively. For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to according to their litigative status in the Original Suit. Case of the plaintiffs in brief: 3. The first plaintiff is the mother of the second plaintiff. The first plaintiff's husband – J. Bhojan and the first defendant are brothers, their father being Jevana Gowder. The suit property is a house property bearing Door No.1/72 situate in Survey No.622/14 of Bettatty Revenue Village. As per the family oral partition held in 1980, the suit property was allotted to the first plaintiff's husband – J. Bhojan. The marriage between J. Bhojan and the first plaintiff was solemnised in September 1988. The 2 nd plaintiff was born on August 2, 1993. After the said oral partition, J. Bhojan was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property by paying house tax. 3.1. Bhojan passed away on July 7, 2000 leaving behind the plaintiffs as his only legal heirs to succeed the suit property. After the demise of Bhojan, the plaintiffs were residing in the suit property for some time and thereafter, they shifted to the first plaintiff's maternal house giving permissive possession of the suit property to the first defendant with a condition that the 1 st defendant shall pay house tax regularly in the name of Bhojan. However, the first defendant, being a member of the Jaganthala Panchayat Board, with an ulterior motive to defeat and defraud the plaintiff's rights over the suit property, used his influence to forge a letter in Bhojan's name and changed the House Tax Assessment Records in his own name. 3.2. On January 15, 2012, the first defendant refused to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property upon demand by the 1 st plaintiff. 3.2. On January 15, 2012, the first defendant refused to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property upon demand by the 1 st plaintiff. Thereafter, the 1 st plaintiff learnt about the fraudulent mutation in House Tax Assessment records. Hence, the Suit for Declaration of Title, Recovery of Possession and for directing the second and third defendants to transfer the House Tax Assessment Records in the name of plaintiff. Case of the 1st defendant in brief: 4. According to the first defendant, he acquired right and title over the suit property by virtue of inheritance and succession followed by an inter se oral partition held in the year 1974. His name has been mutated in the revenue records as early as 1999. Since then, he has been in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the same. Hence, the question of permissive possession as claimed by the plaintiffs does not arise at all. Patta also confirms his possession and enjoyment of the suit property. First plaintiff's husband – Bhojan, himself has given a No Objection Letter dated January 8, 1997 with respect to mutating the House Tax Assessment records in the name of first defendant. Accordingly, the first defendant being the absolute owner of the suit property, has been paying House Tax without default. The plaintiffs' suit has no cause of action, is barred by limitation and liable to be dismissed. Case of the 2nd and 3rd defendants in brief: 5. The second defendant filed a written statement and the same was adopted by the third defendant. It has been stated that the plaintiffs and the first defendant have personal dispute and rival claims upon the suit property, hence, the 2 nd and 3 rd defendants are neither admitting nor refuting the plaint allegations; that the first defendant vide letter dated January 27, 1999 requested the Executive Authority of Jagathala Town Panchayat for mutation of House Tax Assessment Records in his name along with a No Objection Letter dated January 8, 1997 purportedly written by J.Bhojan; that the first defendant also enclosed a 'muchalika' dated January 24, 1999 issued by the Village Headman and other Panchayatdars of Bettatty Village vouching that the first defendant has been in actual possession and enjoyment of the suit property for more than 2.5 decades and has renovated the building at his expenses. Further that, the house building had been constructed on a Village Natham Land and that no title document exist with respect to the building for the relevant period. Further that, only after scrutinising the documents, holding field inspection and enquiry, the executive authority passed an order vide its proceedings Po.Ma.Pa.6/99 dated February 4, 1999 thereby transferring the assessment records of the suit property in the name of the first defendant; that there is no infirmity with the said proceedings; that, however, the 2 nd and 3 rd defendants are ready to abide the Order of the Court. Trial Court and First Appellate Court 6. Based on these pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of declaration as prayed for? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the directions against defendant No.1 as prayed for? 3. Whether the plaintiff entitled for the Mandatory Injunction as prayed for? 4. To what relief parties entitled?” 7. At trial, On the side of the plaintiffs, 1 st plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and Ex-A.1 to Ex-A.15 were marked. On the side of the 1 st defendant, the 1 st defendant was examined as D.W.1 and Ex-B.1 to Ex- B.6 were marked. On the side of the 2 nd and 3 rd defendants, neither any documents were marked nor any witnesses were examined. 8. Upon hearing either side and considering the materials available on record, the Trial Court held that the plaintiffs have not proved the Oral Partition alleged by them nor their title over the Suit Property and that plaintiffs have also failed to prove that the first defendant is in permissive possession of the suit property. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. 