JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri D. S. Mishra learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ramanand Pandey learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ashish Mishra learned counsel for the High Court and Sri T.P. Singh learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Satya Prakash and Sri Raj Kumar Yadav learned counsel for private respondent Nos. 6, 8 and 10. 2. Present writ petition has been filed seeking quashing of the revised result dated 01.10.2020-of U.P. Higher Judicial Service Recruitment Examination 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘impugned examination’). Also, challenge has been laid to Notification dated 24.3.2021 issued by the High Court (on administrative side) under Rule 22(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’) insofar as it pertains to appointment of Sri Shashwata Pandey, Sri Pinku Kumar, Sri Utkarsh Yadav, Sri Awanish Kumar, Sri Prakash Chand Rana, Sri Sharad Kumar Tripathi, Sri Ajay Kumar, Smt. Sandeep Chauhan and Ms. Hemlata Tyagi as Additional District & Sessions Judges pursuant to the impugned examination. Since the writ petition filed by Sri Rahul Singh/respondent No.12 stands dismissed by the Supreme Court, the petitioner claims appointment in his place. Further, direction has been sought to include the petitioner in the revised result dated 01.10.2020 and to grant appointment to him as Additional District & Sessions Judge, in the State of U.P., pursuant to the impugned examination. 3. Pleadings had been exchanged earlier. Accordingly, the matter was proceeded. During hearing, learned counsel for the High Court produced the original record and consequently also filed Supplementary Counter Affidavit on 23.11.2023. Supplementary Rejoinder Affidavit thereto was filed by the petitioner on 28.11.2023. Those have also been taken on record. 4. On 10.5.2018, the High Court advertised 37 vacancies in Higher Judicial Service being 21 vacancies in Unreserved/Open Category, 07 in the Scheduled Caste category and 09 in the Other Backward Class category. Applications were invited “from Advocates having not less than 7 years standing as on the last date fixed for the submission of application forms”. That date was 14.6.2018. As to the age limit, it was stipulated, the candidate must have attained the age of 35 years and must not have attained the age of 45 years, on 01.01.2019. At the same time, age relaxation of three years was granted to candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Class. 5. That date was 14.6.2018. As to the age limit, it was stipulated, the candidate must have attained the age of 35 years and must not have attained the age of 45 years, on 01.01.2019. At the same time, age relaxation of three years was granted to candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Class. 5. As to horizontal reservation for women, in terms of Rule 7 of the Rules, the advertisement contemplated 20% horizontal reservation for women belonging to the State of U.P. only, in the following terms: “20% horizontal reservation for women belonging to State of U.P. only.” Also, Rule 7 of the Rules reads as below: - “7. Reservation of posts for Scheduled Caste, etc.- Reservation to posts in the service for the members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other categories including women shall be in accordance with orders of the Government for reservation as adopted by the High Court. Provided that twenty percent horizontal reservation for women to posts in service in direct recruitment from Bar in Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service shall be subject to suitability i.e. if the sufficient number of women candidates is not available, then and in that event the reservation shall not have any operation to the extent of such unavailability. Provided further that there shall be no carry forward of reservation for women.” 6. Of candidates who applied under the above advertisement many were serving judicial officers in the State of Uttar Pradesh and even outside. In view of the amended Rule 5 of the Rules and the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Deepak Agarwal Vs. Keshav Kaushik, (2013) 5 SCC 277 , candidature of serving judicial officers was rejected by the High Court, on the administrative side. For ready reference, amended Rule 5(c) of the Rules reads as below: “5. Source of recruitment- The recruitment to the service shall be made--- (a) …… (b)……. (c) [Vide Noti. No. 174/two-4-2016-36(1) 2005 T.C. dated December 20, 2016], by direct recruitment from amongst the Advocates of not less than seven years standing as on the last date fixed for the submission of application forms.” 7. Source of recruitment- The recruitment to the service shall be made--- (a) …… (b)……. (c) [Vide Noti. No. 174/two-4-2016-36(1) 2005 T.C. dated December 20, 2016], by direct recruitment from amongst the Advocates of not less than seven years standing as on the last date fixed for the submission of application forms.” 7. Occasioned by that rejection of their application forms, some such candidates approached this Court as also the Supreme Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction to assail the rejection of their candidature-interim orders came to be passed in their favour allowing them to provisionally participate in the impugned examination. However, their results were not declared during pendency of litigation. Also, respondent No. 12-Rahul Singh approached the Supreme Court by filing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1371 of 2018. Interim order was granted in his favour on 22.11.2018 allowing him to provisionally participate in the examination. 8. Consequently, petitioner as also the private respondents participated in the main written test of the impugned examination from 07.12.2018 to 09.12.2018. First, the High Court declared result of that examination on 28.02.2019. In that, 40 Unreserved/Open Category candidates and 04 Other Backward Class candidates were declared successful for the interview test. They were invited for interview conducted on 11.3.2019 and 12.3.2019. Petitioner was one of them. 9. Thereafter, the High Court declared result on 28.03.2019 wherein 21 candidates under the Unreserved/Open Category and 2 candidates under the OBC category were declared successful. None was successful under the SC Category. Of the 21 candidates successful under the Unreserved/Open Category, 11 were such who had participated in the impugned examination provisionally under interim orders granted by this Court and the Supreme Court. For that reason, their names were not disclosed/published in the result. Against their respective merit position, word “Reserved” was published. Also, a Note was attached below that result: 10. Of the 21 candidates successful under the Unreserved/Open Category, 11 were such who had participated in the impugned examination provisionally under interim orders granted by this Court and the Supreme Court. For that reason, their names were not disclosed/published in the result. Against their respective merit position, word “Reserved” was published. Also, a Note was attached below that result: 10. For ready reference that result as declared is extracted below: - “THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD U.P. HIGHER JUDICIAL SERVICE RECRUITMENT 2018 No. 171/S & A/2019 Dated: Allahabad: March 28, 2019 FINAL RESULT On the basis of written examination held on 07, 08 and 09 December 2018 followed by Interview on 11th and 12th March 2019 the following candidates, in order of merit, have been recommended by the High Court for appointment by way of direct recruitment to U.P. Higher Judicial Service under Rule 5(c) read with Rule 18 of U.P.H.J.S. Rules, 1975: Unreserved Category Sl No. Roll No. Name of Candidates SRI/SMT/KM Category 1. RESERVED 2. RESERVED 3. RESERVED 4 RESERVED 5. 3553 POONAM (F) GEN 6. 2960 MOHD. SHARIQ SIDDIQUE GEN 7. 2513 LAKHWINDER SINGH SOOD GEN 8. RESERVED 9. 5468 SMT RAGINI (F) GEN 10. RESERVED 11. RESERVED 12. 6180 VINOD KUMAR CHAURASIA OBC 13. 2844 MAYANK TRIPATHI GEN 14. 3564 POONAM SINGHAL (F) GEN 15. RESERVED 16. 5201 SHAILJA RATHI (F) OBC 17. RESERVED 18. 759 ANURAG PANWAR GEN 19. RESERVED 20 6411 ZAIBA MAJID (F) GEN 21. RESERVED Note: (1) Names of 02 OBC category candidates have been included in the list of unreserved category candidates on the basis of their marks in the written examination and interview and they are being treated as unreserved category candidates. (2) The results of the petitioners in the above list are kept reserved and their fate shall be decided after the final outcome of the petitions filed by them. OBC Category Sl No. Roll No. Name of Candidates SRI/SMT/KM Category 1 158 AJAY KUMAR OBC 2 5708 SURENDRA PAL SINGH OBC 11. Since the result of 10 selected advocate candidates (under the Open/Unreserved category) and 2 candidates (under the OBC category) was undisputed or clear, selection of those selected candidates was notified in accordance with the terms of the resolution of the Selection Committee dated 15.07.2019 as approved by the Full Court. They were issued appointment letters. Consequently, they joined in service. Since the result of 10 selected advocate candidates (under the Open/Unreserved category) and 2 candidates (under the OBC category) was undisputed or clear, selection of those selected candidates was notified in accordance with the terms of the resolution of the Selection Committee dated 15.07.2019 as approved by the Full Court. They were issued appointment letters. Consequently, they joined in service. For the remaining, the matter remained pending final disposal of petitions filed by them. Meanwhile, the decision of the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor Vs. High Court of Delhi, (2020) 7 SCC 401 was delivered on 19.02.2020. In short, it may be noted, for the first-time law was declared, to be eligible, an advocate candidate seeking direct recruitment to HJS must not only have completed seven years of practice on the last date of submission of applications, but he must continue to be an advocate up to the date of his appointment as a HJS Officer. 12. After the judgement of Dheeraj Mor (supra) all the serving judicial officers whose applications had been rejected by the High Court but who appeared in the impugned examination under interim orders granted by this Court and the Supreme Court, were disqualified. Their writ petitions both before this Court and also before the Supreme Court came to be dismissed. 13. In that circumstance, the High Court revised the earlier result dated 28.03.2019 and declared further (final) result pursuant to the impugned examination, on 01.10.2020. In that, all 21 posts for Unreserved/Open category were filled up. 7 female candidates and 3 candidates who had applied under the OBC category were also shown successful in the Unreserved/Open category. Further, as against 2 OBC candidates shown selected under the earlier result declared on 28.03.2019 only 1 found his name included under that category. One above him in the merit list namely, Ajay Kumar was now shown selected under the Unreserved category. Those found ineligible were replaced by those placed lower in merit (in the Unreserved/Open category). For ready reference, the result dated 01.10.2020 reads as below: - “UNRESERVED CATEGORY Sl No. Roll No. Name of Candidate Catg 1. 3553 POONAM (F) GEN 2. 2960 MOHD. SHARIQUE SIDDIQUE GEN 3. 2513 LAKHWINDER SINGH SOOD GEN 4. 5468 SMT. RAGINI (F) GEN 5. 6180 VINOD KUMAR CHAURASIA OBC 6. 2844 MAYANK TRIPATHI GEN 7. 3564 POONAM SINGHAL (F) GEN 8. 5201 SHAILJA RATHI (F) OBC 9. 3553 POONAM (F) GEN 2. 2960 MOHD. SHARIQUE SIDDIQUE GEN 3. 2513 LAKHWINDER SINGH SOOD GEN 4. 5468 SMT. RAGINI (F) GEN 5. 6180 VINOD KUMAR CHAURASIA OBC 6. 2844 MAYANK TRIPATHI GEN 7. 3564 POONAM SINGHAL (F) GEN 8. 5201 SHAILJA RATHI (F) OBC 9. 759 ANURAG PANWAR GEN 10. 6411 ZAIBA MAJID (F) GEN 11. 5294 SHASHWATA PANDEY GEN 12. 3535 PINKU KUMAR GEN 13. 44 ABHISHEK KUMAR BAGARIA GEN 14. 5908 UTKARSH YADAV GEN 15. 1133 AWANISH KUMAR GEN 16. 3452 PARKASH CHAND RANA GEN 17. 4997 SARAD KUMAR TRIPATHI GEN 18. 5511 SUBHASH CHANDRA TIWARI GEN 19. 158 AJAY KUMAR OBC 20. 4740 SANDEEP CHAUHAN (F) GEN 21. 2026 HEMLATA TYAGI (F) GEN O.B.C. CATEGORY Sl No. Roll No. Name of Candidate Catg 1. 5708 SURENDRA PAL SINGH OBC 14. It is also a fact, besides the impugned examination, three other examinations of U.P.H.J.S. were conducted during the period July, 2016 to September, 2018 being U.P.H.J.S.-2016, U.P.H.J.S.-2018 (Part-II) and U.P.H.J.S.-2018 (Part-III). Litigation was experienced at those three examinations as well. Only upon pronouncement of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra) and dismissal of individual litigation brought by various candidates (allowed to provisionally appear at those examinations), the results for U.P.H.J.S.-2016, U.P.H.J.S.-2018 (Part-II) and U.P.H.J.S.-2018 (Part-III) were finalised on 01.10.2020 along with the impugned examination. For ready reference, the dates of advertisement published and declaration of results of all four exams is given below:- Sl No. Recruitment Year Advertisement Date Written Exam Interview Date Final Result Modified Result 1. UPHJS-2016 10.5.2016 24.3.2017 29/30.04.2017 18.08.2017 01.10.2020 2. UPHJS-2018 10.5.2018 28.2.2019 11/12.03.2019 28.03.2019 01.10.2020 3. UPHJS- 2018(II) 12.11.2018 03.07.2019 13/14.07.2019 26.07.2019 01.10.2020 4. UPHJS-2018)III) 9.8.2019 09.12.2019 14/15.12.2019 20.12.2019 01.10.2020 15. In such facts, Sri D.S. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently urged that respondent Nos. 3 to 9 namely Sri Shashwat Pandey, Sri Pinku Kumar, Sri Utkarsh Yadav, Sri Awnish Kumar, Sri Prakash Chand Rana, Sri Sharad Kumar Tripathi and Sri Ajay Kumar were ineligible, as on 01.10.2020. 16. Sri Shashwata Pandey, Sri Pinku Kumar, Sri Utkarsh Yadav, and Sri Prakash Chandra Rana had earlier been declared successful in U.P.H.J.S.-2018 (Part-II) Examination vide result declared on 26.07.2019. They had joined pursuant to that result. 16. Sri Shashwata Pandey, Sri Pinku Kumar, Sri Utkarsh Yadav, and Sri Prakash Chandra Rana had earlier been declared successful in U.P.H.J.S.