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2024 DIGILAW 266 (UTT)

State of Uttarakhand v. Mohd. Aizaz alias Hafiz

2024-04-23

ALOK KUMAR VERMA, RITU BAHRI

body2024
JUDGMENT : RITU BAHRI, C.J. 1. The present Government Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 04.02.2014, passed by learned IInd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Roorkee, District Haridwar in Sessions Trial No. 231 of 2011, State vs. Mohd. Aizaz alias Hafiz and Others, whereby, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondents-accused persons from the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). 2. In brief, the prosecution’s case is that the informant’s daughter Shahista was married to Mehtab. When he went to her in-laws’ house with his son on 09.04.2011 to invite her for his son’s wedding, he did not meet her. He was told that she had gone to a relative’s house. Later the villagers told him that his daughter had been burnt and her brother-in-law (Dever and Jeth) had taken her to the hospital. Yesterday he came to know that she is admitted in Pal Nursing Home, Roorkee. He also came to know that on 09.04.2011 at around 10:00 a.m., Aizaz, Jabir, Irshad and Gulafsa had poured kerosene oil on his daughter and burnt her. Shahista had also told him these things to him. 3. The investigation was handed over to the Sub-Inspector Pradeep Negi (PW10). He prepared the site plan (Ext. Ka.7). Shahista’s fitness certificate was given by Dr. Rajendra Pal (PW7) after which Gopal Singh Chauhan, Naib Tehsildar (PW9) recorded her dying declaration (Ext.Ka.6) in the hospital on 21.04.2011. 4. An FIR No. 129 of 2011 (Ext. Ka.15) was lodged at Police Station Manglaur on 22.04.2011 at 12:30 hrs. pursuant to a written information (Ext. Ka.1) received from the informant Shamim Ahmad (PW5). The FIR was registered by Constable Harbhajan Singh (PW13) under Sections 147, 307, 201 and Section 323 IPC. 5. Shahista died on 09.05.2011. Sub-Inspector Umesh Kumar (PW12) reached Pal Nursing Hospital. The inquest report (Ext.Ka.9) was prepared by him. After preparing the inquest report, other formalities were performed to send the dead body for post-mortem examination. The post-mortem examination of the dead body was conducted by Dr. Kumar Khagendra (PW8) on 10.05.2011. Sub-Inspector Bhaskar Lal Shah (PW11) recorded the statements of the witnesses. Upon conclusion of the investigation, charge-sheet (Ext. Ka.8) was filed by him. 6. Charges were framed against the respondents- accused persons. As the accused persons pleaded innocence, trial was held. 7. The post-mortem examination of the dead body was conducted by Dr. Kumar Khagendra (PW8) on 10.05.2011. Sub-Inspector Bhaskar Lal Shah (PW11) recorded the statements of the witnesses. Upon conclusion of the investigation, charge-sheet (Ext. Ka.8) was filed by him. 6. Charges were framed against the respondents- accused persons. As the accused persons pleaded innocence, trial was held. 7. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution examined fourteen witnesses. 8. Statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. They denied all the incriminating evidence, produced by the prosecution. 9. Mr. J.S. Virk, learned counsel for the State argued that the dying declaration supports the case of the prosecution and the prosecution’s witnesses are trustworthy, therefore, the judgment of acquittal is not justify. 10. Ms. Lata Negi, learned counsel for the respondents, has supported the impugned judgment. She contended that the deceased had given dying declaration under the influence of her parents. 11. We have carefully assessed the evidence, available on the record. 12. The present case rests solely on the dying declaration of the deceased. She had suffered 70-75% burn injuries, which were below her breast. 13. PW9 Gopal Singh Chauhan, the Naib Tehsildar, recorded the dying declaration (Ext Ka.6) in Pal Nursing Home, Roorkee on 21.04.2011, which is as follows: “My brother’s marriage was on 11.04.2011. I wanted to go to my brother’s wedding. Irshad, who is my brother-in-law (Dever), stopped me from going to the wedding and kicked me. I had fallen from the stairs and my sister-in-law (Jethani) Afsana, Irshad, brother-in-law, Gulafsa, sister-in-law (Devrani) and Aizaz, brother-in-law (Dever) poured kerosene oil on me and set me on fire. When I screamed, my neighbors Rahim, Salim and other neighbors came and put a sheet over me and extinguished the fire. In my in laws’ house, my Jeth and Dever and their wives used to harass and beat me. At that time my husband had gone to the kiln. I have no complaints against him. I am giving my statement consciously. God help me. I cannot sign because of burns. I am putting a thumb impression.” (This is the translated version of the original which is in Hindi script) 14. A dying declaration is an important piece of evidence, which, if found truthful and voluntary by the Court, can be the sole basis for conviction. I am giving my statement consciously. God help me. I cannot sign because of burns. I am putting a thumb impression.” (This is the translated version of the original which is in Hindi script) 14. A dying declaration is an important piece of evidence, which, if found truthful and voluntary by the Court, can be the sole basis for conviction. Relying on the dying declaration alone the conviction can be maintained. No corroboration is necessary if the dying declaration is believed to be truthful one and not vitiated in any manner. 