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2024 DIGILAW 229 (CAL)

Pradeep Kumar Singh v. Union of India

2024-02-01

HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA, MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA

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JUDGMENT : Moushumi Bhattacharya, J. 1. An order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 28.08.2023 passed in an Original Application filed by the petitioner is under challenge in this present writ petition. By the impugned order, the Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s prayer for quashing the memorandum of charge, the order of dismissal, the order of the Appellate Authority confirming the order of dismissal and the Authority’s rejection of review from the said order. The petitioner’s prayer for re-instatement to the post in which the petitioner was appointed was also rejected. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a Constable in the India Reserve Battalion (IRBn), Andaman and Nicobar Islands in 2002. The petitioner was arrested in 2012 in connection with a case in the Aberdeen Police Station under sections 451, 354 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. A preliminary enquiry conducted against the petitioner and the Inquiry Officer submitted a report on 18.06.2012 pursuant to which the petitioner was placed under suspension. A departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner on the Articles of charge vide memorandum dated 24.01.2013. The petitioner denied the charges framed against him. The Inquiry Officer conducted as enquiry and submitted his findings on 10.10.2013 which was served upon the petitioner. An opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner to reply to the findings of the Inquiry Officer which was submitted on 20.10. 2013. 3. The Disciplinary Authority (Commandant), IRBn imposed the penalty of dismissal from service by an order dated 28.02.2014. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority on 23.05.2014. The Appellate Authority rejected the appeal by an order dated 7.06.2014. The petitioner, in the meantime, was acquitted in a criminal proceeding by an order of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class-II on 14.11.2017. Pursuant to the acquittal, the petitioner sought for review of the order passed by the Appellate Authority which however was dismissed on 07.03.2018. The petitioner filed the Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal which culminated in the impugned order dated 28.08.2023. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks setting aside of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal pursuant to the order of acquittal from the criminal charges. Counsel places a letter dated 28.10.2013 from the petitioner to the IRBn which records that the complainants have withdrawn their respective cases from the Court after accepting the petitioner’s apology. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks setting aside of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal pursuant to the order of acquittal from the criminal charges. Counsel places a letter dated 28.10.2013 from the petitioner to the IRBn which records that the complainants have withdrawn their respective cases from the Court after accepting the petitioner’s apology. Counsel submits that the petitioner has been on suspension and sought for an opportunity by way of the said letter to correct his course of conduct. Counsel submits that the Disciplinary Authority did not take the contents of this letter into account while passing the order of dismissal on 28.02.2014. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents opposes the contentions made on behalf of the petitioner and submits that the petitioner was charged with two Articles framed in the departmental enquiry and that the order of the acquittal related only to one of the charges. Counsel also submits that the order of acquittal from the criminal charges was based on at least 3 of the witnesses not being examined by the prosecution. Counsel further submits that the standard of proof in the disciplinary proceeding and the criminal case are wholly different and cannot be equated to give relief to the petitioner on the basis of the order of acquittal. 6. The relevant facts have already been narrated in the first part of the judgment and are hence not being repeated. The sequence of events however assumes importance in view of the order of acquittal dated 14.11.2017 which was passed after the order of the Appellate Authority dated 07.06.2014 confirming the penalty of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority. 7. The question before us is whether the order of acquittal would have a bearing on the penalty of dismissal imposed on the petitioner and whether the Tribunal should have given due weightage to the order of acquittal. 8. I find that the order of dismissal of the Disciplinary Authority mentions two Articles of charge. The first Article relates to the petitioner creating nuisance in an inebriated condition against one Smt. T. Parwati while the second Article relates to the petitioner entering the house and molesting one Smt. Jayanti Ghosh and threatening her husband Shri Biswa Ghosh with dire consequences. The ordering portion which contains the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service however does not segregate the two charges. The ordering portion which contains the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service however does not segregate the two charges. The order of dismissal was imposed on a stray observation of the petitioner being a habitual offender and general remarks of the force being responsible for protecting the life and honour of the citizens of the islands. The Disciplinary Authority concludes that grave allegations have been levelled against the petitioner and the petitioner had displayed scant regard for authority. The authority further concludes that the petitioner is not suitable for continuing in a force like the IRBn which is “a bedrock of discipline, orderliness and courage”. 