JUDGMENT : Alok Kumar Verma, J. This intra-court appeal has been filed assailing the order dated 26.02.2024, passed in Writ Petition No.498 of 2024 (M/S), “M/s Saraswati Dynamic Limited vs. Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and Another”, whereby, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition. 2. Heard Mr. Gopal Narayan, Advocate with Mr. Amar Murti Shukla, Advocate for the appellant and Mr. K.N. Joshi, Deputy Advocate General for the respondent no.1. 3. Mr. K.N. Joshi raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this intra-court appeal. He contended that the impugned order under writ petition dated 20.12.2023 was passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The “Controlling Authority” is a Tribunal. Therefore, no Special Appeal is maintainable under the provisions of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, applicable to High Court of Uttarakhand under U.P. Re-Organization Act,2000, against the order dated 26.02.2024, passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.498 of 2024 (M/S), which was filed by the appellant-writ petitioner against the order dated 20.12.2023, passed by the Controlling Authority. 4. Mr. Gopal Narayan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, opposed the said submission and contended that this Special Appeal is maintainable. 5. In order to appreciate the issue which arises at the preliminary stage of this Special Appeal, a brief reference to the factual back ground is necessary, which is as follows:- The respondent no.2 was employed under the employment of the appellant in the month of November, 1990. He worked under the appellant from 1990 upto 22nd August, 2008. The petitioner had calculated the gratuity and other admissible amount and after informing the respondent no.2 transferred to his account on 26.02.2009. Respondent no.2 received payment of Rs.51,862/-. Respondent no.2 did not raise any objection. The petitioner had received a notice from the office of respondent no.1 along with a copy of Application, filed by respondent no.2 on 23.02.2021. The petitioner filed reply to the said Application in which the petitioner took a specific plea that the Application, filed by the respondent no.2, is not maintainable; the claim of respondent no.2 is barred by limitation, and, the respondent no.2 accepted the amount of gratuity on 26.02.2009, deposited by the petitioner in terms of the provisions contained in the Payment Of Gratuity Act, 1972. The respondent no.1 allowed the claim of the respondent no.2 on 20.12.2023. As per the petitioner, the petitioner has no other alternative, efficacious and speedy remedy. Therefore, the petitioner filed the writ petition with following reliefs : “(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order/judgment dated 20.12.2023 (Annexure-4) issued by respondent no.1. (ii) Issue any other order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (iii) Award cost of the petition.” 6. The learned Single Judge observed that the petitioner has challenged the order dated 20.12.2023, passed by Controlling Authority, under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Since the order impugned in the writ petition is appealable under Section 7 (7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, therefore, the Court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition has been dismissed with liberty to petitioner to approach the appellate authority. 7. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant-writ petitioner is before us. 8. Before we examine the contentions of both the parties, it is necessary to consider the scope of Rule 5 of the Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 which makes provisions for an intra-court appeal. 7. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant-writ petitioner is before us. 8. Before we examine the contentions of both the parties, it is necessary to consider the scope of Rule 5 of the Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 which makes provisions for an intra-court appeal. Rule 5 of the Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 reads as under :- “An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award—(a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one judge”. 9. 9. From a perusal of the aforesaid Rule, it is clear that no Special Appeal will lie in the following matter; (i) the judgment passed by the Single Judge in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court; (ii) an order made by the Single Judge in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction; (iii) an order made by the Single Judge in the exercise of the power of superintendence of the High Court; (iv) an order made by the Single Judge in the exercise of Criminal jurisdiction; (v) an order made by the Single Judge in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgment, order or award by- (a) the Tribunal, (b) the Court, or (c) Statutory arbitrator, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act (as applicable in the State of Uttarakhand) or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (vi) an order made by the Single Judge in respect of any judgment, order or award of the Government or any Officer or Authority made or purported to be made in the exercise of the appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act (as applicable in the State of Uttarakhand) or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. 