JUDGMENT : Ajit Kumar, J. Late petitioner Baleshwar Prasad Sangal, an Ex-Officer of the Bank in MMGS-II, had filed this petition challenging the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dismissing him from employment of the Bank and so also the order rejecting his appeal and review petition by the authorities of the Bank. During pendency of this petition, the petitioner died on 25.12.2003 and consequently his heirs, namely, Smt. Nisha Sangal, Anubhav Gupta and Ms. Ankita Gupta came to be substituted. 2. The original petitioner late Baleshwar Prasad Sangal was subjected to disciplinary proceedings pursuant to two set of charge-sheets dated 15.1.1996 and 18.6.1996. The first charge-sheet contained as many as seven charges and the charges were basically for the delinquent employee having failed to discharge his duties with honesty, integrity and devotion and his act and conduct was taken to be unbecoming of an official of a Bank. Besides the charges of granting credit limit of term loan without due verification, there were charges of over withdrawals, over drafting and enhancing over draft limit by exercising illegally his discretionary power. The second charge-sheet contained charges regarding misappropriation of certain amount of money meant to be deposited into the account of one Suresh Kumar Tyagi, enhancing credit limit in account of fuel and service station and brick works Company, and misplacing the original security documents in respect of two accounts. Petitioner submitted his reply on 12.9.1996 in which instead of denying charges, petitioner took an excuse of ill health as suffering from heart disease and charged co-workers of the Bank to have played foul with him in instigating higher officer to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. The Enquiry Officer proceeded and found three charges to be partly proved, one charge to be not proved and three other charges to be fully proved. The Enquiry Officer in his ultimate finding recorded that the delinquent employee has failed to discharge his duties with honesty, integrity, devotion and diligence and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bank official in violation of Rule 50 (4) of the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules. The inquiry report was supplied to the petitioner on 14.10.1996 and 3.9.1997 inviting his explanation and thereafter the disciplinary authorities considered the entire material placed before it and made a recommendation for dismissal of delinquent employee from service on 9.9.1998. The inquiry report was supplied to the petitioner on 14.10.1996 and 3.9.1997 inviting his explanation and thereafter the disciplinary authorities considered the entire material placed before it and made a recommendation for dismissal of delinquent employee from service on 9.9.1998. The Competent Authority in the matter finally accepted the recommendation of the Disciplinary Authority and imposed penalty in the nature of dismissal of petitioner from service giving it effect from the date of his retirement i.e. 31.7.1996. The Appellate Authority concurred with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and the action taken by the Competent Authority and dismissed the appeal and so also the Reviewing Authority dismissed the review petition of the petitioner. 3. Heard Ms. Anjali Gokhlani, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank 4. Assailing the orders impugned before this Court the argument advanced by Ms. Gokhlani is that inordinate delay in drawing disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner is itself a ground to hold the disciplinary proceedings to be bad. It is submitted that charges are relating to the period between the year 1988-89 whereas the proceedings came to be instituted only in the year 1996 when the petitioner was going to retire and this aspect absolutely established that entire action was ill motivated. Yet, second ground taken is that while petitioner was placed under suspension he was never paid subsistence allowance to which the petitioner was otherwise entitled to and therefore, this was also a reason why the petitioner could not participate in the disciplinary proceedings. It is submitted that several representations were made asking the authority to provide subsistence allowance but they were not paid any heed. In support of her submissions, learned counsel Advocate has placed reliance upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh; 1973 (1) SCC 656 ; Jagdamba Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P. and others; 2000 (7) SCC 90 . It is also argued by Ms. Gokhlani that vide letter dated 12.9.1996, petitioner virtually denied all the charges and, therefore, it cannot be said that petitioner did not deny the charges. It is submitted that petitioner in absence of adequate financial support could not participate in the enquiry and admittedly the enquiry was conducted ex-parte and hence the same cannot be read against the petitioner. Ms. Gokhlani that vide letter dated 12.9.1996, petitioner virtually denied all the charges and, therefore, it cannot be said that petitioner did not deny the charges. It is submitted that petitioner in absence of adequate financial support could not participate in the enquiry and admittedly the enquiry was conducted ex-parte and hence the same cannot be read against the petitioner. Ms. Gokhlani has also argued that charge-sheet was not prepared as per format prescribed under Rule 68 (2) (III) of the Rules. Thus according to Ms. Gokhlani entire disciplinary proceeding was flawed one and, therefore, the impugned punishment deserves to be set aside and so also the orders passed in appeal and review petition filed by the petitioner. 