JUDGMENT : Ajit Kumar, J. 1. Heard Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.K. Jain, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Vinay Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. These four petitions are by four separate tenants of the same landlord and were proceeded with for release/eviction in respect of the tenanted shops under Section 21(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 (in short 'Act') on same grounds. The order of eviction has been passed in respect of all the tenants by separate orders passed by the rent authority that were unsuccessfully challenged in rent appeal. Hence these four petitions are filed both against the order of rent authority as well as of appellate Tribunal. Since these petitions raise common question of fact and law, therefore, they are heard and decided together. 3. There is no dispute between the petitioners and the landlord regarding jural relationship of tenant-landlord. The landlord came to file release application under Section 21(2) of the Act basically on the plea that behind the four shops with Chabutra in question there is an open space of land belonging to landlord which he wanted to use to house the stocks of iron bars, guarders, squares etc. as godown and further to install two gates for the exit and entry of goods with office and washroom on both sides. In order to raise these constructions, he needed to demolish the standing shops and this had become necessary because a lane lying on eastern side of the plot was such narrow that heavy vehicles like Truck, Tractor and Trolley cannot be brought in to the godown. Yet another plea was that the constructions are also in dilapidated stage. Thus, a personal need for the release of the shops was set up to convert the building to be used as godown. 4. An objection was filed by the tenants opposing the release and denying the averments made in paragraph No. 2 only to the extent that whatever has been stated in paragraph No. 2 was not accepted. The landlord/respondent filed an affidavit in evidence in support of the pleadings raised, reiterating the stand and further filed a document of spot map showing the location of shop and the surroundings. The landlord/respondent filed an affidavit in evidence in support of the pleadings raised, reiterating the stand and further filed a document of spot map showing the location of shop and the surroundings. The rent authority after hearing the parties and perusing the records, returned a finding that respondent needed the shop in question to be demolished to use the area of vacant plot as godown and to install two large gates and washroom and also office on both sides. The Court also recorded that the landlord had placed the map and also the income tax return in corroboration of pleadings and thus granted the application directing the petitioner to vacate the tenanted premises. The Prescribed Authority further directed for payment of Rs. 125/- as rent to be payable from January 2019 till the tenanted premises was evicted. 5. This order was sought to be challenged in appeal on various grounds including the ground that the presentation of application under Section 21(2) of the Act was not in accordance with the procedure and the format prescribed under rule 7 of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Rules, 2021 (in short 'Rules'). The Court of appeal has affirmed the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, hence these petitions. 6. Assailing the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as by the appellate authority, learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh has raised following points: (i) The Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority failed to record any finding as to the feasibility of the plot and the area in question to be used as a godown making it necessary to demolish the shops, inasmuch as, there was no finding, nor there is any measurement provided by the landlord/respondent as to what exactly was the area of vacant land behind the shop which could have been used as godown; (ii) Neither the application for eviction/release was maintainable under clause (e) of Section 21(2), nor clause (m) of Section 21(2) of the Act and therefore, in the absence of the conditions prescribed in those clauses the release/eviction could not have been ordered; (iii) Rule 7 of the Rules prescribed for mandatory format and in the absence of such an application on prescribed format, it ought not to have been entertained as maintainable. 7. 7. In support of his first argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the Court to the pleadings raised in eviction application and submitted that except making of a vacant plot behind the shops and a very small land on the eastern side, there is no area given of the vacant land which could be said to be worth converting a godown. He submitted that the averments as made in paragraph No. 2 are vague. He further submitted that the affidavit so filed does not prescribed for any area. Mr. Singh submitted that these pleadings were denied by the petitioner vide para 17 of the written statement and therefore, in these circumstances the exact location of area and the map ought to have been led in evidence so as to make out a case for eviction for the need so set up. 8. He has also taken the Court to the finding part of the Prescribed Authority to allege that the Prescribed Authority has simply relied upon the statement made and the affidavit filed and the certain documents led but there is no independent finding after appreciating those documents and pleadings. 