9. In this context, it is also relevant to state that the Enquiry Report submitted by the Inquiry Officer contained two Articles of charge but contains only the evidence of Smt. Jayanti Ghosh and her husband Shri. Biswa Ghosh with regard to the second Article of charge. 10. The order of the Appellate Authority confirming the order of dismissal is completely without reasons. The Appellate Authority simply declines to interfere with the order of the penalty of dismissal without taking into account any of the factual findings relevant to the matter. The order of the Appellate Authority can be described as a “template order” where there is no application of mind on the individual facts of the case. 11. Hence, the enquiry report, the order of dismissal of the Disciplinary Authority and the order of the Appellate Authority proceeded only on the second Article of charge, that is, with regard to the alleged offence against Smt. Jayanti Ghosh and her husband Shri Biswa Ghosh. 12. The above finding becomes relevant when seen in the context of the order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class-II, which was passed on 14.11.2017 that is more than 3 years after the order of the Appellate Authority. The petitioner was acquitted of all the charges framed in the criminal proceeding forming the basis of the complaint filed by Smt. Jayanti Ghosh before the Aberdeen Police Station. The order was passed on a detailed examination of the facts and evidence together with the provision under which the petitioner was charged. 13. The petitioner was acquitted of all the charges framed in the criminal proceeding forming the basis of the complaint filed by Smt. Jayanti Ghosh before the Aberdeen Police Station. The order was passed on a detailed examination of the facts and evidence together with the provision under which the petitioner was charged. 13. The order also identifies the witnesses who were not examined by the prosecution and the statements of the victim which were not recorded under section 164 of The Code of Criminal Procedure to corroborate the case of the prosecution. The Court goes on to conclude that the prosecution was unable to prove the case under sections 451, 354 and 506 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused person (petitioner) is thus entitled to be acquitted from the case. 14. Although, the respondents have treated the order of acquittal as one which was passed without the benefit of the evidence of all the witnesses, I am of the view that the respondents cannot take advantage of the inaction on the part of the prosecution in failing to examine certain witnesses and thereby take an adverse view of the order of acquittal. This is all the more so since the witnesses who were relevant to the second Article of charge were all examined and their evidence was taken into consideration by the Court. 15. In such view of the matter, nothing remains of the charges which formed the basis of the disciplinary proceeding or the order of the dismissal after the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal case which was passed on the same set of charges as the disciplinary proceedings. 16. The argument made on behalf of the respondents that the order of acquittal only deals with one of the two charges cannot be accepted since the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority did not segregate the charges and imposed the penalty based on omnibus considerations. In fact, the order of dismissal does not deal with the individual Articles of charge at all. The Articles of charge have only been recorded in the first part of the order. 17. The order of acquittal is also significant against the backdrop of the petitioner’s letter to the IRBn dated 28.10.2013 which records that the parties named in the Articles of charge have withdrawn their respective cases from the Court after accepting the petitioner’s apology. The Articles of charge have only been recorded in the first part of the order. 17. The order of acquittal is also significant against the backdrop of the petitioner’s letter to the IRBn dated 28.10.2013 which records that the parties named in the Articles of charge have withdrawn their respective cases from the Court after accepting the petitioner’s apology. The Disciplinary Authority did not take note of this fact and the order of the Appellate Authority, as stated above, is completely opaque in terms of any indication as to the basis of the Appellate Authority’s confirmation of the order of dismissal. It should also be stated that the petitioner’s alleged admission of guilt is certainly not evident from the said letter. An admission has to be specific and in relation to the particular offence. A mere statement that the complainants have accepted the petitioner’s apology is not an admission. 18. After all, the easier route is to condemn based on the case-law; the more difficult task is to assess the individual facts in each case and contextualise the decided case. 19. Similarly, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal does not contain any finding on the order of acquittal or the consequences flowing from it, save and accept accepting the ratio of the decisions cited on behalf of respondents. The Tribunal has not given its consideration on the particular facts before it and has merely upheld the order of the Disciplinary Authority on the grounds that the Tribunal cannot act as a Court of appeal when there are no procedural lapses in the conduct of the departmental enquiry. 20. The finding of the Tribunal, that the order of dismissal should be sustained in the absence of any procedural lapses, is incorrect. The Enquiry Report and the order of the Disciplinary Authority makes it clear that the witnesses in respect of the First Charge were not examined. The petitioner was also not examined with regard to the alleged admission of guilt – thus negating the basis of the order of dismissal. 21. Therefore, the charges brought against the petitioner collapses in the absence of evidence. The order of the Disciplinary Authority merely relies on the Enquiry Report and the petitioner’s alleged admission of guilt and proceeds to find the petitioner unsuitable for the IRBn. 21. Therefore, the charges brought against the petitioner collapses in the absence of evidence. The order of the Disciplinary Authority merely relies on the Enquiry Report and the petitioner’s alleged admission of guilt and proceeds to find the petitioner unsuitable for the IRBn. Un-suitability of a person cannot be a matter of the personal opinion of the Disciplinary Authority but grounded on both the charges being proved against the petitioner. The two charges, in any event, merge into an omnibus/general charge in respect of which the petitioner was given a clean chit 3 years later. 22. The view taken by the Disciplinary Authority is usually accepted as the last word on the suitability of an employee. However, the “sacro-sanctity” given to this view must be accompanied by reasons. An order of dismissal entails grave consequences and the authority is hence duty-bound to ensure that the charges are proved. The test of balance of probabilities is an easier benchmark to satisfy and the authority must do this to the fullest. Moreover, the Appellate Authority cannot act as a yes-man but give its independent assessment to the matter. The order of dismissal and affirmation are hence rendered vulnerable by the mechanical, high-handed handling by the authorities concerned. 23. Nothing remains of the disciplinary proceeding after the petitioner was acquitted of the criminal charges on the same set of facts and evidences and the Appellate Authority could not have sustained the order under review with regard to the order of dismissal. 24. I may also add that in the absence of the First Charge being proved in the Enquiry Report by examination of witnesses or otherwise and the dismissal order also suffering from the same infirmity, the two charges lost their separate existence and merged into one. The Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority have also proceeded on the basis only of the Second Charge relating to Jayanti Ghosh -which formed the subject matter of the order of acquittal. There is also a lot to be said for the principles and practice of truth and reconciliation in light of the petitioner’s letter recording apology and forgiveness particularly after a passage of 6 years. 25. In my considered view, the order of acquittal read with the orders passed by the disciplinary authorities results in a clean slate with regard to the complaint and the FIR lodged against the petitioner. 25. In my considered view, the order of acquittal read with the orders passed by the disciplinary authorities results in a clean slate with regard to the complaint and the FIR lodged against the petitioner. I therefore find the rejection of the petitioner’s review by the Appellate Authority to be devoid of any basis either in fact or in law. 26. In Deputy Inspector General of Police vs. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 , explained the concept of “honorable acquittal”, and phrase of similar import including “fully exonerated” and “acquitted of blame”. The Supreme Court however was of the view that the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The Supreme Court hence was of the opinion that the respondent was not honorably acquitted by the criminal court. In State of Rajasthan and others vs. Heem Singh, (2021) 12 SCC 569 , the Supreme Court considered an acquittal in a criminal trial on a charge of murder and considered Samuthiram in support of its view that acquittal would not affect the decision in the disciplinary proceedings where the accused was not given an honorable acquittal in the criminal trial. 27. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1618, considers Samuthiram but proceeds to dispense with expression like “honorably acquitted” and “benefit of doubt” which, according to the Supreme Court, are not to be used as “magic incantations”. In that case, the Supreme Court gave weightage to the acquittal of the appellant in the criminal proceeding after due consideration of the prosecution evidence and the fact that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge against the appellant. The Supreme Court accordingly held that the disciplinary proceeding and the orders passed therein cannot be permitted to stand in the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge acquitting the appellant before the Court. 28. It may be noted that in Ram Lal, the appellant was directed to be reinstated with all consequential benefits including seniority, notional promotion, fitment of salary and all other benefits including payment of 50% of back wages. 