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2024 DIGILAW 2470 (ALL)

Avadh Bihari Tripathi v. Avadh Bihari Tripathi

2024-12-05

JASPREET SINGH

body2024
JUDGMENT : Jaspreet Singh, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners. Notice on behalf of the respondents No.1 to 3 has been accepted by the office of Chief Standing Counsel. 2. Under challenge is the order dated 22.09.1993 passed by the respondent No.1 whereby the revision of the petitioners was initially rejected. 3. A specific query was put to the learned counsel for the petitioners as to how the petitioners have explained the laches whereby the order passed more than 20 years ago is sought to be challenged by filing the instant petition. 4. Shri Anand Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that the explanation for filing this petition after a long time has been indicated in Paragraphs 15 to 20 of the petition. 5. Having taken note of the aforesaid all that can be decipherd is that it is alleged that even though the petitioners are brothers and the petitioner No.2 was looking after the case on behalf of the others and the petitioners No.1, 3 and 4 being Government Servants were posted at different places, hence, they were not aware. 6. It is also alleged that the erstwhile counsel, who was engaged to contest the proceedings did not file their counter affidavit and neither he informed about the earlier order passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 28.04.2016 coupled with the fact that even the private- respondents did not take any proceedings forward. Rather, in the month of January, 2024 the proceedings were initiated under Rule 109 of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Rules, 1954 and thereafter the petitioners got the knowledge and they applied for the certified copies and ultimately the instant petition has now been filed. 7. Even if the aforesaid explanation is taken at its face value even then it would indicate that in the first round of litigation when the petitioners had filed a revision that came to be finally decided on 22.09.1993 and at the behest of the petitioners the said order was recalled and this came to be challenged by means of Writ Petition No.824 (Consolidation) of 2004 primarily on the ground that the revisional authority did not have power to review its own order. 8. 8. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that before the writ Court the petitioners were duly represented and the writ Court after taking note of the law in the aforesaid regard the writ Court had allowed the aforesaid writ petition on 28.04.2016. Once the said order was passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, the effect would be that the order of the recall would stand set aside, as a result, the revision which was dismissed vide order dated 22.09.1993, the said order would revive and since then more than seven years have lapsed and no action was taken by the petitioners and at this belated stage another attempt is being made to assail the order dated 22.09.1993. 9. There is no explanation as to why the petitioners did not contact their counsel. Even though the counsel may not have informed the petitioners regarding the outcome of the aforesaid writ petition, but there is nothing on record to indicate what efforts were made by the petitioners for the last seven years enquiring about their case. 10. It is also to be noticed that all the petitioners are said to be were in Government service and, therefore, it cannot be said that they were not aware of their legal rights. No effort has been shown regarding the bonafides and due diligence of the petitioners rather an attempt is being made to blame the counsel and this practice has recently been deprecated by the Apex Court in Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash , 2024 SCC OnLine 3380 and the relevant portion reads as under:- "10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief." 11. The Division Bench of this Court in Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. State of U.P. & Ors. in Special Appeal Defective No. 453 of 2024 decided on 21.08.2024 has also taken note of the manner in which the laches are explained and thereafter noticing the law on the point, it noticed as under:- "9. Significantly, for seeking condonation of delay it is not the length of delay which is material but the sufficiency of cause. A long delay if sufficiently explained can be condoned whereas in case if the cause shown is not sufficient then even a short delay may not be condoned. In the instant case, the cause shown for the aforesaid reason does not inspire confidence to persuade this Court to condone the delay of 583 days. 10. Another fact which is reflected from the record is the that the appellant had filed his writ petition assailing the order of the year 2013 in the month of December 2022 almost after nine years and in the entire petition, there is not a single whisper regarding the latches. 11. There is a difference between a matter being barred by limitation and the petition which suffers from the vice of latches. In a writ petition the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply, however, the Courts have evolved the concept of latches to ensure that a person who approaches the Court must do so promptly while invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 12. A writ court exercises powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is a purely discretionary. Thus, the issue of latches assumes significance as it guides the Court to determine whether the 'lis' before it deserves the indulgence in order to exercise its discretion in befitting matters. 12. A writ court exercises powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is a purely discretionary. Thus, the issue of latches assumes significance as it guides the Court to determine whether the 'lis' before it deserves the indulgence in order to exercise its discretion in befitting matters. This is quite different from a proceedings which is governed by the Limitation Act and in terms of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, even if at all, a party does not raise the issue of limitation yet it is incumbent upon the Court to look into this aspect. 13. In the aforesaid circumstances, though the issue of limitation is not attracted to a writ petition but taking an overall scenario, the Court would be well justified in refusing to entertain a petition on the ground of latches. This has been noticed by the Apex Court in Printers Mysore Ltd. Vs. M.A. Rasheed and others, (2004) 4 SCC 460 and Northern India Glass Industries Vs. Jaswant Singh and others, AIR 2003 SC 234 ." 12. Considering the aforesaid facts and material on record, this Court is of the clear view that there has been no diligence on the part of the petitioners as indicated in Paragraphs 15 to 20 of the petition. Accordingly, the petition suffers from the vice of laches and it is accordingly dismissed at the admission stage itself.