JUDGMENT : (Ajit Kumar, J.) Heard Ms. Shreya Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Atul Dayal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Prakash Chandra Dwivedi, learned counsel for the respondent - landlord. 2. This is a tenant petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution invoking superintending and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to question the findings of the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority on the score of release application being granted exercising power chiefly under Section 21(1)(a) and then at the same time under Section 21 (1) (b) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 3. There is no dispute qua jural relationship of landlord and tenant between petitioner and the respondent, however, the plea is set up in defence by the tenant before the prescribed authority as well as before the appellate authority was that tenant had sufficient alternative accommodation in the form of a vacant space behind the shops in question being used as a godown and, therefore, neither the need was so pressing, nor bona fide one inasmuch as on the point of comparative hardships, the petitioner having no other source of livelihood except the business being run from the shop, it lilted more in favour of the tenant. 4. Here another point pressed before this Court is that after the release application was filed petitioner came to know that some partition had already taken amongst the co-owners of the property and the property in question having gone to the share of Vijay Prakash Bajpai, one of the respondents in the release application, the need set up by the landlord-respondent no more remained bona fide. 5. A third argument was also advanced that certain documents were sought to be led qua separate share as a result of partition, by moving appropriate application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC but hearing as to the admissibility of those documents was deferred to be considered by the Court of appeal at the time of final judgment but it completely got scaped from the consideration by the Court and hence judgment is rendered bad. In support of her argument, she has relied upon a judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chand and another v. Ghaziabad Development Authority and others in Appeal (Civil) No. 2349 of 2008 decided on 31st March, 2008. 6. In support of her argument, she has relied upon a judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chand and another v. Ghaziabad Development Authority and others in Appeal (Civil) No. 2349 of 2008 decided on 31st March, 2008. 6. In support of her above arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has led the Court to the pleadings raised in the release application, the amended release application, the written statement filed including the written statement filed by Vijay Prakash Bajpai impleaded as proforma respondents in the case and also the survey commission report including the documents sought to be brought on record vide application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC on 15th May, 2024. She has taken the Court through the grounds raised in appeal also to question the order of prescribed authority for there being no findings touching the point of availability of alternative accommodation. 7. Yet another argument advanced by Ms. Shreya Gupta is that release application could not have been allowed simulteneously under Section 21(1)(a) and Section 21(1) (b) of the Act No. - 13 of 1972. In support of her argument learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Guru Prasad v. 1st Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 1999 (2) ARC 28. 8. Meeting the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Atul Dayal, learned Senior Advocate submitted before the Court that throughout the plea taken in the release application was that accommodation needed for the landlord to settle the sons and heirs and it was also throughout the case that there was a joint family but for the mutual convenience they had adjusted the accommodation into possession specific, however, there had been no partition in metes and bounds and, therefore it would not lie in the mouth of tenant to suggest that the shop in question had fallen in the share of Vijay Prakash Bajpai and that he being not applicant for the release, the release application deserved to be dismissed. He submitted that when the property is joint one, any one of co-owners of the property can maintain the release application. 9. He submitted that when the property is joint one, any one of co-owners of the property can maintain the release application. 9. In support of his argument learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that no document in evidence was led by the tenant petitioner to demonstrate that the particular shop in question had gone to the share of Vijay Prakash Bajpai. He further submitted that Municipal No. 60/39 was allotted to the entire plot/campus where the building situates and upon mutual understanding for the purposes of municipal taxes, the shares were determined as 1/4th each but nowhere it has come on record that particular shop in question had gone to the share of Vijay Prakash Bajpai. He submits that it is true that house No. 60/39 was there claimed by the Vijay Prakash Bajpai but that does not mean that the shop in question itself had fallen to his share in house No. 60/39. 10. Arguing on the point of alternative accommodation, it is submitted by Sri Dayal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent that this accommodation was already there and there is no denial to that effect but the accommodation was being used as a godown and this has come to be averred so in the release application by way of amendment. 