JUDGMENT : 1. The Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C.'), is filed by the appellants/defendants 3 and 4 challenging the decree and Judgment dated 22.02.2013 in O.S. No.58 of 2008 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Addanki (for short, 'the trial court'). 2. Respondents 1 and 2 are the plaintiffs 1 and 2, who filed the suit in O.S.No.58 of 2008 seeking partition of the plaint schedule property into four equal shares and deliver separate possession of one such share to each of them. Respondents 3 and 4 are the Defendants 1 and 2 in the said suit. 3. Referring to the parties hereinafter as arrayed in the suit is expedient to mitigate potential confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: (a) Approximately 35 years ago, the joint family, comprising the 1st Defendant and his deceased father, Mallareddy, possessed ancestral property measuring Ac.6.00 cents of land and Ac.0.15 cents site in their native village, Kondamur. After migrating to Reningavaram and settling there around 30 years ago, Mallareddy passed away intestate. His wife, the 2nd Defendant, and son, the 1st Defendant, were left to succeed his estate, representing an undivided half share in the properties above. Subsequently, the joint family, comprised of Defendants 1 and 2, sold the properties in Kondamur village and utilized the proceeds to acquire the plaint schedule properties at Kondamur village. Given that the 1st Defendant serves as the Kartha and Manager of the joint family, the sale deeds for the properties in Reningavaram, namely the plaint schedule properties, were obtained in his name during their acquisition. The plaintiffs and Defendants 1 and 2 have jointly possessed and enjoyed the plaint schedule properties. (b) Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the minor children of the 1st Defendant. Over the past five years, the 1st Defendant has succumbed to vices, squandering family income. Exploiting the 1st Defendant's vulnerability, Defendants 3 and 4 orchestrated a nominal, sham, and collusive sale deed from him under Ex.B.1, dated 23.01.2004, explicitly pertaining to item No.2 of the plaint schedule property, disregarding the legitimate rights of the Plaintiffs. The 1st Defendant lacks the authority to dispose of the plaint schedule properties in a manner prejudicial to the rights of the Plaintiffs. The 1st Defendant lacks the authority to dispose of the plaint schedule properties in a manner prejudicial to the rights of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 and Defendants 1 and 2 hold a 1/4th share each in the plaint schedule properties. Despite the 2nd Defendant expressing a willingness to partition the plaint schedule properties into four equal shares and allocate one such share to each Plaintiff, this intention has not materialized. Consequently, the Plaintiffs find themselves compelled to institute legal proceedings to secure their rightful share in the plaint schedule properties. 5. Defendants 1 and 2 remained ex parte in the suit. 6. The 3rd Defendant has adopted the written statement of the 4th Defendant, asserting that the 1st Defendant has no vices and effectively manages the joint family comprising the Plaintiffs, their mother Narasamma, and the 2nd Defendant under one roof. According to their contentions, they jointly acquired item No.2 for Rs.6,61,000/- on 23.03.2004 from the 1st Defendant and his wife, with the delivery of possession. The 1st Defendant's wife serves as an attesting witness to this transaction. Further, they contend that neither the minor Plaintiffs nor their mother raised any objections regarding the sale of additional property by the 1st Defendant in 2002. Allegedly, the 1st Defendant utilized the sale proceeds to construct a shopping complex, investing Rs.2,00,000/- in item No.1, depositing Rs.1,00,000/- in his name, and Rs.25,000/- each in the names of the minor Plaintiffs in Agri Gold under Exs.B.31 and B.32. Additionally, he discharged the housing loan in the name of the 2nd Defendant. After the purchase of item No.2, they purportedly acquired another extent of Ac.0.02 cents on 31.05.2004 from third parties under document No.645/2004. They contend to have invested not less than Rs.10,00,000/- in making developments and constructing two additional rooms in item No.2. The property is reportedly utilized for a shopping complex, for which they pay taxes to the Gram Panchayat and have it assessed under Exs.B.4 to B.28.They posit that the 1st Defendant initiated this suit through the minor Plaintiffs to extract money from them under the false claim of a “2-feet excess width of site”. 7. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition as prayed for? (2) Whether the suit schedule property is self-acquired property of the D1? 7. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition as prayed for? (2) Whether the suit schedule property is self-acquired property of the D1? (3) Whether the registered sale deed standing in the name of D3 and D4 is valid one, executed by D1 personally and as guardian of plaintiffs 1 and 2? (4) Whether the Court Fees paid is correct or not? (5) Whether there is any cause of action to file this suit? (6) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for future mesne profits? (7) To what relief? 