JUDGMENT : 1. Through the medium of afore-titled four petitions filed under Section 482 CrPC, the petitioners have challenged FIR No. 0013/2021 for offences under Sections 420/120-B RPC registered with Crime Branch, Jammu. Since all the petitioners have challenged the same FIR, as such, these petitions are being taken up together for their disposal. 2. The impugned FIR owes its origin to a written complaint lodged by the complainant/respondent No.2 with respondent No.1-Crime Branch, Jammu on 04.03.2021. As per the allegations made in the said complaint, petitioners Rakesh Kumar Gupta and Ravinder Gupta introduced respondent No.2/complainant to petitioner Champa Kumari somewhere in the month of June, 2012 and represented that she is owner of a residential house bearing No. 20/2nd Ext. Gandhi Nagar,Jammu built over land measuring 01 kanal and that she is intending to sell the said House. It was alleged that complainant expressed his willingness to purchase the said house. Accordingly, sale consideration was settled at Rs.1,92,00,000/-. It was further alleged in the complaint that an Agreement to Sell was executed between the complainant and petitioner Champa Kumari on 30.07.2012 and at that time she received an amount of Rs.45,00,000/- as token money from the complainant. It was agreed that balance amount of Rs.1,47,00,000/- shall be paid within 90 days, failing which, the complainant was to forfeit the amount paid by him in advance and in case of failure of petitioner Champa Kumari to execute the necessary documents, the complainant was to get refund of double the amount of advance. It was further stated in the complaint that the complainant was taken ill for a considerable period of time and when he recovered, he asked the above named petitioners to execute the Sale Deed, but they avoided to do so. The complainant came to know that the accused persons had transferred the said property in the name of some third person and, as such, they have deceived him. 3. The respondent-Crime Branch, after conducting preliminary verification, found that petitioners Rakesh Kumar Gupta, Ravinder Gupta and Champa Kumari have cheated the complainant in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy and have duped him of money amounting to Rs.1,92,00,000/-. It was, prima facie, found that they have committed offences under Sections 420/120-B RPC. Accordingly, the impugned FIR came to be registered. 4. The respondent-Crime Branch, after conducting preliminary verification, found that petitioners Rakesh Kumar Gupta, Ravinder Gupta and Champa Kumari have cheated the complainant in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy and have duped him of money amounting to Rs.1,92,00,000/-. It was, prima facie, found that they have committed offences under Sections 420/120-B RPC. Accordingly, the impugned FIR came to be registered. 4. The petitioners have challenged the impugned FIR on the ground that the transaction between petitioner Champa Kumari and respondent No.2/ complainant is purely of civil nature and that the same cannot be given a criminal colour. It has been submitted that petitioner Champa Kumari did receive an amount of Rs.45.00 lacs in advance, but because the complainant failed to pay the balance amount within the stipulated time, as such, the agreement executed between her and respondent No.2 came to an end. It has been submitted that respondent No.2 has approached the police after nine years of execution of Agreement to Sell dated 30.07.2012 just to pressurize and harass the petitioners. It has been contended that a bare perusal of the impugned FIR would reveal that ingredients of offence under Section 420 RPC are not attracted at all as there is nothing in the impugned FIR to show that there was dishonest intention on the part of the executants of the Agreement to Sell right from the inception. According to the petitioners, the only remedy available to respondent No.2 is to file a suit for recovery of the advance amount which he has paid to petitioner Champa Kumari or to claim specific performance of the Agreement. 5. According to petitioner Ravinder Gupta, he is not, in any manner, connected with the case and that he has been implicated only for the reason that he happens to be the son-in-law of petitioner Champa Kumari. According to him, he has been implicated only to pressurize petitioner Champa Kumari to return the advance amount received by her. 6. So far as petitioner Rakesh Kumar Gupta is concerned, , he has submitted that he has nothing to do with the transaction between petitioner Champa Kumari and respondent No.2/complainant and that he has no knowledge about the said transaction. 7. 6. So far as petitioner Rakesh Kumar Gupta is concerned, , he has submitted that he has nothing to do with the transaction between petitioner Champa Kumari and respondent No.2/complainant and that he has no knowledge about the said transaction. 7. Petitioners Ganda Mal Gupta and Madhu Gupta have submitted in their petition that they have been falsely implicated just because petitioner Ganda Mal Gupta happens to be the husband and petitioner Madhu Gupta happens to be the daughter of petitioner Champa Kumari. According to them, as per the deal struck between petitioner Champa Kumari and respondent No.2, balance amount of Rs.1,47,00,000/- was to be paid by respondent No.2 within three months which he failed to do, as such, he forfeited the advance amount paid by him to petitioner Champa Kumari. 