-2018 (Part-II) Examination vide result declared on 26.07.2019. They had joined pursuant to that result. Sri Awanish Kumar was selected at the H.J.S. Examination conducted in the State of Gujarat; Sri Prakash Chand Rana had also been selected at the H.J.S. Examination conducted in the State of Himachal Pradesh and Sri Sharad Kumar Tripathi had been selected at the H.J.S. Examination conducted in the State of Jharkhand. All three had joined against those selections before declaration of the result of the impugned examination, on 01.10.2020. In fact, Sri Prakash Chand Rana first resigned from U.P.H.J.S and then joined at Himachal Pradesh. Last, Sri Ajay Kumar had joined U.P.H.J.S. pursuant to the result declared on 28.03.2019 upon his selection as a OBC candidate. Also, the subsequent result declared on 01.10.2020 was not acted upon. No notification has been issued to appoint him under Unreserved/Open category. Hence, all seven (respondent Nos. 3 to 9) are described ineligible to appointment on 01.10.2020, in view of the ratio of Dheeraj Mor (supra). On the self-same reasoning Rahul Singh, respondent No. 12 is described as ineligible for reason of his appointment and joining M.P. Judicial Service, prior to declaration of result of the impugned examination on 01.10.2020. Though he has not been declared successful, it is further asserted, his higher merit position (as compared to petitioner) is to be ignored owing to his ineligibility. In any case, his Writ Petition filed before the Supreme Court has been dismissed. Hence, he may have no claim. 17. The underlying reasoning in support of the above submission advanced by Sri D.S. Mishra is-being a mandatory condition prescribed in Dheeraj Mor (supra), no candidate could be eligible at the impugned examination unless he had continued in practice without any break till his appointment under the impugned examination. None of the private respondent Nos. 3 to 9 remained eligible for appointment on 01.10.2020 as they had discontinued their practice of law before that date. Respondent Nos. 3 to 9 had joined judicial service prior to that date. Therefore, they were not in continuous practice on the date of appointment offered to them by the High Court, on 01.10.2020. None of the private respondent Nos. 3 to 9 remained eligible for appointment on 01.10.2020 as they had discontinued their practice of law before that date. Respondent Nos. 3 to 9 had joined judicial service prior to that date. Therefore, they were not in continuous practice on the date of appointment offered to them by the High Court, on 01.10.2020. In support of the above, heavy reliance has been placed on the language of Article 233 of the Constitution of India as last interpreted by the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Here, it has been further disclosed, in similar circumstances, Awanish Kumar filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court to gain appointment under the Delhi H.J.S. That claim was negated and his writ petition was dismissed by the Delhi High Court on 28.01.2020 being Awanish Kumar Vs. Registrar General, Writ Petition (C) 489 of 2020, since he stood appointed in Gujarat on 05.07.2018. 18. Also, the dictum of the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra) has been further relied on and followed in subsequent decisions pronounced, both by the Supreme Court and different High Courts. Reference has been made to R. Poornima and others versus Union of India and others 2020 SCC OnLine SC 714; Praveen Kumar Vs. High Court of Delhi and others 2022 SCC Online DEL 4447; Smt. Lily Krishnan Vs. State of Kerala and others 2023–KER 68493; K. Deepa Vs. State of Kerala 2020 SCC Online KER 2769; Sunil Kumar Verma Vs. State of Bihar 2021 SCC Online BIH 786., as also a decision of this Court in Shashank Singh and 4 others Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and another, 2021 SCC OnLine All 835, (Writ-A No. 27120 of 2018 decided on 03.12.2021) 2021:AHC:152579:DB. Thus, it has been emphasised, the only consistent view on the issue is that laid down by the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor as reiterated in R. Poornima (supra). 19. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and another, 2021 SCC OnLine All 835, (Writ-A No. 27120 of 2018 decided on 03.12.2021) 2021:AHC:152579:DB. Thus, it has been emphasised, the only consistent view on the issue is that laid down by the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor as reiterated in R. Poornima (supra). 19. To complete his submission on the issue, Sri Mishra has pointed out, the correctness of the view taken by the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra) may have been doubted and the matter referred to a larger bench of the Supreme Court on a Review Application, at the same time, in absence of any order passed to stay the operation and effect of the judgment in the case of Dheeraj Mor (supra), the ratio of the said decision retains its binding precedential value. In absence of any doubt as to that, this Court must apply that law declared by the Supreme Court. Here reference has been made to 5 judge bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab versus Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172 and a division bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Praveen Garg Vs. High Court of Delhi and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine 4477. Referring to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union Territory of Ladakh and others Vs. J&K National Conference and Another, 2023 INSC 804 , it has been vehemently asserted, in view of the clear law declared by the Supreme Court, it does not remain open to the High Court to await the outcome of the result of the reference made to the larger bench of the Supreme Court. It is clearly not open to the High Court to refuse to follow the said law even if it may have been doubted later, by another bench of the Supreme Court. It has been further asserted, in that situation the earlier decision of the Supreme Court would bind this Court. In any case, review has not been preferred (before the Supreme Court), by any of the respondents in the present case. Hence, relying on P.V. George and Others Vs. State of Kerala and Others as followed in Manoj Parihar and another Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 782, it has also been asserted, the law declared by the Supreme Court would operate retrospectively. 20. Hence, relying on P.V. George and Others Vs. State of Kerala and Others as followed in Manoj Parihar and another Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 782, it has also been asserted, the law declared by the Supreme Court would operate retrospectively. 20. Second, it has been submitted, the procedure of selection; the process of selection and result has been changed during the selection process. 20% reservation for women was originally advertised. That would translate to 4 vacancies under the Open/Unreserved category. Against that, 5 female candidates were declared selected in that category in the provisional result declared on 28.3.2019. Instead of rectifying that error, at the stage of declaration of the further result on 01.10.2020, 2 more female candidates were declared selected under the Open/Unreserved category that too those who were placed lower in merit to the present petitioner. Thus, against 5 posts reserved for women, 7 women candidates have been selected, two of whom (respondent Nos. 10 & 11) stood lower in merit to the petitioner. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Ramesh Ram and others, Civil Appeal Nos. 4310-4311 of 2010. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Manjushree Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (2008) 3 SCC 512 , it has been emphasised, it was never permissible for the High Court to change the rules of recruitment after issuance of the advertisement. 21. First referring to the terms of advertisement dated 10.05.2018, it has been asserted, 20% horizontal reservation for women had to be provided according to the Government Order issued by the Government of UP i.e. in a compartmentalised manner only. Reliance has been placed on Rajesh Kumar Dariya Vs. Rajasthan PSC, (2007) 1 SCC 785 as also a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ajay Kumar Vs State of UP and others 2019 SCC Online All 2674 (FB). Applying that method, only four women candidates may have been selected under the Unreserved/Open category i.e. on the strength of merit. This exact approach was criticised by the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Gupta and ors. Vs St. of U.P. (1995) 5 SCC 173 . Thus, it has been submitted, the mandatory rule in favour of compartmentalised reservation to give effect to 20% horizontal reservation for women, was violated. This exact approach was criticised by the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Gupta and ors. Vs St. of U.P. (1995) 5 SCC 173 . Thus, it has been submitted, the mandatory rule in favour of compartmentalised reservation to give effect to 20% horizontal reservation for women, was violated. To that extent selection of respondent numbers 10 and 11 must be cancelled. 22. Further, as to the correct method to be applied to implement compartmentalised horizontal reservation, the law laid down by the Gujarat High Court in Tamannaben Ashok Bhai Desai Vs Shital Amrutlal Nishad 2020 SCC Online Guj 2592 as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Saurav Yadav Vs State of UP and others 2020 SCC Online 1109 has been relied. Following that method, respondent Nos. 10 & 11 would remain excluded from selection as an Unreserved/Open category candidate as four women candidates stood selected (under that category), from before, on the strength of their higher merit position. 23. In this regard, it has also been submitted, Ms. Poonam Singhal the candidate selected at serial no. 1 of the result dated 01.10.2020 cannot be included under horizontal reservation for women. She being a candidate domiciled in the State of Haryana, the horizontal reservation for women of Uttar Pradesh was not available to her. 24. Next, it has been submitted, a Wait List of 12 candidates including the present petitioner had been prepared and approved in the meeting of the Selection Committee dated 13.03.2019. That was approved by the Full Court. Though, its existence was initially denied in the Counter Affidavit filed by respondent number 2 yet, pursuant to the earlier order of this Court, the record produced clearly demonstrates and confirms the existence of that Wait List. That resolution of the Selection Committee had been approved by the Full Court. Thus, it has been submitted, the candidate Yogesh Kumar though placed at serial number 6 of the Wait List, he was granted appointment in the Higher Judicial Service pursuant to his selection in the examination for the year 2016. Similarly, Ajay Kumar had been selected as OBC candidate. Thus, it has been submitted, the candidate Yogesh Kumar though placed at serial number 6 of the Wait List, he was granted appointment in the Higher Judicial Service pursuant to his selection in the examination for the year 2016. Similarly, Ajay Kumar had been selected as OBC candidate. Since, the writ petition filed by Rahul Singh (the candidate placed at serial number 11 of the Wait List) was dismissed by the Supreme Court, the petitioner claims absolute entitlement to appointment being placed at Serial No. 12 of the Wait List in terms of the resolution of the Selection Committee dated 13.03.2019. 25. On that premise and reasoning, learned senior counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged - the petitioner deserved to be included in the list of 21 selected candidates under the Unreserved/Open category. The petitioner is entitled to that selection irrespective of application of the rule of compartmentalised horizontal reservation for women. In fact, the Selection Committee itself made a note in the minutes of the meeting dated 13.03.2019 that the petitioner would be selected if the writ petition filed by Rahul Singh would be dismissed. For ready reference, relevant extract of the Wait List considered by the Selection Committee in its meeting held on 13.03.2019, is quoted below: “IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD U.P. HIGHER JUDICIAL RECRUITMENT 2018 (DHJS) Waiting List Against Petitioners Remarks:* Permitted by Courts Order (F) Female Candidate Sl No. Roll No. Name of Candidates Date of Birth Category Marks of Written Exam (Max. 800) Marks of Interview (Max. 200) Total Marks (Max. 100) 1. 5294 SHASHWATA PANDEY 21.06.1983 GEN 374.50 120.00 494.50 2. 3535 PINKU KUMAR 10.04.1981 GEN 392.50 100.00 492.50 3. 44 ABHISHEK KUMAR BAGARIA 20.12.1978 GEN 371.00 120.00 491.00 4. 5908 UTKARSH YADAV 11.08.1983 GEN 364.50 125.00 489.50 5. 1133 AWANISH KUMAR 01.03.1981 GEN 369.00 120.00 489.00 6. 6392 YOGESH KUMAR 20.01.1975 GEN 363.50 125.00 488.50 7. 3452 PARKASH CHAND RANA 13.05.1979 GEN 367.00 120.00 487.00 8. 4997 SARAD KUMAR TRIPATHI 02.01.1979 GEN 364.50 120.00 484.50 9. 5511 SUBHASH CHANDRA TIWARI 16.09.1974 GEN 361.50 120.00 481.50 10. 3418 PANKAJ KUMAR RAI 01.01.1978 GEN 373.00 100.00 473.00 11. *3952 RAHUL SINGH 28.04.1979 GEN 360.00 110.00 470.00 12. 6392 YOGESH KUMAR 20.01.1975 GEN 363.50 125.00 488.50 7. 3452 PARKASH CHAND RANA 13.05.1979 GEN 367.00 120.00 487.00 8. 4997 SARAD KUMAR TRIPATHI 02.01.1979 GEN 364.50 120.00 484.50 9. 5511 SUBHASH CHANDRA TIWARI 16.09.1974 GEN 361.50 120.00 481.50 10. 3418 PANKAJ KUMAR RAI 01.01.1978 GEN 373.00 100.00 473.00 11. *3952 RAHUL SINGH 28.04.1979 GEN 360.00 110.00 470.00 12. 3446 PARDEEP NARAYAN PANDEY 01.11.1975 GEN 369.00 100.00 469.00 * Permitted by Courts Order Note: Sri Rahul Singh Advocate, appearing at serial number 11 has also filed a petition before Apex Court in case of His Petition gets dismissed Sri Pardeep Narayan Pandey appearing at serial number 12 shall be recommended. 26. Prakash Chand Rana (upon resigning his position under U.P.H.J.S and accepting appointment at Himachal Pradesh), Rahul Singh (upon dismissal of his writ petition by the Supreme Court) and Yogesh Kumar (upon assignment of higher seniority) being not available for consideration against their original Wait List positions, the petitioner claims a perfect right to be appointed against his original Wait List position 12, on the strength of the resolution of the Selection Committee dated 13.03.2019 (extracted above). 27. Again, as noted above, respondent No.9 Ajay Kumar who was earlier shown selected under the OBC category was later migrated to the Open/Unreserved category. It has been reiterated, since Ajay Kumar joined as OBC candidate pursuant to the result declared on 28.03.2019, he ceased to be in practice as an Advocate on the occurrence of that event. Consequently, he became ineligible to be appointed under the Open/Unreserved Category under the result declared on 01.10.2020. 