11. Sri Dayal has further contended that the survey commission report which has been heavily relied upon by learned counsel appearing for the respondent only comes to show that there is certain area which was being used as godown. 12. Sri Dayal thus submitted that merely for certain area being used as godown, it does not give any right to tenant to question the bona fide need on the ground of an alternative accommodation. He submitted that the landlord is the sole arbiter of his need and requirement and there being a joint family, once the need has been set up, may be for a son or two, that itself is sufficient to allow the release application. He submits that once need got set up, even in affidavit of a son it has not come to be averred that need was set up for him alone, it will not dilute the merit of the release application and will not weaken the point of bona fide need. 13. He submits that once need got set up, even in affidavit of a son it has not come to be averred that need was set up for him alone, it will not dilute the merit of the release application and will not weaken the point of bona fide need. 13. Meeting the point upon Order 41 Rule 27 application, Sri Dayal first submitted that the municipal assessment records that were sought to be led in evidence would not have changed the complexion of the case as to bona fide need either. He submitted that this was for the assessment year 2016 and the amendment is sought to be led much thereafter. Besides this Sri Dayal argues that this was only in respect of the municipal No. - 60/39 and is not indicative of any fact that shop in question situated in house No. 60/39 alone. Therefore, according to Mr. Dayal, a case instituted against the Nagar Nigam for the purposes of municipal taxes to fasten liability upon the co-owners, cannot be an evidence of an absolute partition in metes and bounds of the property so as to enable the tenant to question the bona fide need and it is on this count also, he submits, the sons of Vijay Prakash Bajpai would fall within the meaning of the family and not outside the family as was sought to be argued by learned counsel for the petitioner. He submits that Court of appeal though has not referred to these documents quite specifically but even reference to them would not have changed the merit of the case as far as the release application was concerned. He sought to urge that a document led even if not considered, can become a good ground for remand provided it affects the merit of the case and non consideration thereof can be proved to have led to miscarriage of justice. 14. Replying to the argument that release could not have been allowed both on the grounds of 21(1)(a) and 21(1)(b) simultaneously, Mr. Dayal submitted that once the Court is satisfied with the bona fide need and grants release for that, any observation made on count of release of building also for it being in a dilapidated condition would not vitiate the decision of release. Dayal submitted that once the Court is satisfied with the bona fide need and grants release for that, any observation made on count of release of building also for it being in a dilapidated condition would not vitiate the decision of release. He further argued that while allowing release Court may consider bona fide need to the effect that building being in a dilapidated condition needed demolition to be raised again to be used by landlord to satisfy his/her need. 15. In the rejoinder Ms. Shreya Gupta has sought to argue that the document as was suggested by Mr. Dayal to be old one being the year of assessment 2016, was not an old one but issued in the financial year 2023-24 only and, therefore, petitioner could not have its knowledge prior to its issuance. 16. On the point of building being in a dilapidated condition, Ms. Gupta argued that engineer's report was contested and another engineer's report was submitted on behalf of the tenant that fully demonstrated that only work of repair was needed. Thus, she has sought to urge that building was not in a dilapidated condition to be released under Section 21(1) (b). 17. Replying to the argument raised in counter Ms. Shreya Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the affidavit of Sandeep Bajpai, one of the heirs of the release applicants fully demonstrated that he did not admit that he needed the shop in question though the need was set up for him. She, therefore, submitted that if there is a need specific set up, the shop can be released in favour of that needy person only and no general directions for the release can be made. 18. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the records, I see three following points to have emerged for consideration by this Court: (i). Whether there was a bona fide need established by the tenant-petitioner and findings returned by the prescribed authority can be termed to be perverse; (ii). Whether the judgment of Court of appeal is bad for non consideration of the additional evidence though taken on record; and (iii) Whether the findings returned under Section 21(1)(b) are liable to be ignored in the event the Court concurs with the findings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act No. 13 of 1972. 19. Whether the judgment of Court of appeal is bad for non consideration of the additional evidence though taken on record; and (iii) Whether the findings returned under Section 21(1)(b) are liable to be ignored in the event the Court concurs with the findings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act No. 13 of 1972. 