29. The facts in the present case are similar to those in Ram Lal. as the order of acquittal specifically records; “... 28. It may be noted that in Ram Lal, the appellant was directed to be reinstated with all consequential benefits including seniority, notional promotion, fitment of salary and all other benefits including payment of 50% of back wages. 29. The facts in the present case are similar to those in Ram Lal. as the order of acquittal specifically records; “... thorough scrutiny of the prosecution evidence as a whole, this court is of the view that prosecution was unable to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt u/ 451/354/506 of IPC and on the basis of the instant prosecution evidence, conviction cannot be awarded to the accused person is thus entitled to get acquitted from this case.” 30. The order of acquittal in the instant case is an ‘honourable acquittal’ in every sense since the order specifically notes that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 31. I should also record at this stage that the cases relied upon proceed on the difference in the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding compared to that of a disciplinary proceeding, namely, beyond reasonable doubt and on a balance of probabilities, respectively. It needs to be said in this context that the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding is much more strict and involves a higher threshold. Hence, once the accused is acquitted of the charges in a criminal case, permitting the Disciplinary authority to proceed with the enquiry or sustain its penalty on the same set of charges would amount to nullifying the order of acquittal. 32. An order of acquittal, by its very definition, allows a person to start afresh without the stigma or consequences of criminal charges. The acquitted person cannot be put through the grind of a disciplinary proceeding-which by its very nature, involves a lower standard of scrutiny and proof-and made to suffer the consequences thereof. The Supreme Court has held that disciplinary proceedings should be deferred till disposal of a criminal case. The aforesaid conclusion is of course subject to both the proceedings involving the same set of charges, facts and evidence. 33. Thus in my view, the reasons stated above are good grounds for setting aside the impugned order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal on 28.08.2023. The aforesaid conclusion is of course subject to both the proceedings involving the same set of charges, facts and evidence. 33. Thus in my view, the reasons stated above are good grounds for setting aside the impugned order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal on 28.08.2023. As a consequence thereof, the orders of dismissal dated 28.02.2014, the order of the Appellate Authority confirming the same dated 07.06.2014 and the rejection of the review dated 07.03.2018 are also set aside. The petitioner shall be given the benefit of this judgment in the form of re-instatement in the post of Constable along with consequential service benefits including payment of arrear salary on and from the date of suspension. 34. WPCT/79/2023 is accordingly allowed and disposed of in terms of the above. 35. I had the privilege to go through the judgment proposed to be delivered by my Learned Sister (Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.). With deepest of respect to my Learned Sister, I am unable to agree with the conclusions arrived at in the said judgment. I, therefore, decided to deliver a separate judgement giving my findings and conclusions. 36. The Judgment and order dated August 28th, 2023 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit Bench at Port Blair (for short “the Tribunal”) is under challenge in this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the instance of the original applicant in OA 351/00622/2018/AN. 37. The charge memorandum dated 24.01.2013, the order dated 28.02.2014 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the order dated 7.06.2014 passed by the Appellate Authority and the order dated 01.03.2018 passed by the Reviewing Authority in a disciplinary proceedings were assailed before the learned tribunal in the aforesaid original application. 38. The Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of “dismissal from service” upon the petitioner. The Appellate Authority affirmed the said order and the Reviewing Authority also refused to accede to the request for revision of the order of penalty. 39. The learned Tribunal, by the judgement and order impugned, dismissed the said original application. Being aggrieved the original applicant has approached this Court. 40. The petitioner was appointed as a Constable in India Reserve Battalion, Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the year 2002. 39. The learned Tribunal, by the judgement and order impugned, dismissed the said original application. Being aggrieved the original applicant has approached this Court. 40. The petitioner was appointed as a Constable in India Reserve Battalion, Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the year 2002. He was arrested on 14.01.2012 in connection with Police Station Aberdeen Challan No. 16/2012 under Section 107/116 (3)/151 Cr.P.C. He was again arrested in connection with the case crime No. 40/2012 under section 451/354/506 of Aberdeen Police Station. A preliminary inquiry was conducted by the employer and the preliminary Inquiry Officer submitted his findings on 18th June, 2012. Thereafter the petitioner was placed under suspension and a regular Departmental Enquiry was initiated against him by issuance of a Charge Memorandum dated 24.01.2023 containing two Articles of Charges. 