JUDGMENT ON BOARD : Goutam Bhaduri, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment & decree dated 3-9- 2021 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Ambikapur (Surguja), in civil suit No.9-B/2015 whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff claiming damages for malicious prosecution was dismissed. Being aggrieved by such judgment, the present appeal. 2. (i) The plaintiff filed a suit against three of the State authorities wherein the defendant No.4 was also arrayed in his personal capacity. According to the plaintiff, he was working as a Principal, Oriental Public School Navagarh, Ambikapur, from 1994. It was established in 1990. The pleading shows that the school used to impart education from LKG to Class XII under the pattern of CBSE (Central Board of Secondary Education), Delhi. It was pleaded that about 1800 students were studying. In the said school, 55 teachers and 40 office staff members were working. The school was spread over in the lands situated in village Navagarh, which comprises a sports ground also. The school had a reputation that large number of students from different parts of the vicinity used to study. (ii) The plaintiff stated that owing to political rivalry, the defendants No.1 to 3 forcibly entered into the school premises on 3-9-2011 and seized the tractor trolley bearing registration No.CG-15-A-8606 & CG-15-A-8607, respectively and took away to the Forest Office at South Surguja. According to the plaintiff, it was informed to the police. Subsequent to such seizure, the case was registered for confiscation bearing POR No.16225/12 and the allegations were there that the plaintiff has illegally excavated the Murum from the forest land. Pursuant thereto the tractor trolley was seized with the Murum and initiated the confiscation proceedings. The plaintiff stated that the said tractor trolley stationed in school premises and no transportation of Murum was carried out from any forest land. The tractor trolley was directed to be confiscated by the competent authority on 15-2-2013. (iii) Being aggrieved by such confiscation order, the plaintiff had filed an appeal before the appellate authority under Section 52A of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (for short ‘the Act, 1927’) wherein the said appeal was dismissed by order dated 31-8-2013. The tractor trolley was directed to be confiscated by the competent authority on 15-2-2013. (iii) Being aggrieved by such confiscation order, the plaintiff had filed an appeal before the appellate authority under Section 52A of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (for short ‘the Act, 1927’) wherein the said appeal was dismissed by order dated 31-8-2013. Against the said order, criminal revision bearing No.94/2013 was preferred wherein the First Additional Sessions Judge by order dated 31-5-2014 allowed the revision and set aside the orders of both the competent authority and the appellate authority, which was for confiscation of tractor trolley. According to the plaintiff, since clear finding was recorded by the First Additional Sessions Judge that the Forest Department failed to prove the land from which the seizure of tractor trolley was made was that of a forest land and the alleged Murum was excavated from forest land. Thereafter, the tractor trolley was taken back. While the tractor trolley was being taken back it was completely in wrecked condition and many parts were missing. (iv) The plaintiff stated that while tractor trolley was seized it was in the state of mobility and while the return was made after 1105 days it almost turned scraped. The plaintiff sought for payment of amount of damages of cost of tractor trolley to the extent of Rs. 4,50,000/-; the accumulated rent of Rs. 5,52,500/- (at the rate of Rs. 500/- per day x 1105 days); defamation was valued at Rs. 5,00,000/-; as also the notice charge of Rs. 2,000/-, in total Rs. 15,04,500/- was claimed. 3. The defendants filed their written statement and denied all the plaint averments. It was stated that the plaintiff had already filed a complaint before the police, but the police having investigated found that the action of the State was justified. 4. The plaintiff on his behalf examined as many as five witnesses namely; himself (Israr Ahmed Khan Suri) as PW-1; Mohib Khalifa (PW-2); Ashfaq Ahmed Khan (PW-3); Santosh Tekam (PW-4); and Babulal Vishwakarma (PW-5) whereas the defendant examined one witness namely; Vijendra Singh Thakur (DW-1) 5. On the basis of pleadings made by the parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had admitted his fault on a show cause notice addressed, therefore, no relief can be granted. Thus, this appeal. 6. On the basis of pleadings made by the parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had admitted his fault on a show cause notice addressed, therefore, no relief can be granted. Thus, this appeal. 6. (a) Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff would submit that the finding has been recorded by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge in criminal revision that the defendant has failed to prove the fact that the land from which the alleged Murum was excavated was a forest land. He would further submit that the statement of the witness on behalf of the Forest Department they admitted the fact that the tractor trolley was seized from the premises of the school, which was clearly demarcated by the boundaries and without any demarcation report with a bad intent the seizure of the tractor trolley was made. (b) Learned counsel would also submit that thereafter eventually when the plaintiff succeeded in the criminal revision, the tractor trolley was returned after 1105 days which was completely in the wrecked condition and few parts were missing, which is also proved by the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled for such decree apart from the fact that he was deprived to use the tractor for a long period of more than three years, which has caused whopping loss apart from the fact that parts of tractor had gone missing from the premises of the defendant. He would submit that the trial Court completely misdirected itself to dismiss the suit on the basis of show cause, which was not a part of the record, therefore, on an evidence outside the purview of the Court, the Court has dismissed the suit. He would submit that consequently the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside by grant of monetary decree in favour of the plaintiff. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants No.1 to 3/State, per contra, would submit that only technical benefits were given to the plaintiff and no evidence has been adduced in the civil suit to justify the claim. Referring to the statement of Vijendra Singh Thakur (DW-1), learned counsel would submit that since the proceedings were quasi judicial one, the suit for malicious prosecution could have been entertained. Referring to the statement of Vijendra Singh Thakur (DW-1), learned counsel would submit that since the proceedings were quasi judicial one, the suit for malicious prosecution could have been entertained. He would submit that even the statement of plaintiff witnesses would show that the plaintiff has failed to prove incurring loss per day. According to the learned counsel, at para 7 of the plaint it is alleged that owing to political influence, the authorities acted against the plaintiff in a malicious manner, but they have not been made a party, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trail Court is well merited, which do not call for any interference of this Court. 8. (A) Learned counsel appearing for the defendant No.4, who has arrayed in his personal capacity, would submit that from the cause title of the plaint would show the intent of the plaintiff that he wanted to catch hold of the defendant No.4 when he stood retired from service. He would submit that the statement of the witnesses would show that there was complete Forest team of Dilip Singh, Satish Bahadur Singh and Pushpa Kumar Singh along with the plaintiff but taking into benefit that the defendant No.4 has retired from service he has been inculpated, which itself shows that the suit itself is filed with malicious intent. He would submit that when Section 69 of the Act, 1927 draws a presumption that any property which is from the forest belongs to Government and action was taken by the forest team and no categorical role has been referred that too of the defendant No.4. (B) According to the learned counsel, in a quasi judicial proceeding the plaintiff cannot be allowed to take benefit. He would also submit that the plaintiff has failed to plead and prove the ownership of the tractor trolley. Referring to the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others vs. Kallo Bai, (2017) 14 SCC 502 and Prof. Sumer Chand vs. Union of India and Others, (1994) 1 SCC 64 learned counsel would submit that in the case of like nature in order to prove malicious prosecution the plaintiff was required to plead and prove the fact elaborately which cannot be accepted and without any pleading no statement can be accepted. Sumer Chand vs. Union of India and Others, (1994) 1 SCC 64 learned counsel would submit that in the case of like nature in order to prove malicious prosecution the plaintiff was required to plead and prove the fact elaborately which cannot be accepted and without any pleading no statement can be accepted. He would submit that dismissal of the suit against the defendant No.4 by the trial Court is well merited, which do not call for any interference of this Court. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 10. Pleading and evidence would show that the tractor trolley bearing registration No.CG-15-A-8606 & CG-15-A-8607 was seized by the forest officials on 3-9-2011 on the ground that the tractor trolley was involved in excavating Murum from the forest land. Subsequent thereto the confiscation proceeding started. Notice was served to the plaintiff and the order of confiscation passed by the competent authority is Ex.P/2. Reading of it would show that admittedly the entire proceeding was premised over the admitted fact that the plaintiff is the owner of tractor trolley for which the proceeding under the provisions of the Act, 1927 was commenced, which is not in dispute. The order of confiscation was initially passed by the competent authority in forest offence bearing No.16225/12. While passing the said order, the competent authority discussed the statement of officials in the preliminary enquiry which shows that one Dilip Singh, Assistant Range Officer in his statement admitted the fact that on the date of seizure on 3-9-2011 the tractor trolley was stationed inside the school premises. It also shows that adjacent to the school premises the forest land situates and the excavation was not done inside the school premises. According to the statement, the Murum was seized from the trolley. Likewise, in the statement of Satish Bahadur Singh the discussion finds that during the enquiry it was found that the tractor trolley was in side the school premises and no demarcation map was there on the date when the seizure was made. Statement of Pushpa Kumar Singh would show that separate demarcation report of the land was not attached and after seizure the tractor trolley was driven to the premises of the Forest. 11. This order of confiscation was subject of appeal. The appellate order is dated 31-8-2013 (Ex.P/23). Statement of Pushpa Kumar Singh would show that separate demarcation report of the land was not attached and after seizure the tractor trolley was driven to the premises of the Forest. 11. This order of confiscation was subject of appeal. The appellate order is dated 31-8-2013 (Ex.P/23). By the said order the appellate authority affirmed the order of confiscation passed by the competent authority. Thereafter, the plaintiff challenged the appellate order in criminal revision before the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur. The said Court by order dated 31-5-2014 (Ex.P/1) allowed the revision and set aside the order of confiscation. 12. While passing such an order the Court observed that adjacent to the land of school premises, the forest land bearing No.2582 situates and the tractor trolley was seized on the ground that it has excavated the Murum illegally from the forest land. The Court reiterated the fact that the tractor trolley was stationed inside the school premises and further fortified the fact on the ground that no demarcation report was attached, which would demarcate the land of the forest and the land of the school. The Court also observed that the Murum which was easily available was made to seize, but the Murum which was alleged to be excavated from the forest land was not matched and the POR on which the initial process of confiscation started the demarcation report was not attached. Considering the statement of the witnesses, the Court observed that after marshaling the evidence of witnesses, this has not come to fore that the tractor trolley was in the forest land and the demarcation report was completely absurd. After the revision was allowed the order of confiscation as also the order of appellate authority merged in it. 13. Admittedly, there was no further challenge to the revisional order dated 31-5-2014 (Ex.P/1), and, as such, the same has attained its finality. Therefore, according to the final order, which was passed, the confiscation and the seizure of tractor trolley though was alleged to be made from the forest land but it was found to be from the school premises and the Forest Department was unable to prove the fact that any Murum was seized, which was excavated from the forest land. 14. Now coming back to the statement of witnesses. Plaintiff Israr Ahmed Khan Suri has examined himself as PW-1. 14. Now coming back to the statement of witnesses. Plaintiff Israr Ahmed Khan Suri has examined himself as PW-1. He stated that he is working as Principal of the School wherefrom the tractor trolley was seized. According to him, on 3-9-2011 due to political pressure the defendants entered into school premises and took the tractor trolley to the forest office and thereafter proceeding started. Examination-in-chief further narrates that different proceedings were carried out before the competent authority, appellate authority and the revisional Court. DW-1 Vijendra Singh Thakur, Sub Divisional Officer (Forest) stated that on 3-9-2011 the Forest Department seized the tractor trolley for the reason that it had excavated Murum from the forest land. He further stated that the benefit of revisional order dated 31-5-2014 cannot be given to the plaintiff, as the confiscation proceeding was based on technical grounds. However, when we went through the order dated 31-5- 2014 we find that elaborate discussion was made and the fact finding was recorded by the revisional Court, therefore, the statement of DW-1 Vijendra Singh Thakur itself would show that the interpretation was made in its own way without having read in between the lines of the order dated 31-5-2014 (Ex.P/1). Cross- examination of this witness would show that he was not posted in the office, which proceeded with the confiscation proceeding in the year 2011 as he was posted there in the year 2019. Statement of this witness further would show that the confiscation proceeding was started on the basis of POR, but it did not contain the demarcation report as per the office file. The cross- examination further would show that he was unable to state as to how the alleged mining was carried out in the forest land. 15. Statements of PW-2 Mohib Khalifa and PW-3 Ashfaq Ahmed Khan would lament the fact that the premises from which the tractor trolley was seized, no evidence was on record or demarcation report was produced to show that the said land was within the forest land. 16. After the confiscation proceeding was set aside by the revisional Court by order dated 31-5-2014 (Ex.P/1), the defendant by communication dated 30-6-2014 (Ex.P/6) directed for return of the tractor trolley to the plaintiff, being the owner. While taking delivery of the vehicle, the panchnama was prepared on 2-7-2014 vide Ex.P/5A. 16. After the confiscation proceeding was set aside by the revisional Court by order dated 31-5-2014 (Ex.P/1), the defendant by communication dated 30-6-2014 (Ex.P/6) directed for return of the tractor trolley to the plaintiff, being the owner. While taking delivery of the vehicle, the panchnama was prepared on 2-7-2014 vide Ex.P/5A. The missing parts of the tractor in total 15 were shown i.e. (i) silencer; (ii) Air Cleaner; (iii) Battery; (iv) Dynamo; (v) Self; (vi) Pump; (vii) Oil Pipe; (viii) Side Mirror; (ix) Horn; (x) Hood; (xi) Both back lights; (xii) Seat & Steering Cover; (xiii) Leg Guard; (xiv) Cover of fuel tank; (xv) Two numbers of Hub Bolt. 17. From the statement of PW-1 Israr Ahmed Khan Suri & PW-2 Mohib Khalifa it is manifest that the tractor was returned after a period of 1105 days. Cross-examination of PW-2 Mohib Khalifa this also would show that suggestion was given that the plaintiff is the owner of the tractor trolley, albeit the fact remains that he has not seen the registration. The tractor mechanic namely; Babulal Vishwakarma (PW-5) supported that he has also inspected the tractor trolley and various parts were missing and because of circulation of water in the engine, the same was ceased and the tractor was completely in non-workable condition. Subsequently, certain bills have been produced for repair of the tractor. The statement of PW-2 Mohib Khalifa would show that the tractor was kept in an open place. 18. As per the plaintiff, the bills of payment which required to repair the tractor are from Ex.P/7 to Ex.P/18. Total amount accumulated to Rs. 89,928/-. The plaintiff further stated that he used to earn Rs. 500/- per day from the tractor. Similar statement has been made by PW-3 Ashfaq Ahmed Khan, but it is apparent that no documents have been produced to support that the tractor trolley was being given on rent at the rate of Rs. 500/- per day earlier to such seizure. To appreciate the loss, no register or any receipt was produced on record to connect the income at the rate of Rs. 500/- per day. 19. The plaintiff Israr Ahmed khan Suri (PW-1) in para 20 of the cross-examination categorically stated that he does not have any document to show that he was earning Rs. 500/- per day by rent of tractor trolley. The other claim is for defamation of Rs. 5.00 lacs. 500/- per day. 19. The plaintiff Israr Ahmed khan Suri (PW-1) in para 20 of the cross-examination categorically stated that he does not have any document to show that he was earning Rs. 500/- per day by rent of tractor trolley. The other claim is for defamation of Rs. 5.00 lacs. As to what is the degree of defamation caused nothing is on record to appreciate. Only bald statement has been made that it has ruined his reputation, but no independent witness to support that how the image was lowered down before the public at large is not on record except the fact of repair of tractor. 20. The concept of ‘defamation’ has been extensively dealt with in various definitions, descriptions and analytical perceptions regard being had to its ingredients and expanse which clearly show the solemnity of ‘fame’ and its sapient characteristics. “Defamation”, according to Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, means to take away or destroy the good fame or reputation. 21. The Supreme Court in the matter of Subramanian Swamy v Union of India, Ministry of Law and Others, (2016) 7 SCC 221 held thus at paras 23.2, 23.4, 23.9, 25 and 169 : 23.2.Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, defines “defamatory statement” as under : “10. Defamatory statement.—A defamatory statement is a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally or to cause him to be shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to him in his office, profession, calling, trade or business.” 23.4. “Defamation”, according to Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, means to take away or destroy the good fame or reputation; to speak evil of; to charge falsely or to asperse. According to Salmond : “The wrong of defamation, consists in the publication of a false and defamatory statement concerning another person without lawful justification. The wrong has always been regarded as one in which the court should have the advantage of the personal presence of the parties if justice is to be done. According to Salmond : “The wrong of defamation, consists in the publication of a false and defamatory statement concerning another person without lawful justification. The wrong has always been regarded as one in which the court should have the advantage of the personal presence of the parties if justice is to be done. Hence, not only does an action of defamation not survive for or against the estate of a deceased person, but a statement about a deceased person is not actionable at the suit of his relative.” 23.9.Carter Ruck on Libel and Slander has carved out some of the tests as under : (Manisha Koirala case, SCC OnLine Bom para 23) “(1) A statement concerning any person which exposes him to hatred, ridicule, or contempt, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his office, profession or trade. (2) A false statement about a man to his discredit. (3) Would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally?” CONCEPT OF REPUTATION 25. Having dealt about “defamation”, we would like to refer to the intrinsic facets of “reputation” and what constitutes reputation. The allusions would clearly exposit the innate universal value of “reputation” and how it is a cherished constituent of life and not limited or restricted by time. The description may be different, but the crucial base is the same. 169. In Jeffrey J. Diermeier vs. State of W.B., a two-Judge Bench deliberated on the aspect as to what constitutes defamation under Section 499 IPC and in that context, it held that there must be an imputation and such imputation must have been made with the intention of harming or knowing or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person about whom it is made. In essence, the offence of defamation is the harm caused to the reputation of a person. It would be sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant, irrespective of whether the complainant actually suffered directly or indirectly from the imputation alleged. 22. In respect of other aspect of damages, the plaintiff could not prove the same. It would be sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant, irrespective of whether the complainant actually suffered directly or indirectly from the imputation alleged. 22. In respect of other aspect of damages, the plaintiff could not prove the same. The fact that the tractor trolley was seized on 3-9-2011 and was released after 1105 days in the year 2014 is evident from the documents, therefore, in other sequence the plaintiff suffered loss and deprivation for use of tractor trolley apart from the damages which caused. 23. The plaintiff has brought this suit on the ground of malicious prosecution. The Supreme Court in the matter of West Bengal State Electricity Board vs. Dilip Kumar Ray, (2007) 14 SCC 568 while dealing with the malicious prosecution has explained the nature as such and has laid down that the prosecution on some charge of crime which is wilful, wanton, or reckless, or against the prosecutor’s sense of duty and right, or for ends he knows or its bound to know or wrong and against the dictates of public policy. While explaining the malicious prosecution the Supreme Court held thus at para 15 : 15. Malice and malicious prosecution as stated in Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn. by P. Ramanatha Aiyar read as follows: “Malice.