9. This according to Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh does not amount to rendering due application of mind and the findings therefore, are liable to be held bad. He submitted that the Court of appeal also simply affirms the order of the Prescribed Authority and has not discussed the exact need and the feasibility of converting alleged available land into a godown. 10. Advancing the second argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the Court to the relevant provisions as contained under Section 21(2) of the Act that provides ground for moving an application for eviction of the tenants under Section 21(1) of the Act. Mr. Singh has placed before the Court various grounds thereof and submitted that ground 2(e) and 2(f) and 2(m) are grounds for eviction if the matter of demolition and alteration, repair, reconstruction of building was included for release/eviction. Mr. Singh has placed before the Court various grounds thereof and submitted that ground 2(e) and 2(f) and 2(m) are grounds for eviction if the matter of demolition and alteration, repair, reconstruction of building was included for release/eviction. He argued that while ground No. (f) would not be attracted, the ground 2(e) will be attracted but then this ground of eviction is qualified by the proviso which gives a right to a tenant to re-occupy the premises with the mutual agreement of the landlord and the landlord having not offered for such mutual agreement the application under Section 21(2)(e) of the Act was not maintainable. Regarding Section 22(2)(m) of the Act, Mr. Singh argued that demolition of a building is permissible provided if the same structure is reconstructed. 11. Regarding third argument, Mr. Singh has taken the Court through relevant provisions of Rule 7 of the Rules and contended that all those documents and details that are required to be placed before the rent authority in Form-7 while moving an application for recovery of possession was not complied with, nor even the mail ID, whatsapp number and mobile number was disclosed therein. Mr. Singh submitted that these copies in duplicates were also required to be sent to the tenant which also was not done. it is submitted that in the absence of non compliance of these mandatory provisions, the application was not maintainable. 12. Meeting the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Jain, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent submitted that the Court has to look into only this much as to whether there is a genuine need of the landlord to get the building demolished and reconstruct for his personal use and if he sets up a case then such an application would be maintainable within the meaning of Section 21(2)(m) of the Act. He has argued that Section 21(2)(m) of the Act gives an absolute right to the landlord to move an application for eviction of tenant from the tenanted premises, if he wanted its demolition for reconstruction for his personal use. He submitted that his case would fall either under Section 21(2)(e) or 21(2)(f) of the Act. It is further argued by Sri Jain that since sufficient pleadings were placed, the map etc. He submitted that his case would fall either under Section 21(2)(e) or 21(2)(f) of the Act. It is further argued by Sri Jain that since sufficient pleadings were placed, the map etc. were filed before the rent authority and there was no denial of pleadings in the written objection, nor there was any evidence led by the tenant to dispute the evidence filed by the landlord, the Court was justified in decreeing the application for eviction. Regarding non compliance of Rule 7, Mr. Jain argued that such an application may not have been entertained, if any objection had been raised. Since no objection had been raised as to the jurisdiction of the Court at the first available opportunity before the Prescribed Authority, this opportunity got closed and issue could not have been opened at the stage of appeal. He placed reliance upon the principle contained in Section 21 of C.P.C. where the question of jurisdiction could have been raised or the maintainability of an eviction application could have been raised at first available opportunity. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the records, in so far as the first argument is concerned regarding non disclosure of area etc. of the land in question and the map etc. much emphasis upon which was placed by Sri Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, I find that in the application for eviction it has been specifically disclosed that certain vacant land was lying behind the shops and on the eastern side of which there was a lane and the landlord wanted to convert the area into godown but the lane was not wide enough to make it possible for the heavy vehicle to move in and out which would have made the downloading/uploading and transportation of iron bars etc. impossible. The map of the area was also placed before the Prescribed Authority to which the Prescribed Authority very much referred to in its finding part. The tenant has of course, denied the averments made in para 2 of the eviction application, vide paragraph No. 17 of the written objection but the denial is very evasive. He simply denies the existence of any plot but no where in the petition, nor in the affidavit filed before the rent authority it has been pleaded that the map which had disclosed the location of the area was wrong. He simply denies the existence of any plot but no where in the petition, nor in the affidavit filed before the rent authority it has been pleaded that the map which had disclosed the location of the area was wrong. In the written objection it is said that the disputed shops were not on the western side of the chungi but there is no denial as to the lane on the eastern side of the vacant plot and that the lane was very narrow. 