5. Countering the submissions advanced by Ms. Gokhlani, Mr. Satish Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-Bank submitted that in the entire petition there is no ground as such taken that the enquiry was bad for long delay in its initiation. He also argued that service of charge-sheet is an independent act in a disciplinary proceeding and if delinquent employee was of the opinion that charge-sheet was not prepared as per the format prescribed and was not served adequately then such an objection ought to have been taken by him in the very beginning. Regarding non supply of list of documents to the delinquent employee alongwith charge-sheet, he submitted that no such ground was ever taken by the delinquent employee. It is argued by Mr. Chaturvedi that such argument on facts questioning flaw in the procedure adopted for departmental enquiry, cannot be permitted to be raised unless pleaded either before the Disciplinary Authority or Appellate Authority or even before this Court in the writ petition. He submitted that pleadings being silent upon these aspects, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise this issue. He has submitted that whatever has been argued on behalf of the petitioner was nowhere pleaded in the entire writ petition, nor any such ground was taken. Mr. Chaturvedi has further argued that if delinquent employee deliberately fails to appear before the Enquiry Officer and does not submit his reply to the charge-sheet, he cannot be permitted to take a plea that enquiry being ex-parte was flawed one and, therefore, findings deserved to be set aside. Mr. Mr. Chaturvedi has further argued that if delinquent employee deliberately fails to appear before the Enquiry Officer and does not submit his reply to the charge-sheet, he cannot be permitted to take a plea that enquiry being ex-parte was flawed one and, therefore, findings deserved to be set aside. Mr. Chaturvedi has submitted that scope of interference by this Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter of disciplinary proceedings is very limited one. He has placed reliance upon the authorities of Supreme Court State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao; (1964) 3 SCR 25 , State of Orissa and another v. Murlidhar Jena; AIR 1963 SC 404 , R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and others; (1999) 8 SCC 90 , State of U.P. and others v. Nand Kishore Shukla and another; (1996) 3 SCC 750 . 6. Submitting her rejoinder argument Ms. Gokhlani has placed reliance upon the review petition that was filed by delinquent employee before the Chief General Manager in which according to her, the charged officer had explained away the reasons which made it impossible for him to participate in the enquiry. She submitted that petitioner was suffering from acute heart disease and high blood pressure and it was for serious illness and resultant worst medical condition that he could not participate in the enquiry. She has also placed reliance upon certain paragraphs of review petition to suggest that sufficient ground was taken to question the delayed enquiry and that too at the fag end of his service career. 7. Having heard the submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing for respective parties and having perused the record, I find that basic point argued was that the departmental enquiry was ex-parte and the Disciplinary Authority adopted a flawed procedure for not properly drafting charge-sheet and not providing copy thereof on a prescribed format as per relevant rules. The legal proposition laid down by the judgment cited before me by learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner would come for the aid of petitioner only if I am convinced that the disciplinary proceeding was flawed one and that petitioner was faced with such medical situation that made it impossible for him to participate in the enquiry and the Enquiry Officer and thereafter the Disciplinary Authority did fail to consider the same. 8. 8. Coming to the first argument qua charge-sheet not being upon a prescribed format, I do not find there to be any such pleading raised in the entire writ petition, nor there are any such grounds specific to the point. Still further, the only reply that is available on record and that was sent by registered post by the delinquent employee to the Enquiry Authority dated 12.9.1996 does not contain any avernment or statement questioning the charge-sheet, nor so even in the memo of appeal that was filed before the Appellate Authority, nor even in the review petition filed before the Reviewing Authority any such ground was taken. In such circumstances, therefore, now this Court cannot permit the petitioner's counsel to raise this argument of which there is no pleading available on record. The delinquent employee had sufficient opportunity to file reply to the charge-sheet but instead of doing that, he