—Unlawful intent. Ill will; intent to commit an unlawful act or cause harm. Express or actual malice is ill will or spite towards the plaintiff or any indirect or improper motive in the defendant's mind at the time of the publication which is his sole or dominant motive for publishing the words complained of. This must be distinguished from legal malice or malice in law which means publication without lawful excuse and does not depend upon the defendant's state of mind. (1) The intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. (2) Reckless disregard of the law or of a person's legal rights. (3) Ill will; wickedness of heart. This sense is most typical in non-legal contexts. ‘Malice means in law wrongful intention. It includes any intent which the law deems wrongful, and which therefore serves as a ground of liability. Any act done with such an intent is, in the language of the law, malicious, and this legal usage has etymology in its favour. This sense is most typical in non-legal contexts. ‘Malice means in law wrongful intention. It includes any intent which the law deems wrongful, and which therefore serves as a ground of liability. Any act done with such an intent is, in the language of the law, malicious, and this legal usage has etymology in its favour. The Latin malitia means badness, physical or moral— wickedness in disposition or in conduct—not specifically or exclusively ill will or malevolence; hence the malice of English law, including all forms of evil purpose, design, intent, or motive. [But] intent is of two kinds, being either immediate or ulterior, the ulterior intent being commonly distinguished as the motive. The term malice is applied in law to both these forms of intent, and the result is a somewhat puzzling ambiguity which requires careful notice. When we say that an act is done maliciously, we mean one of the two distinct things. We mean either that it is done intentionally, or that it is done with some wrongful motive.’ ‘Malice in the legal sense imports (1) the absence of all elements of justification, excuse or recognised mitigation, and (2) the presence of either (a) an actual intent to cause the particular harm which is produced or harm of the same general nature, or (b) the wanton and wilful doing of an act with awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result…. The Model Penal Code does not use “malice” because those who formulated the Code had a blind prejudice against the word. This is very regrettable because it represents a useful concept despite some unfortunate language employed at times in the effort to express it.’ ‘MALICE’ in the legal acceptance of the word is not confined to personal spite against individuals but consists in a conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another. In its legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. ‘Malice’, in its legal sense, does not necessarily signify ill will towards a particular individual, but denotes that condition of mind which is manifested by the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Therefore the law implies malice where one deliberately injures another in an unlawful manner. Malice means an indirect wrong motive. ‘Malice’, in its legal sense, does not necessarily signify ill will towards a particular individual, but denotes that condition of mind which is manifested by the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Therefore the law implies malice where one deliberately injures another in an unlawful manner. Malice means an indirect wrong motive. ‘… “malice” in its legal sense means, malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause.’ Malice, in ordinary common parlance, means ill will against a person, and in legal sense, a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or reason. It is a question of motive, intention or state of mind and may be defined as any corrupt or wrong motive or personal spite or ill will. ‘Malice’ in common law or acceptance means ill will against a person, but in legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. It signifies an intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse or an action determined by an improper motive. “MALICE”, in common acceptation, means, ill will against a person; but in its legal sense, it means, a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse’ … Malice in its common acceptation, is a term involving some intent of the mind and heart, including the will; and has been said to mean a bad mind; ill will against a person; a wicked or evil state of the mind towards another; an evil intent or wish or design to vex or annoy another; a wilful intent to do a wrongful act; a wish to vex, annoy or injure another person or an intent to do a wrongful act; a condition of the mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief. “MALICE” means wickedness of purpose, or a spiteful or malevolent design against another; a purpose to injure another; a design of doing mischief, or any evil design or inclination to do a bad thing, or a reckless disregard to the rights of others, or absence or legal excuse, or any other motive than that of bringing a party to justice.’ ‘The meaning of the term malice in English law, has been a question of much difficulty and controversy; and those who made through the many disquisitions on the subjects in textbooks and judicial opinions are almost tempted to the conclusion that the meaning varies almost infinitely, and that the only sense which the term can safely be predicated not to have in any given legal context is that which it has in popular language viz. spite or ill will. It certainly has different meanings with respect to responsibility for civil wrongs and responsibility for crime; and even with respect to crime it has a different sense according as it is used with reference to murder, libel, or the capacity of an infant to commit crime, expressed by the rule malitia supplet act item.’ (Ency. of the Laws of England.) Ordinarily, the absence of reasonable and probable cause in instituting a proceeding which terminates in favour of the plaintiff, would give rise to the inference of malice. MALICE has been said to mean any wrong or indirect motive but a prosecution is not malicious merely because it is inspired by anger. However, wrong-headed a prosecutor may be, if he honestly thinks that the accused has been guilty of a criminal offence he cannot be initiator of a malicious prosecution. MALICE means the presence of some improper and wrongful motive—that is to say an intent to use the legal process in question for some other than its legally appointed and appropriate purpose. It means an improper or indirect motive other than a desire to vindicate public justice or a private right. It need not necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or ill will; it may be due to a desire to obtain a collateral advantage. *** MALICE in fact is malue animus indicating that action against a party was actuated by spite or ill will against him or by indirect or improper motives. It need not necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or ill will; it may be due to a desire to obtain a collateral advantage. *** MALICE in fact is malue animus indicating that action against a party was actuated by spite or ill will against him or by indirect or improper motives. MALICE : HATRED : AVERSION : ANTIPATHY : ENMITY : REPUGNANCE : ILL WILL : RANCOUR : MALEVOLENCE : MALIGNITY : MALIGNANCY. Hatred is a very general term. Hatred applies properly to persons. It seems not absolutely involuntary. It has its root in passion, and may be checked or stimulated and indulged. Aversion is strong dislike. Aversion is a habitual sentiment, and springs from the natural taste or temperament which repels its opposites, as an indolent man has an aversion to industry, or a humane one to cruelty. Antipathy is used of causeless dislike, or at least one of which the cause cannot be defined. It is found upon supposition or instinctive belief, often utterly gratuitous. Enmity is the state of personal opposition, whether accompanied by strong personal dislike or not; as ‘a bitter enemy’. Repugnance is characteristically employed of acts or courses of action, measures, pursuits, and the like. Ill will is a settled bias of the disposition. It is very indefinite, and may be of any degree or strength. Rancour is a deep-seated and lasting feeling of ill will. It preys upon the very mind of the subject of it. While enmity may be generous and open, rancour is malignant and private. Malice is that enmity which can abide its opportunity of injuring its object, and pervert the truth or the right, or go out of its way, or shape course of action, to compass its ends. ‘Malevolence commences with some idea or evil belonging to and connected with the object; and it settles into a permanent hatred of his person and of everything relative to him’ — (Gogan). Malignity is cruel malevolence, or innate love of harm for the sake of doing it. It is malice the most energetic, inveterate, and sustained. *** Malice in fact.—‘Malice in fact’ means express malice. MALICE IN FACT OR ACTUAL MALICE, relates to the actual state or condition of the mind of the person who did the act. Malignity is cruel malevolence, or innate love of harm for the sake of doing it. It is malice the most energetic, inveterate, and sustained. *** Malice in fact.—‘Malice in fact’ means express malice. MALICE IN FACT OR ACTUAL MALICE, relates to the actual state or condition of the mind of the person who did the act. Malice in fact is where the malice is not established by legal presumption or proof of certain facts, but is to be found from the evidence in the case. Malice in fact implies a desire or intention to injure, while malice in law is not necessarily inconsistent with an honest purpose. Malice in law.—‘Malice in law’ means implied malice. ‘MALICE IN LAW’ simply means a depraved inclination on the part of a person to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by his injurious acts. *** Malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause. S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India [ (1979) 2 SCC 491 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 216 : AIR 1979 SC 49 ], AIR at p. 51. *** Malicious.—Done with malice or an evil design; wilful; indulging in malice, harboring ill will, or enmity malevolent, malignant in heart; committed wantonly, wilfully, or without cause, or done not only wilfully and intentionally, but out of cruelty, hostility of revenge; done in wilful neglect of a known obligation. ‘MALICIOUS’ means with a fixed hate, or done with evil intention or motive; not the result of sudden passion. *** Malicious abuse of civil proceedings.—In general, a person may utilise any form of legal process without any liability, save liability to pay the costs of proceedings if unsuccessful. But an action lies for initiating civil proceedings, such as action, presentation of a bankruptcy or winding-up petition, an unfounded claim to property, not only unsuccessfully but maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause and resulting in damage to the plaintiff. (Walker) Malicious abuse of legal process.—A malicious abuse of legal process consists in the malicious misuse or misapplication of process to accomplish a purpose not warranted or commanded by order of court— the malicious perversion of a regularly issued process, whereby an improper result is secured. (Walker) Malicious abuse of legal process.