JUDGMENT : Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, J. 1. Heard Sri B.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Vivek Srivastava, learned counsel for petitioners, Sri Anshul Nigam, learned Standing Counsel for State and Ms. Anjali Upadhyay, learned counsel for respondents. 2. In the present case, about 5 decades ago, a notice was issued on 01.01.1970 against ancestors of petitioners in regard to land in dispute under Section 122 -B of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short “Act of 1950”) for eviction. In said suit, vide a reasoned order dated 21.04.1970, the notice was withdrawn with an observation that since ancestors of petitioners were in possession on land in dispute for more than 12 years and since no proceedings for eviction were earlier taken, therefore, they have acquired sirdari rights and a direction was passed to initiate proceedings for imposing taxes. Relevant part thereof is quoted below:- 3. A second proceeding for eviction was initiated after a decade of above referred order and a second notice was issued in the year 1982 under Section 122 -B of Act of 1950 and on basis of report of Lekhpal dated 07.09.1982, proceedings were initiated, however, said second notice was also set aside vide order dated 27.03.1983 on same grounds with an observation that ancestors of petitioners may file a suit for declaration of their right. Relevant part thereof is quoted below :- [Emphasis supplied] 4. It appears that thereafter ancestors of petitioners remained silent for a decade and when their names were not recorded in revenue records on basis of their long possession and since above two notices for eviction were already set aside, the petitioners filed a suit under Section 229 /122-B (4F) of Act of 1950 with a prayer to record their names as a ^^laØe.kh; Hkwfe/kj** In the plaint, proceedings of earlier cases were specifically mentioned. 5. In the above referred suit, following 5 issues were framed for consideration :- 6. The trial Court, after considering evidence on record, vide judgment dated 01.05.1998, decreed the suit with a direction that petitioners be declared as ^^laØe.kh; Hkwfe/kj** It appears that thereafter a recall application was filed by the State that they were not able to place their case properly earlier and same was allowed vide order dated 28.10.1998 with a direction to decide the suit afresh. 7. 7. Since there was certain ambiguity in said order, therefore, petitioners challenged the same before Commissioner by way of filing an appeal which was disposed of vide order dated 06.01.2000 with a direction that suit be heard afresh on merit. Said order was not challenged further though Court is of considered opinion that once the suit was heard on merit, after hearing rival parties, there was no ground to recall it, that it was not properly contested rather appropriate remedy with State was to file an appeal but since said order appeared to be accepted by the petitioners, therefore, Court is not entering into that issue. 8. In aforesaid circumstances, the suit was decided afresh and above referred issues were decided and vide judgment dated 30.11.2000, a contrary order to earlier was passed and suit was dismissed. For reference, relevant part thereof is quoted below :- 9. Aforesaid judgment was challenged by petitioners by way of filing an appeal, however, same was dismissed vide order dated 29.11.2023. Relevant part thereof is quoted below :- 10. Aforesaid both orders were challenged by way of filing a Second Appeal before Board of Revenue, however, same was also dismissed vide order dated 14.07.2006. Relevant part thereof is quoted below:- 11. Aforesaid orders dated 30.11.2000, 29.11.2003 and 14.07.2006 are challenged at the behest of petitioners before this Court. 12. This Court has passed following order on 05.10.2016 :- “Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel, who has accepted notice on behalf of respondents 1, 3, 4 and 5 as well as Sri V. K. Singh, learned counsel for respondent ??. 2. The respondents pray for and are granted one month's time to file counter affidavit. The petitioners will have three weeks' thereafter to file rejoinder affidavit. List immediately after expiry of the aforesaid period. In view of the law laid by the Apex Court in the case reported in JT 2003 (3) SC 538, Manorey @ Manohar Vs. Board of Revenue (U.P.) and others, the petitioners have been able to make out prima facie case for grant of interim order. Till further orders of this Court, the petitioners shall not be dispossessed from the plots in dispute.” 13. Board of Revenue (U.P.) and others, the petitioners have been able to make out prima facie case for grant of interim order. Till further orders of this Court, the petitioners shall not be dispossessed from the plots in dispute.” 13. Sri B.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing for petitioners has submitted that Trial Court, First Appellate Court and Second Appellate Court have wrongly rejected the outcome of two proceedings earlier initiated for eviction under Section 122 -B of Act of 1950, wherein respective notices were set aside firstly vide order dated 21.04.1970 and subsequently vide order dated 27.03.1983 with an observation that possession of ancestors of petitioners were continuous for more than 12 years and accordingly, they have accrued sirdari rights. Findings returned in the above referred orders were not challenged as well as were never set aside, therefore, has attained finality. 14. Learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that in pursuance of above referred two orders, there was no requirement for petitioners to file a suit for declaration since it was legal obligation of State Authorities to correct the revenue records since repeated notices were set aside by reasoned orders. In support of possession, reliance has been placed on Khasra of 1362F to 1377F and khatauni prior to 1365F and of 1365F. 15. Learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that once the suit was decreed on merit after hearing rival parties, order could not be recalled. The only option available with State/Gaon Sabha at that time was to file an appeal. Right of the petitioners were perfected in view of provisions of original Act and the suit could not be affected by amendment in Section 210 of Act of 1950. 