28. It has also been submitted, Surendra Pal Singh was selected under the social category OBC, under the result declared on 28.03.2019. However, he had appeared in the impugned examination upon age relaxation granted to him as an OBC candidate. Therefore, he would remain selected under that social category. Being over-aged, he may never claim selection/migration from OBC Category to Open/Unreserved Category. Reliance has been placed on Nirav Kumar Dilip Bhai Makwana Vs. Gujarat Public Service Commission & Ors., (2019) 7 SCC 383 . 29. Therefore, he would remain selected under that social category. Being over-aged, he may never claim selection/migration from OBC Category to Open/Unreserved Category. Reliance has been placed on Nirav Kumar Dilip Bhai Makwana Vs. Gujarat Public Service Commission & Ors., (2019) 7 SCC 383 . 29. According to the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, in any case, three vacancies are still available under Open/Unreserved Category being that of Prakash Chand Rana who has not joined pursuant to the result dated 01.10.2020, Ajay Kumar who may continue only as an OBC candidate and Yogesh Kumar who had been moved to 2016 U.P.H.J.S. Since the writ petition filed by Rahul Singh was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 27.09.2021, the petitioner is one of the only two candidates available for that selection. Therefore, without prejudice to the other submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, he remains entitled to appointment against that vacant post. 30. Responding to the above, Sri Ashish Mishra, learned counsel for the High Court submitted, it is factually incorrect to say that the appointment of respondent no. 9/Ajay Kumar had not been notified. 31. Second, as to eligibility condition of seven years continuous practice, the unamended Rule 5(c) of the Rules prescribed eligibility of seven years of practice on the first day of January following the year of publication of the advertisement. That stipulation in the Rule was contrary to the law declared by the Supreme Court in Deepak Agarwal (supra). Consequently, vide amendment made on 20.12.2016, Rule 5(c) was amended to prescribe seven years of practice on the last date for submitting applications. Applying that law, the advertisement was published on 10.05.2018, for the impugned examination. Second, similar selections for H.J.S. (both in the State of Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere) were initiated in different years, during 2016 to 2018. 32. While such selections were pending, another controversy arose namely, whether judicial officers (of the Nyayik Seva/similar cadre in other states) who had been an advocate for seven years before joining such judicial service, were eligible as an advocate candidate to apply for appointment in the H.J.S. cadre of a State judiciary. Thus, in Dheeraj Mor (supra) that issue was raised by serving judicial officers in the context of Delhi Higher Judicial Service examination. Thus, in Dheeraj Mor (supra) that issue was raised by serving judicial officers in the context of Delhi Higher Judicial Service examination. They claimed eligibility under advocate candidate category as they had completed seven years continuous practice before joining the State judiciary in the lower cadre. Pending that challenge raised, many such officers/applicants approached the Supreme Court or this Court. They were provisionally permitted to participate in the H.J.S. examinations conducted during 2016 to 2018. 33. In dealing with that issue the Supreme Court ruled (for the first time) in Dheeraj Mor (supra) that the eligibility condition of seven years of continuous practice must not only be met on the last date of filing the application but must it continue to be met till the date of appointment in the H.J.S. cadre. That stipulation first arose in Dheeraj Mor (supra). It was a clear departure made from the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Deepak Agarwal (supra). He has also referred to the difference of language employed by the Rules and Rule 9 of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules considered by the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra). There, the eligibility condition required a candidate to have not less than seven years of practice. That language alone fell for interpretation. 34. Thus, Sri Ashish Mishra has attempted to distinguish Dheeraj Mor (supra). Relying on N.I.C. Ltd. Vs Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 it has been submitted, a later coequal bench of the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra) may have differed and thus referred to a larger bench of that Court, the point of disagreement. Yet, it may not have laid down a law contrary to Deepak Agarwal (supra). To that extent, the earlier law laid down remains the only binding law. 35. Third, invoking the evidentiary rule of legitimate expectation and relying on Shivanandan C.T. Vs High Court of Kerala 2023 SCC Online 994 it has been submitted, upon publication of the advertisement for the impugned examination and by notification of the eligibility condition of seven years of practice on the last date of making the application, a legitimate expectation arose in favour of all applicants fulfilling that eligibility condition. Therefore, it was not possible to make any addition or change to those eligibility conditions and/or create fresh disabilities to exclude the eligible candidates. Therefore, it was not possible to make any addition or change to those eligibility conditions and/or create fresh disabilities to exclude the eligible candidates. The same principle was applied by a coordinate bench of this Court in Kushagra Upadhyay Vs State of U.P and others (Writ A 8118/2020 decided on 05.10.2020, Neutral Citation No.-2020:AHC:84862-DB). There, in the context of the same examination it was ruled- the eligibility had to be seen on the last date of submitting the application form. 36. Fourth, it has been submitted, if the law laid down in Dheeraj Mor (supra) was applied retrospectively, it would lead to unintended, grossly harsh, and wholly unwarranted results. Its literal compliance would require the respondents to comb through the entire H.J.S. cadre, to eliminate those who may have joined service against vacancies for advocate candidates while serving as judicial officers on the date of their respective appointments. It would result in removal from service of officers whose selection had never been challenged and who fulfilled the eligibility condition on the date of their respective appointment. Even in the context of the present dispute, the ousted candidates would lose their eligibility at any subsequent examination for reason of their suffering forced discontinuance of practice for the duration they remained in service upon their selection under the impugned examination. Thus, reference has been made to the interim orders granted by the Supreme Court in Misc. Application No. 1050/2021 i.e. in the Review Application proceedings arising from Dheeraj Mor (supra) being order dated 04.01.2023 as also the order dated 12.07.2021 in Rejanish K.V. Vs K. Deepa and Others, Civil Appeal No. 3947/2020. 37. The challenge raised in Dheeraj Mor (supra) remained pending before the Supreme Court from year 2015 to 2020, upon arising of vacancies (in the H.J.S. cadre). In due compliance of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) and another Vs UPPSC & others (2008) 17 SCC 703 the High Court conducted 4 examinations, including the impugned examination. Results of all such selections became pending, occasioned by pendency of Dheeraj Mor (supra) while vacancies continued to pile. Considering the above circumstances, initially on 15.07.2019, the Selection Committee resolved to give effect to the interim order dated 10.05.2019 passed by the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Results of all such selections became pending, occasioned by pendency of Dheeraj Mor (supra) while vacancies continued to pile. Considering the above circumstances, initially on 15.07.2019, the Selection Committee resolved to give effect to the interim order dated 10.05.2019 passed by the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Thus, it resolved to appoint such practicing advocates who had been selected (pending the outcome of that litigation), whose eligibility was not in doubt. That declaration of the results is therefore described provisional. For ready reference, a relevant extract of the resolution dated 15.07.2019 is quoted below: "…......The Committee before recommending the name of the candidates finally, for appointment against the vacancies determined under 25% quota of direct recruitment to U.P. Higher Judicial Service, 2018 (Part- II) deliberated over the order dated 10.05.2019 Dheeraj Mor vs. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi (supra) wherein it has been directed that the "......practicing advocates who have been found selected for appointment, their result be declared and they be appointed subject to the outcome of the pending matter." 38. Upon pronouncement of the decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra), the Selection Committee vide further resolution dated 27.02.2020 initially resolved to exclude from the Select List such advocate candidates who may have been serving in the judicial service/Nyayik Seva, on the date of their appointment in the H.J.S. cadre. Later, on 18.03.2020 the Selection Committee reconsidered its earlier resolution dated 27.02.2020 and took a conscious decision to apply the ratio of Dheeraj Mor (supra) prospectively. Further, the Selection Committee resolved to place the selected candidates in order of their seniority against success in their first/earlier selection gained in the four H.J.S. selection examinations referred to above. To that extent, the earlier resolutions were specifically modified. That resolution dated 18.03.2020 was approved by the Full Court on 30.9.2020. For ready reference the relevant extract of the resolution dated 18.03.2020 is quoted below: "1. It has been apprised that certain candidates have been selected in multiple recruitment such as UPHJS-2016, UPHJS-2018, UPHJS-2018 (Part II) and UPHJS-2018 (Part III). To that extent, the earlier resolutions were specifically modified. That resolution dated 18.03.2020 was approved by the Full Court on 30.9.2020. For ready reference the relevant extract of the resolution dated 18.03.2020 is quoted below: "1. It has been apprised that certain candidates have been selected in multiple recruitment such as UPHJS-2016, UPHJS-2018, UPHJS-2018 (Part II) and UPHJS-2018 (Part III). The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above pronouncement in context with Article 232(2) of the Constitution of India observed as below: "Under Article 232(2), an Advocate has to be continuing in practice for not less than 7 years as on the cut off date and at the time of appointment as District Judge..." In the light of above observation, the Committee in its meeting held on 27.02.2020 had resolved to the effect that: "The Committee is of the considered opinion that in view of the above observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is necessary to ensure that a direct recruit shall not be in employment as on the cut off date fixed for determining the continuous practice of 7 years as well as on the date of appointment. In case the candidate is found to be in employment on any such dates, he/she shall be considered as in-eligible for appointment in Higher Judicial Service. This shall be ensured by the Government of U.P. before issuing appointment to such direct recruits." The Committee reconsidered its above resolution dated 27.02.2020 and is of the considered opinion that such criterion be not applied on any of the past recruitments and may be enforced prospectively. Hence, the resolution of the Committee dated 27.02.2020, in the matter, stands modified. 2. The High Court has conducted one examination in year 2016-17 and three examinations in the year 2018-19. The advocate-candidates have appeared in the multiple examinations as they were eligible and this Court had permitted them to take multiple examinations (provisionally). Some of the candidates have succeeded in UPHJS-2016 as well as in 2018 or in other UPHJS examinations. The Committee resolves that such candidates shall not be denied their claim for recruitment on the basis of earliest examination. Some of the candidates have succeeded in UPHJS-2016 as well as in 2018 or in other UPHJS examinations. The Committee resolves that such candidates shall not be denied their claim for recruitment on the basis of earliest examination. The Committee is of the considered opinion that in case a candidate is getting selected in Direct Recruitment to UPHJS-2016 and UPHJS-2018 as well, he/she shall be considered eligible and be placed in the final select list of UPHJS-2016 as per his/her merit and will forego his selection in UPHJS-2018. The post so becoming vacant will be filled up by the candidate placed below in the select list of the relevant year and as per Rule. 3. The Committee considered a possibility that while revision of result of the relevant years, the posts falling under the quota of direct recruitment may remain unfilled due to unavailability of suitable candidates. Under these circumstances, said unfilled post shall be filled up by promotion of the officers in Nyayik Sewa in the select list of that particular examination as per the provision of Rule 8(2) of the Rules, 1975. 4. The Committee further resolves that the vacancy already determined for the UPHJS Recruitments 2016, 2018, 2018 (Part II) and 2018 (Part III) shall not be re-determined and in case, during the course of revision of results of UPHJS Recruitment, 2016, UPHJS Recruitment, 2018, UPHJS Recruitment, 2018 (Part-II), UPHJS Recruitment, 2018 (Part-III), vacancies are occurring under the quota of direct recruitment due to unavailability of suitable candidates and insufficient number of officers in the select list for promotion by application of Rule 8(2) of the. Rules, 1975, such vacancies be taken into account as unforeseen vacancies for the next UPHJS Recruitment." (emphasis supplied) 39. On the second submission regarding horizontal reservation for women, first, reference has been made to the clear language of Rule 7 of the Rules and paragraph 2 of the Advertisement. They only provide for 20% horizontal reservation for women belonging to the State of U.P. Neither compartmentalised reservation was prescribed under the governing Rules or the Advertisement nor overall horizontal reservation was prohibited in law. Therefore, there is no error in selecting all 7 suitable women candidates against 37 total vacancies- that being well within the overall 20% ceiling prescribed. In absence of availability of any other/more women candidate, all 7 women candidates who were also suitable for selection, got selected. Therefore, there is no error in selecting all 7 suitable women candidates against 37 total vacancies- that being well within the overall 20% ceiling prescribed. In absence of availability of any other/more women candidate, all 7 women candidates who were also suitable for selection, got selected. Insofar as the Rules and the Advertisement did not prescribe compartmentalised reservation, the selection made is claimed to be protected under the ratio of Malik Mazhar Sultan (supra). Therefore, the selections made are in accordance with the governing Rules. 