simply wrote a letter on 12.9.1996 complaining of his ill health issue and further making allegations upon some co-workers. For better appreciation of stand taken by the delinquent employee, the reply letter, which he had made after service of charge-sheet to the Enquiry Officer, on 12.9.1996 is reproduced hereunder : ''Dated: 12.9.1996 To, Shri A.K. Sheopuri, Inquiring Authority, Vigilance Department, State Bank of India, Local Head Office, Administrative Building, Moti Mahal Marg, Lucknow-226 001'' Respected Sir, DEPARTMENTAL ENQUIRY With reference to you letter No. Gig/Aks/123 dated 3.9.96, I today wired you as under : ''SHRI A.K. SHEOPURI, VIGILENCE, VICTIM OF MAJOR HEART DISEASE, LETTER FOLLOWS''. ''B.P. SNGAL'' (2) In this connection I have to inform that I am the victim of major heart disease as per medical certificates of senior Bank Medical Officer and heart specialist, photocopy of both are enclosed herewith for your kind perusal. (3) The allegations fabricated against me are false and baseless. Some Co-workers, have played foul games sitting behind the curtain to blackmail, harrass and harm me. I am proud of my beloved Institution and its great officers. I do not want to indulge in any contraction and I will happily accept as usual the verdicts of my superiors as I have always perfound my duties in good faith, without Negligence and in the interest of bank, and also for the good of mankind. With Sincere regards, Yours Faithfully. (B.P. SANGAL) Officer (Retd.) C/o State Bank of India, HASANPUR. With Sincere regards, Yours Faithfully. (B.P. SANGAL) Officer (Retd.) C/o State Bank of India, HASANPUR. Residence Address: H-86, Shastri Nagar, MEERUT.'' 9. Thus, the argument is wholly found to be unsustainable. 10. Regarding the ground of inordinate delay in the matter of disciplinary proceedings as it pertains to discharge of duties by petitioner some time in the year 1988-89, I find that petitioner did not raise any objection either by filing reply to the charge-sheet, nor appeared even before the Enquiry Officer to rebut the charges. It is not a case pleaded by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority that he was not afforded with sufficient opportunity to submit reply to the charge-sheet. All that he has taken by way of plea, was that the delinquent employee could not have inflicted upon him such harsh punishment and that such enquiry could not have been continued after the petitioner had retired. Interestingly, no such argument was advanced before Competent Authority even though proceedings had continued after petitioner had retired. So this argument of inordinate delay in the matter of disciplinary proceedings cannot be entertained at this stage. 11. In the entire writ petition, petitioner has not taken the ground that he was not supplied with the enquiry report and that he had no opportunity to question the enquiry report whereas the order of Disciplinary Authority fully records that copy of enquiry report was served upon the petitioner on 14.10.1996 and 3.9.1997 respectively and that the entire enquiry was conducted as per Rule 68 of State Bank of India Officers Service Rules. In such circumstances, therefore, it can be safely concluded that petitioner had adequate opportunity to rebut the charges even at the stage when the Disciplinary Authority issued notice to him to submit his explanation qua the enquiry report but petitioner for the reasons best known to him, did not submit any reply. The Recommending Authority after considering entire facts, charge-sheet and material available on record, recorded following findings vide paragraphs-7 to 10 in its recommendation dated 9.9.1998 : ''7. The Recommending Authority after considering entire facts, charge-sheet and material available on record, recorded following findings vide paragraphs-7 to 10 in its recommendation dated 9.9.1998 : ''7. Having gone through the charge-sheet, defence statements, the Presenting Officer's brief, the defence brief, proceedings of the enquiry, the findings of the Enquiring Authority and other related records of the case, it is proved that the charged officer did not ensure to obtain financial data in respect of units and he failed to compile opinion reports on borrowers and guarantors while sanctioning and disbursing the loans. He has also failed to ensure end use of the loans and advances granted to the borrowers. He negotiated a cheque for Rs. 40,000/- on the 30th December 1983 to cover up irregular drawings in the account, which was received back unpaid. He has permitted irregularities to the borrowers beyond his discretionary powers. He permitted the borrower to open a current account in the name of the borrowing firm at the Branch to enable him to divert the sale proceeds. He created equitable mortgage to collaterally secure the advance on the basis of certified copies of title deeds deposited by Shri Mela Ram, the guarantor. He accommodated Shri Kuldip Kumar wilfully placing the Bank's interest in jeoparady. He did not submit the irregular cash credit account/current account O.D. returns to the Controlling office during his tenure at the Branch. He allowed Shri No. Kuldeep Kumar another O.D. in his current account No. 100003 beyond his discretionary powers. He allowed irregular drawings in current account No. 10002 beyond his discretionary powers and against RBI/Bank's instructions. 