9. Upon dismissal, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court held that Ex-B.1 and Ex-B.2 – Photocopies of the alleged Letter written by Bhojan and Muchalika are inadmissible in law; that the Trial Court failed to consider the fact that until 1998, the House Tax Assessment records stood in the name of Bhojan; that the Oral Partition alleged by the first defendant is not proved by him; that the Trial Court failed to consider the plaintiff side documents. Accordingly, the Suit was decreed as prayed for. The aggrieved first defendant has filed this Second Appeal. Substantial Question of Law: 10. Accordingly, the Suit was decreed as prayed for. The aggrieved first defendant has filed this Second Appeal. Substantial Question of Law: 10. This Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on December 7, 2023: “Whether the findings of the First Appellate Court that respondents/plaintiffs proved oral partition is vitiated by perversity?” Arguments: 11. Mr.R.Subramanian, learned Counsel for the appellant / first defendant has submitted that First Appellate Court has not appreciated the oral and documentary evidence, especially Ex-B.1 - Letter and Ex-B.2 – Muchalika, in the right perspective. The plaintiffs failed to establish that the Suit Property was allotted to Bhojan in the Oral Partition alleged by them. In such a scenario, the First Appellate Court ought not to have decreed the suit as prayed for. Accordingly, he prayed to allow the Second Appeal and dismiss the Suit. 11.1. As an alternate argument, he has submitted that, even while assuming that the 1 st defendant has failed to establish the Oral Partition alleged by him, the first defendant and the first plaintiff's husband – Bhojan are entitled to equal share in the Suit Property after the demise of Jevana Gowder, as per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as the plaintiffs failed to establish the Oral Partition alleged by them. He made an alternate prayer to pass a preliminary decree to that extent. 12. Per contra, Mr.L.Mouli, learned Counsel for the respondent 1 and 2 / plaintiffs, has submitted that Ex-A.4 to Ex-A.11 documents prove the Oral Partition and the pursuant plaintiffs' possession and enjoyment of the Suit Property. Exs.B1 and B2 are inadmissible documents created for the purpose of defeating and defrauding the rights of the first plaintiff who is a widow. He further submitted that, the First Appellate Court, after considering the entire facts and circumstances as well as the evidence, allowed the appeal and decreed the Suit as prayed for. There is no perversity in the Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court. Accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the Second Appeal and confirm the First Appellate Court's Judgment and Decree. 13. Mrs.R.Anitha, learned Special Government Pleader for the Respondent No.4 has submitted that the plaintiffs and the first defendant have personal dispute and rival claims upon the Suit Property. There is no perversity in the Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court. Accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the Second Appeal and confirm the First Appellate Court's Judgment and Decree. 13. Mrs.R.Anitha, learned Special Government Pleader for the Respondent No.4 has submitted that the plaintiffs and the first defendant have personal dispute and rival claims upon the Suit Property. The third respondent / Executive Officer issued the proceedings dated February 4, 1999 in Po.Ma.Pa.6/99 only after due enquiry and full inspection as per the procedures. Hence, there is no infirmity with the proceedings issued by the third respondent. She has further submitted that, the 4 th respondent is ready to obey the Order of this Court. Discussion: 14. This Court has considered the submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record. 15. As alternative argument, the learned counsel for the appellant/first defendant has submitted that, the plaintiffs and the first defendant are co-owners of the Suit Property. Plaintiffs are collectively entitled to 1/2 share while the first defendant is entitled to 1/2 share. Since the Original Suit is interalia for the relief of declaration of title, with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, he alternatively prayed to pass preliminary decree accordingly. 16. This Court has perused the deposition of D.W.1. Cross examination of D.W.1 reads as follows:- 16.1 A perusal of D.W.1, would show that, Jevana Gowder died leaving six sons as his legal heirs. They are all necessary parties to the Suit, and hence, ought to have been impleaded, but, they have not been impleaded. In such a scenario, this Court cannot pass a preliminary decree as alternatively prayed for by the learned Counsel for the 1 st defendant, for the reason that the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and to be dismissed. [vide T. Panchapakesan (died) and others Vs. Peria Thambi Naicker (died) and others , reported in AIR 1973 Madras 133 and A. Ramachandra Pillai V. Valliammal (died) reported in (1987) 100 LW 486 ]. 17. Admittedly, the Suit Property is a House Property situated in Survey No.622/14. The Suit Property was originally owned by Jevana Gowder, who is none other than the father of the first defendant and father-in-law of the first plaintiff. Admittedly, Jevana Gowder passed away in the year 1981. 17. Admittedly, the Suit Property is a House Property situated in Survey No.622/14. The Suit Property was originally owned by Jevana Gowder, who is none other than the father of the first defendant and father-in-law of the first plaintiff. Admittedly, Jevana Gowder passed away in the year 1981. On perusal of the records, it is learnt that, Ex-A.4 - House Tax Receipt for the year 1980 stands in the name of Jevana Gowder. Ex-A.5 to Ex-A.11 – House Tax Receipts stands in the name of J.Bhojan. Ex-A.5 to Ex-A.11 – House Tax Receipts, would reveal the fact that Bhojan had been paying the House Tax from 1981 to 1998. Mere mutation in Revenue Records and Payment of House Tax are not sufficient to prove the plea of Oral Partition. In this regard, it is apposite to cite the Judgment of this Court in P. Kaliappa Gounder and others Vs. Muthuswami Mudaliar, reported in 1985 SCC OnLine Mad 89 : (1985) 98 LW 773 : AIR 1987 Mad 24 , wherein this Court explained what amounts to partition. Relevant extract runs thus: “7. Before we do the analysis of factual materials, we would like to recapitulate the concept of 'partition' of a joint family. The joint ownership of a thing is the right of two or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others; and the thing, with regard to which there is the joint ownership, is called 'the joint property'. In this joint property, the joint owners do not own anything in specie and every joint owner has got right, title and interest over every piece and parcel of the joint property, subject to the qualification that the quantum of his share in the whole property stands defined in theory and not on ground. Though joint