40. Further, reliance has been placed on Nawal Kishore Mishra Vs High Court of Judicature of Allahabad (2015) 5 SCC 479 to submit, even in the context of social reservation to be provided, the independence of the High Courts in the recruitment process is preserved. Therefore, no legal error occurred upon the High Court applying the non-compartmentalised reservation in accordance with the governing statutory Rules. 41. Reference has also been made to the conscious decision of the Selection Committee dated 06.12.2010, taken upon consideration of Shiv Shanker Vs Public Service Commission (1996) 3 ESC 50; Rajeev Kumar Vs State of U.P. & ors. 2010 (5) AWC 5321. and Rajesh Kumar Dharia Vs Rajasthan Public Service Commission (2007) 8 SCC 785 . The Committee took a conscious decision to apply non-compartmentalised overall 20% reservation. That administrative decision does not fall foul to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Saurav Yadav Vs State of U.P. (2021) 4 SCC 542 . However, since the declaration of that law, the High Court has provided for compartmentalised horizontal reservation. 42. As to actual method employed to give effect to 20% horizontal reservation, it has been shown, the Select List was finalised after pronouncement made in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Thus, upon exclusion of those provisionally selected candidates who were serving judicial officers on the last date of submitting their application, the Select List was finalised/drawn. Thus, the Combined Merit List earlier prepared was utilised in order of merit to fill up the vacant posts. In that, effect was also given to 20% horizontal reservation for women. The Combined Merit List of all 44 candidates who faced the selection process up to the final stage of interview, is extracted below: “Combined Merit List Sl No. Roll No. Name of Candidates Date of Birth Category Marks of Written Exam (Max.800) Marks of Interview (Max. 200) Total Marks (Max. 1000) 1. The Combined Merit List of all 44 candidates who faced the selection process up to the final stage of interview, is extracted below: “Combined Merit List Sl No. Roll No. Name of Candidates Date of Birth Category Marks of Written Exam (Max.800) Marks of Interview (Max. 200) Total Marks (Max. 1000) 1. *2471 KULDEEP SHARMA 04/06/1982 GEN 444.00 130.00 574.00 2. *3627 PRADEEP KUMAR MANI 02/07/1982 GEN 420.50 130.00 550.50 3. *3308 NISHANT DEV 07/08/1983 GEN 407.00 125.00 532.00 4. *3728 PRASHANT BILGAIYAN 15/06/1980 GEN 404.00 125.00 529.00 5. 3553 POONAM (F) 04/07/1977 GEN 426.50 100.00 526.50 6. 2960 MOHD. SHARIQ SIDDIQUE 29/05/1977 GEN 401.50 120.00 521.50 7. 2513 LAKHWIND ER SINGH SOOD 08/01/1976 GEN 397.00 123.33 520.33 8. *6266 VISHNU PRATAP SINGH 02/08/1983 GEN 388.50 125.00 513.50 9. 5468 SMT. RAGINI (F) 05/08/1979 GEN 392.00 120.00 512.00 10. *3267 NIDHI YADAV (F) 23/01/1981 GEN 381.50 130.00 511.50 11. *5343 SHIV KUMAR TIWARI 01/02/1982 GEN 384.50 120.00 504.50 12. 6180 VINOD KUMAR CHAURASIA 15/08/1983 OBC 384.50 120.00 504.50 13. 2844 MAYANK TRIPATHI 10/01/1980 GEN 384.00 120.00 504.00 14. 3564 POONAM SNGHAL (F) 27/09/1981 GEN 382.00 120.00 502.00 15. *3614 PRADEEP KUMAR 05/03/1980 GEN 380.50 120.00 500.50 16. 5201 SHAILJA RATHI (F) 23/07/1983 OBC 384.50 115.00 499.50 17. *1583 DHARAM VEER SINGH 14/07/1983 GEN 378.00 120.00 498.00 18. 759 ANURAG PANWAR 17/01/1983 GEN 367.50 130.00 497.50 19. *5552 SUDHANSH U SHEKHAR PANDEY 19/08/1983 GEN 366.50 130.00 496.50 20. 6411 ZAIBA MAJID (F) 15/09/1982 GEN 366.00 130.00 496.00 21. 5294 SHASHWATA PANDEY 21/06/1983 GEN 374.50 120.00 494.50 22. 3535 PINKU KUMAR 10/04/1981 GEN 392.50 100.00 492.50 23. 44 ABHISHEK KUMAR BAGARIA 20/12/1978 GEN 371.00 120.00 491.00 24. 5908 UTKARSH YADAV 11/08/1983 GEN 364.50 125.00 489.50 25. 1133 AWANISH KUMAR 01/03/1981 GEN 369.00 120.00 489.00 26. *3525 PEEYUSH TRIPATHI 03/05/1983 GEN 364.00 125.00 489.00 27. 6392 YOGESH KUMAR 20/01/1975 GEN 363.50 125.00 488.50 28. 3452 PARKASH CHAND RANA 12/05/1979 GEN 367.00 120.00 487.00 29. 4997 SHARAD KUMAR TRIPATHI 02/01/1979 GEN 364.50 120.00 484.50 30. *2683 MANINDRA PAL SINGH 01/07/1982 GEN 368.00 115.00 483.00 31. 5511 SUBHASH CHANDRA TIWARI 16/09/1974 GEN 361.50 120.00 481.50 32. *1603 DHARMEND RA KUMAR TIWARI 30/06/1976 GEN 360.00 120.00 480.00 33. 158 AJAY KUMAR 25/11/1981 OBC 360.00 120.00 480.00 34. *4124 RAJESH KUMAR MISHRA 21/11/1976 GEN 365.00 110.00 475.00 35. 3418 PANKAJ KUMAR RAI 01/01/1978 GEN 373.00 100.00 473.00 36. *2683 MANINDRA PAL SINGH 01/07/1982 GEN 368.00 115.00 483.00 31. 5511 SUBHASH CHANDRA TIWARI 16/09/1974 GEN 361.50 120.00 481.50 32. *1603 DHARMEND RA KUMAR TIWARI 30/06/1976 GEN 360.00 120.00 480.00 33. 158 AJAY KUMAR 25/11/1981 OBC 360.00 120.00 480.00 34. *4124 RAJESH KUMAR MISHRA 21/11/1976 GEN 365.00 110.00 475.00 35. 3418 PANKAJ KUMAR RAI 01/01/1978 GEN 373.00 100.00 473.00 36. 5708 SURENDRA PAL SINGH 15/01/1973 OBC 372.00 100.00 472.00 37. *3952 RAHUL SINGH 28/04/1979 GEN 360.00 110.00 470.00 38. 3446 PARDEEP NARAYAN PANDEY 01/11/1975 GEN 369.00 100.00 469.00 39. *3559 POONAM PATHAK (F) 07/01/1982 GEN 364.50 100.00 464.50 40. 5835 TOSH KUMAR SHARMA 28/07/1974 GEN 374.00 90.00 464.00 41. 4740 SANDEEP CHAUHAN (F) 30/06/1983 GEN 361.00 100.00 461.00 42. 3367 OM PRAKASH MISHRA 05/01/1977 GEN 360.50 100.00 460.50 43. 2026 HEMLATA TYAGI (F) 20/01/1983 GEN 363.50 90.00 453.50 44. 1861 GIRISH CHANDRA SHUKLA 01/01/1976 GEN 366.00 80.00 446.00 Remarks: * Permitted by Court’s Order (F) Female Candidate 43. Referring to that, it has been asserted, the candidates at merit position Nos. 1 to 4, 8, 10-11, 15, 17, 19, 26, 30, 32, 34, 37 and 39 were ineligible being in service of the Union or the State on the last date of submission of application. The candidate at serial no. 27/Yogesh Kumar was adjusted against his first selection in the H.J.S. 2016 examination. Excluding those 17 candidates, remaining were considered for appointment in order of inter se merit. It caused displacement of 11 candidates from the provisional Select List dated 28.03.2019. An equal number of other candidates were now included in the Select List under the Unreserved/Open category. First, nine candidates were included in the Open/Unreserved Category in strict order of inter se merit. They happened to be male candidates. Thereafter, two women candidates placed lower in merit to the next three suitable male candidates were accommodated to give effect to 20% horizontal reservation (overall) to women. 44. Thus, all 21 vacancies under the Unreserved/Open category got filled. It included the first 19 eligible candidates in order of merit. Of that only 5 happened to be women candidates. Also, two out of 19 thus selected in the Unreserved/Open category namely, Shailja Rathi (female candidate) and Vinod Kumar Chaurasia (male candidate) were also members of OBC. However, having earned their selection under the General Merit, they were included under the Unreserved/Open category. Of that only 5 happened to be women candidates. Also, two out of 19 thus selected in the Unreserved/Open category namely, Shailja Rathi (female candidate) and Vinod Kumar Chaurasia (male candidate) were also members of OBC. However, having earned their selection under the General Merit, they were included under the Unreserved/Open category. Thereafter, Yogesh Kumar who stood 16th in the Combined Merit List was excluded for reason of his prior selection under H.J.S. 2016. Also, upon exclusion of the first 11 candidates from the provisional Select List dated 28.03.2019, Ajay Kumar who till then was provisionally shown selected against OBC category became the 19th suitable candidate, in order of merit. Therefore, he was included in Open/Unreserved category. He had scored total 480 marks against 469 marks scored by the petitioner. 2 vacancies remained under that category. 45. Thus, only 5 women candidates stood selected in the first 19 in the Unreserved/Open category and none was selected under the social/vertical categories of reservation. Thereafter, only 2 more were available both under the Unreserved/Open category and none under other/social/vertical reservation category. Thus, Ms. Sandeep Chauhan and Ms. Hemlata Tyagi though placed lower in merit (under Open/Unreserved category), to next three male candidates in order of merit (including the petitioner), were selected to complete the 20% overall horizontal reservation for women. Therefore, the next 2 Unreserved/Open category male candidates namely, Pankaj Kumar Rai and failing him Rahul Singh (both placed higher in merit to the petitioner), were not selected. Surender Pal Singh remained selected, under reserved category, O.B.C. 46. Thus, it has been claimed, there neither was practiced any “change of the rule of the game” nor the Rules read with the terms of Advertisement of the impugned selection were violated. In fact, the entire selection process including provision of 20% horizontal reservation for women was completed strictly in accordance with the law. As to existing or possible vacancies, it has been stated there are none. Unforeseen vacancy, if any had been carried forward to the next H.J.S. examination in accordance with the Rules. Thus, referring to the Combined Merit List it has been submitted, the petitioner being placed 3rd beyond the last male candidate/Ajay Kumar, he has no claim whatsoever. 47. As to the submission based on preparation of the Wait List, it has been replied, the Rules did not permit preparation of Wait List. Thus, referring to the Combined Merit List it has been submitted, the petitioner being placed 3rd beyond the last male candidate/Ajay Kumar, he has no claim whatsoever. 47. As to the submission based on preparation of the Wait List, it has been replied, the Rules did not permit preparation of Wait List. Relying on State of U.P. Vs Karunesh Kumar and Ors. 2022 SCC Online SC 1706 it has been asserted, in absence of provision to prepare a Wait List, no right can be claimed (by the petitioner), to selection. Reference has also been made to Rule 20 of the U.P. Judicial Services Rules to contrast the absence of Wait List under the Rules applicable to the impugned examination. 48. Last, referring to the resolution/s of the Selection Committee dated 24.07.2020 as approved by the Full Court, it has been further submitted, earlier resolutions dated 17.05.2017, 13.03.2019, 15.07.2019 and 16.12.2019 stood modified. Therefore, in absence of any selection gained by the petitioner (at an earlier point in time), no right vested in the petitioner under the original/unmodified resolutions of the Selection Committee dated 13.03.2019, even if those may have been approved by the Full Court at that stage, pending decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra). In absence of selection made, no right vested in the petitioner upon the resolution dated 24.07.2020 passed by the Selection Committee as was approved by the Full Court on 30.09.2020. 49. Sri. T.P. Singh learned Senior Advocate for the private respondent Nos. 6 & 8 has supported the submissions advanced by Sri Ashish Mishra. Additionally, he emphasised, Dheeraj Mor (supra) involved a different issue of eligibility of a member of a lower judicial service of a State seeking appointment to Higher Judicial Service in the same State. It did not involve any dispute of a member of Higher Judicial Service in one State seeking to join similar service in another State, before declaration of the result of his selection in the (other) State of his choice. That chance service rendered in the interregnum, by force of circumstance, did not create any ineligibility of lack of seven years continuous practice. That eligibility must arise on the last date of submission of application. The stipulation of continuous practice till the date of appointment must exist qua those in service in the same State from before i.e. on the date of submitting their individual application. That eligibility must arise on the last date of submission of application. The stipulation of continuous practice till the date of appointment must exist qua those in service in the same State from before i.e. on the date of submitting their individual application. He has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar Verma Vs State of Bihar and Ors (2022) 9 SCC 686 . The peculiarity of facts noticed in that case exists in the present case as well. 50. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, in the first place, it is undisputed between the parties, in the overall merit list drawn by the High Court, the petitioner was placed lower in merit-to respondent Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Respondent no.9 (the last male candidate selected on merit), obtained 480 marks whereas the petitioner obtained 469 marks. Thus, if the dictum of Dheeraj Mor (supra) had been available before the issuance of the Advertisement published on 10.05.2018, the petitioner would have no right to selection over respondent Nos. 3 to 9. The claim made by the petitioner viz-a-viz respondent Nos. 8 & 9 may be considered a later while considering the issue of horizontal reservation, granted to female candidates. 51. Therefore, only if respondent Nos. 3 to 9 are found ineligible, the petitioner’s claim may merit consideration along with Pankaj Kumar Rai and Rahul Singh, both placed higher in merit (to the petitioner). Then, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is right in his contention-since Surendra Pal Singh was granted relaxation of age as a member of a reserved category, he could not be included under the Unreserved/Open category despite securing higher merit position than the petitioner. 52. It is also not disputed, on the date of issuance of the Advertisement, the law was, as declared in Deepak Agarwal (supra). Later, in the year 2020, the Supreme Court laid down the further law in Dheeraj Mor (supra)- that eligibility of seven years of practice must not only exist on the date of filing of the application, but that the eligible candidate must continue/remain in practice up to the date of his appointment in service. 