JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant/Defendant has preferred this First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (for short ‘the CPC’), challenging the judgment and decree dated 09.8.2011 passed by the Third Additional District Judge, Raipur in Civil Suit No.36A/2011, whereby, the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for declaration of title and vacant possession of room of the suit house, where the defendant is residing, situated at land bearing Khasa No.1110/5 area 552 sq.ft. Lakhe Nagar, Pt. Laxmi Narayan Das Ward No.61, Raipur, has been decreed, in favour of the plaintiff. (For the sake of convenience, parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status and ranking shown in the suit before the trial Court.) 2. Facts of the case, in nutshell, are that deceased Gulechi Bai, during her life time, constructed a house on plot bearing Khasra No.1110/5 area 552 sq.ft. situated at Lakhe Nagar, Pt. Laxmi Narayan Das Ward No.61, Raipur (henceforth refers as ‘suit house’. Since Gulechi Bai was issueless, she kept the plaintiff with her since his childhood and he served her during her old age, hence, Gulechi Bai executed a registered Will on 05.3.2001 in favour of the plaintiff in respect of suit house. Gulechi Bai died on 23.01.2006 and thereafter the plaintiff got entered his name in the revenue records of Municipal Corporation, Raipur on the basis of the said Will. During the life time of Gulechi Bai, one of the room of the suit house was given under licence to the defendant to reside there and the defendant was residing there with her husband. After the death of Gulechi Bai, the licence of the defendant automatically expired and the plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the suit house, however, she refused to vacate and declared herself as owner of the suit house. Thereafter the plaintiff filed civil suit for declaration of title and vacant possession of the room of the suit house, where the defendant is residing. 3. The defendant/appellant herein filed written statement along with counter claim stating therein that suit house is not self acquired property of deceased Gulechi Bai, but it is ancestral property, therefore, she has no right to bequeath a Will. It is further pleaded that the Will is a forged one and the same has been registered secretly. 3. The defendant/appellant herein filed written statement along with counter claim stating therein that suit house is not self acquired property of deceased Gulechi Bai, but it is ancestral property, therefore, she has no right to bequeath a Will. It is further pleaded that the Will is a forged one and the same has been registered secretly. Since Gulechi Bai was illiterate and was ill due to her old age, taking undue advantage of this, the plaintiff got executed and registered a forged Will in her name. It is further pleaded that the plaintiff was residing in the suit house only on the capacity of licensee/tenant, on which he has no right, whereas, the defendant is the owner of the suit property by virtue of being niece of Gulechi Bai and her sole successor, therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff may be dismissed and vacant possession of suit house from the plaintiff and outstanding rent Rs.800/- per month from January 2006 be granted to her from the plaintiff by allowing counter claim. 4. Based on the above facts, learned trial Court framed issues and after affording opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 09.8.2011 allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff and dismissed the counter claim filed by the defendant, holding therein that the plaintiff is having title over the suit house on the basis of valid Will executed by late Gulechi Bai in his name and the defendant has no right to retain her possession in the disputed room of the suit house. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the defendant has preferred instant appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submits that the defendant is the niece of deceased Gulechi Bai, who is the original owner of the suit house. She is residing in suit house since life time of the Gulechi Bai. She has also used to take care of her, although, in some portion of suit house the plaintiff is residing on rent. He would further submit that, at the time of execution of alleged Will, health of Gulechi Bai was not well as she was suffering from serious illness, hence, she was not mentally fit and was not in a position to think about her well being and consequences of the act. He would further submit that, at the time of execution of alleged Will, health of Gulechi Bai was not well as she was suffering from serious illness, hence, she was not mentally fit and was not in a position to think about her well being and consequences of the act. It is further submitted that taking undue advantages of aforesaid physical and mental status of Gulechi Bai, the plaintiff got executed aforesaid Will fraudulently, therefore, finding recorded by the learned trial Court that Ex-P/1 is a valid Will, executed by Gulechi Bai in favour of the plaintiff, is perverse and illegal, and suit filed by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed. Further since the defendant is a niece and successor of deceased Gulechi Bai, therefore, counter claim filed by the defendant may be allowed by granting vacant possession of the suit house and outstanding rent to the tune of Rs.800/- from January 2006 on account of non-payment of rent, may also be granted to the appellant/defendant by allowing instant appeal. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would submit that since Gulechi Bai was issueless and her husband had already died, therefore, she had executed registered Will (Ex-P/1) in favour of the plaintiff with her free will and conscious state of mind as she had kept him with her from his childhood and subsequently plaintiff looked after and take care of her, till her death. He would further submit that at the time of execution of Will, although she was old aged lady, but she was physically and mentally fit and also sound minded to think about her well beings. It is further submitted that Will has been executed by Gulechi Bai in the presence of two attesting witnesses, out of which, one witness namely Gokaran (PW-2) has been examined by the plaintiff and he has supported the Will. He would further submit that the defendant has no relationship with Gulechi Bai, not even in her distant relation. She is not the niece of deceased Gulechi Bai, rather she is residing in one room of the suit house as licensee with the consent of Gulechi Bai. He would further submit that the defendant has no relationship with Gulechi Bai, not even in her distant relation. She is not the niece of deceased Gulechi Bai, rather she is residing in one room of the suit house as licensee with the consent of Gulechi Bai. He would further submit that suit house was self acquired property of Gulechi Bai, therefore, she is competent to execute Will, which she has executed in favour of the plaintiff, hence, the learned trial Court has not committed any error in allowing the suit and granting decree in favour of the plaintiff, therefore, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record of the trial Court. 8. It is not in dispute that, Gulechi Bai was the owner of suit house situated on Khasra No. 1110/5, which she along with her husband Narsingh Das had purchased vide registered sale deed Ex. P-17. Defendant has controverted aforesaid fact by saying that, it is ancestral property of Gulechi Bai, but she has not proved aforesaid fact by adducing any cogent evidence, rather, on the strength of registered sale deed Ex. P-17, pleading and deposition of plaintiff Itwari Kumar Kannoje is found proved that, Gulechi Bai had purchased suit land and thereafter constructed suit house on it, and therefore, after death of her husband, Smt. Gulechi Bai was sole owner of the suit house as they were issueless. 9. It is also not in dispute that, since life time of late Gulechi Bai, plaintiff and defendant, both were residing in suit house on separate portion. Plaintiff has deposed that, since Gulechi Bai was issueless, therefore, she had kept him as her son since his childhood and plaintiff looked after and took care of her during her old age till her death, therefore, Gulechi Bai bequeathed suit house by Will deed (Ex. P-1) in favour of plaintiff, and after her death on 23.01.2006, on the basis of that Will deed, the suit house has been mutated in his name in the revenue records of Municipal Corporation, therefore, he is paying water tax and other taxes of suit house. His statement is well supported by revenue paper and tax receipts vide Ex. P-3 to Ex. P-12. 10. Plaintiff has claimed his title over the suit house on the basis of registered Will Ex. His statement is well supported by revenue paper and tax receipts vide Ex. P-3 to Ex. P-12. 10. Plaintiff has claimed his title over the suit house on the basis of registered Will Ex. P-1 dated 5-3-2001 executed by late Smt. Gulechi Bai in his favour, which has been challenged by defendant Smt. Laxmi Bai Mainikpuri alleging that, the plaintiff has no relation whatsoever with Gulechi Bai, rather, he was residing in some portion of suit house on rent basis. Gulechi Bai was old aged lady, suffering from various ailments and taking undue advantage of her such physical conditions, the plaintiff has got executed forged Will, whereas, the defendant is niece of Gulechi Bai and alleged Will Ex. P-1 is forged document, therefore, she is sole successor of suit house of Gulechi Bai. 11. In the case of Meena Pradhan & Ors. v. Kamla Pradhan & Anr., (2023) 9 SCC 734 , Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering issue of Will observed in para 9 as under :- “9. A will is an instrument of testamentary disposition of property. It is a legally acknowledged mode of bequeathing a testator's property during his lifetime to be acted upon on his/her death and carries with it an element of sanctity. It speaks from the death of the testator. Since the testator/testatrix, at the time of testing the document for its validity, would not be available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be executed, stringent requisites for the proof thereof have been statutorily enjoined to rule out the possibility of any manipulation. 