41. The first charge in the Articles of Charge was that on 14.01.2012 the petitioner was found creating nuisance and using unparliamentary words under the influence of alcohol against Smt. T. Parwati and her daughter and threatening them with dire consequences. 42. The second charge against the petitioner was that on 31.01.2012 the petitioner illegitimately entered into the house of Smt. Jayanti Ghosh while she was alone and tried to molest her modesty. When the petitioner was caught by the husband of Smt. Jayanti Ghosh, he threatened her husband with dire consequences. 43. The Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry and submitted his Report dated 10.10.2013. Petitioner submitted his reply to the inquiry report and the Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of “dismissal from service” upon the petitioner vide order dated 28.02.2014. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of the Disciplinary Authority was rejected by the Appellate Authority on 07.06.2014. In the meantime the petitioner was acquitted from the charges by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-II in GR No. 217 of 2012 on 14.11.2017. After being acquitted by the criminal court, the TR No. 413 of 2014 petitioner made a representation to the authorities for reconsideration of his appeal in the light of his acquittal in the criminal case on 07.02.2018 which was rejected by the order dated 01.03.2018. 44. The petitioner being aggrieved by the rejection of the prayer for reconsideration of his appeal as well as the Penalty Order and the Appellate Order approached the Tribunal. 45. Mr. 44. The petitioner being aggrieved by the rejection of the prayer for reconsideration of his appeal as well as the Penalty Order and the Appellate Order approached the Tribunal. 45. Mr. Kumar, learned advocate representing the petitioner submitted that the nature of charges in the disciplinary proceedings as well as before the criminal court being more or less identical and also that the Magistrate after conducting a full-fledged trial has passed an order of acquittal in favour of the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority ought to have reinstated him in service in the light of the judgement passed by the criminal court. In support of such submission he placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal vs. State Rajasthan and others reported at 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1618. 46. Per contra, Mr. Shatadru Chakraborty, learned advocate appearing for the respondent contended that the acquittal of the petitioner cannot be said to be a “Honourable Acquittal” in the criminal trial. He submitted that since there is a distinction regarding standard of proof in case of disciplinary proceedings and criminal trial, mere acquittal of the petitioner shall not have any impact on the disciplinary proceedings. He further submitted that mere acquittal of the petitioner by the Criminal Court cannot lead to automatic reinstatement. In support of such contention Mr. Chakraborty placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and others vs. Heem Singh reported at (2021) 12 SCC 569 . 47. Heard the learned advocates for the parties and perused the materials placed. 48. Record reveals that the petitioner/Charged Officer proposed to defend the case himself and he was permitted to do so by the Inquiry Officer. It further appears from the Inquiry Report that the PW 2 namely Smt. Jayanti Ghosh in course of her examination stood by her statement recorded during the preliminary inquiry. She also identified her signature and the person who entered her house and tried to molest her modesty. Opportunity was granted to the charged officer to cross examine the said witnesses but the charged officer denied to cross examine PW 2. Thereafter PW 3 namely Biswa Ghosh during his examination stood by his statement recorded in the preliminary inquiry and also identified his signature. Opportunity was granted to the charged officer to cross examine the said witnesses but the charged officer denied to cross examine PW 2. Thereafter PW 3 namely Biswa Ghosh during his examination stood by his statement recorded in the preliminary inquiry and also identified his signature. It further appears from the Inquiry Report that the charged officer denied to cross examine PW 3. The Inquiry Officer further proceeded to record that during inquiry and after examination of PW 2 and PW 3, the charged officer admitted his guilt to the charges levelled against him which he gave it in writing. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 10.10.2013 concluding that as the charged officer has voluntarily admitted all the charges levelled against him and, therefore, the charges in the charge memorandum dated 24.01.2013 stands proved. 