14. Besides the above, I find that the rent authority has discussed the map also filed by the landlord and held the need of the landlord to be genuine so also to get the shops demolished to utilize the entire area as godown to open two wide gates to facilitate entry of heavy vehicles. This finding has come to be affirmed in appeal and appellate Court has also discussed these aspects of the matter. Thus, it cannot be said that the issue has not been judiciously decided by the Prescribed Authority as well as by the appellate authority. 15. In so far as the second argument is concerned, I find it apt here to reproduce Section 21(2)(m) and (e) of the Act which runs as under: “(m) that the premises is required by land lord either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction thereof for the purpose of its occupation by landlord. (e) where it is necessary for the landlord to carry out any repair or construction or rebuilding or addition or alteration or demolition in respect of the premises or any part thereof, which is not possible to be carried out without the premises being vacated: Provided that after such repair, construction, rebuilding, addition or alteration, the tenant may be allowed to reoccupy the premises only when it has been mutually agreed to between the landlord and the tenant and a new tenancy agreement has been submitted with the Rent Authority: Provided further that the tenant shall not be allowed to reoccupy the premises: (i) in the absence of submission of such mutual tenancy agreement with the Rent Authority. (ii) in cases where the tenant has been evicted under the orders of a Rent Authority.” 16. (ii) in cases where the tenant has been evicted under the orders of a Rent Authority.” 16. From a bare reading of Section 21(2) (e) of the Act, I find it to be clearly providing for entertaining an application for eviction on the ground of construction/rebuilding/ alteration/demolition in respect of the premises or any part thereof and it would not be possible without getting the premises vacated. Thus, the Act provides for eviction of the tenant on the ground that landlord wants reconstruction or rebuilding or demolition of the premises and for which naturally the tenant will have to vacate because no reconstruction, no rebuilding or alteration or demolition can be carried out with the tenant sitting inside. In so far as the first proviso is concerned, it gives a statutory right to the tenant to re-enter the tenancy to occupy the premises provided the landlord and tenant have mutually agreed for the same. This mutual agreement is also at the discretion of the landlord because if the landlord does not want any mutual agreement and wants not to let out the building after reconstruction or remodeling or alteration, then tenant cannot compel him. This further comes to be affirmed from the second proviso which says that in the absence of submission of such mutual tenancy agreement with the rent authority, tenant cannot reoccupy the premises. Further, clause (i) and (ii) of the second proviso make it absolutely clear that this statutory right of the tenant is not absolute. 17. Moving to clause (m), I find that this clause is more applicable to the facts of the case because it provides for landlord to get the building vacated and to use it by raising new construction after demolition. Looking to the averments made in eviction application, in my considered view the application falls within clause 21(2)(m) and therefore, the argument advanced by Mr. Jain holds merit. The clause (m) does not get qualified from any such proviso as contained under Section 21(2)(e) of the Act. 18. Coming to the last argument regarding non compliance of Rule 7 of the Rules suffice it to say that it relate to procedural part of the Act and for any procedural infirmity, if application was not entertainable, then objection ought to have been taken at very initial stage. 18. Coming to the last argument regarding non compliance of Rule 7 of the Rules suffice it to say that it relate to procedural part of the Act and for any procedural infirmity, if application was not entertainable, then objection ought to have been taken at very initial stage. Petitioner having not taken any objection at the stage of Prescribed Authority would be taken to have submitted to the proceedings and therefore, cannot be permitted to raise objection at the stage of appeal. Besides this, I also find that the purpose for certain details and documents that are required for an eviction application to bear, is only for the purposes of facilitating copies to the tenant/respondent and to provide him full knowledge for which the application has been filed. 19. Once the tenant files his written objection to the eviction application, it will be taken that he is fully aware of the facts and therefore, it was his opportunity now to allege that the facts were wrong or that the application was misconceived. 20. In my considered view, merely for any procedural flaw an application has been entertained, if the proceedings did not suffer from any vice of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Court, the mere entertainability of such application and thereafter, the decision thereupon would not render the judgment bad much less a nullity. No other points have been argued before the Court on behalf of the petitioners. 21. In view of the above, all the four petitions are held to be devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed.