ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India at the instance of the petitioners herein / landlords is directed against the impugned order dated 16-1-2023 passed by the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur in Appeal No.33 A/2022, by which the learned Tribunal has allowed the appeal preferred by the tenant / respondent herein and set aside the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller in favour of the petitioners herein / landlords holding that relationship of landlord & tenant between the petitioners & the respondent has not been established and other heirs of Govind Agrawal have not been impleaded as party non-applicants in the eviction proceeding before the Rent Controller. Brief Facts: - 2. The petitioners herein namely, Natthuram Agrawal & Pawan Agrawal, S/o Late Govind Agrawal, jointly filed an application under Section 12(2) read with Schedule 2 of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011 (for short, ‘the Act of 2011’) against respondent herein Dr. Prahlad Rai Agrawal seeking his eviction and arrears of rent pleading inter alia that suit shop situate at Khasra No.1061/2, area 0.06 acre, was let out by father of petitioner No.2 namely Govind Agrawal to the respondent herein on monthly rent of Rs.42/- for running clinic. However, father of petitioner No.2 Govind Agrawal died and petitioner No.2 & petitioner No.1 Natthuram Agrawal both are title holders and petitioner No.2 has now become the landlord and the respondent is the tenant, as admitted by him in Civil Suit No.98A/1984 (Gopilal and another v. Prahlad Rai) decided on 25-10-1996 (Annexure P-3), and the respondent has not given rent with effect from 25-10-1996, neither he has vacated the premises nor running the clinic, it is locked and is getting damaged on account of non-maintenance. The petitioners had already sent legal notice on 22-11-2018 directing him to vacate the premises which he has not vacated leading to filing of application. 3. The petitioners had already sent legal notice on 22-11-2018 directing him to vacate the premises which he has not vacated leading to filing of application. 3. On being noticed, the respondent/tenant appeared before the Rent Controller and filed reply to the application in which in reply to paras 4 & 5, he has admitted the fact that he is the tenant of Govind Agrawal and not the tenant of Gopilal and also admitted the fact that he has not paid rent with effect from 25-10-1996 and also took specific plea in para 15 of the reply that he is in possession of the suit shop for last 12 years for running a clinic by which he has perfected his title by way of adverse possession and prayed for rejection of application. 4. The Rent Controller framed issues and held that by judgment dated 27-1-2003 passed in Civil Suit No.25A/2002 (Bajrang v. Gopilal and others), the suit shop has been held to be in the title of the petitioners herein as landlords, as the respondent herein has admitted, in Civil Suit No.98A/1984 (Gopilal and another v. Prahlad Rai) decided on 25-10-1996 (Annexure P-3), Govind Agrawal to be his landlord and furthermore, the Rent Controller has also held that proceeding for eviction in question of title cannot be adjudicated and despite notice, the respondent herein has not vacated the suit shop, therefore, it has been held that the petitioners herein are entitled for eviction of the respondent herein from the suit accommodation and rent with effect from 25-10-1996. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the Rent Controller on 25-5-2022, the respondent herein had preferred appeal under Section 13 of the Act of 2011 before the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur and the learned Tribunal by its impugned order dated 16-1-2023 allowed the appeal holding that other legal heirs of Govind Agrawal have not been impleaded as party non-applicants in the eviction proceeding and title of Govind Agrawal is also not established and accordingly, proceeded to set aside the order of eviction passed in favour of the petitioners herein against which this writ petition has been preferred. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, would submit that the learned Tribunal is absolutely unjustified in setting aside the well reasoned and well merited order of the Rent Controller, as joinder of other legal heirs of Govind Agrawal is not necessary in light of the decision rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai, (2002) 6 SCC 16 followed in the matter of Kasthuri Radhakrishnan and others v. M. Chinniyan and another, (2016) 3 SCC 296 . He would further submit that joinder of other heirs of petitioner No.2 herein is also not necessary in view of the decision rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375 followed in Kasthuri Radhakrishnan (supra). In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal deserves to be set aside. 7. Mr. Akhand Pratap Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, would submit that the learned Tribunal has rightly held that the petitioners are not entitled for eviction from the suit accommodation as other heirs of petitioner No.2 herein (Govind Agrawal) have not been impleaded as party non-applicants in the rent control proceeding and further, the title of the petitioners is also not established, therefore, the order of the learned Tribunal is well merited and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Further, in alternative plea, he would submit that the Rent Controller has directed recovery of rent with effect from 25-10-1996 at the rate of 42.50 ps. per month, though it may be recoverable, but it has become time barred, therefore, it cannot be recovered for more than three years, if any, as such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. The questions that have come up for consideration before us are, 1. Whether the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal is justified in interfering with the finding of the Rent Controller holding that relationship of landlord and tenant is not established? 2. If relationship of landlord and tenant is answered in affirmative, whether the petitioners are entitled for recovery of rent with effect from 25-10-1996 i.e. more than three years? Question No.1: - 10. Whether the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal is justified in interfering with the finding of the Rent Controller holding that relationship of landlord and tenant is not established? 