12. Thus, if title is claimed by any person on the basis of bequeathing Will, then it is liability of such person to prove that alleged Will was executed by the testator with his/her free will, fit state of mind and it was the last Will executed by the testator. It is also incumbent upon the beneficiary/prepounder to remove all legitimate suspicion. 13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Murthy & Ors. v. C. Saradambal & Ors. [(2022) 3 SCC 290], while considering one of the celebrated decision in the case of H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma, ( AIR 1959 SC 443 ) has observed as under :- “32. In fact, the legal principles with regard to the proof of a will are no longer res integra. v. C. Saradambal & Ors. [(2022) 3 SCC 290], while considering one of the celebrated decision in the case of H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma, ( AIR 1959 SC 443 ) has observed as under :- “32. In fact, the legal principles with regard to the proof of a will are no longer res integra. Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872, are relevant in this regard. The propounder of the will must examine one or more attesting witnesses and the onus is placed on the propounder to remove all suspicious circumstances with regard to the execution of the will. 33. In the abovenoted case, this Court has stated that the following three aspects must be proved by a propounder: (Bharpur Singh case [Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 934], SCC p. 696, para 16) “16. … (i) that the will was signed by the testator in a sound and disposing state of mind duly understanding the nature and effect of disposition and he put his signature on the document of his own free will, and (ii) when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of propounder, and (iii) if a will is challenged as surrounded by suspicious circumstances, all such legitimate doubts have to be removed by cogent, satisfactory and sufficient evidence to dispel suspicion. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts indicated therein.” 34. In [Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur, (1977) 1 SCC 369 ], this Court pointed out that when a will is allegedly shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the defendant. What generally is an adversarial proceeding, becomes in such cases, a matter of the court's conscience and then, the true question which arises for consideration is, whether, the evidence let in by the propounder of the will is such as would satisfy the conscience of the court that the will was duly executed by the testator. What generally is an adversarial proceeding, becomes in such cases, a matter of the court's conscience and then, the true question which arises for consideration is, whether, the evidence let in by the propounder of the will is such as would satisfy the conscience of the court that the will was duly executed by the testator. It is impossible to reach such a satisfaction unless the party which sets up the will offers cogent and convincing explanation with regard to any suspicious circumstance surrounding the making of the will. 35. In [Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 934], this Court has narrated a few suspicious circumstance, as being illustrative but not exhaustive, in the following manner: (SCC p. 699, para 23) “23. Suspicious circumstances like the following may be found to be surrounded in the execution of the will: (i) The signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful or not appear to be his usual signature. (ii) The condition of the testator's mind may be very feeble and debilitated at the relevant time. (iii) The disposition may be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances like exclusion of or absence of adequate provisions for the natural heirs without any reason. (iv) The dispositions may not appear to be the result of the testator's free will and mind. (v) The propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the will. (vi) The testator used to sign blank papers. (vii) The will did not see the light of the day for long. (viii) Incorrect recitals of essential facts.” 