53. Admittedly, respondent Nos. 3 to 9 were eligible on the date of issuance of Advertisement dated 10.05.2018. 53. Admittedly, respondent Nos. 3 to 9 were eligible on the date of issuance of Advertisement dated 10.05.2018. They had completed seven years of practice on the last date of submission of their applications. Also, they remained in practice till declaration of the result on 28.03.2019. The ineligibility is alleged to have been acquired by them later, notably during pendency of Dheeraj Mor (supra). Yet, only to give effect to the interim orders passed by the Supreme Court and this Court, they were not declared successful at the impugned examination. 54. Again, it is not in doubt that the dispute in Dheeraj Mor (supra) arose not at the behest of any advocate candidate who may have been in practice on the date of submission of his application. It arose at the instance of existing judicial officers serving in the lower judicial service (Nyayik Sewa, in the State of Uttar Pradesh and others) on the date of submission of their application. They claimed eligibility to appear as a direct recruit for the HJS Examination-having completed seven years of practice prior to entering that judicial service. Such in-service candidates applied as direct recruits amongst others, under the impugned examination. 55. Since, such in-service candidates were treated to be ineligible to apply for direct recruitment (by various High Courts), upon that challenge raised, solely under interim orders granted by the Supreme Court as were replicated by this Court and other High Courts, many candidates including Kuldeep Sharma, Pradeep Kumar Mani, Nishant Dev, Prashant Bilgaiyan, Vishnu Pratap Singh, Nidhi Yadav, Shiv Kumar Tiwari, Pradeep Kumar, Dharam Vir Singh, Sudhanshu Shekhar Pandey and Piyush Tripathi appearing at overall merit position Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17, 19 and 26 of the merit list extracted in paragraph 42 above (hereinafter referred to as ‘in-service candidates), appeared at the impugned examination. 56. However, by virtue of the interim orders granted by the Supreme Court and this Court, the in-service candidates did not earn any right to selection pending decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Then, none of the private respondent Nos. 3 to 11 was party to the proceedings in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Though those respondents had no lis with the in-service candidates yet, they could not be considered for selection in face of interim orders operating in favour of the in-service candidates. Then, none of the private respondent Nos. 3 to 11 was party to the proceedings in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Though those respondents had no lis with the in-service candidates yet, they could not be considered for selection in face of interim orders operating in favour of the in-service candidates. In fact, as would be discussed below, those respondents have suffered on account of litigation brought by in-service candidates and interim orders passed therein. 57. It may also be noted, the impugned examination was not a stray selection examination held by this Court. Considering the pre-existing directions issued by the Supreme Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan (supra), regular exams had been held for recruitment to the HJS, periodically. That occurrence was independent of the dispute or issue arising in Dheeraj Mor (surpa). Thus, as noticed in paragraph 14 above, four examinations being U.P.H.J.S. 2016, U.P.H.J.S. 2018, U.P.H.J.S. 2018 (Part-II) and U.P.H.J.S. 2018 (Part-III) came to be conducted pursuant to separate advertisements dated 10.05.2016, 10.05.2018, 12.11.2018 and 09.08.2019 respectively, all during pendency of Dheeraj Mor (supra). We take judicial notice of similar examinations conducted in other States as well. 58. While it may have otherwise remained open to the High Court to not declare result of the above noted examinations till decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra) yet, it is also an undisputed position on record, by virtue of interim orders granted by the Supreme Court, inter alia the order dated 10.05.2019, passed on I.A. No. 49518 of 2019 in Dheeraj Mor, that fact circumstance was considered and it was clearly provided (again as a provisional/interim measure), that the result of the practicing advocates (i.e. non in-service candidates) found selected for appointment, be declared and they be appointed subject to outcome of the proceedings in Dheeraj Mor (supra). For ready reference, we consider it proper to extract the order of the Supreme Court dated 10.05.2019. It reads as below: “In these matters, it is in dispute as to whether the incumbents who have joined the services as Civil Judge can stake their claims for the posts meant for direct recruitment from the Bar reserved for practicing advocates for appointment as District Judges. Since there is a quota in the direct recruitment of Bar Members, in order to attract talent from the Bar out of practicing advocates. Since there is a quota in the direct recruitment of Bar Members, in order to attract talent from the Bar out of practicing advocates. There are separate quota of promotional posts for the incumbents who have joined the services as Civil Judge to the post of District Judge. There is a set procedure for that and there is a merit promotion quota which has to be made by virtue of the limited departmental examination as held in All India Judges’ Association & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 247 and followed in All India Judges’ Association & Ors. v. Union of India And Ors. - (2010) 15 SCC 170 . Nowhere it is provided that such inservice incumbents can stake their claim as against posts which are reserved for direct recruitment from the Bar. It was contended that in certain cases, interim relief has been granted by this Court and by virtue of the interim directions issued, certain in-service incumbents participated in the exam and other process by staking claim to be appointed in the quota which is basically meant for lawyers. Since the entitlement of Civil Judges to occupy posts of Bar quota is yet to be decided by hearing matter finally and in case such interim orders are continued to be granted and the Civil Judges from the judiciary are permitted to be appointed as against the quota which basically meant for practicing lawyers, serious prejudice may be caused to the Bar incumbents. In the past, for the last 65-66 years no person from the Civil Judge cadre were permitted to stake their claims as against the posts which are reserved for direct recruitment from the Bar. It is settled proposition of law that final relief cannot be granted by way of interim measure. When direct recruitment has to be from Bar, we cannot continue to grant interim order of final nature leaving the situation virtually irreversible, an incumbent from Bar has to be deprived of the post given to in-service candidate which is reserved for Bar, question of seniority would also arise and in case relief is not finally granted several other complications would arise. In any case such ad-hoc arrangements by appointing such incumbents is not at all warranted that too in higher judiciary unless and until the case is decided in favour of in-service candidates. In any case such ad-hoc arrangements by appointing such incumbents is not at all warranted that too in higher judiciary unless and until the case is decided in favour of in-service candidates. It was also contended that in Dheeraj Mor case, certain interim orders have been passed allowing the members of the judicial service to stake their claims for the posts which are meant to be filled by the direct recruitment from the Advocates. In the circumstances, for years together such interim orders cannot be granted nor interim orders can be treated as a precedent. As they are creating more complications and the question of entitlement of in- service candidates has been referred to Larger Bench which will take call on it. It is considered appropriate that quota meant for the Bar no more filled by in-service candidates. However, the recruitment from Bar shall be subject to the final outcome of the matter which has been referred. We are of the considered opinion that we cannot direct any more appointment by way of interim orders of Civil Judges as against posts meant for practicing advocates or allow the judiciary members to participate in such examination to make position worse. Serious complications would arise in case ultimately in-service candidates are not found eligible for such quota. As such we are not inclined to pass any further interim orders either by permitting in service candidates to stake their claims in the examination or for being appointed as against the quota reserved for Bar. It would not be proper to stop all recruitments for years together, so as to prevent complications as to seniority as well as the quota which is required to be maintained. It was submitted that if such an anomaly is permitted to be continued, the posts reserved for the Bar members in the High Court too will have to be filled even from the District Judges who might have earlier practiced for 10 years. Be that as it may, as we are not on that issue, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that it is not appropriate to pass such interim orders any more. As the matter is urgent, we request Hon’ble The Chief Justice to post the matter before appropriate Bench for hearing it finally as early as possible. Be that as it may, as we are not on that issue, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that it is not appropriate to pass such interim orders any more. As the matter is urgent, we request Hon’ble The Chief Justice to post the matter before appropriate Bench for hearing it finally as early as possible. We make it clear that we are not disturbing the appointments which have been made so far by virtue of such interim orders. However, no new appointments be made from now onwards of in-service candidates against quota reserved for Bar. In case even if in-service candidate has been selected in the examination held earlier as against the Bar quota no further appointment to be made of such candidates. However, the practicing advocates who have been found selected for appointment, their result be declared and they be appointed subject to the outcome of the pending matter.” Similar course was followed in the other three HJS examinations conducted in the State of U.P. (noted above), and similar H.J.S. examination in all other States. 59. Thus, the results declared by the High Court- of UPHJS-2016 on 18.08.2017, UPHJS-2018 on 28.03.2019, UPHJS-2018 (Part-II) on 26.07.2019 and UPHJS-2018 (Part III) on 20.12.2019 remained consistent and compliant to the interim order passed by the Supreme Court as above noted and other similar orders passed by that Court and this Court. By no means those results may be described as final. In fact, in face of pending litigation in Dheeraj Mor (supra) and orders passed therein, (final) results could not be declared, at that stage. The Supreme Court had itself provided- that the results declared in the meanwhile would remain subject to the outcome of that litigation. 60. By way of corollary, the in-service candidates permitted to appear at the impugned examination, could not be excluded from the selection process, at that stage. Their candidature could neither have been accepted nor it could have been disregarded or rejected, pending decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra) generally, and during pendency of their individual writ petitions, especially. Thus, the results declared remained provisional. It is also not in dispute that all such individual writ petitions remained pending till decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra). 61. Their candidature could neither have been accepted nor it could have been disregarded or rejected, pending decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra) generally, and during pendency of their individual writ petitions, especially. Thus, the results declared remained provisional. It is also not in dispute that all such individual writ petitions remained pending till decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra). 61. Therefore, the net effect of the interim orders passed in their respect, created a lien in favour of the in-service candidates- to be considered for selection subject to outcome of Dheeraj Mor (supra). That lien was first lifted upon decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Therefore, pending that decision, results declared for all H.J.S. examinations (all over the country) including the impugned examination remained provisional. Such results did not confer or vest substantive rights in the in-service candidates provisionally included in the Select List declared on 28.03.2019. 62. Thus, the candidature of the in-service candidates-Kuldeep Sharma, Pradeep Kumar Mani, Nishant Dev, Prashant Bilgaiyan, Vishnu Pratap Singh, Nidhi Yadav, Shiv Kumar Tiwari, Pradeep Kumar, Dharam Vir Singh, Sudhanshu Shekhar Pandey and Piyush Tripathi remained subject to outcome of litigation in Dheeraj Mor (supra). It is a settled position in law that interim orders do not seek to create or vest final rights in the parties to a dispute. In fact, on the jurisprudential plain, no interim order may be granted by any Court that has the effect of granting final relief. The interim orders granted in favour of the in-service candidates effectively prevented the High Courts from excluding the claims of the in-service candidates, pending the litigation in Dheeraj Mor (supra). 63. In the facts of the present case, upon vacation of the interim orders granted in favour of the in-service candidates and dismissal of their individual writ petitions-considering the law declared in Dheeraj Mor (supra), those candidates lost their lien or right to be considered for selection. It cannot be said, by virtue of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra), the selection of such in-service candidates was first cancelled. Since the in-service candidates were never selected at any earlier point in time, no selection or right to selection ever vested in those candidates. That consequence in law never arose. 64. It cannot be said, by virtue of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor (supra), the selection of such in-service candidates was first cancelled. Since the in-service candidates were never selected at any earlier point in time, no selection or right to selection ever vested in those candidates. That consequence in law never arose. 