JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has challenged order No. P.8-2/2006/EC-2 dated 23.10.2006 issued by respondent No.5-Commandant 4th Bn. CRPF whereby the petitioner has been awarded penalty of dismissal from service in terms of Section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 (‘the Act’ for short). Challenge has also been thrown to order dated 17.04.2004 issued by the Appellate Authority i.e. respondent No.4- DIG CRPF whereby the appeal of the petitioner against the order of his dismissal from service has been dismissed. The petitioner has further challenged order dated 17.06.2008 issued by the Revisional Authority-respondent No.3 herein (Inspector General of CRPF) whereby the revision petition of the petitioner has also been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated, the facts emanating from the pleadings of the parties are that the petitioner was appointed as Constable in CRPF on 15.06.2004. On 03.04.2006, he was detailed on Sentry duty in Morcha No. 11 at Chief Minister’s residence, Jammu from 1800 hours to 2000 hours. On the same day, during 1500 hours to 1700 hours, Constable Anand Kumar Singh was detailed on Sentry duty in Morcha No. 3 at Chief Minister’s residence, Jammu. Head Constable Joginder Jha had made a complaint against Constable Anand Kumar Singh about his slackness in duty and reported the matter to Inspector Mohan Shyam. Accordingly, the Officer Commanding reprimanded Constable Anand Kumar Singh and advised him to remain alert while on duty, failing which, he would be sent to Bn. Headuqartr for further disciplinary action. 3. On 03.04.2006, at about 1945 hours, Constable Anand Kumar Singh left the Sentry Post with his personal rifle and rushed to the Company office and fired few rounds at Inspector Mohan Shyam. He also fired at Head Constable H.N. Pandey which led to his death. Thereafter, Constable Anand Kumar Singh reached Morcha No. 11 where petitioner was standing on sentry duty and he enquired from the petitioner about Head Constable Vipin Kumar. He also told him that the company would be smashed away by him and that he would kill all of them. Constable Anand Kumar Singh proceeded towards company mess and shot dead Head Constable Yogender Jha and escaped from Camp through gate No. 11 where the petitioner was detailed on sentry duty, where-after, he surrendered before Police Station, Peer Mirtha, Jammu. 4. Constable Anand Kumar Singh proceeded towards company mess and shot dead Head Constable Yogender Jha and escaped from Camp through gate No. 11 where the petitioner was detailed on sentry duty, where-after, he surrendered before Police Station, Peer Mirtha, Jammu. 4. While the case of the petitioner is that he has not committed any dereliction of duty while manning Morcha No. 11 at the relevant time, the respondents claim that the petitioner has been found remiss in performance of his duty, inasmuch as he failed to stop assailant Constable Anand Kumar Singh by firing upon him, in spite of being fully armed at the relevant time. It is the case of the respondents that the petitioner has shown cowardice and slackness in his duty, even though he had ample opportunity to stop or shoot Constable Anand Kumar Singh. 5. It seems that after the aforesaid episode, the respondents initiated departmental inquiry against the petitioner after serving charge-sheet upon him. The English version of article of charge framed against the petitioner is reproduced as under: “That No.041599023 Sep/GD Om Parkash D/4 Bn. while on duty at the post of Sep/GD being the member of the force violated the suitable owners and showed negligence on duty under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act 1949 wherein No. 041599023 Sep/GD Om Parkash D/4 Bn wsa on sentry duty from 1800 hours to 2000 hours on 03.04.2006 at Morcha No. 11 of the Coy. at the residence of Chief Minister in Jammu. On 03.04.2006 at about 1945 hours No. 981410095 Sep/GD Anand Kumar Singh opened the fire at Company Commander No. 891320177 Inspector/GD Mohan Shyam and No. 830762272 Hav/GD H.N.Pandey who was standing near the gate of Barrack No. 3 of other Ranks Line. Thereafter Sep/GD Anand Kumar Singh went to Sentry Sep/GD Om Parkash D/4 Bn on duty at Morcha No.11 and asked as to where is Hav/GD Bipin Kumar. In addition, Sep Anand Kumar Singh also said that D Company will be no more today; he will kill every one. After that Sep/GD Anand Kumar Singh went towards the other Ranks Mess where he opened the fire at No. 860230071 Hav/GD Yogender Jha. After the firing Sep Anand Kumar Singh went out from the gate of Morcha No.11 But No. 041599023 Sep/GD Om Parkash D/4 Coy. After that Sep/GD Anand Kumar Singh went towards the other Ranks Mess where he opened the fire at No. 860230071 Hav/GD Yogender Jha. After the firing Sep Anand Kumar Singh went out from the gate of Morcha No.11 But No. 041599023 Sep/GD Om Parkash D/4 Coy. being on sentry duty neither tried to stop/catch Sep/GD Anand Kumar Singh nor did he try to cause any injury to him instead he ran away leaving the Morcha post unattended, while Sep Om Parkash was safe on Morcha and being alert on duty, he had enough opportunity and he could have stopped/caught Sep/GD Anand Kumar Singh.This act of carelessness on duty, violation or orders and indiscipline of Sep/GD Om Parkash being the member of the force is punishable offence under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act 1949.” 