2. If relationship of landlord and tenant is answered in affirmative, whether the petitioners are entitled for recovery of rent with effect from 25-10-1996 i.e. more than three years? Question No.1: - 10. The two petitioners herein field application for eviction under Section 12(2) of the Act of 2011 stating inter alia that father of petitioner No.2 herein was the original landlord who has let-out the suit accommodation to the respondent herein for the purpose of running a clinic which the respondent has also admitted in Civil Suit No.98A/1984 (Gopilal and another v. Prahlad Rai) decided on 25-10-1996 filed as Annexure P-3. In para 3 of the judgment dated 25-10-1996 (Annexure P-3) it has been clearly mentioned / recorded that the respondent herein has admitted that he has taken the suit accommodation on rent from Govind Agrawal, father of Pawan Agrawal – petitioner No.2 herein and the said fact has also been incorporated in the application for eviction before the Rent Controller in para 4 by the petitioners herein and while filing reply, the respondent herein has also admitted the said fact has correct and further admitted in para 5 of the reply that he has not paid rent of the suit accommodation from 25-10-1996. As such, from the admission of the respondent herein in the earlier proceeding between Gopilal and another v. Prahlad Rai decided on 25-10-1996 as well as in this proceeding, the respondent has categorically admitted the fact that he has taken the suit accommodation on rent from Govind Agrawal, father of Pawan Agrawal – petitioner No.2 herein, and after death of Govind Agrawal, petitioner No.2 herein has inherited the property from his father, which has not been disputed. The only question that has been raised is, other legal heirs of Govind Agrawal have not been impleaded as party applicants in the said proceeding. The only question that has been raised is, other legal heirs of Govind Agrawal have not been impleaded as party applicants in the said proceeding. This question is no longer res integra and it has been considered and decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dhannalal (supra) in which their Lordships took note of all relevant case laws on the point and examined the legal position governing the issue and held that when the property forming the subject-matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned, and he can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. It has been observed in paragraph 16 of the report as under: - “16. It is well settled by at least three decisions of this Court, namely, Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184 , Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814 and Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, (1989) 1 SCC 444 that one of the co-owners can alone and in his own right file a suit for ejectment of the tenant and it is no defence open to the tenant to question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the other co-owners were not joined as parties to the suit. When the property forming the subject-matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned. He can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. In Sri Ram Pasricha case4 reliance was placed by the tenant on the English rule that if two or more landlords institute a suit for possession on the ground that a dwelling house is required for occupation of one of them as a residence the suit would fail; the requirement must be of all the landlords. In Sri Ram Pasricha case4 reliance was placed by the tenant on the English rule that if two or more landlords institute a suit for possession on the ground that a dwelling house is required for occupation of one of them as a residence the suit would fail; the requirement must be of all the landlords. The Court noted that the English rule was not followed by the High Courts of Calcutta and Gujarat which High Courts have respectfully dissented from the rule of English law. This Court held that a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff though he was not the absolute and full owner of the premises because he required the premises for his own use and also satisfied the requirement of being ‘if he is the owner’, the expression as employed by Section 13(1)( f) of the W.B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.” 11. The principle of law enunciated in Dhannalal (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kasthuri Radhakrishnan (supra). 12. As such, the finding recorded by the Rent Controller that legal heirs of Govind Agrawal – father of petitioner No.2 herein, have not been impleaded as applicants in the eviction proceeding, therefore non-suited the petitioners, is contrary to the well settled law in this behalf. 13. This would bring us to the next finding recorded by the Rent Controller that title of the petitioners has not been established and therefore non-suited the petitioners herein. This issue raised is also no longer res integra and stood settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sheela (supra) in which it has been held by their Lordships that in rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself, and observed in paragraph 10 of the report as under: - “10. … the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. [Indeed] ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. … the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. [Indeed] ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit.” 14. The said principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sheela (supra) has been followed in Kasthuri Radhakrishnan (supra). 15. However, the issue of title of the petitioners herein can also be considered from another angle, as the respondent herein has raised a plea in his reply before the Rent Controller that the respondent has perfected his title over the suit property as he is in continuous possession for more than 12 years and therefore proceeding for eviction is not maintainable. In the matter of Uttam Chand (dead) Through Legal Representatives v. Nathu Ram (dead) Through Legal Representatives and others, (2020) 11 SCC 263 relying upon the Constitution Bench decision in the matter of M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1 it has been held by their Lordships that a plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another, against whom the claimant asserts possession adverse to the title of the other, and observed as under in paragraph 15 of the report: - “15. The matter has been examined by a Constitution Bench in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1 wherein, it has been held that a plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another, against whom the claimant asserts possession adverse to the title of the other. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 703-706, paras 1142-1143 & 1147-1150) “1142. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 703-706, paras 1142-1143 & 1147-1150) “1142. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed. Evidently, therefore, the plaintiffs in Suit 4 ought to be cognizant of the fact that any claim of adverse possession against the Hindus or the temple would amount to an acceptance of a title in the latter. Dr Dhavan has submitted that this plea is a subsidiary or alternate plea upon which it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to stand in the event that their main plea on title is held to be established on evidence. It becomes then necessary to assess as to whether the claim of adverse possession has been established. 1143. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous possession which meets the requirement of being nec vi nec claim and nec precario. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case. Reading Para 11( a), it becomes evident that beyond stating that the Muslims have been in long, exclusive and continuous possession beginning from the time when the Mosque was built and until it was desecrated, no factual basis has been furnished. This is not merely a matter of details or evidence. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence.” * * * * * * * * *” 16. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence.” * * * * * * * * *” 16. Furthermore, by virtue of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, during the continuance of the tenancy, would be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant, had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. Thus, Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates a bar for a tenant to deny the title of the landlord particularly when payment of rent was not disputed. 17. As such, establishment of title was even not at all required for grant of eviction in a proceeding between landlord and tenant. In that view of the matter, the finding of the Rent Controller that relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondent is not established, is hereby set aside and even it is held that the question is not germane to the proceeding between landlord and tenant. It is held accordingly. 18. Now, the question is, whether the petitioners are entitled for rent with effect from 25-10-1996? 19. Article 52 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides limitation for recovery of arrears of rent, which states as under :- Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 52. For arrears of rent. Three years Where the arrears become due. 20. This issue has been considered by the Full Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Mankunwarbai and others v. Sunderlal Jain, AIR 1978 MP 165 as also by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Kamala Bakshi v. Khairati Lal, (2000) 3 SCC 681 in which it has been held that prescription of three years limitation period would be appropriate and applicable for recovery of arrears of rent. Paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kamala Bakshi (supra) states as under: - “7. Paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kamala Bakshi (supra) states as under: - “7. A perusal of the provision shows that it postulates making an order of eviction by any court/controller in favour of the landlord and against a tenant for non-payment of arrears of rent legally recoverable within two months of the service of notice of demand, claiming the arrears of rent, on the tenant by the landlord. It may be pointed out that if the claim of the appellant for recovery of arrears of rent was not enforceable in a court of law for having become barred by limitation, the amount ceases to be “legally recoverable”. Here the appellant will be entitled to recover only that much of the arrears of rent for which she can sue in a court of law. For recovery of arrears of rent Article 52 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of three years from the date the arrears become due. Now, the question is narrowed down to this: when did the rent of the suit premises become due?” 21. In that view of the legal position, arrears of rent would be recoverable three years prior to filing of application before the Rent Controller and other parts would not be recoverable. In the present case, application for vacant possession and arrears of rent was filed by the petitioners herein / landlords on 7-5-2019. Therefore, arrears of rent would be recoverable from the respondent herein / tenant three years prior to 7-5-2019 only. 22. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed and the order directing eviction of the respondent herein is hereby upheld, however, the order directing payment of rent with effect from 25-10-1996 is set-aside. The petitioners will be entitled for rent three years prior to 7-5-2019. No order as to cost(s). 23. At this stage, Mr. Akhand Pratap Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent / tenant, submits that time up to 31st May, 2024 be provided to vacate the suit accommodation, which has not been opposed by Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel for the petitioners / landlords. 24. Since the respondent is in possession of the suit accommodation for fairly long time and he is said to be running a clinic therein, the prayer is allowed. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel for the petitioners / landlords. 24. Since the respondent is in possession of the suit accommodation for fairly long time and he is said to be running a clinic therein, the prayer is allowed. Accordingly, time to vacate the suit accommodation as prayed for is granted subject to furnishing of an undertaking by the respondent supported by affidavit before the Rent Controller within fifteen days from today to the effect that he will vacate the premises on or before 31st May, 2024 and meanwhile, not part with the possession to any third person / party and will make payment of the arrears of rent as directed earlier within the stipulated period. If this direction is not followed then this part of the order stands dissolved without reference to the Bench.