16. Learned Senior Advocate has next submitted that when suit was decided afresh, absolutely contrary findings were returned and by taking an absolute different view of reasons assigned while above referred two notices were set aside and without even framing issue in that regard as well as without setting aside the findings returned therein, suit was dismissed. The First Appellate Court as well as Board of Revenue were failed to cure legal errors. 17. The First Appellate Court as well as Board of Revenue were failed to cure legal errors. 17. Aforesaid submissions were opposed by learned Standing Counsel for State and learned counsel for respondents that only on basis that earlier two notices were set aside under Section 122 -B of Act of 1950 would itself not give any right to petitioners and they have to prove basis of their possession which they failed to prove. In the garb of outcome of notices, encroachers cannot perfect any right. 18. Heard learned Senior Advocate for petitioners, learned counsel for respondents and perused the records. 19. Before considering the rival submissions, few paragraphs of a judgment of Supreme Court in Manorey @ Manohar vs. Board of Revenue (U.P.) and others, (2003) 5 SCC 521 being relevant are referred below :- “ 8. First, the endeavour should be to analyse and identify the nature of the right or protection conferred by sub-section (4-F) of Section 122 -B. Sub-Sections (1) to (3) and the ancillary provisions up to sub-section (4-E) deal, inter alia, with the procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupants of land vested in the Gaon Sabha. Sub-Section (4-F) carves out an exception in favour of an agricultural labourer belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe having land below the ceiling of 3.125 acres. Irrespective of the circumstances in which such eligible person occupied the land vested in the Gaon Sabh a (other than the land mentioned in Section 132), no action to evict him shall be taken and moreover, he shall be deemed to have been admitted as a bhumidhar with non-transferable rights over the land, provided he satisfies the conditions specified in the sub-section. According to the findings of the Sub-Divisional Officer as well as the Appellate Authority, the appellant does satisfy the conditions. If so, two legal consequences follow. Such occupant of the land shall not be evicted by taking recourse to sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 122 -B. It means that the occupant of the land who satisfies the conditions under sub-section (4-F) is entitled to safeguard his possession as against the Gaon Sabha. The second and more important right which sub-section (4-F) confers on him is that he is endowed with the rights of a bhumidhar with non-transferable rights. The deeming provision has been specifically enacted as a measure of agrarian reform, with a thrust on socio-economic justice. The second and more important right which sub-section (4-F) confers on him is that he is endowed with the rights of a bhumidhar with non-transferable rights. The deeming provision has been specifically enacted as a measure of agrarian reform, with a thrust on socio-economic justice. The statutorily conferred right of bhumidhar with non-transferable rights finds its echo in clause (b) of Section 131. Any person who acquires the rights of bhumidhar under or in accordance with the provisions of the Act, is recognized under Section 131 as falling within the class of bhumidhar. The right acquired or accrued under sub-section (4-F) is one such right that falls within the purview of Section 131(b). 9. Thus, sub-section (4-F) of Section 122 -B not merely provides a shield to protect the possession as opined by the High Court, but it also confers a positive right of bhumidha r o n the occupant of the land satisfying the criteria laid down in that sub-section. Notwithstanding the clear language in which the deeming provision is couched and the ameliorative purpose of the legislation, the learned Single Judge of the High Court had taken the view in Ramdin v. Board of Revenue [1994 RD 388] (followed by the same learned Judge in the instant case) that the bhumidhari rights of the occupant contemplated by sub-section (4-F) can only blossom out when there is a specific allotment order by the Land Management Committee under Section 198. According to the High Court, the deeming provision contained in sub-section (4- F) cannot be overstretched to supersede the other provisions in the Act dealing specifically with the creation of the right of bhumidhar. In other words, the view of the High Court was that a person covered by the beneficial provision contained in sub-section (4-F) will have to still go through the process of allotment under Section 198 even though he is not liable for eviction. As a corollary to this view, it was held that the occupant was not entitled to seek correction of revenue records, even if his case falls under sub-section (4-F) of Section 122 -B. We hold that the view of the High Court is clearly unsustainable. It amounts to ignoring the effect of a deeming provision enacted with a definite social purpose. It amounts to ignoring the effect of a deeming provision enacted with a definite social purpose. When once the deeming provision unequivocally provides for the admission of the person satisfying the requisite criteria laid down in the provision as bhumidhar with non-transferable rights under Section 195, full effect must be given to it. Section 195 lays down that the Land Management Committee, with the previous approval of the Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division, shall have the right to admit any person as bhumidhar with non-transferable rights to any vacant land (other than the land falling under Section 132) vested in the Gaon Sabha. Section 198 prescribes “the order of preference in admitting persons to land under Sections 195 and 197”. The last part of sub-section (4-F) of Section 122 -B confers by a statutory fiction the status of bhumidhar with non-transferable rights on the eligible occupant of the land as if he has been admitted as such under Section 195. In substance and in effect, the deeming provision declares that the statutorily recognized bhumidhar should be a s good as a person admitted to bhumidhari rights under Section 195 read with other provisions. In a way, sub-section (4-F) supplements Section 195 by specifically granting the same benefit to a person coming within the protective umbrella of that sub-section. The need to approach the Gaon Sabha under Section 195 read with Section 198 is obviated by the deeming provision contained in sub-section (4- F). We find no warrant to constrict the scope of the deeming provision. 