JUDGMENT : Ritu Bahri, C.J. The State has come-up in Appeal against the judgment dated 10.06.2014 passed by the Special Sessions Judge, Uttarkashi in Special Sessions Trial No. 15 of 2013, whereby the respondents-Mrs. Subhadra @ Meena and Ramesh have been acquitted of facing charges under Sections 363 and 370 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘I.P.C.’), under Section 3/4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘POCSO’) and under Section 9/10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. Accused-Ramesh Lal (respondent No. 1) had also been charge-sheeted under Section 376 IPC and he was acquitted. 2. The case set-up by the prosecution was that a complaint was made by mother of the victim on 29.11.2013 to the Chauki Incharge Dunda (Police Station-Kotwali, Uttarkashi) against accused-Smt. Meena and Suresh Lal. She alleged therein that on 27.11.2013, at about 05:00 P.M. when her minor daughter had gone to the house of respondent No. 2 (Mrs. Subhadra) and when she did not come-back, she sent her son, who told that Smt. Meena was not home, nor was her daughter. On 28.11.2013, they tried to search out their daughter throughout the day, but Smt. Meena was not found anywhere and Ramesh was found at home. On being asked, he said that he did not know anything about this. On this, the complainant went to the police. The age of the daughter of the complainant was 15 years. The complaint was registered and the investigation started, and during the investigation, on 29.11.2013 at 16:30 Hours the victim was recovered by the Investigator from the company of accused Smt. Subhadra alias Meena Devi and Ramesh, and the accused were arrested. During the investigation, medical examination of the victim was conducted by the Investigator, the statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’), school records related to the age of the victim were obtained, a visual map of the recovery site was prepared and the statements of the witnesses were taken. 3. A charge-sheet was filed in the Court on 23.12.2013, and on 30.01.2013, accused-Mrs. 3. A charge-sheet was filed in the Court on 23.12.2013, and on 30.01.2013, accused-Mrs. Subhadra @ Meena Devi was charged for offenses under Sections 363 & 370 I.P.C., Section 9/10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 and Sections 3 and 4 of POCSO Act, whereas in addition to the above Sections, accused-Ramesh was also charged for offense under Section 376 of I.P.C. They denied the charges and pleaded to be tried. 4. The following prosecution-witnesses were examined : P.W.1-Complainant and mother of the victim. P.W.2-Brother-in-law (Devar) of PW1. P.W.3-Dr. Sudha Singh, P.W.4-Victim, P.W.5-Lady Constable Laltesh Bharti, P.W.6-Constable Ajay Kunwar, P.W.7-Sub Inspector B.S. Chauhan P.W.8-Smt. Rajeshwari Nautiyal. 5. In the documentary evidence, the written report (Tahrir) of the complainant Exhibit-A-1, Medical Examination Report Exhibit A-2, Chick First Information Report Exhibit A-3, GD of registration of case Exhibit A4, Memo of Arrest Exhibit A-5, Two Memos of arrest of accused and recovery of the victim Exhibit A-6, Memo of Information Exhibit A-7, Site map of the place of incident Exhibit A-8, Delivery Note Exhibit A-9, Copy of GD Exhibit A-10, Site map of the place of recovery Exhibit A-11, Charge-Sheet Exhibit A-12 and a copy of School Admission Register Exhibit A-13 were filed. 6. The statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., wherein they stated all the facts to be false. Accused Smt. Subhadra alias Meena stated that due to domestic enmity, the complainant and brother-in-law of the complainant have falsely implicated her and as per accused-Ramesh, he was caught from Haridwar and he had not given his father’s Mobile Number. 7. Victim (PW4), in her cross examination, stated that Meena did not come to her house. Even before this incident, she had gone to Meena’s house two-three times. Meena had told her earlier also that they would take her down and had threatened her. She went to Meena’s house on 20th the day when Meena had threatened her. After this, she went to Meena’s house on 27th of her own free will but she did not tell her mother and brother about the threatening on 20th. She stayed at Meena’s house for two-three minutes on 20th. She went to Meena’s house at 04:00 PM on 27th and stayed in her house for an hour. She drank tea at Meena’s house and after that by threatening, Meena took her to Dunda. She stayed at Meena’s house for two-three minutes on 20th. She went to Meena’s house at 04:00 PM on 27th and stayed in her house for an hour. She drank tea at Meena’s house and after that by threatening, Meena took her to Dunda. Then she herself went to Dunda on foot from Meena’s house and she did not find anyone on the way. She stated that when we come to Dunda Bazar from Meena’s house, first comes School, thereafter comes people’s houses, thereafter comes Tehsil and after that comes the Market. There was crowd in the market. Meena had a bag. She