6. The Commandant-respondent No.5 herein vide his order dated 09.05.2006 appointed Sh. S.K.Rattu of 4th Bn. CRPF CRPF as an Inquiry Officer. Accordingly, the departmental inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry officer, where-after, a report dated 29.07.2006 was submitted by the Inquiry Officer. As per report of the Inquiry Officer, the charge against the petitioner was found established. Vide impugned order dated 23.10.2006, respondent No.5-the Commandant, on the basis of the aforesaid report, ordered dismissal of the petitioner from service. The said order came to be challenged by the petitioner by way of a statutory appeal before respondent No.4-DIG CRPF, who vide impugned order dated 17.04.2007 dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. 7. It seems that the petitioner approached the High Court of Delhi challenging the action of the respondents by filing a writ petition, but the same was dismissed as withdrawn with a liberty to the petitioner to approach the Court of competent jurisdiction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision petition under Rule 29 of CRPF Rules, 1955 (‘the Rules’ for short) and the same was dismissed by respondent No.3- Inpsector General of CRPF in terms of impugned order dated 17.06.2008. 8. The petitioner has challenged the impugned actions of the respondents on the ground that the inquiry against him has not been conducted by the respondents’ in accordance with the Rules and that the same was only an eye wash. 8. The petitioner has challenged the impugned actions of the respondents on the ground that the inquiry against him has not been conducted by the respondents’ in accordance with the Rules and that the same was only an eye wash. It has been contended that the petitioner was not allowed to have the services of a friend for defending his case and, as such, Rule 14 (8) of CCS(CCA) Rules 1965 (‘Rules of 1965’ for short) stands violated. It has been further contended that the inquiry proceedings were conducted in English language which is not understood by the petitioner. It has also been contended that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to defend his case. It has been contended that the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer is based upon no evidence and, in fact, the evidence on record shows that there has been no slackness on the part of the petitioner and actually the negligence has been on the part of the superiors of the petitioner who despite being present on spot did not impart any instructions to the petitioner. Lastly, it has been contended that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is harsh, excessive and disproportionate to the alleged misconduct as the petitioner, at the relevant time, was only in second year of his service and was not experienced in dealing with such situations. 9. I have heard leaned counsel for the parties and I have also gone through the pleadings filed by the parties as well as the record of inquiry produced by the respondents. 10. The facts pleaded by the parties to the extent of involvement of Constbale Anand Kumar Singh in the incident relating to firing upon his colleagues/officers on the day of occurrence at about 1945 hours are not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that as a result of this firing, there were some causalities on spot. The petitioner has not disputed the fact that, at the relevant time, he was posted on duty at Morcha No. 11 at CM’s residence, Jammu. In these circumstances, the only question that was required to be determined by the inquiry officer was as to whether there was any slackness or negligence on the part of the petitioner while discharging his duties at Sentry Post No. 11. 11. In these circumstances, the only question that was required to be determined by the inquiry officer was as to whether there was any slackness or negligence on the part of the petitioner while discharging his duties at Sentry Post No. 11. 11. The grounds that have been urged by the petitioner impugning the Inquiry Report are that the respondents have not followed the procedure prescribed under the CRPF Rules and CCS(CCA) Rules 1965, inasmuch as he has not been given option of defending his case through next friend; the proceedings were conducted by the Inquiry Officer in English language which he could not understand; he was not afforded an opportunity to defend his case and that the Inquiry Officer himself acted as a prosecutor. 