10. In order to decide the said question, it is necessary to refer to the provision of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Section 7 of the said Act reads as under:- “7. Determination of the amount of gratuity. (1) A person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under this Act or any person authorised, in writing, to act on his behalf shall send a written application to the employer, within such time and in such form, as may be prescribed, for payment of such gratuity. Determination of the amount of gratuity. (1) A person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under this Act or any person authorised, in writing, to act on his behalf shall send a written application to the employer, within such time and in such form, as may be prescribed, for payment of such gratuity. (2) As soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer shall, whether an application referred to in sub-section (1) has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount gratuity so determined. (3) The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. (3A) If the amount of gratuity payable under sub-section (3) is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3), the employer shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate, not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long-term deposits, as that Government may, by notification specify: Provided that no such interest shall be payable if the delay in the payment is due to the fault of the employee and the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delayed payment on this ground. (4) (a) If there is any dispute as to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under this Act or as to the admissibility of any claim of, or in relation to, an employee for payment of gratuity, or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer shall deposit with the controlling authority such amount as he admits to be payable by him as gratuity. (b) Where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or matters specified in clause (a), the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the controlling authority for deciding the dispute. (b) Where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or matters specified in clause (a), the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the controlling authority for deciding the dispute. (c) The controlling authority shall, after due inquiry and after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the matter or matters in dispute and if, as a result of such inquiry any amount is found to be payable to the employee, the controlling authority shall direct the employer to pay such amount or, as the case may be, such amount as reduced by the amount already deposited by the employer. (d) The controlling authority shall pay the amount deposited, including the excess amount, if any, deposited by the employer, to the person entitled thereto. (e) As soon as may be after a deposit is made under clause (a), the controlling authority shall pay the amount of the deposit – (i) to the applicant where he is the employee; or (ii) where the applicant is not the employee, to the nominee or, as the case may be, the guardian of such nominee or heir of the employee if the controlling authority is satisfied that there is no dispute as to the right of the applicant to receive the amount of gratuity. (5) For the purpose of conducting an inquiry under sub-section (4), the controlling authority shall have the same powers as are vested in a court, while trying a suit, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely : (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents, (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. (6) Any inquiry under this section shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860). (6) Any inquiry under this section shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860). (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under subsection (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount. (8) The appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, after giving the parties to the appeal a reasonable opportunity of being heard, confirm, modify or reverse the decision of the controlling authority.” 11. A tribunal, generally, is any person or institution with authority to judge, adjudicate on, or determine claims or disputes, whether or not, it is called a tribunal in its title. Nomenclature may be different. In Bharat Bank Limited vs. Employees of the Bharat Bank, 1950 SCR 459 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed, “……it is to be noticed that owing to the intricate and complex system of Government that exists in a modern State and the vast expansion of social legislation of all sorts that have taken place in England and in other countries including own, within the last few decades, the so called administrative and quasi-judicial tribunals have come to be a permanent feature of our social and political system. They function as adjudicating bodies in disputes concerning a large number of economic and social affairs. They function as adjudicating bodies in disputes concerning a large number of economic and social affairs. In a sense they are governmental bodies appertaining to the executive and not to the judicial branch of the State, though in various matters they are armed with judicial powers analogous to those normally carried out by Courts of law”. 12. In Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd, Meerut vs. Lakshmichand and others, AIR 1963 SC 677 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed “Question whether a decision is judicial or is purely administrative, often arises when jurisdiction of the superior courts to issue writs of certiorari is invoked. Often the line of distinction between decisions judicial and administrative is thin; but the principles for ascertaining the true character of the decisions are well settled. A judicial decision is not always the act of a judge or a tribunal invested with power to determine questions of law or fact; it must however be the act of a body or authority invested by law with authority to determine questions or disputes affecting the rights of citizens and under a duty to act judicially. A judicial decision always postulates the existence of a duty laid upon the authority to act judicially. Administrative authorities are often invested with authority or power to determine questions, which affect the rights of citizens”. 