Shinu C. R, S/o Raghavan v. Deputy Conservator Of Forests & Wild Life Warden Wayanad Wild Life Division
2024-01-08
V.G.ARUN
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The revision petitioner is the appellant in CMA No.19 of 2019 of the District Court, Kalpetta. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was filed challenging the order issued by the first respondent under Section 61A of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961('the Act' for short), confiscating the petitioner's auto rickshaw bearing registration No. KL-73-A-4379, on the premise that the vehicle was used for transportation of illegally cut sandalwood logs. The appeal filed against the confiscation order was rejected by the court below, accepting the respondent’s contention that cutting, possession and transportation of sandalwood without permission would fall within the ambit of offences under Sections 47B, 47C, 47F, 47G, 47H read with Section 47(a)(b) and (c) of the Act and hence, Section 52 providing for seizure of the timber and conveyance, and Section 61A, empowering confiscation of the sandalwood, equipments and conveyances, would apply. 2. Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the sandal tree was cut from private land belonging to one Paru Mooppathi. As such, the sandalwood was not Government property and it could not have been confiscated under Section 61A of the Act. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decisions in Bhargavan v. Divisional Forest Officer (ILR 1994 (2) Ker.442), Moideen K.K. and Another v. Assistant Wildlife Warden, Tholpetty Range and Another [ 2010 (4)KHC 80 ], and State of Kerala v. Jossy Sequeria [ 2017 (9) SCC 316 ]. 3. The learned Special Government Pleader contended that Chapter VIA of the Act contains special provisions relating to sandalwood. Sections 47B therein imposes restriction on cutting and sale of sandal trees and Section 47C prohibits possession and transport of sandalwood and sandalwood oil. As per Section 47H, where an offence is believed to have been committed in respect of any sandalwood, then the sandalwood and the conveyance used for its transportation are liable to be seized under Section 52 and the Sections 61A, 61B, 61C, 61D, 61E, 61F would, mutatis mutandis, apply to such seizure and confiscation. Moreover, possession or transportation of sandalwood in excess of 1 kg is a punishable offence and in the instant case the sandalwood transported in the petitioner's vehicle weighed 26.5 Kgs. Hence, irrespective of whether the sandalwood was cut from private property or not, Section 47H is attracted.
Moreover, possession or transportation of sandalwood in excess of 1 kg is a punishable offence and in the instant case the sandalwood transported in the petitioner's vehicle weighed 26.5 Kgs. Hence, irrespective of whether the sandalwood was cut from private property or not, Section 47H is attracted. Resultantly, the sandalwood and the vehicle used for transportation can be seized under Section 52 and confiscated as per Section 61A of the Act. 4. Indisputably, the sandal tree was cut from private property. No doubt, possession and transportation of sandalwood in excess of 1Kg is an offence punishable under section 47G. It is also true that Section 47H read with Sections 52 and 61A provides for seizure and confiscation of the sandalwood as well as the tools and conveyances with respect to offences involving sandalwood. In this regard it is pertinent to note that, as per Section 52, when there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any timber or other forest produce, such timber or produce, together with all tools, rocks, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing any such offence can be seized by any Forest Officer or Police Officer. If the timber thus seized is believed to be the property of the Government, then the timber, along with the tools and conveyance seized, should be produced before the officer authorised to order confiscation. The authorised officer can thereupon order confiscation of the property thus produced or seized by him under Section 52, together with all tools, rocks, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing such offence, if he is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in respect to such property. The term 'such property' in the context of section 61A means ‘property of the Government’. Thus, Section 52 provides for seizure of any timber or other forest produce with respect to which a forest offence is believed to have been committed and Section 61A(2) empowers the authorised officer to confiscate the articles seized and produced before him, if the forest produce is found to be the property of the Government. 5. In Bhargavan's case (supra), teak logs purchased in the auction conducted by the Forest Department and seized during transportation without valid permit mandated under the Kerala Forest Produce Transit Rules, 1975 was later confiscated.