8. For convenience, the trial Court recast the issues as follows: (1) Whether the suit schedule property is the ancestral property of the 1st Defendant Kontham Anji Reddy? (2) Whether the registered sale deed, dated 23.01.2004 executed by the 1st Defendant in favour of defendants 3 and 4 is valid one? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to have a partition from the suit schedule properties? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for future mesne profits? (5) To what relief? 9. Throughout the trial, the Plaintiffs presented P.Ws.1 to 3 as witnesses and introduced Exhibits A.1 to A.3 into evidence. On the Defendants' side, D.Ws.1 to 7 were called to testify, and Exhibits B.1 to B.34 were marked. 10. Following the trial's completion and after considering both parties' arguments, the trial Court passed a decree in favour of the Plaintiffs, with costs. The decree allocated a 1/4th share to each of Plaintiffs 1 and 2, a 1/4th share to the 1st Defendant, and a 1/2 share to the 2nd Defendant. The specifics of equities are to be determined during the final decree petition. 11. During the Appeal proceedings, the 4th Respondent/2nd Defendant passed away. Subsequently, her Legal Representative, the 5th Respondent, was added to the proceedings following the Order dated 17.08.2016 in ASMP.No.2210 of 2015. Additionally, as per the Order dated 06.10.2022 in I.A. No.1 of 2019, Respondents 1 and 2, who are Plaintiffs 1 and 2, were declared majors. 12. After extensive hearings from the learned counsel representing the parties and a thorough examination of the trial Court's Judgment and its findings, I have carefully reconsidered all the evidence on record, including the testimonies of relevant witnesses presented by both sides. 13. 12. After extensive hearings from the learned counsel representing the parties and a thorough examination of the trial Court's Judgment and its findings, I have carefully reconsidered all the evidence on record, including the testimonies of relevant witnesses presented by both sides. 13. The arguments presented by Sri Nimmagadda Satyanarayana, learned counsel representing the Appellants/Defendants 3 and 4, emphasize that the trial Court overlooked the pleadings and evidence of the Appellants. According to him, the Plaintiffs' father used the sale proceeds for the family's legal necessities by constructing houses and making fixed deposits in his name and the names of the Plaintiffs. He contends that the trial Court's assertion of voidness due to lack of permission under section 7(3) of the Guardian and Wards Act is misplaced. He argues that this Act doesn't apply to the undivided interests of minors in a joint family property managed by an adult family member. The need for permission arises only when the property exclusively belongs to the minor. The Appellants also challenge the trial Court's finding on their failure to demonstrate the consideration's utilization for legal necessity. They argue that the trial Court overlooked established legal principles, asserting that minors challenging a sale deed should plead and prove how the family manager misused the consideration. Failure to allege and prove this misuse absolves the alienee from demonstrating the consideration's proper utilization, as per Supreme Court precedent and the principles upheld by this Hon’ble Court. 14. On the contrary, Sri G. Veerendra Nadh Babu learned counsel representing Respondents 1 to 3 (Plaintiffs and 1st Defendant) and the 5th Respondent, contends that the trial Court meticulously assessed the factual circumstances and arrived at a sound conclusion. He argues that the reasons provided by the trial Court do not warrant any interference. 15. Considering the pleadings in the suit, the trial Court's findings, and the opposing arguments presented before this Court, the following points necessitate determination: 1) Is the trial Court justified in holding that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a share in the suit schedule properties and allotting 1/4th share to them and 1/4th share to the 1st Defendant and half share to the 2nd Defendant in the suit schedule properties? 2) Does the trial Court judgment need any interference? POINT NOs.1 & 2: 16. PW.1, the next friend and mother of minor Respondents 1 and 2/Plaintiffs 1 and 2, testified in the case. 2) Does the trial Court judgment need any interference? POINT NOs.1 & 2: 16. PW.1, the next friend and mother of minor Respondents 1 and 2/Plaintiffs 1 and 2, testified in the case. She initiated the suit on behalf of the minor Plaintiffs, and the 1stDefendant is the father of Plaintiffs 1 and 2, while the 2ndDefendant is the 1stDefendant’s mother. PW.1’s father, Yellala Obula Reddy, is examined as PW.2. On behalf of the Plaintiffs, Devarakonda Subba Rao, a third party, is examined as PW.3. DW.1, the 3rd Defendant, is examined on behalf of Defendants 3 and 4, and DWs.2 to 7, third parties, are examined on behalf of the Defendants. The suit schedule properties, items 1 and 2, were initially purchased by the 1stDefendant, Konatham Anji Reddy. The Plaintiffs relied on Exs.A.1 to A.3, sale deeds supporting their case.Ex.A.1, a certified copy of the sale deed dated 04.08.1998, reveals that Defendants 1 and 2 and the 1stDefendant’s sister, Chinnamai, executed a registered sale deed in favour of Venkata Suresh Babu and Sreedhar Babu, represented by Koteswararao, S/o Venkaiah. This sale pertains to the extent of Ac.2.36 cents of wetland in Sy. No.466/3, Kondamuru