owners may be content with owning lands in common, yet subsequently one joint owner or some joint owners may conceive the idea of owning the property referable to his or their share for himself or for themselves to the exclusion of the other or the others. This is the reason which motivates the move to get joint property partitioned. The legal term 'partition' is applied to the division of lands or properties belonging to joint owners and the allotments amongst them of the parts referable to their shares so as to put an end to community ownership or joint ownership. This is the reason which motivates the move to get joint property partitioned. The legal term 'partition' is applied to the division of lands or properties belonging to joint owners and the allotments amongst them of the parts referable to their shares so as to put an end to community ownership or joint ownership. Mayne says: “In England ownership as a rule is single, independent and unrestricted. In India on the contrary, joint ownership is the rule and will be presumed to exist until the contrary is proved.” While individual property appears to be the rule in the West, corporate property appears to be the rule in the East. Though passage of time and change of notions have shaken up this concept both in theory and in practice, yet, in our country and in particular in rural areas, joint ownership is allowed to persist by sufferance of custom and convenience until the bone of contention crops on. 8. Partition is the intentional severance of the joint ownership by an unequivocal expression of an intention to bring out severance in the eye of law and further implementing it by actual division by metes and bounds. What was held in common as a single property gets converted into a holding in severalty and in specie. Joint ownership turns into ownership in severalty and in specie. It is true that 'partition' is not a transfer. But there must be the element of conversion as the joint ownership into ownership in severalty and in specie. Therefore, the essence of partition is that the joint ownership is put an end to and the joint owners come to hold the property in severalty and each in his own individual right. In this country, it is common that not only coparceners of a joint Hindu family but also individuals join or continue together to own property in common. If this common ownership is to be put an end to not only in theory but also in practice, there must be primarily severance of the joint ownership in the eye of law, followed up by actual physical division. We make it clear that in the present case, we are not concerned with the concept of a bare unequivocal expression of an intention to separate to bring about a division in status in a joint Hindu family. We make it clear that in the present case, we are not concerned with the concept of a bare unequivocal expression of an intention to separate to bring about a division in status in a joint Hindu family. It is not unusual for parties holding properties jointly or in common to have separate enjoyment of portions for the sake of sheer convenience. But such separate enjoyment of convenience cannot be equated to partition in the eye of law and in fact, so as to say that the joint ownership has been put an end to and in its place ownership in severalty or in specie has come into existence. Separate enjoyment for the sake of convenience is one thing and partition in the eye of law is another. The latter carried with it the legal incidents of mutating the joint ownership. The latter has to pass through and satisfy a more rigorous test in law and on facts.” 18. It is settled law that the burden of proving the plea of Oral Partition falls on the person who brings it up. In such a scenario, after the demise of Jevana Gowder, the 1 st plaintiff's husband and the first defendant along with the other legal heirs would have been co-owners and post the demise of first plaintiff's husband, the plaintiffs would have become co-owners in the place of J.Bhojan. All the co-owners are deemed to be in joint possession and enjoyment of the Suit Property unless it is specifically pleaded and proved that one co-owner has been expelled from the joint possession. Mere House Tax Receipts standing in the name of one co-owner, does not confer exclusive title to that co-owner excluding the other co-owners. 19. In this case, the first defendant, very much relied on Ex-B.1 - Letter allegedly executed by Bhojan in favour of him. Ex-B.1 is the photocopy and its' original has not been marked. A bare reading of Ex- B.1 would show that Bhojan has given consent to effect name transfer in the House Tax Assessment Records in favour of the first defendant. That document alone, assuming that it is admissible as evidence in law, does not confer title to the first defendant. A title over immovable property worth more than Rs.100/- can be extinguished only by way of a registered instrument. 20. That document alone, assuming that it is admissible as evidence in law, does not confer title to the first defendant. A title over immovable property worth more than Rs.100/- can be extinguished only by way of a registered instrument. 20. Hence, the findings of the Trial Court that the plaintiffs have not proved that the first defendant is in permissive possession of the Suit Property, is incorrect. The findings of the First Appellate Court that, Ex- A.4 to Ex-A.11 prove the Oral Partition alleged by the plaintiff and the title of the plaintiff, is also incorrect. They both are liable to be interfered with. Accordingly, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellants. 21. In this case, the plaintiffs miserably failed to establish their case of oral partition. The first defendant also failed to establish his case. Further, the Suit is bad of non-joinder of necessary parties. Hence, the First Appellate Court has erred in allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit as prayed for. Hence, this Court is inclined to allow the second appeal. 22. Before parting, since the plaintiffs, first defendant and other legal heirs of Bhojan are entitled to share in the Suit Property, it is made clear that this judgment shall not be a bar for any claim for partition over the Suit Property by the legal heirs including the plaintiffs and the first defendant. 23. Resultantly, the Second Appeal is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.