5. In Bhargavan's case (supra), teak logs purchased in the auction conducted by the Forest Department and seized during transportation without valid permit mandated under the Kerala Forest Produce Transit Rules, 1975 was later confiscated. Interfering with the order, this Court held as under; “Therefore, for transporting the teak poles, which are found to be not the property of the Government without any valid permit or pass as required under R.3(1)(iii) of the Rules, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on the person who has violated the Rule is imprisonment for a period of six months with fine which may extend to rupees five hundred or both by a Magistrate on conviction of the accused therein and there is no question of passing an order of confiscation of the lorry for violation of the above Rules. The learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondent did not point out any other provision of law which would enable the Authorised Officer to order confiscation of the lorry for violation of the Forest Produce Transit Rules.” The above reasoning was approved by the Apex Court in Jossy Sequeria(supra). 6. In Moideen.K.K (supra), rosewood logs transported from Karnataka to Kerala were seized and confiscated. The confiscation was challenged on the ground that the rosewood was not property of the Government of Kerala. The challenge was upheld, holding that the power of confiscation under Section 61A will be available only if the authorised officer is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in respect of property belonging to the Government of Kerala. Being contextually relevant, paragraph 5 of the Judgment is extracted hereunder; “5. S.52(1) of the Act empowers the forest officer or police officer to seize 'any timber or other forest produce' if he has reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of it, together with all tools, vehicles etc. used in committing such offence. Under sub-section (2) such officer is to make a report of the seizure to the Magistrate concerned. There is no mention in S.52(1) or (2) whether property seized should be property of 'the Government' or not.
used in committing such offence. Under sub-section (2) such officer is to make a report of the seizure to the Magistrate concerned. There is no mention in S.52(1) or (2) whether property seized should be property of 'the Government' or not. But the proviso to sub-section (2) makes it clear that when timber or forest produce in respect of which a forest offence is believed to be committed 'is the property of the Government' and the offender is unknown, it is sufficient if the forest officer makes a report of the circumstances to his official superior. S.55 of the Act empowers the Magistrate trying the forest offence while ordering conviction of the offender to direct confiscation of all timber or other forest produce in respect of which the offence is committed together with tools, vehicles etc. used in committing such offence. That provision also does not say whether timber or other forest produce should be property of the Government or not for ordering confiscation. S.60 of the Act states that where an order for confiscation of 'any property' has been passed by the Magistrate under S.55, or under S.57 and no appeal has been presented or when any such appeal has been presented but the order of confiscation (by the Magistrate) is confirmed, such property shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is relevant to note that in S.60 also there is no classification as to whether the property which is to vest in the Government should be property of the Government or not. But in S.61A of the Act, specific reference is made to timber, charcoal, firewood or ivory which is 'the property for the Government'. It would therefore appear that when the property seized under S.52 in respect of which a forest offence is believed to be committed is 'the property of the Government', the officer seizing such property has to produce such property together with the vehicle etc. used for commission of such offence before the authorised officer under S.61A(1) and the authorised officer can order confiscation only if he is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in respect of 'such property', i.e. 'the property of the Government' and the vehicle, etc. produced before the authorized officer under sub-section (1) or (2) of S.61A. The decision in Bhargavan v. Divisional Forest Officer (supra) is supportive of the above view.
produced before the authorized officer under sub-section (1) or (2) of S.61A. The decision in Bhargavan v. Divisional Forest Officer (supra) is supportive of the above view. There, the property in relation to which offence under R.3(1)(i) r/w R.23 of the Rules was allegedly committed was proved to be not belonging to the Government. The order of confiscation was held to be illegal as the property was not property of the Government.” 7. In the instant case, sandal tree was cut from private land. Hence, the sandalwood logs are not the property of the Government. The petitioner’s vehicle could be confiscated by exercising the power under Section 61A only if the forest offence was committed in respect of property belonging to the Government. Being so, the challenge against the impugned order is liable to be upheld. In the result, the Revision Petition is allowed by setting aside the judgment in CMA No.19 of 2019 of the District Judge, Kalpetta and order No.W4-10246/18 issued by the first respondent.