had nothing. When she reached the road, it was 2 kms. road where she walked along with Meena Devi. She reached the road at 06:00 PM and she did not find any man on the road. She walked towards Devidhar and not towards Uttarkashi. They had taken two rooms in a hotel ahead of Dunda for the night. She and a man had stayed in one room and Meena had stayed in another room. They stayed in the same hotel for three days and they had food in the hotel itself. Servants used to bring food in the hotel. She further stated that she does not know whether the same servant or different servants used to bring food. She did not know how big the hotel was. Meena, present in the Court, had taken her inside the hotel room. She had gone on foot with her. The hotel was small and not very big, and had one story. She stayed in the hotel for three days. She came out of the room at 03:00 PM on 30th November, 2013 and Meena-her aunt and accused uncle Ramesh-the third person, present in the Court, came from the room to the Verandah for some time and then went inside the room. After 10-15 minutes, they came out with bag and reached Devidhar. They reached Devidhar from the hotel in 1015 minutes. After coming out of the hotel, we walked to Devidhar. They waited for the taxi at Devidhar for 2-3 hours, by then the police reached there. She stated that she cannot tell how many shops were there in Devidhar; and she never went to Devidhar before. 8. They reached Devidhar from the hotel in 1015 minutes. After coming out of the hotel, we walked to Devidhar. They waited for the taxi at Devidhar for 2-3 hours, by then the police reached there. She stated that she cannot tell how many shops were there in Devidhar; and she never went to Devidhar before. 8. After going through the evidence, the Trial Court came to a conclusion that if the victim had gone to Meena’s house on 20th and was threatened, in that case the victim going to the house of accused-Meena on her own free will again on 27th was completely suspicious. Moreover, if the victim was kept in a hotel ahead of Dunda for three days, where two rooms were taken on rent, out of which in one room, accused Ramesh and victim stayed and in another room, accused-Meena stayed, but she did not make any mention about this fact in her statements under Section 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C. and hence, this evidence in itself becomes suspicious. In her statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. the victim did not say that accused-Ramesh had committed rape on her, whereas in her statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. the victim stated that when she was kept from 27th November, 2013 to 30th November, 2013, she was asked to do bad things. She did not know as to which place they had taken her. However, during her evidence in the Court, the victim had clearly stated that she had taken two rooms in the hotel ahead of Dunda. Meena stayed in one room and the man and the victim stayed in another room. The victim also stated that in the hotel room, she was served food by the servants. Had the victim informed about the hotel and had alleged that she was kidnaped on 27th November, 2013 and was recovered on 30th November, 2013, then the Investigator should have gathered information from the Hotel owner or those providing food. The owner and the servants, who were providing food, would have been the main witnesses in the present case. 9. The Sub-Inspector B.S. Chauhan (Investigator), during his cross examination, stated that he was told by the victim about the places where the accused had kept the victim from 27th November, 2013 to 30th November, 2013. The owner and the servants, who were providing food, would have been the main witnesses in the present case. 9. The Sub-Inspector B.S. Chauhan (Investigator), during his cross examination, stated that he was told by the victim about the places where the accused had kept the victim from 27th November, 2013 to 30th November, 2013. He further stated that he did not have any information about these places and he never asked literally about the places where the victim was kept. He further stated, during the cross examination, that he did not seize the clothes worn by victim and the clothes of accused-Ramesh. He also admitted that in Exhibit–A11 the map of the place of arrest and recovery of accused, hotel and shops have been shown and a Taxi-Stand has also been shown. No attempt was made by the Investigator to make hotel owner or any shopkeeper, or taxi-driver or any people travelling on the highway as witnesses. He himself stated that nobody was ready to become a witness and in this backdrop, the statement of the Investigator also became doubtful. The Trial Court further observed that if the victim had been kidnapped in such a public place like Devidhar, some public witness would have given information / evidence to the Investigator when the accused were arrested from that busy place. This is in itself suspicious that a serious crime like kidnapping and rape was committed by the accused and they were arrested after that at a public place Devidhar, but no public witnesses were present to give testimony. Also, the statements given by the victim under Section 161 and 164 of the Cr.P.C. were different from the evidences given by victim in her testimony during her cross-examination. 