8. These petitions have been contested by the respondents by filing their reply. According to respondent No.2, petitioner Champa Kumari had no authority to enter into an Agreement to Sell dated 30.07.2012 with him as she was not owner of the property at the relevant time. Despite knowing this fact, she represented herself to be the owner of the property. Similar representation was made by petitioners Rakesh Kumar Gupta and Ravinder Gupta through whom the deal was struck. According to respondent No.2, the afore-named three persons fraudulently projected that petitoner Champa Kumari is the registered owner of the property in question and is competent to execute the sale deed, whereas the fact remains that she was not competent to execute the said document. It has been submitted that respondent No.2 was taken ill after the execution of Agreement to Sell and when he recovered, he paid the balance amount of settled consideration to petitioner Champa Kumari through petitioner Rakesh Kumar Gupta regarding which Rakesh Kumar Gupta executed receipts on the reverse page of Agreement to sell. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that respondent No.2 did not pay the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time, is not factually correct. Respondent No.2 has further submitted that it is not an abstract proposition of law that in every case where a person has a civil remedy that he is debarred from initiating criminal proceedings. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that respondent No.2 did not pay the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time, is not factually correct. Respondent No.2 has further submitted that it is not an abstract proposition of law that in every case where a person has a civil remedy that he is debarred from initiating criminal proceedings. It has been contended that, in the instant case, the petitioners knew that petitioner Champa Kumar was not the owner of the property in question and, still then, they represented that she is owner of the property in question and she also executed an Agreement to sell in favour of respondent No.2 which means that the petitioners were having fraudulent intention from the very inception. Thus, according to respondent No.2, the petitioners cannot invoke jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of CrPC to quash the impugned proceedings. 9. Respondent No.1-the Investigating Agency has also filed its reply. In its reply, it has been submitted that during the course of investigation, it was found that petitioners Rakesh Kumar Gupta and Ravinder Gupta had negotiated the deal between petitioner Champa Kumari and respondent No.2 in respect of the property in question and the sale consideration was fixed at Rs.1,92,00000/-. It was also found that Petitioner Champa Kumari on the request of complainant produced original documents relating to allotment of plot which showed that the same is in the name of Sh. Puran Chand Bhardwaj and that the plot belongs to J&K housing Board. As per the documents produced by petitioner Champa Kumar before the complainant, legal heirs of Puran Chand Bhardwaj, the original allottee had sold the said house to one Pardeep Jain on 03.04.2005, who, in turn, executed an Agreement to sell and a General Power of Attorney in favour of one Anil Kumar on 15.02.2010. Sh Anil Kumar, in turn, executed a General Power of Attorney and Agreement to Sell in favour of petitioner Champa Kumari on 10.03.2012. It was also found that these documents made the complainant believe that petitioner Champa Kumari is owner of the house in question and he requested her to execute the documents on making of final payment. Sh Anil Kumar, in turn, executed a General Power of Attorney and Agreement to Sell in favour of petitioner Champa Kumari on 10.03.2012. It was also found that these documents made the complainant believe that petitioner Champa Kumari is owner of the house in question and he requested her to execute the documents on making of final payment. Agreement to Sell dated 30.07.2012 was executed and an amount of Rs.45 lacs was paid in advance by the complainant to petitioner Champa Kumari, out of this, an amount of Rs.40 lacs was transferred to the joint account of petitioner Champa Kumar and her daughter Madhu Gupta, whereas a further sum of Rs.5.00 lacs was paid in cash. It was also found that rest of the amount i.e Rs. 1,47,00,000/- was paid in cash to petitioner Rakesh Kumar Gupta and even after getting the full and final payment , petitioner Champa Kumari did not execute the Sale Deed in favour of the complainant. It was further found that petitioner Champa Kumari has transferred the said property in the name of her daughter Madhu Gupta. This shows that petitioner Champa Kumari had no intention of transferring the property to complainant, as such, a case of cheating is, prima facie, made out against the petitioners. It has also been submitted that in the previous past, petitioner Champa Kumar had, in connivance with petitioner Rakesh Kumar Gupta sold the said property to one Kuldeep Wahi but later on, they resiled from the said agreement which resulted in lodging of FIR No. 78/2013 against petitioners Champa Kumari and Rakesh Kumar Gupta. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings filed by them as also the case diary produced by the Investigating Agency. 11. Leaned counsels appearing for the petitioners have, during the course of their arguments, reiterated that transaction between petitioner Champa Kumar and respondent No.2 is purely of civil nature, as such, respondent No.2 cannot give it a criminal colour and book the petitioners for criminal offences. They have further contended that respondent-Crime Branch does not have jurisdiction to register the impugned FIR and undertake investigation of allegations of instant nature as the jurisdiction of the Crime Branch is circumscribed by SRO 202 dated 03.06.1999, according to which, the cases of instant nature do not figure in the list of cases that can be investigated by the Crime Branch. It has also been contended that respondent No.2 has already invoked the civil remedy in respect of the Agreement to Sell which is subject matter of the present FIR and, as such, it is not open to him to pursue the instant case. In this regard, the petitioners have placed on record copies of the plaints in respect of two suits filed by respondent No.2 against some of the petitioners. 12. Learned counsels appearing for the respondents have contended that the proceedings at this nascent stage cannot be quashed by this Court and it is for the Investigating Agency to determine as to whether the dispute between the parties is purely of a civil nature or the same has a criminal flavor to it. It has been contended that there is no absolute bar to launching of criminal prosecution in a case where the facts give rise to civil remedy as well. 13. As is clear from the allegations made in the impugned FIR, an Agreement to Sell dated 30.07.2012 has been executed between petitioner Champa Kumari and respondent No.2 whereby she has agreed to sell the House in question for a sale consideration of Rs.1,92,00,000/-. As per the said Agreement, she has also received Rs.45 lacs as token money. Petitioner Champa Kumari claims that respondent No.2 did not pay the balance amount, as such, he forfeited the advance amount as per the covenants of Agreement to sell, whereas respondent No.2 claims that he has paid even the balance amount to petitioner Champa Kumari. It is also claimed by respondent No.2 that petitioner Champa Kumari was not competent to execute the Sale Deed in respect of the property in question in his favour, as such, from the very inception, she had fraudulent intention. 14. The question that falls for determination is, whether, in the face of aforesaid nature of dispute between the parties, it would be open to the police to set criminal law into motion at the instance of one party to the dispute against the other and whether this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC can quash the proceedings. 15. The Supreme Court in the case of M/S Indian Oil Corporation vs. M/S NEPC India Ltd. & Ors (2006) 6 SCC 736 , while noticing its earlier judgments on the issue relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. 15. The Supreme Court in the case of M/S Indian Oil Corporation vs. M/S NEPC India Ltd. & Ors (2006) 6 SCC 736 , while noticing its earlier judgments on the issue relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C to quash the complaints and criminal proceedings, has observed as under: "12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few- Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [ 1988 (1) SCC 692 ], State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [ 1995 (6) SCC 194 ], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., [ 1996 (5) SCC 591 ], State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agrawalla [ 1996 (8) SCC 164 ], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, [ 1999 (3) SCC 259 ], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [ 2000 (3) SCC 269 ], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [ 2000 (4) SCC 168 ], M. Krishnan vs Vijay Kumar [ 2001 (8) SCC 645 ], and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [ 2005 (1) SCC 122 ]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. While no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in accordance with law. One positive step that can be taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their power under section 250 Cr.P.C., more frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the complainant. Be that as it may." 16. From the aforequoted principles of law, it is clear that before deciding as to whether proceedings in a criminal complaint are to be quashed, the Court has to be satisfied that the subject matter involved in the complaint is a purely civil wrong and it has no criminal texture to it. 17. Be that as it may." 16. From the aforequoted principles of law, it is clear that before deciding as to whether proceedings in a criminal complaint are to be quashed, the Court has to be satisfied that the subject matter involved in the complaint is a purely civil wrong and it has no criminal texture to it. 17. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, let me now analyze the allegations made in the impugned FIR. As already noted, the petitioners are alleged to have committed offence under Section 420 RPC. In order to attract the ingredients of Section 420, there has to be an element of cheating on the part of the accused. Cheating has been defined in Section 415 RPC. To constitute offence under Section 420, there must be a fraudulent or dishonest inducement on the part of a person and thereby the other party must have parted with his property. To establish an offence under Section 420 RPC, it must be shown that there was a fraudulent and dishonest intention at the time of commission of the offence and that the person practising deceit had obtained the property by fraudulent inducement and willful representation. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent, dishonest intention is shown at the beginning of the transaction i.e., at the time when the offence is alleged to have been committed. 18. "Dishonestly" has been defined in Section 24 of RPC to mean deliberate intention to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss and when, with such intention, deception is practised and delivery of property is induced, then the offence under Section 420 RPC can be said to have been committed. Thus, Section 420 postulates dishonest intention as a precondition for even prima facie establishing the commission of said offence. It is only if ingredients postulated in Section 415 RPC are made out from the contents of the impugned FIR that offence under Section 420 can be said to have been disclosed. 19. The Supreme Court in the case of Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 , has observed that it is the intention which is the gist of the offence and in order to hold a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. 20. Again, in Alpic Finance Ltd vs P. Sadasivan And Anr, (2001) 3 SCC 513 , the Supreme Court held that “an honest man entering into a contract is deemed to represent that he has the present intention of carrying it out but if, having accepted the pecuniary advantage involved in the transaction, he fails to pay his debt, he does not necessarily evade the debt by deception”. Thus, it is necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making of promise, to say that he committed an act of cheating. 21. In the light of aforesaid legal position, let us now analyze the allegations made in the impugned FIR and the stand taken by the parties before this Court. The grievance of respondent No.2 is that he had entered into an Agreement to sell with petitioner Champa Kumari who was aided and assisted by petitioner Rakesh Kumar Gupta and Ravinder Gupta. By virtue of the said agreement, she had agreed to sell the aforesaid property to respondent No.2 for a sale consideration of Rs.1,92,00,000/-. According to the petitioners, petitioner Champa Kumari only received Rs.45.00 lacs and the balance amount was not paid by respondent No.2 which resulted in forfeiture of the advance amount. This has been disputed by respondent No.2. According to him, he has paid the whole amount through Rakesh Kumar Gupta who has executed receipts. 22. So far as Agreement to Sell executed between a buyer and a seller of the property is concerned, the parties to such an agreement are expected to adhere to the covenants of the agreement. The covenants of the agreement, which is subject matter of the present case, show that respondent No.2 was to pay whole of balance sale consideration within three months from the date of execution of the agreement, failing which, the advance amount of Rs.45.00 lacs was to be forfeited. There are contrary versions of the parties on this aspect of the matter. While petitioner Champa Kumari claims that she has not received the balance amount, respondent No.2 claims that he has paid the whole amount through Rakesh Kumar Gupta. There are contrary versions of the parties on this aspect of the matter. While petitioner Champa Kumari claims that she has not received the balance amount, respondent No.2 claims that he has paid the whole amount through Rakesh Kumar Gupta. Even if, it is assumed that petitioner Champa Kumari has received whole of the sale consideration through petitioner Rakesh Kumar Gupta, the question would be whether her act of not executing the sale deed in respect of the property in question in favour of respondent No.2 amounts to deception and cheating. In order to find an answer to this question, it would be apt to refer to the relevant covenants of the Agreement to Sell dated 30.07.2012, which read as under: “1. That the party of the first part has agreed to sell his plot measuring 01 kanals and single storied house constructed….situated at House No. 20 2nd Extension Gandi Nagar Jammu to the party of 2nd part…consideration of Rs.1,92,00,000. 2. That the party of 1st part acknowledges that receipt of an advance of Rs.45 lac and party of 2nd part has further agreed to pay balance amount i.e. Rs.1,47,00,000/- on or before 90 days fialing which shall forfeit the amount given as advance. 3. That in case of failure of party of 1st party to execute the necessary documents along with peaceful possession with all easement rights free from all sorts of encumberance, then party of 1st party will be responsible to pay double the amount of advance received to the party of 2nd part”. 23. Clause (3) of the Agreement to Sell provides that in case party of the first part i.e petitioner Champa Kumar fails to execute the necessary documents along with peaceful possession, the said party will be responsible to pay double the amount received from the second party meaning thereby that as per the covenants of the Agreement to sell, petitioner Champa Kumari was obliged to pay double the amount received by her to respondent No.2 in case of her failure to execute the necessary documents. Therefore, the remedy provided to respondent No.2 in terms of the covenants of Agreement to sell was to sue petitioner Champa Kumari for return of double the amount of money paid by him or to seek specific performance of Agreement to sell. Therefore, the remedy provided to respondent No.2 in terms of the covenants of Agreement to sell was to sue petitioner Champa Kumari for return of double the amount of money paid by him or to seek specific performance of Agreement to sell. Respondent No.2 has already filed a suit for specific performance of Agreement against petitioner Champa Kumari, a copy of the plaint in the said suit has been placed on record by the petitioners. Merely because petitioner Champa Kumari has failed to adhere to the terms of the Agreement to sell which clearly provides a civil remedy to the aggrieved party, does not mean that an offence of cheating has been committed by the petitioners. 24. Learned counsels for the respondents have vehemently argued that petitioner Champa Kumari, to her own knowledge, was not competent to execute the Sale Deed in favour of respondent No.2 in respect of the property in question, inasmuch as it was not entered in her name in the records of J&K Housing Board. Therefore, from the very inception, the petitioners were having dishonest intention and they intended to defraud respondent No.2. 25. The argument, at first blush, appears to be attractive, but when we have a closer look at the pleadings and the documents on record, it appears to be devoid of any merit. Respondent No.2 has, in his reply to the present petitions as also in his pleadings before the Civil Court, admitted that, at the time of entering into transaction with petitioner Champa Kumari, he was provided the documents relating to the property in question by her. Respondent No.2 has also admitted that as per these documents, the property existed in the records of J&K Housing Board in the name of its original allotttee Sh. Puran Chand Bhardwaj, whose legal heirs executed a Sale Deed in favour of Pardeep Jain, who, in turn, executed an Agreement to Sell and A Power of Attorney in favour of Sh. Anil Kumar. Thereafter Sh. Anil Kumar executed a Power of Attorney and an Agreement to sell in favour of petitioner Champa Kumari. These documents were provided to the complainant at the time of striking the deal. Anil Kumar. Thereafter Sh. Anil Kumar executed a Power of Attorney and an Agreement to sell in favour of petitioner Champa Kumari. These documents were provided to the complainant at the time of striking the deal. So, it was known to respondent No.2 at the time of entering into transaction with petitioner Champa Kumari that the property in question was entered in the name of its original allottee and petitioner Champa Kumari was only an Attorney Holder. In fact, respondent No.2 has admitted in his pleadings before the civil Court as well as before this court that petitioner Champa Kumari had assured him that she will acquire the title of the property meaning thereby that respondent No.2 was in knowledge of the fact that at the time of entering into transaction, petitioner Champa Kumari had not acquired the title of the property in question. Same is the stand of the Investigating Agency. In such circumstances, it can safely be infered that respondent No.2 with his eyes wide open has entered into an Agreement to sell with petitioner Champa Kumari knowing fully well that her name did not figure as owner of the property in question in the records of Jammu and Kashmir Housing Board and that she was only an Attorney Holder. Thus, it cannot be stated that petitioner Champa Kumari or the other petitioners had made any false representation to respondent No.2 at the time of entering into the transaction, which is an essential ingredient of offence of cheating. This vital ingredient of offence under Section 420 RPC is missing in the present case and, as such, the said offence is not even prima facie made out against the petitioners. 26. It has also been contended by respondent No.2 that petitioner Champa Kumari transferred the property in question in favour of her daughter Madhu Gupta, though she had entered into an Agreement to Sell with respondent No.2 and her subsequent conduct shows her fraudulent intention. In this regard, the record shows that petitioner Champa Kumari and her husband petitioner Ganda Mal Gupta had executed a Family Settlement Deed on 15.03.2018 whereby they have settled as many as three properties including the property which is subject matter of the present case, in favour of their daughter petitioner Mahdu Gupta. The said Family Settlement Deed has been challenged by respondent No.2 by way of a suit before the civil Court. The said Family Settlement Deed has been challenged by respondent No.2 by way of a suit before the civil Court. A copy of the plaint has been placed on record by the petitioners and the contents thereof are not in dispute. 27. As already stated, the said Settlement Deed has been executed on 15.03.2018 and the Agreement to Sell which is subject matter of present petition was executed in the year 2012. Since the deal between petitioner Champa Kumari and respondent No.2 could not mature during all these six years, therefore, merely because petitioner Champa Kumari settled the property in question along with certain other properties in favour of her daughter does not make it a case of cheating. It is quite natural for parents to settle their properties in favour of their children at the fag end of their lives. Therefore, the act of petitioner Champa Kumari cannot be termed as defrauding the rights of respondent No.2 under Agreement to Sell. It is not a case where petitioner Champa Kumari has sold the property to a stranger during subsistence of validity of Agreement to sell, but it is a case where she has waited for six years for the deal to mature and when it did not happen, she settled the property in favour of her daughter and not in favour of a stranger. From this subsequent event, fraudulent intention on the part of petitioner Champa Kumari can never be inferred. 