49. The charged officer submitted a reply to the Inquiry Report. The Disciplinary Authority after considering the inquiry report and the reply of the petitioner observed that the petitioner being a member of disciplined force was responsible for protecting life and honour of the citizen of the Islands and instead of discharging his duty honestly and sincerely he himself has indulged in criminal activities which is reprehensible and unbecoming of member of an uniformed force. The Disciplinary Authority further observed that after such an act of gross misconduct, if charged officer is allowed to continue in the battalion or a bit of leniency is shown towards him it would be a bad precedent and would encourage other members of the force to wrongly believe that such acts are minor delinquencies which could be overlooked. It was further observed therein that the act of indiscipline of the charged officer has brought undesirable and negative impact on the organisation and, therefore, the petitioner is not suitable to continue in a force like India Reserve Battalion whose bed rock is discipline, orderliness and courage. 50. In view of admission of guilt to the charges levelled against the petitioner and that too in writing, I am of the considered view that the Disciplinary Authority was justified in arriving at a finding that the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge memorandum stands proved. 51. The Disciplinary Authority, after taking into consideration the nature of charges which are grave, assigned cogent reasons in support of its decision to impose punishment of “dismissal from service” upon the petitioner. 52. 51. The Disciplinary Authority, after taking into consideration the nature of charges which are grave, assigned cogent reasons in support of its decision to impose punishment of “dismissal from service” upon the petitioner. 52. The appellate authority after taking note of the request made by the petitioner for reinstatement into service and the statement of the petitioner that he will not indulge in any undesirable activity in future observed that such conduct of the petitioner who is member of a uniformed force cannot be accepted. On the basis of such findings Appellate Authority rejected the appeal petition. 53. Petitioner did not challenge the order of the Appellate Authority dated 07.06.2014 at the relevant point of time. 54. The Judicial Magistrate First Class-II Court at Port Blair, South Andaman District by judgement dated 14.11.2017 in GR No. 217 of 2012 acquitted the petitioner upon holding TR No. 413 of 2014 that he is not guilty of offence under Section 451/354/506 of Indian Penal Code. After the petitioner was acquitted by the Criminal Court he filed a revision application before the second respondent praying for setting aside the appellate order dated 07.06.2014. The Deputy Superintendent of Police (HQ) by an order dated 1st March, 2018 rejected the prayer for review upon holding that the acquittal from criminal cases has no bearing upon the disciplinary proceedings. 55. The issue that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the petitioner shall be automatically reinstated in service upon being acquitted by the criminal court. 56. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Heem Singh (supra) held that acquittal in a criminal trial does not conclude a disciplinary inquiry and acquittal for technical reasons shall not affect the decision in the disciplinary proceeding and lead to automatic reinstatement. . The Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus:- “38. … In Southern Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, this Court held: “37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge.” (emphasis supplied) 39. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge.” (emphasis supplied) 39. In Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that unless the accused has an “honorable acquittal” in their criminal trial, as opposed to an acquittal due to witnesses turning hostile or for technical reasons, the acquittal shall not affect the decision in the disciplinary proceedings and lead to automatic reinstatement. But the penal statutes governing substance or procedure do not allude to an “honourable acquittal”. Noticing this, the Court observed: “Honourable acquittal 24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [ (1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 : (1994) 26 ATC 619] . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari [ 1972 SLR 44 (SC)] this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] which is as follows: “8. … ‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. … ‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.’” (Robert Stuart case, ILR pp. 188-89) 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.” (emphasis added) 57. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.” (emphasis added) 57. In Ram Lal (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that expression like “benefit of doubt” and “Honourably acquitted” used in judgements are not to be understood as magic incantations. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgement in its entirety and the court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used. 58. Keeping in mind the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court this Court shall now proceed to examine the substance of the judgement passed by the Criminal Court. 59. After going through the judgement dated 14.11.2014 this Court finds that the learned Judicial Magistrate specifically recorded that the independent witnesses though available were not examined by the prosecution. It was further recorded in the said judgement that one of the neighbour who went out to chase the accused was also not examined by the prosecution. It was further recorded that the carpenter was also not examined by the prosecution. After examining the substance of the judgement passed by the Criminal Court I find that the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses. The learned Magistrate also recorded that the statement of the victim was not recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C by any of the Magistrate to corroborate the case of the prosecution. I am, therefore, of the considered view that the acquittal of the petitioner cannot be said to be an honourable acquittal and the acquittal was for technical reasons. 