15. In Atbir Vs. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, (2010) 9 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the following guidelines with respect to the admissibility of dying declaration: “22...... (i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court. (ii) The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.” 16. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.” 16. Prosecution witnesses Rahim (PW2), Salim (PW3) and Nasim (PW14) have not supported the prosecution’s case. Rahim (PW2) has deposed that he did not go to the spot and he does not even know how the deceased was burnt. Salim (PW3) has stated that he did not hear the scream of the deceased. He did not go to her house. He had not put any sheet or quilt on the deceased. Nasim (PW14) is the neighbor of the deceased. He has stated that he did not go to the spot. 17. The deceased’s 10-years-old daughter Mehak (PW4), has also not supported the prosecution. She has stated that her mother had poured kerosene oil on herself and set herself on fire. According to her evidence, the accused persons had not beaten her mother, her mother had no quarrel with them nor had they burnt her mother. 18. PW1 Mahtab is the husband of the deceased. He has deposed that his daughter Mehak had told him that her mother was burnt. According to him, his wife was taken to the hospital located in Muzzaffarnagar and after that she was taken to Jaslok Hospital, Roorkee, where the doctor admitted her and bandaged her. She was taken to Pal Nursing Home from Jaslok Hospital. He has stated in his cross-examination that when his wife was in Jaslok Hospital and Pal Nursing Home, she did not blame anyone for her burning nor did she take anyone’s name. Even though he had asked his wife several times, she did not take anyone’s name. Whatever statement was given by his wife, she gave it under the influence of his in-laws because his in-laws were not happy with the love marriage between him and the deceased. 19. PW5 Shamim Ahmad is the father of the deceased and informant of this case. He stated that about 10-11 years ago his daughter had married Mahtab of her own will. He had lodged an FIR through his written information (Ext. Ka.1), but he has not given any statement that his daughter had told him anything regarding her burning. 19. PW5 Shamim Ahmad is the father of the deceased and informant of this case. He stated that about 10-11 years ago his daughter had married Mahtab of her own will. He had lodged an FIR through his written information (Ext. Ka.1), but he has not given any statement that his daughter had told him anything regarding her burning. 20. PW6 Smt. Hamida is the mother of the deceased. She has stated that the deceased had told her in Pal Nursing Home that the accused persons had burnt her, but the witness has not made it clear as to when the deceased had given her the said statement, because she has stated in her cross-examination that when the police and Magistrate came to Pal Nursing Home, she told them that she did not know anything. 21. It is quite natural that when such an incident occurs, the neighbors would definitely try to ask the injured how the incident had happened. The neighbors of the deceased, on whom the prosecution has expressed confidence, have not supported the prosecution case. The daughter of the deceased has also not supported the prosecution. According to the dying declaration, respondent-accused Irshad had hit her with his foot, due to which she fell from the stairs, while Dr. Rajendra Pal (PW7) has deposed that apart from burn injuries, there was no other injury on her body. 22. Shahista was first taken to the hospital located in Muzzaffarnagar, then she was taken to Jaslok Hospital, Roorkee and from there to Pal Nursing Home. According to Dr. Rajendra Pal (PW7), Shahista had to meet other persons in Pal Nursing Home. Therefore, even before 21.04.2011, she had ample opportunity to explain how she had received burn injuries. Therefore, in the light of the entire circumstances arising after assessment of the entire evidence produced by the prosecution, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the deceased had given the dying declaration after being induced by her parents cannot be ruled out. 23. The present case rests on circumstantial evidence. No one had seen the assault by the respondents on the deceased. 23. The present case rests on circumstantial evidence. No one had seen the assault by the respondents on the deceased. It is a well established law that in cases of the circumstantial evidence, the chain of evidence should be complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. Even grave suspicion cannot take place of proof. 24. On a detailed examination and scrutiny of the evidence of the prosecution, this Court upholds the view taken by the Trial Court. In our considered view, the prosecution has failed to establish the commission of the alleged offence by the respondents beyond all reasonable doubt. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment impugned herein. 25. As a result, the present Appeal is liable to be dismissed. The Government Appeal is dismissed accordingly.