19. Insofar as the bona fide need is concerned, I have gone through the application of release placed before me. Although it has come to be specifically averred vide paragraph 4 that the building was in a dilapidated condition for construction being old and in paragraph 6 it has been stated that petitioners had sufficient means to demolish the construction to raise new building, but in paragraph 9 it has come to be stated that tenanted premises in question was needed to establish the sons of petitioner No. 1 and 2 as they had already got married and had their own families. The details of the families have been given in the same paragraph and in paragraph 11 it has been stated that petitioners needed very badly the accommodation in tenancy of opposite party No. 2 and for which they had been making repeated requests. It has also been averred in paragraph 13 that petitioners wanted to start business in electronics and electrical goods and its repair in the accommodation after the release and reconstruction. Further it has been stated that they do not intend to let out the newly constructed shop to anyone else and have pleaded that in view of hardships being faced by them for settlement of members of family, they needed the shop in question. In paragraph 19 it is clearly averred that progress in life of the sons and daughters are stuck due to the lack of income. Thus the relief was that the release application to be allowed and tenanted premises be handed over to the respondent - landlords. 20. Reading the entire release application as discussed above any prudent man would come to conclude that the landlords needed not only the shop to settle the sons but also for the purposes of self settlement as they were not having sufficient financial resources for their sons and daughters to survive and since building was in a dilapidated state they intended its reconstruction after demolition. So in a sense it can be construed also that demand of release was sought for reconstruction after its demolition for personal need of the family to use it after its reconstruction. 21. The need was set up for family need as well as for the sons' and daughters' need and at the same time the release was sought to raise needbased reconstruction and with further statement that it would not be let out to a third party any further. 22. In the written statement that was filed in reply to the release application it has come to be averred in paragraph 27 that there is commercial place available with an area of 400 Square feet which would be sufficient alternative accommodation available to the landlord to fullfill the needs of the sons and daughters. 23. Interestingly in paragraph 25 it has come to be averred that commercial use was being done jointly by the sons of late Vishwanath Bajpai and also Vijay Prakash Bajpai and others. In reply to this an application was filed by the respondent-landlord to amend the release application with averments to the effect that accommodation was being used as a godown and I am apprised at the bar that this amendment was though questioned but ultimately challenge laid to the amendment came to an end with the rejection of the of the petition by the higher Courts. 24. Now looking to the pleadings raised by respective parties it clearly transpires that the accommodation was needed by the family for its own use and settlement of their sons and daughters and it cannot be said that there was a person specific need. Even though it may not have come in the affidavit of Sandeep Bajpai that he needed the shop in question but I do not find to be there something to infer in support of the petitioner tenant that there was no more any need of the shop in question for him. It is an affidavit filed in support of release application and for a little vagueness in it, if any, it cannot be read negatively to benefit the defence. 25. The survey commission report is there which also upon perusal I do not find to be supporting the case of the tenant petitioner to question bona fide element need set up by landlord. 25. The survey commission report is there which also upon perusal I do not find to be supporting the case of the tenant petitioner to question bona fide element need set up by landlord. All that has come that behind the shop there is certain space already in possession of landlord and landlord has come to state candidly that it was already in use as godown. Hence need could not to be neutralized for this accommodation. It has been held that admittedly by this Court and there are the authorities of the Supreme Court that landlord is a sole arbitrator of his need and it does not lie in the mouth of tenant to suggest as to which accommodations would suit the landlord better (Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 ). 26. In the face of the fact that there is no denial to the available premises of 400 square yard being used as a godown, the tenant cannot suggest that that space can be used for purposes for which need was set up better. 27. Coming to the second point as to the evidence being not considered sought to be led by way of additional evidence though there was an order by the Court of appeal that it would deal with at the stage of final hearing, I gave this opportunity to the petitioner's counsel to demonstrate that how the additional evidence in any manner help her client in getting the findings by the prescribed authority on the question of bona fide need reversed. She though has sought to place before the Court the plaint filed in the suit by the Vijay Prakash Bajpai against the municipal corporation and also certain papers qua municipal assessment of the premises in question but upon perusal thereof, I am not able to infer from those documents that there was in fact any partition in metes and bounds and the shop in question fell in the share of Vijay Prakash Bajpai. There is no pleading as such in the entire written statement except for the additional evidence sought to be led. There is no pleading as such in the entire written statement except for the additional evidence sought to be led. The Court may not have considered