64. It is a settled principle in law (as has been rightly relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner), that declaration of a law must relate back or be retrospective. Therefore, the 11 in-service candidates provisionally allowed to participate in the impugned examination were found ineligible-from inception. If that consequence is truly recognised, only 10 Advocate candidates were found eligible to selection in the (provisional) result declared on 28.03.2019. However, their selection was specifically made subject to outcome of the decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Therefore, that selection was provisional. Also, there remained available 11 vacancies and other candidates (including respondent Nos. 3 to 9) suitable for selection, against the same. Hence the entire result declared on 28.03.2019 was provisional. 65. At that stage, the merit/suitability of the private respondents 3-11 and the petitioner and other non-selected candidates could not be acted upon for reason of inter se lower merit position achieved in comparison to the in-service candidates. Therefore, after the decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra) and upon dismissal of the individual petitions filed by the in-service candidates i.e. at the stage of drawing the (final) result on 01.10.2020, the High Court was right in including private respondent Nos. 3 to 9 under the Unreserved/Open category. To that, petitioner cannot be heard to complain as the petitioner himself falls outside the list of first 21 candidates (in order of merit), initially considered for selection in the provisional result, dated 28.03.2019. 66. Similarly, in a similar scheme of things, in the context of the exactly similar unclear position in law and litigation, respondent Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 had been provisionally selected against the provisional result declared on 26.07.2019 for U.P.H.J.S. 2018 (Part-II) examination-by virtue of their clear selection earned against higher merit position secured, in that later examination in the State of U.P. Similarly, respondent Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 had been provisionally selected against the provisional result declared on 26.07.2019 for U.P.H.J.S. 2018 (Part-II) examination-by virtue of their clear selection earned against higher merit position secured, in that later examination in the State of U.P. Similarly, respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 came to be similarly provisionally selected at separate H.J.S. examinations for the States of Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, and Jharkhand while respondent No. 9 came to be provisionally selected as a O.B.C. candidate under the impugned examination itself. 67. Those private respondents never had a choice to join or to not join pursuant to the provisional selection offered to them under the interim orders passed by the Supreme Court and this Court (under different examinations), during pendency of Dheeraj Mor (supra). Pending declaration of (final) results of those similar/other examinations written by them, the private respondents were never required/called to either elect or surrender their right to selection under the impugned examination. Rather, they were unknowingly forced to take up that appointment, awaiting declaration of the law in Dheeraj Mor (supra). 68. Theoretically, joining service, pursuant to a clear selection made at U.P.H.J.S.-2018 (Part-II) and other similar examinations would itself have vested substantive rights in the private respondents (qua that examination). Yet, at that stage, all results declared of H.J.S. examinations were expressly and by necessary intent made provisional, under the clear stipulation made in the order dated 10.05.2019, passed by the Supreme Court. In that state of litigation-that lasted five years, the right to selection (under the impugned examination) was not lost to those respondents. In fact, being not parties to that dispute, they remained the innocent bystanders to the legal action being enacted in Dheeraj Mor (supra). 69. Thus, pending that litigation, respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 joined U.P.H.J.S.- when offered clear selection at U.P.H.J.S.-2018 (Part-II), conducted later. They could not be forced to, and they never gave up their natural seniority in U.P.H.J.S. arising from their selection under the impugned examination (conducted earlier), occasioned by late declaration of the (final) result of the impugned examination on 01.10.2020. It is so because, though they were entitled to be selected at the impugned examination (held earlier), they were not made aware of the same solely for reason of the interim order granted by the Supreme Court dated 10.05.2019. It is so because, though they were entitled to be selected at the impugned examination (held earlier), they were not made aware of the same solely for reason of the interim order granted by the Supreme Court dated 10.05.2019. Therefore, they had a natural right to claim, retain and enjoy that higher seniority in the cadre of U.P.H.J.S.–the service. 70. In that backdrop of undisputed facts, seen from the perspective of respondent Nos. 3-5 and the High Court, the services rendered by respondent Nos. 3-5 pursuant to their selection at U.P.H.J.S.-2018 (Part-II), pending litigation in Dheeraj Mor (supra) were undoubtedly provisional. Since the said respondents were not made aware of their higher/better rights arising from their selection under the impugned examination, those services were rendered wholly in ignorance of that higher/better right. Also, those respondents could not have foreseen the detriment/loss of their rights under the impugned examination–arising from their joining U.P.H.J.S. pursuant to their selection under the U.P.H.J.S.-2018 (Part-II) examination. They were never required to, and they did not elect to forego their rights under the impugned examination. Therefore, the services rendered by them pending declaration of the (final) result on 01.10.2020, were a chance occurrence or were purely fortuitous arising from an act of the Court, in action to which they were not party. 71. In Rudra Kumar Sain v. Union of India, (2000) 8 SCC 25 a five-judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the meaning of the words ‘ad hoc’, ‘stopgap’ and ‘fortuitous’ service, often used in service jurisprudence. It was held: “16. The three terms “ad hoc”, “stopgap” and “fortuitous” are in frequent use in service jurisprudence. In the absence of definition of these terms in the Rules in question we have to look to the dictionary meaning of the words and the meaning commonly assigned to them in service matters. The meaning given to the expression “fortuitous” in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary is “accident or fortuitous casualty”. This should obviously connote that if an appointment is made accidentally, because of a particular emergent situation and such appointment obviously would not continue for a fairly long period. The meaning given to the expression “fortuitous” in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary is “accident or fortuitous casualty”. This should obviously connote that if an appointment is made accidentally, because of a particular emergent situation and such appointment obviously would not continue for a fairly long period. But an appointment made either under Rule 16 or 17 of the Recruitment Rules, after due consultation with the High Court and the appointee possesses the prescribed qualification for such appointment provided in Rule 7 and continues as such for a fairly long period, then the same cannot be held to be “fortuitous”. In Black's Law Dictionary, the expression “fortuitous” means “occurring by chance”, “a fortuitous event may be highly unfortunate”. It thus, indicates that it occurs only by chance or accident, which could not have been reasonably foreseen. The expression “ad hoc” in Black's Law Dictionary, means “something which is formed for a particular purpose”. The expression “stopgap” as per Oxford Dictionary, means “a temporary way of dealing with a problem or satisfying a need”. 17. In Oxford Dictionary, the word “ad hoc” means for a particular purpose; specially. In the same dictionary, the word “fortuitous” means happening by accident or chance rather than design. 18. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon (2nd Edn.) the word “ad hoc” is described as: “For particular purpose. Made, established, acting or concerned with a particular (sic) and or purpose.” The meaning of word “fortuitous event” is given as “an event which happens by a cause which we cannot resist; one which is unforeseen and caused by superior force, which it is impossible to resist; a term synonymous with Act of God”. 19. The meaning to be assigned to these terms while interpreting provisions of a service rule will depend on the provisions of that rule and the context in and the purpose for which the expressions are used. The meaning of any of these terms in the context of computation of inter se seniority of officers holding cadre post will depend on the facts and circumstances in which the appointment came to be made. For that purpose it will be necessary to look into the purpose for which the post was created and the nature of the appointment of the officer as stated in the appointment order. For that purpose it will be necessary to look into the purpose for which the post was created and the nature of the appointment of the officer as stated in the appointment order. If the appointment order itself indicates that the post is created to meet a particular temporary contingency and for a period specified in the order, then the appointment to such a post can be aptly described as “ad hoc” or “stopgap”. If a post is created to meet a situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature then the appointment of such a post can aptly be described as “fortuitous” in nature. If an appointment is made to meet the contingency arising on account of delay in completing the process of regular recruitment to the post due to any reason and it is not possible to leave the post vacant till then, and to meet this contingency an appointment is made then it can appropriately be called as a “stopgap” arrangement and appointment in the post as “ad hoc” appointment. It is not possible to lay down any strait-jacket formula nor give an exhaustive list of circumstances and situation in which such an appointment (ad hoc, fortuitous or stopgap) can be made. As such, this discussion is not intended to enumerate the circumstances or situations in which appointments of officers can be said to come within the scope of any of these terms. It is only to indicate how the matter should be approached while dealing with the questions of inter se seniority of officers in the cadre. 20. In service jurisprudence, a person who possesses the requisite qualification for being appointed to a particular post and then he is appointed with the approval and consultation of the appropriate authority and continues in the post for a fairly long period, then such an appointment cannot be held to be “stopgap or fortuitous or purely ad hoc”…………………” 72. Thus, if the law [declared in Dheeraj Mor (supra)], existed from before i.e. before the conduct of the impugned examination, no doubt respondents 3-5 would have found their names included in the Select List on the first date of the declaration of the result itself. That effect must be preserved to them upon declaration of the law made in the year 2020. That effect must be preserved to them upon declaration of the law made in the year 2020. First, on principle, that declaration of law must relate back or be retrospective. Second, the private respondents 3-5 cannot be prejudiced by an act of Court arising from litigation involving rights claimed by in-service candidates. Third, we find no justifiable reason to deny them that right, for reason of a fortuitous circumstances arising as a direct result of interim orders passed by the Supreme Court and this Court in that litigation to which they were neither party nor their rights were in contest. In absence of any direction issued in Dheeraj Mor (supra) to the contrary, the private respondents 3-5 who were non-parties to that litigation must be kept immune from the unintended collateral damage of that decision. The ratio of that decision would bind only the in-service candidates/petitioners in that batch of petitions. 73. Similarly, respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 first found their names included in the final select list declared on 01.10.2020. Since respondent Nos. 6 and 8 were offered selection under provisional results declared for H.J.S. examinations in different States- in circumstances not different than those noted above, it may never be assumed or presumed that those respondents would not have accepted selection under the impugned examination (at higher seniority), at the relevant time. Also similarly, owing to his higher merit position (qua the petitioner), respondent No. 9 was entitled to, and he would naturally have been selected under the Unreserved/Open category. He was initially disclosed selected under Reserved Category/OBC in the provisional result dated 28.03.2019, considering his overall merit position. The said Ajay Kumar secured 482 marks as against 469 marks secured by the present petitioner. In view of the discussion made above, category allocation/OBC assigned to the said Ajay Kumar in that provisional result also did not vest any rights and did not restrict his selection under that social category. The law in that regard being well settled since Indra Sawhney and Others Vs. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477 , the said Ajay Kumar remained entitled to selection under the Unreserved/Open Category by virtue of his higher merit position, in the (final) result declared on 01.10.2020. For the reasons assigned above, we find the same would apply to the case of respondent No.9 as well. 74. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477 , the said Ajay Kumar remained entitled to selection under the Unreserved/Open Category by virtue of his higher merit position, in the (final) result declared on 01.10.2020. For the reasons assigned above, we find the same would apply to the case of respondent No.9 as well. 74. Similar peculiarity of facts was taken note of by the Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar Verma (supra). In that decision the Supreme Court observed as below: “12. It could thus be seen that firstly, the appellant was neither in services of the Bihar Subordinate Judicial Services Cadre on the date on which he applied and secondly, nor was he in the services of the Bihar Subordinate Judicial Officer Cadre on the date on which he was selected. 