12. Before proceeding to determine the merits of the aforesaid contentions raised by the petitioner, it would be apt to refer to the provisions contained in Rule 27 (c) of CRPF Rules which governs the procedure for holding inquiry. The same reads as under: “27.Procedure for the award of punishments; (a)…………… (b)………… (c) The procedure for conducting a departmental enquiry shall be as follows: (1) The substance of the accusation shall be reduced to the form of a written charge, which should be as precise as possible. The charge shall be read out to the accused and a copy of it given to him at least 48 hrs. before the commencement of the enquiry; (2) At the commencement of the enquiry the accused shall be asked to enter a plea of “Guilty” or “Not Guilty” after which evidence necessary to establish the charge shall be let in. The evidence shall be material to the charge and may either be oral or documentary, if oral; (i) it shall be direct; (ii) it shall be recorded by the Officer conducting the enquiry himself in the presence of the accused; (iii) the accused shall be allowed to cross examine the witnesses. (3) When documents are relied upon in support of the charge, they shall be put in evidence as exhibits and the accused shall, before he is called upon to make his defence, be allowed to inspect such exhibits. (4) The accused shall then be examined and his statement recorded by the officer conducting the enquiry. If the accused has pleaded guilty and does not challenge the evidence on record, the proceedings shall be closed for orders. (4) The accused shall then be examined and his statement recorded by the officer conducting the enquiry. If the accused has pleaded guilty and does not challenge the evidence on record, the proceedings shall be closed for orders. If he pleads “Not guilty”, he shall be required to file a written statement, and a list of such witnesses as he may wish to cite in his defence within such period, which shall in any case be not less than a fortnight, as the officer conducting enquiry may deem reasonable in the circumstances of the case. If he declines to file a written statement, he shall again be examined by the officer conducting the enquiry on the expiry of the period allowed. (5) If the accused refuses to cite any witnesses or to produce any evidence in his defence, the proceedings shall be closed for orders. If he produces any evidence the officer conducting the enquiry shall proceed to record the evidence. If the officer conducting the enquiry considers that the evidence of any witness or any document which the accused wants to produce in his defence is not material to the issues involved in the case, he may refuse to call such witness or to allow such document to be produced in evidence, but in all such cases he must briefly record his reasons for considering the evidence inadmissible. When all relevant evidence has been brought on record, the proceedings shall be closed for orders. (6) If the Commandant has himself held the enquiry, he shall record his findings and pass orders where he has power to do so. If the enquiry has been held by any officer other than the Commandant, the officer conducting the enquiry shall forward his report together with the proceedings, to the Commandant, who shall record his findings and pass orders, where he has power to do so”. 13. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it comes to the fore that in the first instance, substance of the accusation has to be reduced to the form of a written charge which has to be read out to the accused and a copy thereof has to be given to him. Thereafter, the accused has to be asked to enter a plea of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’. Thereafter, the accused has to be asked to enter a plea of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’. The next stage is production of evidence which has to be recorded in presence of the accused who has to be given opportunity to cross examine the witnesses. After completion of evidence of the Department, the accused has to be called upon to make his defence and he has to be permitted to inspect the documents. Thereafter, statement of the accused has to be recorded and, in case, he pleads not guilty, he has to be given an opportunity to produce witnesses in defence, where-after, the case has to be closed for orders. 14. A perusal of the Record of Inquiry shows that on 06.02.2006, the Inquiry Officer clearly inquired from the petitioner whether he has received the article of charges and the material annexed thereto, to which, the petitioner responded that he has received these documents. He was also specifically asked as to whether he desires to have the assistance of any person to which the petitioner responded that he does not need any such assistance. The record further reveals that the inquiry proceedings have been conducted in Hindi language and not in English language as has been alleged by the petitioner. The record also reveals that the petitioner has been given ample opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and he has, in fact, cross-examined all the witnesses produced by the Department. After completion of evidence by the Department, the statement of the petitioner has been recorded on 03.07.2006. He was also given an opportunity to lead evidence in defence within 15 days to which the petitioner responded that he does not need to produce any evidence in defence, but, if he feels necessary, he would do so. The petitioner did not produce any evidence in defence and he submitted his written statement before the Inquiry Officer and his statement was again recorded by the Inquiry Officer on 21.07.2006. On the said date, the petitioner told the Inquiry Officer that he could not get any witness because nobody is ready to depose. Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer closed the proceedings and submitted his report indicting the petitioner. 