36. It was further observed in Shamsher Singh case [Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 934] that the circumstances narrated hereinbefore are not exhaustive. Subject to offering of a reasonable explanation, existence thereof must be taken into consideration for the purpose of arriving at a finding as to whether the execution of the will had been duly proved or not. It may be true that the will was a registered one, but the same by itself would not mean that the statutory requirements of proving the will need not be complied with. 37. In [Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi v. Mrudula Jyoti Rao, (2006) 13 SCC 433], in paras 34 to 37, this Court has observed as under: (SCC pp. 447-48) “34. It may be true that the will was a registered one, but the same by itself would not mean that the statutory requirements of proving the will need not be complied with. 37. In [Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi v. Mrudula Jyoti Rao, (2006) 13 SCC 433], in paras 34 to 37, this Court has observed as under: (SCC pp. 447-48) “34. There are several circumstances which would have been held to be described by this Court as suspicious circumstances: (i) when a doubt is created in regard to the condition of mind of the testator despite his signature on the will; (ii) When the disposition appears to be unnatural or wholly unfair in the light of the relevant circumstances; (iii) where propounder himself takes prominent part in the execution of will which confers on him substantial benefit. *** 35. We may not delve deep into the decisions cited at the Bar as the question has recently been considered by this Court in [B. Venkatamuni v. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh, (2006) 13 SCC 449], wherein this Court has held that the court must satisfy its conscience as regards due execution of the will by the testator and the court would not refuse to probe deeper into the matter only because the signature of the propounder on the will is otherwise proved. 36. The proof of a will is required not as a ground of reading the document but to afford the Judge reasonable assurance of it as being what it purports to be. 37 [Ed.: Para 37 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./86/2007 dated 5- 12-2007.] . We may, however, hasten to add that there exists a distinction where suspicions are well founded and the cases where there are only suspicions alone. Existence of suspicious circumstances alone may not be sufficient. The court may not start with a suspicion and it should not close its mind to find the truth. A resolute and impenetrable incredulity is not demanded from the Judge even if there exist circumstances of grave suspicion.” 39. Similarly, in [Leela Rajagopal v. Kamala Menon Cocharan, (2014) 15 SCC 570 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 267], this Court opined as under: (SCC p. 576, para 13) “13. A will may have certain features and may have been executed in certain circumstances which may appear to be somewhat unnatural. Similarly, in [Leela Rajagopal v. Kamala Menon Cocharan, (2014) 15 SCC 570 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 267], this Court opined as under: (SCC p. 576, para 13) “13. A will may have certain features and may have been executed in certain circumstances which may appear to be somewhat unnatural. Such unusual features appearing in a will or the unnatural circumstances surrounding its execution will definitely justify a close scrutiny before the same can be accepted. It is the overall assessment of the court on the basis of such scrutiny; the cumulative effect of the unusual features and circumstances which would weigh with the court in the determination required to be made by it. The judicial verdict, in the last resort, will be on the basis of a consideration of all the unusual features and suspicious circumstances put together and not on the impact of any single feature that may be found in a will or a singular circumstance that may appear from the process leading to its execution or registration. This, is the essence of the repeated pronouncements made by this Court on the subject including the decisions referred to and relied upon before us.” 14. In the case of Meena Pradhan (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court, considering its various judgments on the principles required to be proved with regard to the validity of execution of Will, has observed in para 10 & 11 as under;- 10. Relying on [H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 31 : 1959 Supp (1) SCR 426 : AIR 1959 SC 443 ] (three-Judge Bench), [Bhagwan Kaur v. Kartar Kaur, (1994) 5 SCC 135 ] (three-Judge Bench), [Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam, (2003) 2 SCC 91 ] (two-Judge Bench), [Yumnam Ongbi Tampha Ibema Devi v. Yumnam Joykumar Singh, (2009) 4 SCC 780 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 348] (three-Judge Bench) and [Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa, (2021) 11 SCC 277 ] (three-Judge Bench), we can deduce/infer the following principles required for proving the validity and execution of the will: 10.1. The court has to consider two aspects : firstly, that the will is executed by the testator, and secondly, that it was the last will executed by him; 10.2. It is not required to be proved with mathematical accuracy, but the test of satisfaction of the prudent mind has to be applied. 10.3. The court has to consider two aspects : firstly, that the will is executed by the testator, and secondly, that it was the last will executed by him; 10.2. It is not required to be proved with mathematical accuracy, but the test of satisfaction of the prudent mind has to be applied. 