9. Considering the above facts, the charged officer failed to discharged his duties with utmost devotion and diligence and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bank official in violation of rule 50(4) of State Bank of India Officers Service Rules. The acts of the official have been highly detrimental to the Bank's interests. He deserves severe punishment of dismissal in terms of Rule 67(j) of State Bank of India Officers Service Rules in this case also. 10. Having gone through all the records of the cases, I have separately considered both the cases without prejudice to each other and observe that Sri B.P. Sangal, Officer MMGS-II has committed serious lapses with mala fide intention, due to which Bank's interest is jeopardised. 10. Having gone through all the records of the cases, I have separately considered both the cases without prejudice to each other and observe that Sri B.P. Sangal, Officer MMGS-II has committed serious lapses with mala fide intention, due to which Bank's interest is jeopardised. He failed to perform his duties with utmost honesty, integrity, diligence and devotion, while working at Raja Ka Tajpur, Dhanaura and Bhaila Kalan Branches. The charge-sheets, enquiry proceedings, records of the case etc. have been analysed separately and each of the proceedings and charges proved thereto itself sufficient and warrants severe punishment independent of other charge-sheet/proceedings thereto. Accordingly to I recommend that Shri B.P.Sangal, Officer MMGS-II be dismissed from the service in terms of Rule 67(j) of the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules read with rule 68 of the rules in both cases for the charges proved against him in the two separate enquiry proceedings. The order to be served on Shri Sangal shall be effective from the effective date of his retirement, i.e., 31.7.1996. 12. This recommendation was accepted by the Competent Authority of the Bank while imposing punishment and returning the finding vide paragraphs-3 to 6 in its order dated 16th September, 1998, which reads as under : ''3. I have carefully gone through all the relevant records of both the cases independently. The charge-sheets, the defence statements, the proceedings of the enquiries, the prosecution exhibits and the defence exhibits, the briefs of the Presenting Officer and the Defence Representative, the findings of the Inquiry Authority. The submissions made by you thereon and the views of the Disciplinary Authority have been examined by me. Upon an independent perusal of the records of the cases without prejudice to each other, I concur with the reasoning, findings and recommendations of the Disciplinary Authority for the reasons adduced by him in both the cases. 4. Considering the gravity of lapses proved against you, in both the cases separately and independently I have decided to impose upon you the penalty of dismissal from the Bank's service in terms of Rule 67(j) of the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules read with Rule 68 of the rules ibid in both the cases severally for the charges proved against you in separate enquiries. I, hereby order accordingly. This order shall be effective from the effective date of your retirement i.e. 31.7.96. 5. I, hereby order accordingly. This order shall be effective from the effective date of your retirement i.e. 31.7.96. 5. A copy of the order alongwith other relevant records of the case, is being placed in your service file. 6. If you desire to make an appeal to the Appellate Authority against my order imposing upon you the penalty specified above, you may do so within 45 days from the date of receipt of this order by you, as provided for in Rule 69 of the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules. 7. Meanwhile, please acknowledge receipt. Yours faithfully, Sd/-Illegible GENERAL MANAGER (DEV. & PER. BANKING) APPOINTING AUTHORTY.'' 13. Petitioner had occasion to question these findings even at the stage of appeal but in appeal instead of questioning the findings he has raised the issue that disciplinary proceedings could not have been continued after his superannuation and has raised pleas based upon Regulation 20 (3) (III) of the Officers Service Regulation and referred to the opinion of the Standing Committee. He had gone more on the question of scope of punishment than assailing the findings returned by the Enquiry Officer. 14. Certain issues have been raised regarding findings upon Charge Nos. III, V and VI on the plea that no such evidence was available on record. The findings are sought to be assailed only on the ground that conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Office was not supported by material. In my considered view all these aspects could have been considered by the Departmental Enquiry Officer himself, had the petitioner submitted reply to the charge-sheet and participated in the enquiry. The delinquent employee, who did not submit reply to the charge-sheet in rebuttal to the charges and failed to lead any supportive evidence in his defence, cannot be permitted to raise objection to the findings based upon material placed by the Presenting Officer of the Bank. 15. In the case of disciplinary proceedings, if the delinquent employee does not put up his defence and takes a flimsy ground that he was only being cornered by the co-workers for certain vested interest, cannot be said to have denied the charges at all. Thus, the submission regarding finding to be perverse or enquiry to be flawed as advanced by Ms. Gokhlani are liable to be rejected. Thus, the submission regarding finding to be perverse or enquiry to be flawed as advanced by Ms. Gokhlani are liable to be rejected. The proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments cited before me by Ms. Gokhlani would have come to rescue of the delinquent employee provided he himself would have raised any such issue either at the stage of charge-sheet or even at the stage of appeal but he failed to do so. As a matter of fact the delinquent employee had tried to put up a defence of medical condition more to show his bona fides in not participating than questioning the delayed enquiry. Insofar as the question of non-payment of subsistence allowance is concerned, I again find there to be no such ground raised in the departmental appeal and even in the writ petition there is no such ground taken to question disciplinary proceedings. The only plea taken was that petitioner was entitled for provisional pension equivalent to subsistence allowance. 16. On the question of opportunity of hearing, suffice it to say that petitioner himself did not participate and for his this voluntary act, he cannot be permitted to take a legal plea that the enquiry was ex-parte or flawed one. The law is well-settled that in matters of disciplinary proceedings, the Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution would not interfere unless and until it is pleaded and established that enquiry was a flawed one and that the findings returned by the Enquiry Officer was perverse. In the matter of Union of India and others v. Subrata Nath; 2022 SCC Online SC 1617, the Supreme Court has discussed the principle qua judicial review of the administrative action taken in the matter of disciplinary proceedings and has held that in a very rare case where either findings are found to be perverse or that there is violation of principles of natural justice that Courts would interfere otherwise where there is no such procedural flaw in conduct of disciplinary proceedings, the Court will not embark upon an enquiry to substitute its own finding to the finding of the Enquiry Officer as an appellate authority or Court/tribunal of appeal. vide paragraphs-14, 15 and 16, the Supreme Court held thus : ''14. vide paragraphs-14, 15 and 16, the Supreme Court held thus : ''14. It is well-settled that Courts ought to refrain from interfering with findings of facts recorded in a departmental inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are patently perverse or grossly incompatible with the evidence on record, based on no evidence. However, if principles of natural justice have been violated or the statutory regulations have not been adhered to or there are mala fides attributable to the Disciplinary Authority, then the Courts can certainly interfere. 15. In the above context, following are the observations made by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) : ''12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. 18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.'' [Emphasis laid] 16. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, a two Judge Bench of this Court held as below : ''7. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, a two Judge Bench of this Court held as below : ''7. It is now well-settled that the Courts will not act as an appellate Court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, Courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil). [Emphasis laid]'' 17. The Court further discussed its earlier judgment in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran; (2015) 2 SCC 610 , wherein the Court laid down the broad principles for exercising power under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution by the High Courts in the matter relating to disciplinary proceedings. vide paragraph-18, the Court has held thus : ''18. Laying down the broad parameters within which the High Court ought to exercise its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, a two Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran, held thus : ''12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second Court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.'' 18. As I have already discussed above and held that neither petitioner could claim to have been denied opportunity, nor the disciplinary enquiry can be held to be bad for any flawed procedure pursued, nor there was any perversity in the finding returned. As I have already discussed above and held that neither petitioner could claim to have been denied opportunity, nor the disciplinary enquiry can be held to be bad for any flawed procedure pursued, nor there was any perversity in the finding returned. Thus, I do not find this case to be falling fit upon the parameters laid down and discussed in the aforesaid authorities of Supreme Court so as to interfere in the decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority, affirmed in appeal and in review petition. 19. Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to cost.