10. That being the legal position, there is no bar against an application being made by the eligible person coming within the four corners of sub-section (4-F) to effect necessary changes in the revenue record. When once the claim of the applicant is accepted, it is the bounden duty of the Revenue Authorities concerned to make necessary entries in revenue records to give effect to the statutory mandate. The obligation to do so arises by necessary implication by reason of the statutory right vested in the person coming within the ambit of sub-section (4-F). The lack of specific provision for making an application under the Act is no ground to dismiss the application as not maintainable. The revenue records should naturally fall in line with the rights statutorily recognized. The lack of specific provision for making an application under the Act is no ground to dismiss the application as not maintainable. The revenue records should naturally fall in line with the rights statutorily recognized. The Sub-Divisional Officer was therefore within his rights to allow the application and direct the correction of the records. The Board of Revenue and the High Court should not have set aside that order. The fact that the Land Management Committee of the Gaon Sabha had created leasehold rights in favour of the respondents herein is of no consequence. Such lease, in the face of the statutory right of the appellant, is non est in the eye of the law and is liable to be ignored.” 20. As referred above, in present case, it is not disputed that two successive notices issued U/s 122-B of Act of 1950 were set aside by reasoned orders returning specific finding that ancestors of petitioners were in continuous possession on land in dispute for more than 12 years and by virtue of law, they have accrued sirdari rights. It is not much disputed that reasons assigned while rejecting above referred two notices were based on records and that it was not challenged by State or Gaon Sabha and therefore, has attained finality. 21. In aforesaid circumstances, petitioners have filed a suit for declaration as ^^laØe.kh; Hkwfe/kj** and petitioners have lost at trial Court, Appellate Court as well as before Second Appellate Court. All Courts have returned a finding that ancestors of petitioners as well as petitioners have not perfected their rights and since land was of Gaon Sabha, therefore, they were not entitled for any relief and has interfered with findings returned when two notices were set aside. 22. In aforesaid circumstances, the judgment passed by Supreme Court in Manorey (supra) becomes relevant since it has been specifically held therein that “sub-Section 4-F of Section 122 -B of Act of 1950 not merely provides a shield to protect the possession as opined by the High Court, but it also confers a positive right of bhumidhar on the occupant of the land satisfying the criteria laid down in that sub-section.” 23. In present case, a suit was filed under Section 122 -B (4-F) also. In present case, a suit was filed under Section 122 -B (4-F) also. According to Manorey (supra), once notices for eviction under Section 122 -B (4F) of Act of 1950 and were repeatedly rejected with a specific finding that ancestors of petitioners became sirdar, being in possession for more than 12 years, therefore, it was binding upon Revenue Authorities to make necessary entries in revenue records to give statutory mandate but as referred above, in present case, duty was not discharged, therefore, petitioners were constrained to file a suit wherein all Revenue Courts have taken a view which was not sustainable in view of law, as referred above. It is not a case where an encroacher is seeking declaration but petitioners are taking benefit of legal consequence of few line of proceedings initiated twice against the petitioners under Section 122 -B of Act of 1950. 24. All Courts have taken a view that petitioners were not able to prove their possession, ignoring the fact that two notices for eviction were set aside with reasoned order that petitioners were in possession for more than 12 years and their names were recorded in Khatauni under Class-IV and therefore legal consequence of rejection of proceedings under Section 122 -B of Act of 1950 shall follow. Findings returned cannot be ignored except being perverse and no material has been brought on record that findings returned in said proceedings were perverse. Mere assumption would not be sufficient to set aside any finding. The findings of collusive order are not based on any substantive evidence as well as only on ground that petitioners have filed suit after a decade would itself become a ground to doubt findings returned in the proceedings of Section 122 -B of Act of 1950. The petitioners are also entitled for benefit of Section 122 -B (4F) of Act of 1950 in view of Manorey (supra). All issues were decided contrary to law and, therefore, liable to be set aside. 25. In aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that all 3 Revenue Courts have committed error and returned an incorrect finding and illegally dismissed the suit, first appeal and second appeal filed by petitioners. 26. Accordingly, all impugned orders are hereby, set aside and this writ petition is allowed and suit is decreed. 27. Legal consequence of it shall follow.