—A malicious abuse of legal process consists in the malicious misuse or misapplication of process to accomplish a purpose not warranted or commanded by order of court— the malicious perversion of a regularly issued process, whereby an improper result is secured. There is a distinction between a malicious use and a malicious abuse of legal process. An abuse is where the party employs it for some unlawful object—not the purpose which it is intended by the law to effect; in other words, a perversion of it. Malicious abuse of process.— Wilfully misapplying court process to obtain object not intended by law. The wilful misuse or misapplication of process to accomplish a purpose not warranted or commanded by the writ. An action for malicious abuse of process lies in the following cases. A malicious petition or proceeding to adjudicate a person an insolvent, to declare a person lunatic or to wind up a company, to make action against legal practitioner under the Legal Practitioners Act, maliciously procuring arrest or attachment in execution of a decree or before judgment, order or injunction or appointment of receiver, arrest of a ship, search of the plaintiff's premises, arrest of a person by police. Malicious abuse of process of court.—*** Malicious act.—Bouvier defined a malicious act as ‘a wrongful act, intentionally done, without cause or excuse’. A malicious act is one committed in a state of mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief—a wrongful act intentionally done, without legal justification or excuse. *** ‘A malicious act is an act characterised by a pre- existing or an accompanying malicious state of mind. …’ Malicious prosecution—Malice.—Malice means an improper or indirect motive other than a desire to vindicate public justice or a private right. It need not necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or ill will. It may be due to a desire to obtain a collateral advantage. The principles to be borne in mind in the case of actions for malicious prosecutions are these:— Malice is not merely the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but it must be established that the defendant was actuated by malus animus, that is to say, by spite or ill will or any indirect or improper motive. The principles to be borne in mind in the case of actions for malicious prosecutions are these:— Malice is not merely the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but it must be established that the defendant was actuated by malus animus, that is to say, by spite or ill will or any indirect or improper motive. But if the defendant had reasonable or probable cause of launching the criminal prosecution no amount of malice will make him liable for damages. Reasonable and probable cause must be such as would operate on the mind of a discreet and reasonable man; ‘malice’ and ‘want of reasonable and probable cause,’ have reference to the state of the defendant's mind at the date of the initiation of criminal proceedings and the onus rests on the plaintiff to prove them. OTHER DEFINITIONS OF ‘MALICIOUS PROSECUTION’.—‘A judicial proceeding instituted by one person against another, from wrongful or improper motive and without probable cause to sustain it.’ ‘A prosecution begun in malice, without probable cause to believe that it can succeed and which finally ends in failure.’ ‘A prosecution instituted wilfully and purposely, to gain some advantage to the prosecutor, or through mere wantonness or carelessness, if it be at the same time wrong and unlawful within the knowledge of the actor, and without probable cause.’ ‘A prosecution on some charge of crime which is wilful, wanton, or reckless, or against the prosecutor's sense of duty and right, or for ends he knows or is bound to know are wrong and against the dictates of public policy.’ The term ‘malicious prosecution’ imports a causeless as well as an ill-intended prosecution. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION is a prosecution on some charge of crime which is wilful, wanton, or reckless, or against the prosecutor's sense of duty and right, or for ends he knows or its bound to know are wrong and against the dictates of public policy. In malicious prosecution there are two essential elements, namely, that no probable cause existed for instituting the prosecution or suit complained of, and that such prosecution or suit terminated in some way favorably to the defendant therein. 1. The institution of a criminal or civil proceeding for an improper purpose and without probable cause. 2. The cause of action resulting from the institution of such a proceeding. 1. The institution of a criminal or civil proceeding for an improper purpose and without probable cause. 2. The cause of action resulting from the institution of such a proceeding. Once a wrongful prosecution has ended in the defendant's favor, he or she may sue for tort damages—Also termed (in the context of civil proceedings) malicious use of process. (Black's, 7th Edn., 1999) ‘The distinction between an action for malicious prosecution and an action for abuse of process is that a malicious prosecution consists in maliciously causing process to be issued, whereas an abuse of process is the employment of legal process for some purpose other than that which it was intended by the law to effect—the improper use of a regularly issued process. For instance, the initiation of vexatious civil proceedings known to be groundless is not abuse of process, but is governed by substantially the same rules as the malicious prosecution of criminal proceedings.’ 