this additional evidence but even after considering this additional evidence, since the shop in question cannot be said to be have already fallen in the share of Vijay Prakash Bajpai, it could not have led the Court to hold that for alleged partition the need no more remained a bona fide one. 28. Besides the above, I do not find there to be any pleading raised before the Court of appeal or before the prescribed authority that there was a partition in metes and bounds to be suggestive of shop in question falling in the share of Vijay Prakash Bajpai or there to be any admission by Vijay Prakash Bajpai as to partition and ownership of shop coming to him. In the absence of such pleadings raised even if the additional evidence is considered, it cannot said with certainty that the shop in question had fallen in the share of Vijay Prakash Bajpai and, therefore, release application was not maintainable at the instance of other co-owners of the property. Nothing in the affidavit of Sandeep Bajpai as has been argued to be demonstrative of any such partition. 29. Even otherwise if the ownership of landlords is not disputed and while there exists joint ownership and co-owners are in joint possession and do not claim partition, it is not for the tenant to question title to non-suit the landlord in a claim for release set up for bona fide need. A tenant must understand that after all he is a tenant and cannot claim an indefeasible right to retain tenancy. Once landlord has set up a need and it has come to be stated and proves that members of the family are not gainfully employed, any business even if run by a few may not suffice the financial need of the entire family and, therefore, need would be bona fide. Similarly it should be landlord's choice to use a particular partition of his property for a particular business to settle members of the family. Tenant should make search for a new accommodation to accommodate the landlord and not vice versa. 30. A matter can be remanded if a particular point was required to be addressed but only when it may affect merit of the matter. Tenant should make search for a new accommodation to accommodate the landlord and not vice versa. 30. A matter can be remanded if a particular point was required to be addressed but only when it may affect merit of the matter. It will be too technical a view to be taken to set aside an order to remit the matter to be decided for consideration of such evidence which the Court finds to be of no help to the party leading such evidence and result is bound to be the same. In matters where substantive rights as to title may be an issue, a matter can be remanded but in summary trial of eviction of tenant for want of premises by landlord to settle his family, I do not see any justification for any justification for such highly technical to be taken to remand a matter for consideration of certain more documents to test the bona fide need of landlord. Thus, I do not see there to be any prejudice caused to the tenant in the matter for no consideration of plaint of suit filed by one of the landlords against Municipal Corporation for settlement of municipal taxes and document relating to assessment of the building more especially when issue as to the application of Act No. 13 of 1972 was not involved. Remand for remands' sake is not necessary. 31. Coming to the last argument on the question of order being passed under Section 21(1)(a) and Section 21(1)(b) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 simultaneously, in my view once findings returned on the question of bona fide need is sustainable for not suffering from any perversity so as to interfere with, this itself shows a sufficient ground to order for release. Once the Court finds that the bona fide need issue has been decided correctly in favour of the landlord, the question whether the building was in a dilapidated condition or not and whether the order on that count is sustainable need not be gone into. The judgment of Division Bench which has been cited raises a valid point that where the bona fide need is set up, this can be allowed irrespective of the state of building and even if claim of bona fide need is held not sustainable, still landlord can press for release on the ground that building is in a dilapidated stage. The judgment of Division Bench which has been cited raises a valid point that where the bona fide need is set up, this can be allowed irrespective of the state of building and even if claim of bona fide need is held not sustainable, still landlord can press for release on the ground that building is in a dilapidated stage. vide paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the judgement, the Court has held thus: ''5. When the composite application under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) is made by the landlord it is open to him to press his case under any of the two clauses. He may claim eviction of the tenant under clause (a) if proves bona fide requirement of the building for his personal occupation and also satisfies the other requirements laid down by the relevant Rules. In such a case even if the building is in dilapidated condition which requires demolition and new construction the case will be covered by clause (a) and not by clause (b). If the landlord fails to satisfy the requirement of clause (a) he can still press the application for release of the building under clause (b). 