Gram Panchayat, for a valid consideration of Rs.8,300/- per acre.Ex.A.2, a certified copy of the sale deed dated 25.03.1999, illustrates that Defendants 1 and 2, along with the 1stDefendant’s sister, Chinnamai, executed a registered sale deed in favour of Boggavarapu Edukondalu, S/o Venkaiah. This sale pertains to Ac.2.00 cents in Sy. No.437, with specific boundaries, for a valid consideration of Rs.13,000/- per acre.Ex.A.3, a certified copy of the sale deed dated 25.03.1999, shows that the 1st Defendant executed a registered sale deed in favour of Mudimudi Pothyreddy, covering Ac.6.77 cents of dry land with specific boundaries, for a consideration of Rs.16,300/-.Exs.A.1 to A.3 collectively indicate that Mallareddy, the 1st Defendant's father, initially acquired these properties. Chinnamai, the 1stDefendant's sister, also participated in selling properties covered under Exs.A.1 and A.2. According to the Plaintiffs, the suit schedule property in Reningavaram was purchased using the proceeds from selling properties in Kondamuru village. 17. There is no dispute that the property mentioned in Ex.B.1, precisely item No.2 of the schedule, stands in the name of the 1stDefendant. This property was acquired by the 1stDefendant using the sale proceeds from the ancestral property covered under Exs.A.1 and A.2. 17. There is no dispute that the property mentioned in Ex.B.1, precisely item No.2 of the schedule, stands in the name of the 1stDefendant. This property was acquired by the 1stDefendant using the sale proceeds from the ancestral property covered under Exs.A.1 and A.2. The trial Court acknowledged that the schedule property classified as ancestral, was acquired by the 1stDefendant with the funds generated from the sale of ancestral properties mentioned in Exs.A.1 to A.3. Upon reviewing the entire record, this Court concurs that, while not strictly characterized as ancestral, the schedule property was indeed acquired by the 1st Defendant through the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties covered under Exs.A.1 and A.2. The trial Court aptly addressed the first issue by determining that the schedule property was purchased using the proceeds from Exs.A.1 to A.3. The trial Court answered the 1st issue by holding that the schedule property was purchased from the sale proceeds of Exs.A.1 to A.3 and the issue is answered by the trial Court that the suit schedule property is the ancestral property of the 1st Defendant, K.Anji Reddy. 18. The finding of the trial Court that the schedule property was purchased from the sale proceeds of ancestral properties has not been contested by the Plaintiffs. The consensus among the parties, as reflected in the record, is that the schedule property was acquired using the proceeds from the sale of ancestral properties. The Plaintiffs, however, argue that due to this transaction, their father (1st Defendant) unlawfully sold the property to Defendants 3 and 4. They contend that the 1st Defendant lacked absolute authority to make such a sale, and as coparceners, they maintain entitlement to a share in the schedule property. The trial Court duly noted that the 1st Defendant had indeed sold item No.2 of the schedule property to Defendants 3 and 4 through Ex.B.1. The contents of the Ex.B.1 sale deed indicate that the property was handed over to Defendants 3 and 4 on the day of the sale, i.e., January 23, 2004. The 3rd Defendant, examined as DW.1, presented Ex.B.1 as a registered sale deed to establish their purchase, and the document writer, N. Ravi Sankar (DW.6), corroborated their case. 19. Additionally, DW.3 Subba Rao supported Defendants 3 and 4, affirming their purchase of item No.2 for a valuable consideration. The 3rd Defendant, examined as DW.1, presented Ex.B.1 as a registered sale deed to establish their purchase, and the document writer, N. Ravi Sankar (DW.6), corroborated their case. 19. Additionally, DW.3 Subba Rao supported Defendants 3 and 4, affirming their purchase of item No.2 for a valuable consideration. The sale deed, dated January 23, 2004 (Ex.B.1), was attested by the mother of Plaintiffs 1 and 2 (PW.1) and her brother, Bramha Reddy, who served as witnesses, and the Defendants 3 and 4 paid Rs.6,97,000/- to the 1st Defendant as the consideration amount. The consistent testimony of D.W.s 3 and 6 supports the position maintained by Defendants 3 and 4 regarding the transaction detailed in Ex.B.1. 20. Notably, PW.2, PW.1's father, did not contest the execution of the Ex.B.1 sale deed or the passage of consideration. Throughout the trial, the Plaintiffs contended that the signature of PW.1 (K. Narasamma) as an attesting witness on Ex.B.1 was forged. However, the trial Court noted that this plea had not been raised in the plaint. After a comprehensive examination of the evidence presented, the trial Court arrived at the following conclusions : The schedule properties are the properties purchased by the 1st Defendant with the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties. Defendants 3 and 4 purchased the schedule property vide Ex.B.1 document. The execution of the Ex.B.1 document, passing of the consideration, and the delivery of the possession of the property to Defendants 3 and 4 are also established. 