ORDER ON BOARD : 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable writ(s), order(s), by quashing the impugned order dated 03.04.2018 (Annexure P/1) and letter dated 13.09.2017 the respondent authorities to allow the petitioner to run the Madarsha (School) as per the C.G. Madarsha Board Adhiniyam 1998 (with necessary amendement incorporated in the year 2007). 10.2. The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the record from the respondent authorities. 10.3. Any other relief, which the Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be granted.” 2. The facts of the present case are as follows:- A. The petitioner was a Madarsa (hereinafter referred to as ‘the institute’) registered in the year 2006 according to the provisions of Chhattisgarh Madarsa Board Adhiniyam, 1998 (for short, the Act, 1998). B. The institute could not renew its registration; therefore, again it got registered according to the amended provisions of the Chhattisgarh Madarsa Board (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 2007 (for short, the Act, 2007) on 18.01.2013 bearing registration No. 770092. C. The institute was registered/recognized according to Section 8 (2) (a) of the Act, 1998, imparting school education to girls up to the age of 14. D. On 21.08.2017, the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kanker [for short, the SDO(R)] visited the institute and found certain deficiencies. A report was prepared by the SDO(R) observing that no warden was appointed in the institute; there were no adequate toilets and no medical facilities (first aid medical facilities); girls more than 14 years of age were granted admission; most of the students are not from the State of Chhattisgarh; without permission, boarding facilities are granted to many students, and such report was submitted before the Collector on 21.07.2017. E. Pursuant to that, the Collector, North Bastar-Kanker sent a letter along with a report to the Madarsa Board on 02.08.2017 to take appropriate action. F. The Chhattisgarh Madarsa Board, Raipur (for short, the Board) vide order dated 13.09.2017 cancelled the registration and recognition of the institute. E. Pursuant to that, the Collector, North Bastar-Kanker sent a letter along with a report to the Madarsa Board on 02.08.2017 to take appropriate action. F. The Chhattisgarh Madarsa Board, Raipur (for short, the Board) vide order dated 13.09.2017 cancelled the registration and recognition of the institute. G. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 14 of the Act, 1998 on 28.10.2017 before the State Government against the order dated 13.09.2017 taking the sole ground that no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner before taking the penal decision and the same was dismissed by respondent No. 1 on 03.04.2018 on the ground that no averments were made in the appeal with regard to the merits of the case. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the only ground raised by the petitioner before the appellate authority was that no opportunity of hearing was afforded before taking stern action against the petitioner. He would further submit that the petitioner/institute was running Madarsa (educational institute) and at that point in time, there were 55 girls students enrolled, and on the date of inspection, 47 girls were found present. He would also submit that though in the Act, 2007, there is no specific provision regarding affording an opportunity of hearing to the concerned person/institute, it would be construed as the principles of natural justice embodied in the Act, 2007 itself. He would contend that before taking any action against the petitioner a notice ought to have been issued to the petitioner and opportunity ought to have been afforded to the petitioner to defend its matter. In support of his contention, reliance is placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Sahara India (firm), Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I and another, (2008) 14 SCC 151 (para- 15); and, Canara Bank and others v. Debasis Das and others, (2003) 4 SCC 557 . 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would oppose. They would submit that there were serious complaints against the petitioner/institute. An inquiry was conducted by the SDO(R), and after due satisfaction, the report was submitted before the Collector. They would further submit that the Collector referred the matter to the Board to take appropriate action. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would oppose. They would submit that there were serious complaints against the petitioner/institute. An inquiry was conducted by the SDO(R), and after due satisfaction, the report was submitted before the Collector. They would further submit that the Collector referred the matter to the Board to take appropriate action. They would also submit that the Board taking into consideration the material available took a decision to cancel the registration and recognition of the petitioner institute, which suffers from no infirmity or illegality; thus, this petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on the record. 6. Section 8 of the Act, 1998 reads as under:- “8. Powers and functions of the Board. - (1) It shall be the duty of the Board to advise the State Government on all matters relating to Madarsa Education. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder the Board shall have power to direct and supervise Madarsa Education and in particular have the following powers : (a) to grant recognition to Madarsas; (b) to withdraw recognition of Madarsa; (c) to maintain the record of recognition of Madarsas; (d) to appoint Management Committees of Madarsas in the prescribed manner; (e) to constitute recognition committee, examination committee, finance committee and such other committees as the Board may consider necessary for the proper and efficient functioning of the Board; (f) to prescribe the syllabus for primary and middle level Madarsa Education and to arrange for the conduct of the examination of Class V and VIII and to award certificates; (g) to develop mechanism for inspection of Madarsas, and to ensure proper utilization of funds; (h) to supervise implementation of Central and State Government schemes in regard to Madarsa Education; (i) to prepare annual budget estimates and accounts of the Board for the approval of the State Government; (j) to perform such other functions as may be entrusted to it by the State Government.” 7. Section 8(2)(a)(b) of the Act, 1998 deals with the grant of recognition to the Madarsa and to withdraw the recognition of the Madarsa. 8. From a perusal of the entire scheme of the Act, 1998, it is apparent that no power has been conferred with the Madarsa Board to cancel the registration of Madarsa or such school. 9. Section 8(2)(a)(b) of the Act, 1998 deals with the grant of recognition to the Madarsa and to withdraw the recognition of the Madarsa. 8. From a perusal of the entire scheme of the Act, 1998, it is apparent that no power has been conferred with the Madarsa Board to cancel the registration of Madarsa or such school. 9. In the present case, the order dated 13.09.2017 was issued by the Board, wherein, the registration and recognition both have been cancelled by the board based on the recommendation of the Collector, and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner before taking the aforesaid action. Admittedly, the SDO(R) visited the institute on 21.08.2017 and a report was submitted before the Collector, who referred the matter to the Board with the recommendation to take appropriate action. Further, no notice was issued to the petitioner before taking stern action against the petitioner/institute. Against the order dated 13.09.2017, an appeal was preferred before respondent No. 1, who also dismissed the appeal on the solitary ground that the petitioner has not pressed the matter on merits. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow (supra) in para 15 held as under:- “15. Rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The phrase "natural justice" is also not capable of a precise definition. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly i.e, fair play in action. As observed by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of Indial, the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. (Also see ITO v. Madnani Engg Works Ltd. (1979) 2 SCC 455 ).” 11. In the matter of Shri Debasis Das (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paras- 14 to 17 as under:- 14. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants' defence. 15. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi- judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to "vocate interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1963 (143) ER 414), the principle was thus stated: "Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. "Adam" says God, "where art thou has thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that though should not eat". Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond. 16. "Adam" says God, "where art thou has thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that though should not eat". Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond. 16. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. 17. What is meant by the term 'principles of natural justice' is not easy to determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in Ray v. Local Government Board (1914) 1 KB 160 at p.199:83 LJKB 86) described the phrase as sadly lacking in precision. In General Council of Medical Education & Registration of U.K. v. Sanckman (1943 AC 627: (1948) 2 All ER 337), Lord Wright observed that it was not desirable to attempt 'to force it into any procusteam bed' and mentioned that one essential requirement was that the Tribunal should be impartial and have no personal interest in the controversy, and further that it should give 'a full and fair opportunity' to every party of being heard.” 12. Though in the Act, 1998, particularly in Section 8, there is no provision to provide the opportunity of hearing to the person aggrieved, in the absence of such provision, it cannot be held that the principles of natural justice would not attract. The principles of natural justice are those which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. The natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly i.e., fair play in action. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as ‘audi alteram partem’ rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. 13. The natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly i.e., fair play in action. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as ‘audi alteram partem’ rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. 13. Taking into consideration the proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cited judgments, the respondent authorities have committed grave illegality in passing the orders impugned. In the considered opinion of this Court, the orders passed by the Board and respondent No. 1 dated 13.09.2017 and 03.04.2018, respectively, are unsustainable in the eyes of the law; consequently, both the orders are hereby quashed/set-aside. 14. As a result, the instant petition is hereby allowed. The matter is remitted back to the Board to pass an appropriate order afresh after affording a due opportunity of hearing to the interested parties. 15. Consequences to follow.