28. It has also been submitted by the respondents that in the previous past, petitioner Champa Kumari had executed an Agreement to sell with one Kuldip Wahi in respect of the same property, where-after, she thereafter executed the Agreement to sell in favour of respondent No.2 and in this regard, FIR No. 78/2013 was registered with Police Station, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu against petitioners Champa Kumari and Rakesh Kumar Gupta. On this ground, it has been contended that petitioners are in the habit of duping the gullible people. 29. Learned counsels for the petitioners in this regard have submitted that the aforesaid FIR has been quashed by this Court in terms of judgment dated 05.05.2018 passed in a petition bearing 561-A CrPC No. 75/2013, a copy thereof has been produced before the Court. Once the FIR lodged against petitioners has been quashed by this Court, it means that no offence was even prima facie found established against them. Once the FIR lodged against petitioners has been quashed by this Court, it means that no offence was even prima facie found established against them. Therefore, it cannot be stated that the respondents are in the habit of entering into fraudulent transactions. 30. In the instant case, if the allegations made in the impugned FIR are taken at their face value and the same are read in conjunction with the admitted facts and the material, it appears to be a case of “breach of contract”. Therefore, it is not open to respondent No.2 to give it a criminal colour and make it a case of cheating, that too, after waiting for almost nine years of entering into the agreement to sell. Mere use of expression “cheating” in the impugned FIR is of no consequence in the facts and circumstances of the case. 31. The Supreme Court in the case of Mitesh Kumar vs. State of Karnataka and ors, AIR ONLINE 2021 SC 936 has expressed its disapproval for imparting criminal color to a civil dispute, made merely to take advantage of a relatively quick relief granted in a criminal case in contrast to a civil dispute. The Court further went on to observed that such an exercise is nothing, but an abuse of the process of law which must be discouraged in its entirety. 32. The petitioners have also raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of respondent-Crime Branch to investigate the present case. It has been submitted that the Crime Branch cannot undertake investigation of those cases which do not figure in the list annexed to SRO 202 dated 03.09.1999 whereby office of Crime Branch, Kashmir and office of Crime Branch, Jammu have been declared as Police Stations. As per the said SRO, the Crime Branch has been vested with power to investigate the offences of as many as 23 categories. Although, certain other categories of offences have also been included in the list vide SO 232 dated 09.05.2022, but the said SO has been issued after registration of the impugned FIR which is subject matter of the present petition. Therefore, the instant case is governed by SRO 202 dated 03.06.1999. Although, certain other categories of offences have also been included in the list vide SO 232 dated 09.05.2022, but the said SO has been issued after registration of the impugned FIR which is subject matter of the present petition. Therefore, the instant case is governed by SRO 202 dated 03.06.1999. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Kamlesh Devi and others vs. State of J&K and others (CRMC No. 144/2013, decided on 29.11.2022) after relying upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 28.08.2002 passed in Criminal Revision Petitions No. 78/1998 and 10/1999 has held that the Crime Branch was competent to register and investigate only those cases which are specified in the aforesaid notification. The instant case is a simple case of cheating. It is not a case of cheating of a peculiar nature which affects more than one District which figures at S.No.7 of Annexure to the SRO 202 (supra). Therefore, the Crime Branch had no jurisdiction to register the impugned FIR and to investigate the case of instant nature. 31 For the foregoing discussion, it is clear that neither the respondent-Investigating Agency had jurisdiction to register the impugned FIR and to investigate the case, nor the allegations made in the impugned FIR disclose cognizable criminal offences against the petitioners. Thus, this is a fit case where this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings so as to prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice. 33. In view of what has been discussed above, all the petitions are allowed and the impugned FIR and the proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed. Respondent No.2 is, however, at liberty to pursue the civil remedy against the petitioners, which he has already availed. CD file be returned to the concerned.