21. Furthermore, in its 42nd paragraph, the trial Court noted that while there was a claim that PW.1's signature was forged on the Ex.B.1 document, this contention was negatived as the signatures of PW.1 on the document were compared with her known signatures. It was observed that PW.1 vehemently denied her signatures on the Vakalath and plaint. However, the signature of PW.1's brother on the Ex.B.1 document was not contested. The overall facts and circumstances strongly indicate the execution of the document, consideration passing, and property delivery on the day of the Ex.B.1 transaction, aspects that were not subject to dispute. Importantly, the Plaintiffs have not raised any cross-objections against these findings of the trial Court. 22. Upon thoroughly examining the entire record, this Court finds no compelling reasons to intervene with the trial Court's findings. Importantly, the Plaintiffs have not raised any cross-objections against these findings of the trial Court. 22. Upon thoroughly examining the entire record, this Court finds no compelling reasons to intervene with the trial Court's findings. Even if it is assumed that the Plaintiffs were not obligated to file cross-objections, this Court has carefully deliberated on the arguments presented and scrutinized the evidence from both parties. Consequently, there appears to be no justification for altering the trial Court's conclusions, substantiated by the evidence on record. 23. The learned counsel for the Appellants asserts that the trial Court erred in determining that permission was necessary for the 1st Defendant under section 7(3) of the Guardians and Wards Act for alienating the property, rendering the sale void due to the lack of said permission. He contends that the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act do not apply to the undivided interest of minors in a joint family property managed by an adult family member. Such permission is only requisite when the property exclusively belongs to the minor. It is acknowledged that the plaint schedule property was a joint family property of the Plaintiffs and 1st Defendant at the time of the sale deed's execution by the 1st Defendant in favour of Defendants 3 and 4. Consequently, obtaining permission from the 1st Defendant to sell the undivided share of the Plaintiffs in the joint family properties is unnecessary. 24. In Shripati v. Goroba, 2008 S.C.C. OnLine Bom 618, the High Court of Bombay referred the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri Narayan Bal v. Sridhar Sutar, (1996) 8 S.C.C. 54 , wherein it is held that: In that case, Karta of the joint Hindu family along with his widowed mother and widowed aunt for themselves and as guardians of their minor sons, executed a sale pertaining to joint family lands. In para 5, the following observations are made:— "5. With regard to the undivided interest of the Hindu minor in joint family property, the provisions afore-culled are beads of the same string and need to be viewed in a single glimpse, simultaneously in conjunction with each other. Each provision, particularly section 8, cannot be viewed in isolation. If read together, the intent of the legislature in this beneficial legislation becomes manifest. Each provision, particularly section 8, cannot be viewed in isolation. If read together, the intent of the legislature in this beneficial legislation becomes manifest. Ordinarily, the law does not envisage a natural guardian of the undivided interest of a Hindu minor in joint family property. The natural guardian of the property of a Hindu minor, other than the undivided interest in joint family property, is alone contemplated under section 8, whereunder his powers and duties are defined. Section 12 carves out an exception to the rule that should there be no adult member of the joint family in the management of the joint family property in which the minor has an undivided interest, a guardian may be appointed, but ordinarily, no guardian shall be appointed for such undivided interest of the minor. The adult family member in the management of the joint Hindu family property may be a male or a female, not necessarily the Karta. The power of the High Court otherwise to appoint a guardian in situations justifying has been preserved. This is the legislative scheme on the subject. Under section 8, a natural guardian of the property of the Hindu minor, before he disposes of any immovable property of the minor, must seek permission of the Court. But since there need be no natural guardian for the minor's undivided interest in the joint family property, as provided under sections 6 and 12 of the Act, the previous permission of the Court under section 8 for disposing of the undivided interest of the minor in the joint family property is not required. The joint Hindu family by itself is a legal entity capable of acting through its Karta and other adult members of the family in the management of the joint Hindu family property. Thus, section 8, in view of the express terms of sections 6 and 12, would not be applicable where a joint Hindu family property is sold/disposed of by the Karta involving an undivided interest of the minor in the said joint Hindu family property. The question posed at the outset, therefore, is so answered. By following the observations, this Court finds that the observations made by the trial Court in this regard are not sustainable. 25. The question posed at the outset, therefore, is so answered. By following the observations, this Court finds that the observations made by the trial Court in this regard are not sustainable. 