10.3. A will is required to fulfil all the formalities required under Section 63 of the Succession Act, that is to say: (a) The testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and the said signature or affixation shall show that it was intended to give effect to the writing as a will; (b) It is mandatory to get it attested by two or more witnesses, though no particular form of attestation is necessary; (c) Each of the attesting witnesses must have seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of such signatures; (d) Each of the attesting witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, however, the presence of all witnesses at the same time is not required; 10.4. For the purpose of proving the execution of the will, at least one of the attesting witnesses, who is alive, subject to the process of court, and capable of giving evidence, shall be examined; 10.5. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signatures but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator; 10.6. If one attesting witness can prove the execution of the will, the examination of other attesting witnesses can be dispensed with; 10.7. Where one attesting witness examined to prove the will fails to prove its due execution, then the other available attesting witness has to be called to supplement his evidence; 10.8. Whenever there exists any suspicion as to the execution of the will, it is the responsibility of the propounder to remove all legitimate suspicions before it can be accepted as the testator's last will. In such cases, the initial onus on the propounder becomes heavier. 10.9. Whenever there exists any suspicion as to the execution of the will, it is the responsibility of the propounder to remove all legitimate suspicions before it can be accepted as the testator's last will. In such cases, the initial onus on the propounder becomes heavier. 10.9. The test of judicial conscience has been evolved for dealing with those cases where the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. It requires to consider factors such as awareness of the testator as to the content as well as the consequences, nature and effect of the dispositions in the will; sound, certain and disposing state of mind and memory of the testator at the time of execution; testator executed the will while acting on his own free will; 10.10. One who alleges fraud, fabrication, undue influence et cetera has to prove the same. However, even in the absence of such allegations, if there are circumstances giving rise to doubt, then it becomes the duty of the propounder to dispel such suspicious circumstances by giving a cogent and convincing explanation. 10.11. Suspicious circumstances must be “real, germane and valid” and not merely “the fantasy of the doubting mind [Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa, (2021) 11 SCC 277 ] ”. Whether a particular feature would qualify as “suspicious” would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Any circumstance raising suspicion legitimate in nature would qualify as a suspicious circumstance, for example, a shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit, etc. 11. In short, apart from statutory compliance, broadly it has to be proved that : (a) the testator signed the will out of his own free will, (b) at the time of execution he had a sound state of mind, (c) he was aware of the nature and effect thereof and (d) the will was not executed under any suspicious circumstances. 15. In view of aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, if we examine Will Ex. 15. In view of aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, if we examine Will Ex. P-1, then plaintiff Itwari Kumar Kannoje has deposed in his Court statement that, since late Gulechi Bai was issueless, therefore, she had kept him with her since his childhood as her son and he had served her at her old age, therefore, she had bequeathed her suit house by executing Will Ex. P-1 on 5-3-2001, which was also got registered by her. He has denied all negative suggestions in his cross-examination with regard to aforesaid fact. Although he has admitted in his cross-examination that, at the time of execution of Will Ex. P-1, Gulechi Bai was 75 years of age and she was illiterate, but he has denied the suggestion of learned defence counsel that, he has got executed aforesaid Will taking undue advantage of old age and illiteracy of Gulechi Bai. 16. Lalaram Dhobi and Gokaran Sen are said to be attesting witnesses of Will Ex. P-1 from whom, Lalaram is said to be died and Gokaran has been examined as P.W. 2. Attesting witness Gokaran Sen (P.W. 2) has deposed that, he knows Smt. Gulechi Bai and plaintiff Itwari Kumar Kannoje. He has further deposed that, Gulechi Bai had got executed her Will Ex. P-1 from his Advocate, thereafter it was read over to them and Gulechi Bai. He has further stated that, Registrar had also inquired about execution of Will from Gulechi Bai, thereafter, she put her thumb impression on it and subsequently, he (this witness) and Lalaram Dhobi (another attesting witness) put their signature. He has also verified his signature and signature of Lalaram on Will Ex. P-1. 17. Whatever would have been suspicious circumstances in relation to execution of Will deed Ex. He has also verified his signature and signature of Lalaram on Will Ex. P-1. 17. Whatever would have been suspicious circumstances in relation to execution of Will deed Ex. P-1, have been clarified by learned defence counsel in para 3 of crossexamination of attesting witness Gokaran Sen (PW-2), in which he has stated that: 3@ xqysph ckbZ c/kqokikjk vius edku esa jg jgh Fkh A bl of'k;r dh fy[kk&iढ+h jftLVªh dk;kZy; esa gqbZ gS A ftl le; ge yksx of'k;r fy[kkus ds fy, jftLVªh dk;kZy; eSa] yykjke /kksch] xqysph ckbZ vkSj ,d odhy lkgc dqy pkj yksx Fks blds vykok dksbZ vU; O;fDr ugha Fkk A of'k;r ukek dks igys odhy lkgc us iढ+dj lquk;k Fkk mlds ckn jftLVj lkgc us iढ+dj lquk;k Fkk A jftLVj lkgc us xqysph ckbZ ls iwNk Fkk fd vius gks'kksgko'k esa of'k;r ukek dj jgh gks rks xqysph ckbZ dgk Fkk dh gka csVk eSa vius gks'kksgko'k esa dj jgh gaw A ftl fnu of'k;r ukek izn'kZ ih 1 dk fy[kk iढ+h gqvk Fkk mlh fnu jftLVªs'ku gqbZ Fkh A 18. Although Gokaran Sen (PW-2) has also admitted in cross-examination that, Gulechi Bai was old aged lady and illiterate also, but he has stated that she was healthy. He has denied the suggestion of defence counsel that while execution of Will deed, she was ill and her mental status was not good. 19. Thus, as per the aforesaid evidence, on 05.03.2001 when Will deed Ex.P-1 was executed by Gulechi Bai in favour of the plaintiff Itwari Kumar Kannoje, at that time, she was aged about 75 years and was illiterate too, but nothing has been brought in cross-examination of the attesting witness that, she was not in a fit state of mind while execution of Will. Only on the basis of old age, a person cannot be held that he/she was not in a fit state of mind and she was not able to think about the consequences of her act or she was unable to think about her well being. 20. Defendant/Laxmi Bai Manikpuri (DW-1) and Sanna Bano @ Kaneez Bano (DW-2) have deposed in their depositions that, at the time of execution of Will, Gulechi Bai remained ill, but they have shown their ignorance that, if she remained ill, then from where or from which doctor, her treatment was going on. 20. Defendant/Laxmi Bai Manikpuri (DW-1) and Sanna Bano @ Kaneez Bano (DW-2) have deposed in their depositions that, at the time of execution of Will, Gulechi Bai remained ill, but they have shown their ignorance that, if she remained ill, then from where or from which doctor, her treatment was going on. Making such bald statement by defendant/Laxmi Bai Manikpuri, who claims herself to be niece of Late. Gulechi Bai, and also claims to have looked after her and took care of her while her old age, creates serious doubt about truthfulness of her aforesaid statement, because if she was niece of Late. Gulechi Bai, then she ought to have known as to where or from which doctor, she was getting treatment. 21. As per Sanna Bano @ Kaneez Bano (DW-2), Gulechi Bai was her maternal aunt (mosi) and defendant/Laxmi Bai Manikpuri is daughter of her real maternal uncle (mama), but she has not stated name of her Nana and Mama. She has deposed that her mother had got married with Mohammad Nazir Ahmed, therefore, she has kept her name Sanna Bano @ Kaneez Bano i.e. mohammadan name, but she has not stated name of her Nana, Nani, Mama etc. and also her ignorance towards treatment of Gulechi Bai, as has been stated earlier, does not inspire confidence with regard to her deposition favouring defendant. 22. Thus, on due appreciation of evidence available on record, as has been discussed above, particularly considering the evidence of attesting witness Gokaran Sen (PW-2), it is found that learned trial Court after due appreciation of evidence, has held proved the legality of Will Ex.P-1, as no suspicious circumstance is found with regard to execution of aforesaid document and it has been proved by the plaintiff as per requirement of Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925 and in terms of Section 68 of the Evidence Act,1872. It has not been proved that subsequent to bequeathing Will Ex.P-1, Late Gulechi Bai had executed any other Will. It has not been proved that subsequent to bequeathing Will Ex.P-1, Late Gulechi Bai had executed any other Will. Therefore, it is also found that learned trial Court has rightly held that on the strength of Will Ex.P-1 executed by Late Gulechi Bai in favour of the plaintiff, plaintiff Itwari Kumar Kannoje is owner of the suit house, since after the death of Gulechi Bai, license granted to defendant/Laxmi Bai Manikpuri to reside in suit house has come to an end, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to get vacant possession of the disputed room, from Laxmi Bai Manikpuri, where she is residing. 23. In view of above discussion, I do not find any substance in the instant appeal. The same being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 24. Parties shall bear their own cost(s). 25. A decree be drawn accordingly. 26. In view of above, pending IAs, if any, stands disposed of.