60. It is well settled that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in disciplinary proceedings. 61. In the case on hand, the charges against the petitioners have been proved on the basis of admission of the charged officer and also the uncontroverted evidence of the other witnesses. 60. It is well settled that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in disciplinary proceedings. 61. In the case on hand, the charges against the petitioners have been proved on the basis of admission of the charged officer and also the uncontroverted evidence of the other witnesses. The acquittal of the petitioner by the Criminal Court is for the reasons as stated hereinbefore. Therefore, the acquittal of the petitioner cannot have any bearing on the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. 62. That apart the charge memorandum contains two articles of charges. The Disciplinary Authority held that both the charges have been proved. The judgement of the criminal court pertains to one of such charges. Therefore, mere acquittal of the petitioner by the Criminal court in respect of one of the charges and also that such acquittal is not an honourable one, this Court is not inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Kumar that the acquittal of the petitioner by the criminal court shall automatically lead to reinstatement of the petitioner in service. 63. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Heem Singh (supra) reiterated the proposition of law laid down in State vs. S. Samuthiram reported at (2013) 1 SCC 598 that in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by the Criminal court no right is conferred on the employee to claim reinstatement. 64. Since this Court has already held that the acquittal of the petitioner is not honourable, the issue whether the relevant service rules contain such a provision has not been gone into at this stage. 65. There are adequate materials available in the records to support the decision of the authorities in departmental proceedings that retention of the petitioner in service would have a serious impact on the morale and the discipline of the battalion and, therefore, the decision of the authorities to dismiss the petitioner from service does not call for any interference. 66. 65. There are adequate materials available in the records to support the decision of the authorities in departmental proceedings that retention of the petitioner in service would have a serious impact on the morale and the discipline of the battalion and, therefore, the decision of the authorities to dismiss the petitioner from service does not call for any interference. 66. It is well settled that the disciplinary inquiry was not governed by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which governed the criminal trial and, therefore, the order of the reviewing authority dated 01.03.2018 holding that the acquittal the petitioner from criminal cases has no bearing upon the disciplinary proceedings which have been concluded and was on different footing do not suffer from any infirmity. 67. It is well settled that the determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of the natural justice and are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. In exercise of the powers of Judicial Review, a limited scrutiny is to be undertaken in order to determine whether the findings of the disciplinary authority is based on some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. However, the courts cannot re-appreciate the evidences or substitute its view with that of the disciplinary authority. [See para 37 of Heem Singh (Supra)]. 68. The learned Tribunal was right in holding that there was no procedural lapse in conducting the disciplinary inquiry and also that the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner stands proved in view of the fact that the petitioner admitted his guilt during the inquiry. The Tribunal after considering the gravity of charges held that the punishment awarded cannot be said to be disproportionate to the charges proved. The judgement of the Learned Tribunal does not suffer from infirmity. 69. For all the reasons as aforesaid I am not inclined to interfere with the judgement and order dated 28.08.2023 passed by the Tribunal in OA 351/00622/2018/AN. 70. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. 71. There shall, however, no order as to costs. 72. The judgement of the Learned Tribunal does not suffer from infirmity. 69. For all the reasons as aforesaid I am not inclined to interfere with the judgement and order dated 28.08.2023 passed by the Tribunal in OA 351/00622/2018/AN. 70. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. 71. There shall, however, no order as to costs. 72. A copy of the judgment written by my learned colleague was given to me today morning minutes before we were to pronounce the judgment. Although my learned colleague had the benefit of the judgment written by me, I only had the opportunity to read the last few lines of his judgment from which it appears that a different view has been taken. 73. Since we have differed on the outcome, namely, on the effect of the order of acquittal and the judgment given by the Tribunal, we refer the matter to the Hon’ble The Chief Justice for necessary reference.