25. The counsel representing the Plaintiffs argues that it is unnecessary for the minor Plaintiffs to seek the cancellation of the sale deed, as they can instead request a partition of the property. Both children are Plaintiffs and coparceners with Defendants 1 and 2. The burden lies on Defendants 3 and 4 to demonstrate that the sale was carried out for legal necessity. If they fail to establish the flow of title, the transaction is considered void, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to a partition of the properties. The alienee must prove legal necessity supporting the sale by the guardian. The Defendants, aside from asserting that the alienation was made for legal necessity, have not proven the document's contents. Defendants 3 and 4 have failed to meet their legal burden in demonstrating that they are bona fide purchasers and that the sale was conducted for legal necessity and adequate consideration. 26. The trial Court, noted that Plaintiffs 1 and 2 were 6 and 3 years old at the time of the Ex.B.1 transaction. It concluded that the sale consideration amount couldn't have been utilized for the legal necessity of the Plaintiffs, given their young age. Considering their age, expenditures for education, medical needs, or any other purpose were deemed implausible, making the transaction not binding on the minor children/Plaintiffs of the 1st Defendant. 27. The trial Court raised the question of whether the sale proceeds from Exs.A.1 to A.3 were utilized for the legal necessities of the minor children, namely the Plaintiffs. In paragraph No.31, the trial Court noted that there were no pleadings, either in the plaint or averments in the written statement, regarding the use of the sale proceeds for the legal necessities of the minor children, who are coparceners in the Hindu Joint family properties. 28. The burden lies on the 1st Defendant to demonstrate that the alienations were carried out for legal necessity or the benefit of the family or to discharge his antecedent debts. 28. The burden lies on the 1st Defendant to demonstrate that the alienations were carried out for legal necessity or the benefit of the family or to discharge his antecedent debts. The 1st Defendant, the father of Plaintiffs 1 and 2, chose not to contest the suit, and the trial Court observed that his absence indicates a collusive nature of the suit since the primary grievance is against the 1st Defendant by the Plaintiffs. 29. Counsel representing Defendants 3 and 4 argued that the Plaintiff's father utilized the sale consideration for the legal necessities of the family, involving the construction of houses and making fixed deposits in his and the Plaintiff's names. Additionally, it was emphasized that any alleged misuse of the consideration amount would be known exclusively to the Plaintiffs. If they withhold such evidence, the burden of proof should not fall on the alienee/Appellants. As per the contention, the trial court failed to consider PW.1's admission in her evidence that the suit schedule property is a joint family property managed by the 1st Defendant, who is also the father and Manager of Plaintiffs 1 and 2. Furthermore, it is argued that legal necessity pertains to the entire family, not solely the minor children, and for such necessity to be legal, it must be free from any moralities or illegalities. 30. It is settled law that the power of a Karta to sell co parcenary property is subject to certain restrictions, viz., the sale should be for legal necessity or the benefit of the estate. [Vijay A. Mittal v. Kulwant Rai, (2019) 3 SCC 520 ; Mulla on Hindu Law (22nd Edn.), p. 372.] The onus for establishing the existence of legal necessity is on the alienee. In Rani v. Santa Bala Debnath, (1970) 3 SCC 722 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “10. Legal necessity to support the sale must however be established by the alienees. Sarala owned the land in dispute as a limited owner. She was competent to dispose of the whole estate in the property for legal necessity or benefit to the estate. In adjudging whether the sale conveys the whole estate, the actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, and the benefit to be conferred upon the estate in the particular instance must be considered. She was competent to dispose of the whole estate in the property for legal necessity or benefit to the estate. In adjudging whether the sale conveys the whole estate, the actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, and the benefit to be conferred upon the estate in the particular instance must be considered. Legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion: it means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The onus of proving legal necessity may be discharged by the alienee by proof of actual necessity or by proof that he made proper and bona fide enquiries about the existence of the necessity and that he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity.” 31. The Appellants argue that they have demonstrated that the Ex.B.1 sale transaction was a legal necessity for the benefit of the family. Consequently, they assert that the transaction is binding on the Plaintiffs and legally valid, even without obtaining permission from the District Court. In light of this perspective, the Appellants contend that the Appeal should be allowed. 