ORDER : R. SUBRAMANIAN, J. These cases have been placed before us upon a reference made by a learned Single Judge of this Court on the nomenclature to be assigned to 'Appeals' which arise out of certain orders passed in execution proceedings. The learned Single Judge felt compelled to seek an authoritative pronouncement on the issue since he was not in agreement with the views of two learned Single Judges of this Court expressed in Mrs.Vasanthi vs. K.Karuppana Gounder and others reported in (1998) 2 LW 45 and Sudhir V.Joshi vs. E.Kanniappan reported in (1997) 2 LW 660 . The learned Judge also made reference to the judgments of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Anto Mamkoottam vs. Peruvanthanam Service Co-operative Bank reported in 1996 (2) KLT 962 , a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Seetharam Reddy vs. Gunti Yashoda reported in AIR 2005 AP 95 and a judgment of the Punjab and Harayana High Court in Shamsher Singh vs. Zile Ram reported in 2007 SCC OnLine P & H 1024 , in support of the view that appeals arising out of adjudications made under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 58, Order 21, Rules 97 to 100 should be treated as regular appeals under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not as miscellaneous appeals under Section 104 read with Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Before we proceed further, it would be advantageous to refer to certain provisions of the Code. Section 2(2) of the Code which defines a decree reads as follows: ""Decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include: (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation. - A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final.'' 3. Explanation. - A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final.'' 3. Section 96 of the Code provides for appeals against original decrees of Civil Courts and it reads as follows: '' 96. Appeal from original decree:- (1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte . (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees.'' (emphasis supplied) 4. Section 104 which provides for appeals against orders reads as follows: ” 104. Orders from which appeal lies.-- (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders:- (a) to (f) (Omitted by Arbitration Act, 1940;) (ff) an order under section 35-A; (ffa) an order under section 91 or section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in section 91 or section 92, as the case may be; (g) an order under section 95; (h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree; (i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order specified in clause (ff) save on the ground that no order or an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been made. (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section.''(emphasis supplied) 5. As far as execution proceedings are concerned, they are governed by Sections 51 & 52 and provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There are a few instances where an Executing Court is empowered to pronounce upon rights of third parties; they are, “(i) proceedings under Order 21 Rule 58 of the Code where a claim or objection is made to the attachment of property; and (ii) on proceedings under Order 21 Rules 97 to 101 where a claim is made by a third party by way of resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property. Certain other orders that are made in the course of execution are made appealable under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code; they are, (i) an order under Rule 34 of Order 21 on an objection to the draft of a document or of an endorsement; (ii) an order under Rule 72 or Rule 92 of Order 21 setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale; and (iii) an order rejecting an application under sub-rule (1) of Rule 106 of Order 21, provided that an order on the original application, that is to say, the application referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 of that Order is appealable.” 6. Other than the above three instances, orders made in execution are not generally appealable. However, the provisions of Order 21, Rule 58 which deal with objections to attachment of property by a third party and the provisions of Order 21, Rules 97 to 101 which deal with objections by third parties to an attempted dispossession or dispossession made in execution of a decree of a Court, stand on a slightly different footing. These are the only provisions in Order 21 which empower the Executing Court to travel beyond the decree and examine claims made by third parties independent of the parties to the suit / decree. That is the precise reason why an elaborate procedure is provided in these adjudications where the Executing Court is permitted to go into all questions relating to right, title or interest in the property attached arising between the parties to the proceeding or their legal representatives. That is the precise reason why an elaborate procedure is provided in these adjudications where the Executing Court is permitted to go into all questions relating to right, title or interest in the property attached arising between the parties to the proceeding or their legal representatives. In the light of the question referred to us, sub-rule 4 of Rule 58 of Order 21, and Rule 103 of Order 21 would assume significance. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 58 of Order 21 of the Code reads as follows: ''Where any claim or objection has been adjudicated upon under this rule, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. '' 7. Rule 103 of Order 21 reads as follows: ''1 03. Orders to be treated as decrees.— Where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree .'' 