52 Am. Jur. 2dMalicious Prosecution S. 2, at 187 (1970). The term ‘malice,’ as used in the expression ‘malicious prosecution’ is not to be considered in the sense of spite or hatred against an individual, but of malus animus, and as denoting that the party is actuated by improper and indirect motives. As a general rule of law, any person is entitled though not always bound to lay before a judicial officer information as to any criminal offence which he has reasonable and probable cause to believe has been committed, with a view to ensuring the arrest, trial, and punishment of the offender. This principle is thus stated in Lightbody case [1882, 9 Rettie, 934] :‘When it comes to the knowledge of anybody that a crime has been committed a duty is laid on that person as a citizen of the country to state to the authorities what he knows respecting the commission of the crime, and if he states, only what he knows and honestly believes he cannot be subjected to an action of damages merely because it turns out that the person as to whom he has given the information is after all not guilty of the crime. In such cases to establish liability the pursuer must show that the informant acted from malice i.e. “not in discharge of his public duty but from an illegitimate motive,” and must also prove that the statements were made or the information given without any reasonable grounds of belief, or other information given without probable cause; and Lord Shand added (p. 940):“He has not only a duty but a right when the cause affects his own property.” Most criminal prosecutions are conducted by private citizens in the name of the Crown. This exercise of civic rights constitutes what with reference to the law of libel is termed a privileged occasion; but if the right is abused, the person injured thereby is, in certain events, entitled to a remedy. (See H. Stephen, Malicious Prosecution, 1888; Bullen and Leake, Prec. P1., Clerk and Lindsell. Torts, Pollock, Torts; LQR, April 1898; Vin., Abr., tit. ‘Action on the Case’ Ency. of the Laws of England.) MALICIOUS PROSECUTION means that the proceedings which are complained of, were initiated from a malicious spirit i.e. from an indirect and improper motive, and not in furtherance of justice. (Sri Nath Shaha v. L.E. Ralli. [The performance of a duty imposed by law, such as the institution of a prosecution as a necessary condition precedent to a civil action, does not constitute ‘malice’. (Abbott v. Refuge Assurance Co. [‘Malicious prosecution thus differs from wrongful arrest and detention, in that the onus of proving that the prosecutor did not act honestly or reasonably, lies on the person prosecuted’ (per Diplock, L.J. in Dallison v. Caffery [(1965) 1 QB 348 : (1964) 2 All ER 610 : (1964) 3 WLR 385 (CA)] )]. (Stroud, 6th Edn., 2000)” (emphasis in original) 24. Reading of the aforesaid decision with the evidence would show that the distinction between an action for malicious prosecution and an action for abuse of process is that a malicious prosecution consists in maliciously causing process to be issued, whereas an abuse of process is the employment of legal process for some purpose other than that which it was intended by the law to effect. The improper use of a regularly issued process. 25. In the instant case though the complaint is made about malicious prosecution, but the fact that the malicious spirit or improper motive is not brought to fore. The improper use of a regularly issued process. 25. In the instant case though the complaint is made about malicious prosecution, but the fact that the malicious spirit or improper motive is not brought to fore. The evidence of ill will or improper motive by respondents is absent. There is nothing on record to substantiate that no probable cause existed for instituting the prosecution which ended in favour of the appellant. It appears that deprivation of the plaintiff and seizure of tractor trolley was primarily on the ground that excavation of Murum was from the forest land but the fact is that the State did not get the order favourably in the revision because of the fact of demarcation dispute of forest land and private land. Though the plaintiff made a statement that the seizure of tractor trolley was with malice but the tenor of the order that the respondents were harboring malice does not appear to be brought in the said case. But, for the loss caused for such act of the State, it cannot be given complete protection as after the seizure of tractor trolley it was kept in an open place and while the same was seized it was in motorable condition. The plaintiff after receipt of the tractor trolley was required to get it repaired the cost of which amounting to Rs. 89,928/- was borne by him. So far the loss of earning, no evidence is on record as to how the earning of Rs. 500/- per day was being made. However, we are conscious of the fact that the plaintiff was deprived of the use of tractor trolley for about three years. 26. In view of the above, we deem it proper to grant of an amount at the rate of Rs. 7,500/- per month as damages for deprivation of the plaintiff to use the tractor trolley from the date of its seizure till the date of return to the plaintiff apart from an amount of Rs. 89,928/- which were required to be paid for repair of the tractor trolley. In respect of defamation, nothing is on record to evaluate the same and because of quasi judicial proceedings the tractor trolley was seized, therefore, it cannot be said that it would lead to defamation. 27. Accordingly, we direct the defendants No.1 to 3 to pay an amount at the rate of Rs. In respect of defamation, nothing is on record to evaluate the same and because of quasi judicial proceedings the tractor trolley was seized, therefore, it cannot be said that it would lead to defamation. 27. Accordingly, we direct the defendants No.1 to 3 to pay an amount at the rate of Rs. 7,500/- per month from 3-9-2011 (date of seizure) to 2-7-2014 (date of release) to the plaintiff apart from the repairing charges of tractor trolley to the tune of Rs. 89,928/-. 28. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. There shall be no order as to cost(s). A decree be drawn accordingly.