32. Counsel for the Appellants/Defendants 3 and 4 argues that the Plaintiffs did not assert in their pleadings that the Ex.B.1 sale transaction lacked legal necessity. Since such a plea was not raised, it is now impermissible for the Plaintiffs to introduce this contention in the Appeal. This argument is substantiated by reference to the decision in V. Eswara Rao Versus V.T. Sharat Chandra Thotraj, 2014 S.C.C. OnLine AP 156, where the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held: 25. Therefore, in view of the above decision of the Supreme Court, I am of the opinion that in the absence of any specific pleading by Plaintiff as to absence of legal necessity for sale of lot II of plaint 'C' Schedule property under Ex.B.7 and in the absence of an issue framed as to existence of legal necessity by the trial court in that regard, it was not necessary for D.23 to lead any evidence as to existence of legal necessity for the sale of this item of property to her. The Court below, without noticing the above decision of the Supreme Court and lack of proper pleading by Plaintiff and absence of issue on the aspect of legal necessity, erred in holding that D-23 failed to prove the existence of legal necessity for Ex.B.7 transaction. 33. The trial Court did not specifically frame an issue related to legal necessity. Neither party sought recasting of the issues during the trial. Nevertheless, the trial Court examined the validity of the registered sale deed, dated 23.01.2004 (Ex.B.1), by formulating an appropriate issue. 34. Learned counsel for the Plaintiffs relied on the decision in Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, A.I.R. 1963 SC 884, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 5. ………………………………... No doubt, no issue was framed, and the one which was framed could have been more elaborate, but since the parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation of those of the other side, it cannot be said that the absence of an issue was fatal to the case, or that there was that mistrial which vitiates proceedings. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the suit could not be dismissed on this narrow ground and also that there is no need for a remit, as the evidence which has been led in the case is sufficient to reach the right conclusion. Neither party claimed before us that it had any further evidence to offer. We, therefore, proceed to consider the central point in the case, to which we have amply referred already. 35. Although no specific issue was framed on the matter of legal necessity, both parties adduced evidence on this aspect. Defendants 3 and 4 examined DW.4 Ramaraju Lakshmana Raju, who testified that he received a court summons and brought receipts detailing the land purchase in the names of the 1st Defendant and Plaintiffs. According to his testimony, the 1st Defendant sent Rs.1,50,000/- to the Agri Gold company, Addanki branch, for land purchase. They received the amount on 24.11.2004 and used it to buy land, and, as per the terms with Agri Gold, the amount had to be repaid by 2014. Additionally, they refunded Rs.1,50,000/- to the 1st Defendant on 24.01.2007, as seen in Ex.B.31 business statements and receipts. They received the amount on 24.11.2004 and used it to buy land, and, as per the terms with Agri Gold, the amount had to be repaid by 2014. Additionally, they refunded Rs.1,50,000/- to the 1st Defendant on 24.01.2007, as seen in Ex.B.31 business statements and receipts. The statement in Ex.B.32 provides details of the amount refunded to the 1st Defendant, with a remaining balance of Rs.25,000/-. This investment was made after the Ex.B.1 transaction. The trial court noted that Agri Gold refunded Rs.1,50,000/- to the 1st Defendant on 24.01.2007. The Plaintiffs did not let in any evidence to demonstrate that this transaction was unrelated to Ex.B.1 or explain how the 1st Defendant could invest such an amount in Agri Gold. 36. It is the contention of Defendants 3 and 4 that after the sale of property covered under Ex.B.1, an amount of Rs.25,000/- each was deposited in the name of Plaintiffs and Rs.1,00,000/- was deposited in the name of 1st Defendant and he cleared the debts which was indebted by his wife Narasamma (PW.1). While accepting the said contention, the trial Court observed that the said amount was not spent for the legal necessity of the minor children of Narasamma/PW.1 i.e., Plaintiffs. 37. Learned counsel for the Plaintiffs relied on the decision in Sunil Kumar v. Ram Parkash, (1988) 2 S.C.C. 77 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 6. ……………... It is well settled that in a joint Hindu Mitakshara family, a son acquires by birth an interest equal to that of the father in ancestral property. The father, by reason of his paternal relation and his position as the head of the family, is its Manager, and he is entitled to alienate joint family property so as to bind the interests of both adult and minor coparceners in the property, provided that the alienation is made for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate or for meeting an antecedent debt. The power of the Manager of a joint Hindu family to alienate a joint Hindu family property is analogous to that of a Manager for an infant heir, as observed by the Judicial Committee in Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree [(1856) 6 Moo IA 393 (P.C.)] : "The power of a Manager for an infant heir to charge ancestral estate by loan or mortgage is, by the Hindu Law, a limited and qualified power, which can only be exercised rightly by the Manager in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate. But where the charge is one that a prudent owner would make in order to benefit the estate, a bona fide lender is not affected by the precedent mismanagement of the estate. The actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred in the particular instance, or the criteria to be regarded. If that danger arises from any misconduct to which the lender has been a party, he cannot take advantage of his own wrong to support a charge in his favour against the heir, grounded on a necessity which his own wrong has helped to cause…..” 