8. A fiction is created by the above two provisions whereby, orders passed upon adjudication of the claims made either under Order 21, Rule 58 or under Order 21, Rules 97 to 101 are deemed to be 'decrees' even though they are only titled as 'orders'. We have set out the definition of a 'decree' as it appears in Section 2(2) of the Code of the Civil Procedure. The Legislature has taken care to include only certain adjudications in the definition of a decree and there are certain exclusions also. Insofar as the adjudications made under Order 21, Rule 58 and Order 21, Rules 97 to 101, those orders are to be treated as decrees though they are not actually decrees. Section 96 of the Code which is extracted supra, provides for an appeal against the original decree of the Court. No doubt, other High Courts have taken the view that an appeal against an order passed under Order 21, Rule 58 or Order 21, Rules 97 to 101 are appealable only under Section 96 of the Code and not otherwise. Section 96 of the Code which is extracted supra, provides for an appeal against the original decree of the Court. No doubt, other High Courts have taken the view that an appeal against an order passed under Order 21, Rule 58 or Order 21, Rules 97 to 101 are appealable only under Section 96 of the Code and not otherwise. Two learned Single Judges of this Court have taken the view that since the orders passed under the two provisions noted above, are to be treated as decrees for purposes of appeal, such appeal should be filed only under Section 104 and not under Section 96 of the Code of 1908. We have also extracted the provisions of Section 104 above. A perusal of the same would show that the object of Section 104 is to provide for appeals against certain specific orders and not others. The expression ''save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code'' appearing in Section 104 would take within its fold the appeals against orders passed under Order 21, Rule 58 and Order 21, Rule 101 of the Code. A provision appearing in a Procedural Code is made with an object of catering to different situations that may arise during the course of a litigation and in interpreting such provisions, the Court must always bear in mind the object that is sought to be achieved by the Legislature in making a distinction. 9. Yet another factor that is brought to our notice by Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel, whose assistance was sought by us in deciding this reference, is the custom of the court. There are long line of decisions which recognise a practice of the court or a custom of the court as law. Mr.Raghavachari would draw our attention to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jamal Uddin Ahmad vs. Abu Saleh Najmuddin and another reported in (2003) 4 SCC 257 , where, the Hon'ble Supreme Court applied the maxim ' Cursus curiae est lex curiae' to conclude that the practice of the Court is the law of the Court and should normally be adhered to in the absence of rules to the contrary. He would also implore us to take into account the fact that the Legislature has cautiously not included the orders passed in applications under Order 21, Rule 58 or Order 21, Rules 97 to 100 in the definition of a 'decree' under Section 2(2) of the Code. At the same time, caution has been exercised in treating those orders as decrees for the purposes of appeal since those orders will have the effect of affecting third parties' rights or the rights of the decree holder to proceed against a particular property in execution of a decree. According to the learned Senior Counsel, this Court has always treated those appeals against the orders passed by the Executing Court as Miscellaneous Appeals and they have not been treated as Appeals under Section 96. According to the learned Senior Counsel, there is no need to re- visit the practice as it does not impunge upon any existing statutory provision or rule. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that a nomenclature to be given to an appeal or other proceeding should necessarily depend upon the practice of the Court and any deviation therefrom is permissible only when there is a certain statutory prohibition or violation of the rule. 10. The learned Senior Counsel would also invite our attention to a judgment of a Five Judge Bench of the Madras High Court rendered as early as in 1883 in Muttuchidambara vs Karuppa reported in (1883) ILR 7 MAD 382, wherein, a reference was made calling upon the Bench to decide as to whether ryotwari land could be termed as an estate paying revenue to the Government so as to enable the District Collectors to effect partition of such estates under the provision of Section 225 of the Code of 1859 equivalent to present Section 54 of the Code. The Full Bench answered the question as follows: "1. The question for decision is whether the provisions of Section 265 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requiring that a decree for the partition of an estate paying revenue to Government be executed through the Collector of the District, are applicable to raiyatwari holdings. This section corresponds with Section 225 of the Code of 1859. It was held by the Sadr Court that raiyatwari holdings were not estates paying revenue to Government, and this construction has always been acted upon in this Presidency. This section corresponds with Section 225 of the Code of 1859. It was held by the Sadr Court that raiyatwari holdings were not estates paying revenue to Government, and this construction has always been acted upon in this Presidency. It would unsettle a large number of titles to adopt a different construction now, and whatever we might have thought if the matter had come before us as res Integra, we are not prepared to disturb a practice so long established 2. The orders of the District Judge and the Munsif must be set aside and the Munsif directed to pass fresh orders. The costs of the appeal will abide and follow the result.” Relying upon the above dictum, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that there was no need for changing the practice of the Court. 