15. From the aforesaid sequence of events, it is absolutely clear that the petitioner has been given ample opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to produce his defence. Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer closed the proceedings and submitted his report indicting the petitioner. 15. From the aforesaid sequence of events, it is absolutely clear that the petitioner has been given ample opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to produce his defence. He has not only submitted his written statement, but his statement in defence has also been recorded by the Inquiry Officer. The proceedings have been recorded in Hindi language and he has also been given option of engaging the services of an assistant. Thus, the record clearly goes on to show that the respondents have scrupulously adhered to the requirements of Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules while conducting the inquiry. The argument of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in this regard is without merit. 16. It has been vehemently contended by learned Senior Counsel that the Inquiry Officer has acted as a prosecutor, inasmuch as, he has examined the witnesses on behalf of the Department. On this ground, it is urged that the inquiry proceedings are vitiated. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of UOI v. Ram Lakhan Sharma (2018) 7 SCC 670 . In the said aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court has held that the question as to whether Inquiry Officer who is supposed to act independently in an inquiry has acted as prosecutor or not is a question of fact which has to be decided on the facts and proceedings of particular case. 17. The Record of Inquiry reveals that the Inquiry Officer has not put any questions to the witnesses while recording their examination-in-chief. The examination-in-chief of the witnesses has been recorded not in question-answer form, but in a narrative form which means that no questions were put by the Inquiry Officer to the witnesses while recording their examination-in-chief. After recording the examination-in- chief of the witnesses, the Inquiry Officer has questioned these witnesses so as to seek clarifications on certain aspects. The record shows that the delinquent official- the petitioner herein has been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses which he has done in the case of each witness. After recording the examination-in- chief of the witnesses, the Inquiry Officer has questioned these witnesses so as to seek clarifications on certain aspects. The record shows that the delinquent official- the petitioner herein has been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses which he has done in the case of each witness. So, it is not a case where the Inquiry Officer has acted as a prosecutor while recording the statements of Departmental witnesses, but in this case, the Inquiry Officer has only questioned the witnesses after recording their examination-in-chief to elicit clarifications from them on certain aspects which is definitely the domain of the Inquiry Officer. Not only this, after eliciting clarifications from the witnesses, the petitioner has been allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. Thus, it cannot be stated that the Inquiry Officer has acted as prosecutor, rather, in the instant case, the Inquiry Officer has acted independently and followed the mandate of law. The argument of learned Senior Counsel is, therefore, without any merit. 18. Another argument on which much emphasis has been laid by the leaned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the findings of the Inquiry Officer are perverse, inasmuch as, the evidence on record clearly suggests that there was no negligence on the part of the petitioner. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel has highlighted the statement of Hav. M.K Kanhar, who was Guard Commander posted at Morcha No. 11. In his statement, he has deposed that at the relevant time he lost his senses and he did not impart any instructions to his junior official, the petitioner herein. Taking her argument further, leaned Senior Counsel has submitted that once the superior official of the petitioner himself was at a loss as to what is to be done, it was not open to the Inquiry Officer to hold the petitioner responsible for inaction. 19. Before dealing with the aforesaid contention raised by learned Senior Counsel, it would be apt to understand the legal position as regards the scope of the Writ Court in interfering with the findings of Inquiry Officer. The law on the subject has been settled by the Supreme Court in several precedents. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi Vs Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 . In the said case, the Court held as under: “12. The law on the subject has been settled by the Supreme Court in several precedents. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi Vs Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 . In the said case, the Court held as under: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re- appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued”. 