38. In B.Rangarao (died) & others V. G.Venkata Krishna Rao and others 1995 APLJ 129 (HC) DB, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that the kartha of the family can alienate the property only for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family. 39. It is essential to note that the trial court's conclusion that the sale consideration received under Ex.B.1 was not spent for legal necessity merely because the amount was used to purchase property and deposited in the names of the minor Plaintiffs and 1st Defendant is erroneous. The evidence on record indicates that the alienation was made for legal necessity or the benefit of the estate, and it need not be exclusively for the benefit of the minor children, i.e., the Plaintiffs. 40. The Appellants/Defendants 3 and 4 have adduced the evidence of DW.5 to support their claim that the 1st Defendant and his wife (PW.1) resided together. Additionally, documentary evidence has been submitted in this regard. DW.5, the Panchayat Secretary of Reningavaram village, testified in his chief examination that in response to a court summons, he provided voters list particulars for 2008 and 2011. Additionally, documentary evidence has been submitted in this regard. DW.5, the Panchayat Secretary of Reningavaram village, testified in his chief examination that in response to a court summons, he provided voters list particulars for 2008 and 2011. According to these lists, the names of the guardians of Plaintiffs and D.1 were associated with Door No.1/156, including assessment numbers 448 and 449 of Reningavaram village for the year 2008. Similarly, for the year 2011, the names were recorded for the same Door No.1-156, S.No.530 and 531 (as per page No.18). This information is documented in Exs.B.33 and B.34, copies of voters lists for 2008 and 2011, respectively. 41. The trial Court noted several pieces of evidence, including Ex.B.28 (ration card), Ex.B.29 (voters I.D. card), Ex.B.30 (photo with CD), Exs.B.33 and B.34 (voters lists), indicating the presence of the 1st Defendant and PW.1 together. However, the trial Court emphasized that this evidence alone is not conclusive in determining whether the 1st Defendant and PW.1 lived together or separately. The trial Court acknowledged the Plaintiffs' contention that the 1st Defendant, due to vices, neglected them, leading to their separate living arrangements. Despite this claim, the evidence on record suggested otherwise. The trial Court pointed out that PW.1 and her brother attested the Ex.B.1 sale deed, which indicated that the sale was conducted for the benefit of the family. While the Court acknowledged that these recitals are not binding on the Plaintiffs, it highlighted the need for PW.1, who filed the suit on behalf of the Plaintiffs, to explain or present evidence contradicting these recitals. The absence of such evidence raised questions about the credibility of the Plaintiffs' case. Additionally, PW.1's brother, who attested to the Ex.B.1 sale deed, did not testify to support the Plaintiffs' contentions. Despite accusations regarding the 1st Defendant's habits, the evidence suggested that he took care of his family until the disposal of item No.2. The deposition of PW.2 indicated a lack of knowledge about the extent of money wasted by the 1st Defendant's habits, and he testified that the 1st Defendant continued to look after the family till the disposal of Ex.B.1 property. 42. The trial Court noted that the 1st Defendant had sold all family properties, leaving no land. The deposition of PW.2 indicated a lack of knowledge about the extent of money wasted by the 1st Defendant's habits, and he testified that the 1st Defendant continued to look after the family till the disposal of Ex.B.1 property. 42. The trial Court noted that the 1st Defendant had sold all family properties, leaving no land. Defendants 3 and 4 argued that the 1st Defendant executed a sale deed dated 09.08.2002, selling a property of Ac.1.05 cents on behalf of himself and his minor children (Plaintiffs). Subsequently, Defendants 3 and 4 filed I.A. No.1 of 2023 under Order 41 Rule 27 r/w section 151 of C.P.C., seeking to submit the certified copy of the registered sale deed dated 09.08.2002 as additional evidence in this Appeal. Respondents/Plaintiffs countered these claims in their response to I.A. No.1 of 2023, refuting its contents and urging the Court to dismiss the petition. 43. It is trite to observe that under Order 41, Rule 27 of C.P.C., additional evidence could be adduced in one of the three situations, namely, (a) whether the trial Court has illegally refused the evidence although it ought to have been permitted: (b) whether the evidence sought to be adduced by the party was not available to it despite the exercise of due diligence; (c) whether additional evidence was necessary to enable the Appellate Court to pronounce the Judgment or any other substantial cause of similar nature. It is equally well-settled that additional evidence cannot be permitted to be adduced to fill in the lacunae or to patch up the weak points in the case. After considering the material on record, this Court views that none of these three conditions were satisfied in this case. 44. This Court opines that receiving the said document is unnecessary for the case's disposal, as the trial court has already made observations in its Judgment regarding the 1st Defendant's disposal of the property. Given that this fact is undisputed and has been addressed by the trial court, there is no need to admit additional evidence. Furthermore, Defendants 3 and 4 have not provided reasons for not presenting this document during the trial. The evidence on record indicates that the Plaintiffs did not take steps to challenge these sale transactions, and they have not provided any reasons for not contesting these transactions. 45. Furthermore, Defendants 3 and 4 have not provided reasons for not presenting this document during the trial. The evidence on record indicates that the Plaintiffs did not take steps to challenge these sale transactions, and they have not provided any reasons for not contesting these transactions. 45. The evidence on record reveals that PW.1 filed a maintenance case against the 1st Defendant. Additionally, PW.2's testimony indicates that the 1st Defendant continued to support his family until the disposal of item No.2 of the schedule property. PW.2 explicitly states that there were no disputes between the Plaintiffs' mother (PW.1-Narasamma) and the 1st Defendant (K. Anjireddy) until the execution of Ex.B.1. 46. It is crucial to note that the Ex.B.1 sale transaction occurred on 23.01.2004, and the suit was initiated on 27.09.2004. Defendants 3 and 4 specifically assert that the 1st Defendant, claiming an excess amount, insisted on their compliance based on the discovery of a 2-feet excess width of item No.2 during property measurements. When Defendants 3 and 4 refused to accede to the 1st Defendant's request, the present suit was allegedly filed by the Plaintiffs at the 1st Defendant's behest. 47. The contents of Ex.B.1 indicate that the sale was conducted for the family's benefit, with both Plaintiffs being coparceners to the 1st Defendant. The trial court correctly noted in paragraph No.27 that following the Ex.B.1 sale transaction, Defendants 3 and 4 took possession of the schedule property. To substantiate this, they presented Exs.B.4 to B.27 house tax receipts, which are shown the names of Defendants 3 and 4. 48. In the case facts, it cannot be said that the property was alienated without legal necessity. The alienation made by the Manager for family necessity or the estate's benefit binds all undivided family members. 49. In Balmukand V. Kamla Wati and others, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1385, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: For a transaction be regarded as of benefit to the family it need not be of defensive character so as to be binding on the family. In each case, the Court must be satisfied from the material before it that it was, in fact, such as conferred or was reasonably expected to confer benefit on the family at the time it was entered into. Where adult members are in existence of the family alone but that of all the adult members of the family, including the Manager. 50. Where adult members are in existence of the family alone but that of all the adult members of the family, including the Manager. 50. This Court acknowledges that, as discussed in the preceding para-graphs, the 1st Defendant utilized the consideration amount for the family's benefit. If the Ex.B.1 sale transaction had not been for the family's benefit, PW.1, who was an attestor to the document and had knowledge of the transaction, would likely have raised objections. There is no indication that she attested the document under duress or compulsion. Moreover, the other attestor, PW.1's brother, would also have objected to the proper-ty's sale. Since no objections were raised to the Ex.B.1 transaction at the time, PW.1 cannot now argue that it was not for the family's benefit. 51. For the reasons stated above and regarding the case facts, this Court views that the plaintiffs have not established their case. The find-ings and conclusions recorded by the trial court are based on something other than a proper appreciation of the evidence on record. The trial court's Judgment is erroneous, cannot be sustained, and is liable to be set aside. Given the preceding discussion, the Appeal has to be allowed. Accordingly, the points are answered. 52. As a result, (a) The Appeal is allowed without costs. (b) The Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Addanki, in O.S. No.58 of 2008, dt.22.02.2013, is set aside. (c) The suit in O.S. No.58 of 2008 filed by the Plaintiffs is hereby dismissed with costs. (d) However, in the circumstances, I refrain from making any order regarding costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Appeal Suit shall stand closed.