11. We have considered the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel as well as the counsel on record for the parties in these matters and the judgments of the other High Courts that have been referred to by the learned Single Judge in the order of reference. 12. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gurram Seetharam Reddy vs. Smt.Gunti Yashoda reported in 2004 (3) APLJ 251, had concluded that the fact that sub-rule (4) of Order 21, Rule 58 and Rule 101 of Order 21 shall have the force of the decree, would make them original decrees of Courts. A distinction is also sought to be made by the Full Bench on the ground that the words 'original decrees' appearing in Section 96 would mean decrees passed in exercise of original jurisdiction which would include execution. A similar view has been expressed by the Kerala High Court in Anto Mamkoottam vs. Peruvanthanam Service Co-operative Bank reported in 1996 (2) KLT 962 and in Shamsher Singh vs. Zile Ram reported in 2007 SCC OnLine P & H 1024. 13. The nomenclature to be assigned to an appeal depends mostly on the practice of each Court and there is no law or rule which suggests a uniform nomenclature to proceedings in various High Courts. To interfere or tinker with a practice so well established would, in our opinion, may not be proper. As already pointed out, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that practice of a Court will be the law unless it contravenes any statutory rule. To interfere or tinker with a practice so well established would, in our opinion, may not be proper. As already pointed out, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that practice of a Court will be the law unless it contravenes any statutory rule. As we had pointed out, ever since its inception, in 1862, this Court [Madras High Court] has been following certain practices including giving nomenclature for various proceedings before it. Such practice definitely partakes the character of a law in this Court. Unless there is a compelling situation or unless it is shown that the practice becomes contrary to any other rule or law, changing it is unwarranted. 14. Let us now examine the legal provisions extracted above.Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure defines a decree. There are certain inclusions and exclusions. The provisions in issue namely, Order 21, Rule 58(4) and Order 21, Rule 103 do not declare orders passed under those provisions as decrees. They only create a fiction whereby, the orders passed after an adjudication under the two provisions supra, are treated as decrees for the purposes of filing appeals. While interpreting the effect of a statutory provision, the Courts will always take into account the wisdom of the Legislature in providing for two different situations. If the Legislature has intended to treat orders passed under the two provisions supra, on par with the decree in an original suit, it would have included these two orders in the definition of a 'decree' as was done to an order under Order 7, Rule 11 and an order passed under Section 144 (restitution). 15. The fact that the Legislature has not done so and directed these orders to be treated as decrees for the purposes of appeal alone, would demonstrate that the intention of the Legislature was to maintain a difference between orders passed in execution and orders passed on the original side. No doubt, execution proceedings are also carried on by the Courts having original jurisdiction, but execution proceedings by themselves cannot be equated to original proceedings. Section 104 as adverted to above, provides for appeal against orders and it takes care to include orders which are made specifically appealable in the body of the Code which would include provisions of Order 21, Rule 58(4) and Order 21, Rule 103. Section 104 as adverted to above, provides for appeal against orders and it takes care to include orders which are made specifically appealable in the body of the Code which would include provisions of Order 21, Rule 58(4) and Order 21, Rule 103. We are, therefore, unable to subscribe to the views of the Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab and Haryana High Courts on the effect of the two provisions which deem orders passed in execution as decrees for the purposes of filing appeals. There is also another angle to it. The procedure for hearing a regular Appeal is a little different from the procedure for hearing a Miscellaneous Appeal, though the scope would be the same. A Miscellaneous Appeal is not subjected to the rigorous procedure that is prescribed for hearing an Appeal. A regular Appeal is heard after receipt of the records from the trial Court and after preparation of the records by the appellate Court and the process takes a longer duration, but the hearing of a Miscellaneous Appeal is not subjected to such procedural wrangles which would delay it's disposal. May be this is also one of the reasons which prevailed with the Legislature in not bringing these two orders within the definition of 'original decree'. We see no reason to tinker with the practice of this Court in numbering appeals against orders passed by the Executing Courts under Order 21, Rule 58 or under Order 21, Rules 97 to 101 as Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. 16. The Reference is answered accordingly and the Registry is directed to place these appeals before the Judges dealing with the roster. We place on record our sincere appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel, whose assistance was sought for by us to enable us to answer the issue raised in theses appeals.