13. In that view of the matter, we find that the law laid down in the case of Dheeraj Mor (supra) is not applicable in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.” 75. Further ineligibility has been set up in the candidate of Prakash Chandra Rana/respondent no.7 who had been declared successful in the provisional result declared for U.P.H.J.S. 2018 (Part-II). He joined pursuant to that selection. Later, he resigned his position in U.P.H.J.S. 2018 (Part-II) and joined another service on 27.12.2019, consequent to his (provisional) selection in the Himachal Pradesh H.J.S. However, that fact occurrence also took place prior to decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra) which was pronounced on 19.02.2020. It being undisputed that respondent No.7 was first declared successful under the impugned examination, on 01.10.2020 and not earlier, no ineligibility arose in his candidature under the impugned examination. His rights under the impugned examination were separate and independent of his rights under other similar examination for U.P.H.J.S. 2018 (Part-II). 76. The administrative decision of the Selection Committee to apply Dheeraj Mor (supra) prospectively and to provide for selection against the first examination at which a candidate may have been selected, is wholly correct, just, proper, and equitable. It does not alter or affect the rights of the petitioner, who stood lower in merit to respondent Nos. 3-9. 77. Seen in that light, the resolution of the Selection Committee dated 18.03.2020 as approved by the Full Court on 30.09.2020 was only an administrative step-in-aid necessary to give effect to the correct position in law and equity. It does not alter or affect the rights of the petitioner, who stood lower in merit to respondent Nos. 3-9. 77. Seen in that light, the resolution of the Selection Committee dated 18.03.2020 as approved by the Full Court on 30.09.2020 was only an administrative step-in-aid necessary to give effect to the correct position in law and equity. Since no adverse consequence may have been visited on a person not party to the dispute in Dheeraj Mor (supra) and since the provisional result declared during pendency of that litigation did not confer/vest rights as may be perceived to be final (in the context of the then existing litigation), the Selection Committee ensured that no such undeserved adverse consequence was visited on the innocent non-parties to the dispute in Dheeraj Mor (supra). 78. We may also note, in the review petitions that are pending before the Supreme Court arising from the decision of the Dheeraj Mor (supra), the Supreme Court has stayed removal of selected candidates pending that review application. However, we have made this note only to complete the narration of facts but not to rely on the same by way of reasoning in these proceedings. Again, the order of the Supreme Court (noted above) is an interim order. 79. As to the principle invoked by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that Dheeraj Mor (supra) has been consistently applied and followed, it must be noted: (i). in R. Poornima (supra), the Supreme Court considered whether length of practice as an advocate could be considered and added to the length of service as a District Judge consideration for appointment as a High Court Judge, to overlook the otherwise lower seniority position of the person thus recommended for that appointment. Clearly, that fact situation and legal issue is not involved in the instant case. Hence, that ratio is distinguishable. (ii). the Delhi High Court in Awanish Kumar (supra), did not consider the effect of purely fortuitous service rendered before declaration of the (final) result. That issue was not raised or considered in those cases. Therefore, we assume, it was not involved in those cases. In absence of fact similarity shown to exist, we are afraid, the ratio of those decisions may not be enforced to these facts. For the reasoning noted above, we are unable to persuade ourselves to that view. (iii). That issue was not raised or considered in those cases. Therefore, we assume, it was not involved in those cases. In absence of fact similarity shown to exist, we are afraid, the ratio of those decisions may not be enforced to these facts. For the reasoning noted above, we are unable to persuade ourselves to that view. (iii). in Shashank Singh (supra), a coordinate bench of this Court, in Praveen Kumar (supra), the Delhi High Court; in Smt. Lily Krishnan (supra) and Rajanish Kumar (supra), the Kerala High Court; in Sunil Kumar Verma (supra) the Patna High Court had the occasion to consider another fact situation. In all those cases, the candidates had been found to be ineligible on the test of Dheeraj Mor (supra). However, prior to their selection against respective HJS examination, each one of them stood selected in the another/separate examination for a different service, on final and undisputed result basis. Also, each such candidate had joined that other service before being declared selected under the relevant H.J.S. examination. Thus, they were persons exactly similarly placed as the in-service candidates here. Hence, ratio of those decisions is also distinguished. (iv). also, we are unable to persuade ourselves to the reasoning expressed by a coordinate bench of our Court in Kushagra Upadhyay (supra). To us, that reasoning is in the teeth of Dheeraj Mor (supra). Therefore, it may not be good law. 80. We therefore conclude-all services rendered by respondent Nos. 3 to 9 during pendency of litigation in Dheeraj Mor (supra), whether in the State of U.P. or elsewhere were wholly provisional and fortuitous as a direct result of the interim orders passed by the Supreme Court and this Court. Such services were rendered without prejudice to the pre-existing rights of those respondents under the impugned examination, though declaration of that right stood delayed till vacation of the interim orders granted by the Supreme Court and this Court. Thus, the first submission advanced by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner does not find our favour. It is rejected. 81. The case of the petitioner is therefore to be tested against the selection offered to respondent Nos. 10 and 11. Both placed lower in merit to the petitioner, it is to be seen if there is any error in their selection under the 20% horizontal reservation offered to woman candidates. It is rejected. 81. The case of the petitioner is therefore to be tested against the selection offered to respondent Nos. 10 and 11. Both placed lower in merit to the petitioner, it is to be seen if there is any error in their selection under the 20% horizontal reservation offered to woman candidates. As extracted above, both under Rule 7 and under paragraph no.2 of the Advertisement, provision was made in favour of 20% horizontal reservation to women belonging to the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Rule and the Advertisement did not specify if such reservation would be compartmentalized or overall, yet as pointed out by learned counsel for the High Court, the Selection Committee, vide its earlier resolution dated 06.12.2010 had resolved as below: "Thus according to Rule 7 of the U.P. Higher Judicial Services Rules, 1975 as well as the advertisement, the 20% horizontal reservation for women in U.P. HJS Examination is overall reservation and not compartmentalised reservation." 82. Since the High Court was implementing 20% overall horizontal reservation to women, the Government Order issued by the State Government providing for compartmentalised horizontal reservation did not apply- of its own force, to the selections made by the High Court till its’ adoption by the High Court vide later resolution. Therefore, compartmentalised horizontal reservation was not applicable to the impugned examination. Further, in absence of any direct challenge raised to the method applied by the High Court, the ratio in Saurav Yadav (supra) as to the method of computation of compartmentalised horizontal reservation may not engage us any further. That issue is academic in the context of the exact dispute brought before us. 83. Even otherwise, the High Court being independent of the State Government, in matters of selection of judicial officers, the Government Order/decision to apply compartmentalised horizontal reservation for women cannot be enforced on its own strength. That principle (of compartmentalised horizontal reservation) was adopted by the High Court, much later in the year 2022. Since then, recruitments being made by the High Court provide for compartmentalised horizontal reservation-as orally stated by Sri Ashish Mishra, learned counsel for the High Court. Thus, in absence of any patent illegality seen to exist in that method of horizontal reservation provided, we are not inclined to declare illegal-the approach of the High Court. Since then, recruitments being made by the High Court provide for compartmentalised horizontal reservation-as orally stated by Sri Ashish Mishra, learned counsel for the High Court. Thus, in absence of any patent illegality seen to exist in that method of horizontal reservation provided, we are not inclined to declare illegal-the approach of the High Court. Suffice to note, Rule-7 of the Rules and the Advertisement did not provide for compartmentalised horizontal reservation. In fact, the intent was otherwise–to provide overall reservation. 84. In Nawal Kishore Mishra v. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad, (2015) 5 SCC 479 held as below: “20. Such principles can be culled out and stated as under: 20.1. Neither Article 233 nor Article 234 contain any provision of being subject to any enactment by the appropriate legislature as is provided in certain other articles of the Constitution. 20.2. Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution are not subject to the provisions of law made by Parliament or the legislature as no such provision is found in Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution. 20.3. Articles 233 to 235 provide a complete code for regulating recruitment and appointment to the District Judiciary and the Subordinate Judiciary and thereby it gets insulated from interference of any other outside agency. 20.4. The general sweep of Article 309 has to be read subject to the complete code regarding appointment of District Judges and Judges in the Subordinate Judiciary governed by Articles 233 and 234. 20.5. Even under Article 245, it is specifically provided that the same would be subject to other provisions of the Constitution which would include Articles 233 and 234. 20.6. As the twin articles cover entire field regarding recruitment and appointment of District Judges and Judges in the Subordinate Judiciary at base level pro tanto the otherwise paramount legislative power of the State Legislature to operate in this field clearly gets excluded by the constitutional scheme itself. 20.7. Both Articles 309 and 245 will have to be read subject to Articles 233 and 234 as provided in the former articles themselves. 20.8. Though under Article 16(4), the State is enabled to provide for reservations in services, insofar as judicial service is concerned such reservation can be made by the Government in exercise of its rule-making power only after consultation with the High Court. 20.9. 20.8. Though under Article 16(4), the State is enabled to provide for reservations in services, insofar as judicial service is concerned such reservation can be made by the Government in exercise of its rule-making power only after consultation with the High Court. 20.9. The enactment of any statutory provision dehors consultation with the High Court for regulating the recruitment to the District Judiciary and the Subordinate Judiciary will clearly fly in the face of complete scheme of recruitment and appointment to the Subordinate Judiciary and the exclusive field earmarked in connection with such appointments under Articles 233 and 234. 20.10. Realising the need for a scheme of reservation in appropriate cases by resorting to the enabling provision under Article 16(4), the High Court can be consulted by the Government for framing appropriate rules regarding reservation for governing recruitment under Articles 233 and 234. But so long as it is not done, the legislature cannot by an indirect method completely bypass the High Court and by exercising its legislative power circumvent and cut across the very scheme of recruitment and appointment to the District Judiciary as envisaged by the makers of the Constitution. 20.11. Any such attempt by the legislature would be forbidden by the constitutional scheme as that was found on the concept relating to separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as well as the fundamental concept of an independent judiciary as both the concepts having been elevated to the level of basic structure of the Constitution and are the very heart of the constitutional scheme. 20.12. Having regard to Article 16(4), the High Court being a high constitutional functionary would also be alive to its social obligations and the constitutional guideline for having a scheme of reservation to ameliorate the lot of deprived reserved categories like SC, ST and OBC. But for that the Governor in consultation with the High Court should make appropriate rules and provide for a scheme of reservation for appointments at grassroots level and even at the highest level of District Judiciary. If that was not done, the State Legislature cannot upset the entire apple cart and by bypassing the constitutional mandate of Articles 233 and 234 lay down a statutory scheme of reservation governing all State services including judiciary. 20.13. If that was not done, the State Legislature cannot upset the entire apple cart and by bypassing the constitutional mandate of Articles 233 and 234 lay down a statutory scheme of reservation governing all State services including judiciary. 20.13. Even in that respect it is obvious that maintenance of efficiency of judicial administration is entirely within the control and jurisdiction of the High Court as laid down by Article 235. 20.14. If the proper course of formulating the scheme in the form of a rule by the High Court to provide for reservation is not made, that would deprive of the right to suggest the consultative process by way of its own expertise that for maintenance of the efficiency of administration of judicial service controlled by it 50% reservation may not be required and/or and even lesser reservation may be required or even may not be required at all. 20.15. To give Article 335 its full play for enacting a scheme of reservation, the High Court entrusted with the full control of the Subordinate Judiciary as per Article 235 of the Constitution has got to be consulted and cannot be treated to be a stranger to the said service by trying to apply the whole of the Reservation Act”. 85. Seen in that light, against 37 vacancies advertised, 21 fell for selection under the Open/Unreserved category. Also, 7 (20% of 37) were reserved for women, overall. Under the (final) result declared on 01.10.2020, the first 19 selected included 5 women candidates who got selected on the strength of their higher merit (as compared to the petitioner). Only other candidate selected (besides the two lower placed female candidates) is Surendra Pal Singh. With him the petitioner has no lis as he was selected under OBC social category. No woman candidate found selection under the social reservation categories (SC & OBC) and none was available for selection under those categories. Therefore, on one hand, two vacancies survived under the Open/Unreserved category and two vacancies remained to be filled against 7 vacancies reserved for women candidates under the horizontal reservation provided to them. 86. It was a sheer coincidence, only two suitable women candidates were available in the original Combined Merit List of 44 candidates prepared pursuant to the impugned examination. Both belonged to Open/Unreserved category. Both had secured lesser merit marks than the petitioner - being 461 and 453.5 marks, respectively. 86. It was a sheer coincidence, only two suitable women candidates were available in the original Combined Merit List of 44 candidates prepared pursuant to the impugned examination. Both belonged to Open/Unreserved category. Both had secured lesser merit marks than the petitioner - being 461 and 453.5 marks, respectively. At that stage and in that situation, in the backdrop of overall horizontal reservation provisioned, by pure fate, they got selected in preference to the petitioner who had obtained higher merit marks. 87. All reservations (whether under vertical or horizontal reservation scheme) result in-higher merit achieved by Open/Unreserved or Male category candidates being ignored in favour of reservation granted. At the same time, all reservations are provided to achieve a higher constitutional objective referable to Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, no equitable relief may be claimed or be granted by a writ Court to undo the plain result of reservation. 88. Insofar as it cannot be denied that respondent Nos. 10 and 11 were the only two women candidates available against the remaining two seats/vacancies available under horizontal reservation quota guaranteed to them under Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India, hard as it is, the petitioner's case would remain on a lower pedestal. To the extent there is no visible change of Rule of selection (incorporated during pendency of the selection and in absence of any real challenge available to the petitioner to doubt the overall horizontal reservation granted to women, we are not inclined to accept the challenge to appointment of respondent Nos. 10 and 11. 89. Insofar as the argument has been advanced on the strength of Waiting List prepared, it may first be noted that Rules did not permit or contemplate preparation of Waiting List. The law in that regard is clear. Unless enabled by the Rules, the recruiting body may not prepare a Waiting List as may give rise to any right to the candidates be included in such list. In State of U.P. Vs. Karunesh Kumar (supra), it has been observed: “29. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents made a specific reference to the decision rendered in the case of Rajiv Kumar Srivastava (supra) to press home the contention that, when a post is not filled due to non-joining of a candidate, another one waiting in the wings merits consideration, as a vested right inures in his benefit. 30. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents made a specific reference to the decision rendered in the case of Rajiv Kumar Srivastava (supra) to press home the contention that, when a post is not filled due to non-joining of a candidate, another one waiting in the wings merits consideration, as a vested right inures in his benefit. 30. The aforesaid decision, in our considered view, may not have any application to the case on hand. The effect of the relevant rules is not considered therein, as the select list shuts the door to everyone other than the selected candidates. The aforesaid decision was in the context of the 1999 GO, however, as we have held that the 1978 Rules do not apply to the present recruitment, the aforesaid decision would not be of any service. Further, it is settled law that there is no vested right of the unsuccessful candidate to insist upon their consideration, in the absence of any such rule requiring for the preparation of a waiting-list. This Court in the recent decision in Vallampati Sathish Babu v. State of A.P. (Civil Appeal No. 2473 of 2022) has held that: “7.4 In the present case, the final selection list of 33 candidates was prepared. Thereafter all the selected candidates were called for counselling, but one of the candidates did not report for counselling. The aforesaid event took place after the final selection list was prepared and published. As there was no requirement of preparation of a waiting list, the appellant claiming to be the next in the merit cannot claim any appointment as his name neither figured in the list of the selected candidates nor in any waiting list as there was no provision at all for preparation of the waiting list. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 16 is very clear. Therefore, the post remained unfilled due to one of the candidates in the final list did not appear for counselling and/or accepted the employment. Hence, that post has to be carried forward for the next recruitment. 7.5 The appellant could have claimed the appointment to the post which remained unfilled provided there is a provision for waiting list as per the statutory provision. Hence, that post has to be carried forward for the next recruitment. 7.5 The appellant could have claimed the appointment to the post which remained unfilled provided there is a provision for waiting list as per the statutory provision. In absence of any specific provision for waiting list and on the contrary, there being a specific provision that there shall not be any waiting list and that the post remaining unfilled on any ground shall have to be carried forward for the next recruitment. The appellant herein, thus, had no right to claim any appointment to the post which remained unfilled. xxxxxxxxx 8.1 An identical question came to be considered by this Court in the case of Suresh Prasad (supra). In the said decision, it is specifically observed and held that even in case candidates selected for appointment have not joined, in the absence of any statutory rules to the contrary, the employer is not bound to offer the unfilled vacancy to the candidates next below the said candidates in the merit list. It is also further held that in the absence of any provision, the employer is not bound to prepare a waiting list in addition to the panel of selected candidates and to appoint the candidates from the waiting list in case the candidates from the panel do not join. The aforesaid decision of this Court has been subsequently followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Samiula Shareef (supra)”. 90. At the same time, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is quite right in his submission that as a fact a Wait List had been prepared. The same has also been extracted above (in paragraph-25). Yet, as reasoned above, in the context of the wholly provisional result declared on 28.03.2019, preparation of such a list was an administrative necessity to deal with the circumstances arising from the provisional Select List declared in the background of litigation pending in Dheeraj Mor (supra) and the interim orders passed by the Supreme Court and this Court. Since the result of 11 candidates declared on 28.03.2019 was wholly provisional, commensurate provision had to be made and maintained to provide for a legal necessity to replace such candidates if they were found ineligible upon final decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra). 91. In fact that ineligibility arose to 11 candidates provisionally selected in the result declared on 28.03.2019. Since the result of 11 candidates declared on 28.03.2019 was wholly provisional, commensurate provision had to be made and maintained to provide for a legal necessity to replace such candidates if they were found ineligible upon final decision in Dheeraj Mor (supra). 91. In fact that ineligibility arose to 11 candidates provisionally selected in the result declared on 28.03.2019. Therefore, the High Court remained under an obligation to finalise the result by accommodating 11 other candidates who may have been found eligible and suitable for selection under the impugned examination. That exercise was carried out in preparation and computation of the (final) result dated 1.10.2020. No candidate except those included in the Combined Merit List were considered strictly in order of inter se merit (respondent Nos. 3 to 9), Besides, the merit criteria, two women candidates were accommodated to fulfil the constitutionally imposed reservation/preference arising from special status that pre-existed in favour of respondent Nos. 10 and 11. Thus, there is no breach of the law. 92. The above discussion with respect to the Waiting List also leads us to the conclusion that a vacancy that may have arisen after declaration of result dated 01.10.2020 i.e. upon non-joining of respondent No. 7/Prakash Chand Rana was neither required nor permitted to be filled up by any other direct recruit. That result was final in all respects. Selected candidates who joined against that declaration of result became members of H.J.S. and those who did not only gave rise to vacancy (at that stage), to be dealt with in accordance with Rules. 93. The Rules do not permit preparation of a Wait List. Rather, they provide for a complete mechanism to fill up any vacancy initially available to direct recruits that may remain vacant upon completion of that selection process. Therefore, equitable considerations may not arise contrary to the statutory provisions. Hence, we are unable to consider grant of the writ in favour of the petitioner, at this stage. Also, in any case, it cannot be lost sight-both Pankaj Kumar Rai and Rahul Singh were placed higher in merit to the petitioner. Though Rahul Singh lost a similar litigation-as infructuous, the petitioner cannot claim a preferential right over Pankaj Kumar Rai, who in any case did not litigate and was not shown selected elsewhere. 94. Also, in any case, it cannot be lost sight-both Pankaj Kumar Rai and Rahul Singh were placed higher in merit to the petitioner. Though Rahul Singh lost a similar litigation-as infructuous, the petitioner cannot claim a preferential right over Pankaj Kumar Rai, who in any case did not litigate and was not shown selected elsewhere. 94. In view of the above, the fact that Yogesh Kumar who was placed higher in the initial Wait List prepared was granted selection under U.P.H.J.S. 2016, is of no consequence. Further, in view of the discussion made above, we also find that the tentative observation made by the Selection Committee in its resolution dated 13.03.2019 to the effect that the petitioner may be recommended if the writ petition filed by Rahul Singh is dismissed did not confer any right on the petitioner to gain appointment. 95. At that stage, a tentative opinion appears to have emerged with the Committee to allow for inclusion of the petitioner as the 11th candidate if the 11 in-service candidates, provisionally selected in the selection dated 28.03.2019 were eventually disqualified. However, what remained to be considered by the Selection Committee at that stage was the effect that such inclusion would cause on the horizontal reservation to be provided to women. It is that provision made at the stage of preparation of (final) result declared on 01.10.2020 that led to ouster the claim of Pankaj Kumar Rai and the petitioner, rather than anything else. 96. All resolutions passed by the Selection Committee were administrative steps-in-aid to the final decision taken on 24.07.2020. Upon that resolution and its ratification by the Full Court all earlier resolutions stood modified, and the legal effect caused by the earlier/ modified resolutions stood lost. That being exercise of administrative power, it was contrary to the Rules or any precedent. Upon subsequent resolution dated 24.07.2020 being passed by the Selection Committee as was also approved by the Full Court, it wiped out with no trace of any enforceable legal right to the petitioner or any party- to claim under any earlier resolution. Suffice to note, there is no challenge raised to that later resolution. Upon subsequent resolution dated 24.07.2020 being passed by the Selection Committee as was also approved by the Full Court, it wiped out with no trace of any enforceable legal right to the petitioner or any party- to claim under any earlier resolution. Suffice to note, there is no challenge raised to that later resolution. For ready reference, resolution dated 24.07.2020 is extracted below: - “… The Committee further resolves that resolutions of the Committee dated 17.05.2017, 13.03.2019, 15.07.2019 and 16.12.2019 pertaining to the results of U.P. Higher Judicial Service Direct Recruitment, 2016, 2018, 2018 (Part-II), 2018 (Part-III) respectively, stand modified …..” 97. Once no legal infirmity is seen in the selection of respondent Nos. 3 to 11, there did not exist any vacancy against which the petitioner may have been accommodated. Unfortunate as it appears, yet the fate met by the petitioner must be recognised as fair and consistent to the law declared in Dheeraj Mor (supra). Also, we may record, the other submissions advanced by Shri. Ashish Mishra regarding legitimate expectation and the other suggestive of lack of precedential value of Dheeraj Mor (supra), have been noted to be rejected. 98. Writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.