10. The Trial Court, after going through all the documentary and oral evidences available on the record, acquitted both the accused since the prosecution failed to prove case beyond the reasonable doubt. Now, the State has come-up before this Court in the appeal against the impugned judgment whereby the accused were acquitted. This Court has gone through all the records including the original record available before this Court as well as the prosecution evidences. As regards appeal, when two view are possible to be present, the Appellate Court has to go through all the evidences available to check the possible view. This Court has gone through all the records including the original record available before this Court as well as the prosecution evidences. As regards appeal, when two view are possible to be present, the Appellate Court has to go through all the evidences available to check the possible view. In regards this, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 has held that : “44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside.” 11. This Court is also of the view that the documentary evidence available on records, the testimonies presented by the prosecution and the facts discussed above are not sufficient to hold the accused guilty. The prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also in the case of Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 260, has held as under : “21. The prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also in the case of Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 260, has held as under : “21. Taking a close look at the overall picture, the inference which could reasonably be drawn is that the prosecution's case has been marked by lacklustre efforts, revealing a poorly executed endeavour that gives rise to substantial doubts regarding the integrity of the case. The material contradictions apparent in the depositions of prosecution witnesses, including the victim, significantly undermine the credibility of the prosecution version. These inconsistencies in the prosecution's narrative, render it considerably doubtful. On the face of such evident discrepancies, recording conviction becomes untenable, as the foundation of the case crumbles under the weight of doubt. While we might have chosen to overlook other contradictions and solely relied on the victim's account, considering her as a ‘sterling witness’, her version appears muddled and prevaricated, much less coherent. It is precisely these inconsistencies and contradictions, which are material, that compel us to reject the case set up by the prosecution before the Special Court with which the High Court concurred adopting a flawed approach. 22. Conviction undoubtedly can be recorded on the sole evidence of a victim of crime; however, it must undergo a strict scrutiny through the well-settled legal principles as established by this Court in a catena of decisions. While the actions attributed to A-1, as sought to be demonstrated by the prosecution, may fall within the purview of ‘sexual harassment’ under section 11 of the POCSO Act, the evidence in this case has been marred by inadequacies from the outset, evident in contradictions within statements and testimonies. The evidence led leaves reasonable suspicion as to whether A-1 was actually involved in any criminal act. 27. We are, thus, inclined to deem this case unsuitable for securing a conviction under section 11 read with section 12 of the POCSO Act, as there are enough missing links in the present case to extend the benefit of doubt to A-1. As regards A-2, we do not consider that the prosecution was successful in proving that the conduct of A-2 was a case of criminal intimidation punishable under section 506 of I.P.C.; his conviction, too, is also liable to be set aside.” 12. As regards A-2, we do not consider that the prosecution was successful in proving that the conduct of A-2 was a case of criminal intimidation punishable under section 506 of I.P.C.; his conviction, too, is also liable to be set aside.” 12. The findings of the learned Trial Court, on the basis of the evidence, clearly show that this is a case of circumstantial evidence. Apart from the statement of the victim, even the medical evidence does not show that a rape was committed upon her, and as per the story of the victim of her own, there is no sign of kidnapping. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nirmal Premkumar (supra), the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. Hence, this Court finds no merit in the present Government Appeal, and the same is, hereby, dismissed. 14. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.