20. Again, in the case of UOI vs P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610 , the Supreme Court has laid down the broad parameters for exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review and it was held as under: 12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations to the evidence and merits of the case; (e). the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f). the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g). the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h). the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i). the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h). the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i). the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 21. From a perusal of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, it comes to the fore that the power of judicial review is not available for re-appreciating the evidence adduced before the Inquiry Officer. It is only if the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer is wholly arbitrary and capricious, that the Court can exercise its power of judicial review. In order to satisfy a Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the petitioner has to show that the Inquiry Officer has considered irrelevant material or has excluded from its consideration the material evidence. The Court cannot go into the adequacy of evidence or its reliability. 22. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it is correct that the superior official, the Guard Commander of the petitioner has, during his questioning by the Inquiry Officer, admitted that he had lost his senses because of the situation prevailing at the relevant time, but he has also stated that he was not carrying any weapon at the relevant time because it was the petitioner, who was detailed to man sentry post No. 11 at the relevant time. As against this, the petitioner in his own statement made to the Inquiry Officer has admitted that he was fully armed at the relevant time. He has also admitted that Constable Anand Kumar Singh inquired from him the whereabouts of Constable Vipin Kumar and told him that he will kill him and finish the whole company. He has also admitted that Constable Anand Kumar Singh crossed Morcha No. 11 and even stopped there to talk to him. He has also admitted that Constable Anand Kumar Singh inquired from him the whereabouts of Constable Vipin Kumar and told him that he will kill him and finish the whole company. He has also admitted that Constable Anand Kumar Singh crossed Morcha No. 11 and even stopped there to talk to him. In such a situation, the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer that the petitioner had opportunity to either nab Anand Kumar Singh, who had already shot down some of his colleagues or to shoot him down, cannot be termed as ‘perverse’ or based on no evidence. The case of the petitioner cannot be equated with the case of Havaladar M.K. Kanhar who was not armed at the relevant time and who was not manning the post at the relevant time. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer in regard to culpability of the petitioner, cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. 23. The aforesaid contention of the petitioner has been dealt with by the Appellate Authority as well as by the Revisional Authority in great detail. In fact, this Court finds from a perusal of the orders passed by the Appellate and the Revisional Authorities that the same are lucid, precise and well reasoned. Such orders are usually expected of judicial authorities and not from the Administrative Authorities. There is, thus, no scope for this Court to interfere in the impugned orders passed by the Appellate and the Revisional Authorities. 24. Lastly, it has been contended that because the petitioner was a beginner in his service, the punishment imposed upon him by the respondents is disproportionate to his misconduct. In this regard, it is to be borne in mind that this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, cannot go into the proportionality of punishment, unless its shocks its conscience. 25. In the instant case, as already stated, the petitioner has been found to be negligent in performing his duties as sentry on a vital location like CM’s residence. If the security personnel posted at the residence of a high constitutional functionary like CM are allowed to go scot free for their remissness, it would amount to compromising the security of the Chief Minister. If the security personnel posted at the residence of a high constitutional functionary like CM are allowed to go scot free for their remissness, it would amount to compromising the security of the Chief Minister. A security personnel, who has no courage to face an armed colleague, who has gone astray, particularly in a place like CM’s residence, has no place in a brave force like CRPF. Such people do not deserve to be part of such a valiant force which has sacrificed hundreds of its jawans and officers while fighting against enemies of the nation. The punishment imposed upon the petitioner by the respondents can, by no stretch of imagination, be termed as ‘disproportionate’. 26. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition. The same is, accordingly, dismissed. The record be returned to learned counsel for the respondents.