13. In Kihoto Hollohon vs. Shri Zachilhu, AIR 1993 SC 412 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court referring to its earlier decision in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1669 , set out a test to determine whether an authority exercising adjudicatory powers is a Tribunal or not; ….there is a lis an affirmation by one party and denial by another and the dispute necessarily involves a decision on the rights and obligations of the parties to it and the authority is called upon to decide it, there is an exercise of judicial power. That authority is called a Tribunal, if it does not have all the trappings of a Court. 14. That authority is called a Tribunal, if it does not have all the trappings of a Court. 14. In Sudershan Singh Bedi vs. Additional District Magistrate, Varanasi and Others, Allahabad Rent Cases, 1993 (1) 121, the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, while dealing the controversy of maintainability of Special Appeal under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, has observed, “The word “Tribunal” has not been defined under this Act, but now it is settled principle of law that a tribunal is a body or an authority which is invested with the judicial power to adjudicate on question of law or fact affecting the right of parties in a judicial manner”. In para 15, it was observed, “The declaration of vacancy by Rent Control and Eviction Officer contemplates pleadings and evidence and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is invested with the power of a Civil Court in regulating the procedure for taking evidence etc. He is also to determine the dispute after taking into account the objections raised by the parties and has to pass reasoned order”. In these circumstances, it was held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer acts as a Tribunal and order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer shall be treated as an order of Tribunal. 15. In Pratappur Sugar and Industries Limited, Pratappur, District Deoria vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner, U.P. Gorakhpur Region, Gorakhpur and others, [ (2000) 3 UPLBEC 2161 ], the Division Bench of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has observed that the dictionary meaning shows that tribunal is a body authorized by law to decide disputes and impart justice. The Hon’ble Division Bench referred to the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Durga Shankar Mehta vs. Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1950 SC 188 , in which it was held that the expression “Tribunal” as used in Article 136 of the Constitution of India meant the same thing as Court but includes within its submit adjudicating bodies, provided they are constituted by State and are invested with judicial power as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions. The Hon’ble Division Bench referred the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Hari Nagar Sugar Mills vs. Shyam Sunder, AIR 1961 SC 1669 , in which the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that by “Tribunal” is meant those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. The Hon’ble Division Bench also referred the judgment of Hon’ble Constitution Bench in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha vs. The Hind Cycles Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 874 , in which the Hon’ble Apex Court has held, “….The expression “a court” in the technical sense is a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of courts which are invested with the State’s inherent judicial powers. The tribunal as distinguished from the court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi-judicially, but it does not constitute a court in the technical sense. The tribunal, according to the dictionary meaning, is a seat of justice; and in the discharge of its functions, it shares some of the characteristics of the court. A domestic Tribunal appointed in departmental proceedings, for instance, or instituted by an industrial employer cannot claim to be a tribunal under Article 136(1). Purely Administrative Tribunals are also outside the scope of the said Article. The Tribunals which are contemplated by Article 136(1) are clothed with some of the powers of the courts. They can compel witnesses to appear, they can administer oath, they are required to follow certain rules of procedure: the proceedings before them are required to comply with rules of natural justice, they may not be bound by the strict and technical rules of evidence, but, nevertheless, they must decide on evidence adduced before them; they may not be bound by other technical rules of law, but their decisions must, nevertheless, be consistent with the general principles of law. In other words, they have to act judicially and reach their decisions in an objective manner and they cannot proceed purely administratively or base their conclusions on subjective tests or inclinations. In other words, they have to act judicially and reach their decisions in an objective manner and they cannot proceed purely administratively or base their conclusions on subjective tests or inclinations. The procedural rules which regulate the proceedings before the tribunals and the powers conferred on them in dealing with matters brought before them, are sometimes described as the “trappings of a court” and in determining the question as to whether a particular body or authority is a tribunal or not, sometimes a rough and ready test is applied by enquiring whether the said body or authority is clothed with the trappings of a court”. In para 8, it was observed, “…..it would thus be noticed that apart from the importance of the trappings of a Court, the basic and essential condition which makes an authority or a body a tribunal under Article 136, is that it should be constituted by the State and should be invested with the State’s inherent judicial power…”. The Hon’ble Division Bench also referred to the judgment of Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Companies vs. P.N. Sharma and another, AIR 1965 SC 1595 , wherein, it was held, “…..Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the Courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basis and the fundamental features which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State. In considering the question about the status of any body or authority as a Tribunal under Article 136(1) the main test to be applied is whether the body or authority has been constituted by the State and has been clothed with the State’s inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between parties and determine them on the merits fairly and objectively”. 16. 16. Applying the test laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Division Bench has held that an Additional/ Deputy Labour Commissioner while exercising power under sub-clause (6) of Clause LL of the Standing Orders functions as a Tribunal. 17. Before the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Mohd. Arif vs. M/s. Mirza Glass Works and Others, 2005 (107) FLR 129, the question for consideration was as to whether the Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is a Tribunal. The Division Bench extracted Section 15 (1) and Section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, which are as below:- “15. Claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims.—(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint [a presiding officer of any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or under any corresponding law relating to the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State or ] any Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation or other office with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendirary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of wages, [of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters, incidental to such claims………….”] “Section 18 provides for powers of authorities appointed under Section 15 which is extracted below:- 18. Powers of authorities appointed under Section 15.—Every authority appointed under subsection (1) of Section 15 shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and every such authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and of [Chapter-XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974).]” 18. The Division Bench has held, “From a conjoint reading of Section 15 (1) with Section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, it is clear that the authority empowered to decide claims arising out of deduction from wages is entrusted with all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes of taking evidence and for attendance and compelling the production of documents. Thus, the said authority has the trapping of Court and is a Tribunal. Any order, thus passed by the authority, under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, is an order passed by Tribunal. The Special Appeal being barred against an order of one Judge exercising Jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution arising out of a writ petition from an order of the Tribunal, the preliminary objection raised by Counsel for the respondents has substance. The appeal is barred under Chapter-VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court and is dismissed as not maintainable”. 19. Reverting to the question whether this Special Appeal is maintainable or not, we must consider the scheme of the Act. The Payment of Gratuity Act has been passed to provide for a scheme for the payment of gratuity to employees engaged in factories, mines, oilfields, plantations, ports, railway, companies, shops or other establishments and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Object of the Act is to ensure that a workman is rewarded for the honest, efficient and faithful service that he renders for his employer’s benefit. The “Controlling Authority is appointed by the Government. The Controlling Authority, after due enquiry and after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determines the matter in dispute. For the purpose of conducting an enquiry, the “Controlling Authority” has been given all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath, requiring the discoveries and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits and issuing commissions for the examinations of witnesses. Sub-section (6) lays down that enquiry under this Section shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Sub-section (6) lays down that enquiry under this Section shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The “Controlling Authority” is appointed by the State and has been clothed with the State’s inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between the parties and to determine them on merits. The “Controlling Authority” is appointed by the State and is invested with judicial power as distinguished from purely administrative or executive function. Therefore, under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the proceedings before the Controlling Authority have the “Trapping of a Court”. 20. Applying the test laid down by the decisions as abovementioned, it is clear that the “Controlling Authority” while exercising the power under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, particularly Section 7 thereof, acts as a “Tribunal”. 21. A right of appeal is a creature of a statute and a litigant does not have any vested right to prefer the appeal against an order or judgment unless such a right is conferred by law. 22. For the reasons discussed above, the instant intra-court appeal is not maintainable under Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. 23. Consequently, the present Special Appeal is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. The Special Appeal is accordingly dismissed at the stage of admission.