6. In Bhulan Singh v. Ganendra Kumar Roy Chowdhury [AIR 1950 Calcutta 74], a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court while considering the proviso (f) to Section 11 of West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, which provided that where the premises are bona fide required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held it may be released in favour of the landlord, has laid down as under: ''It is suggested that this provision giving the landlord a right to possession, if he established that he required the premises bona fide for rebuilding, could have no application whatsoever unless the state of the premises was such that they required to be rebuilt. It is to be observed that proviso (f) to Section 11(1) of the Act does not mention premises, requiring rebuilding. What it states is that sub-sec. (1) shall have no application if the landlord requires the premises bona fide for rebuilding. The state of the premises therefore is not an essential factor in the case''. 7. It is to be observed that proviso (f) to Section 11(1) of the Act does not mention premises, requiring rebuilding. What it states is that sub-sec. (1) shall have no application if the landlord requires the premises bona fide for rebuilding. The state of the premises therefore is not an essential factor in the case''. 7. Following the aforementioned decision of Calcutta High Court as well as other cases a learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. Champa Kunwar Trust v. District Judge, [ AIR 1976 All 252 ] has held that state or the condition of the building is not material for the purpose of application of Section 21(1)(a). Another learned Single Judge in Madan Gopal v. III Additional District Judge, [1982 ARC 226] has also held that a very old or dilapidated premises can be released under Section 21(1)(a) without complying with the provision of Section 21(1)(b) or Rule 17. Relevant extract from the said decision of learned Judge is reproduced below. ''Then question arises for consideration whether the premises could have been released for making new constructions and that too after demolition of the premises in dispute, in absence of non-compliance of Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the 'Act'. It is not in dispute that the plan has already been submitted and the finding has been recorded by the appellate Court that the shop is in dilapidated condition. The appellate Court relied upon evidence including affidavits and other material on record in arriving at this finding. It believed the affidavits filed on behalf of landlord. Though the shop may not be in such a dilapidated condition which requires immediate attention, but it is an old shop and from its structure it can be said to be dilapidated. The word 'dilapidated' is a relative term and the meaning given to it cannot be static. It believed the affidavits filed on behalf of landlord. Though the shop may not be in such a dilapidated condition which requires immediate attention, but it is an old shop and from its structure it can be said to be dilapidated. The word 'dilapidated' is a relative term and the meaning given to it cannot be static. Under Section 21(1)(a) of the 'Act' a premises can be released in the existing form even for the purpose of new constructions and in the instant case the need of the landlord has been held to be bona fide and genuine and the premises have been released under Section 21(1) of the Act and the need of the landlord having been found to be genuine under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, as such, there was no question of applicability of Section 21(1)(b) of the 'Act' as also Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act. This ground also has got no force.'' 8. In Hans Raj Sharma v. Ist Additional District Judge, Badaun [1986 (12) ALR 408], a learned Single Judge while analysing clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21, has held as follows: ''An analysis of the clauses (a) and (b) clearly leads to the conclusion that where a landlord applies for an order of eviction of a tenant on the ground that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction the case will be squarely covered by clause (b). Where, on the other hand, the application of the landlord is founded on the assertion that the building is required for the personal occupation of the landlord whether in its existing form or after demolition and new construction, the case will be covered by clause (a) of Section 21(1). A building may be required for personal occupation by the landlord after demolition and new construction even if it may not be in a dilapidated condition. The landlord may simply require the building for his personal occupation in whatever condition it may be, whether in its existing form or after demolition and new construction.'' 32. And finally vide paragraph 10 of the judgment answered the reference as under: ''10. …...The need of the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) can be considered even if the landlord had pleaded that the building is in dilapidated condition and requires demolition and new construction.'' 33. And finally vide paragraph 10 of the judgment answered the reference as under: ''10. …...The need of the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) can be considered even if the landlord had pleaded that the building is in dilapidated condition and requires demolition and new construction.'' 33. Looking to this above legal aspect and applying the same to the facts of the present case, I find that the pleading was raised that there was a need but the building was too old to be used. If the judgment of Division Bench is read in its correct perspective and is applied to the facts of the case it can, of course, be held that the Court rightly concluded that the building was in a dilapidated condition but since need was there, the application for release deserved to be allowed. 34. Thus, I do not find any manifest error either in the order of prescribed authority or of the appellate authority to exercise my extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 35. Petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. 36. Cost made easy.