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2024 DIGILAW 271 (AP)

Kandi Pandu Ranga Reddy v. Union of India

2024-02-21

A.V.SESHA SAI, SUMATHI JAGADAM

body2024
JUDGMENT : A.V. SESHA SAI, J. 1. The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed challenging the E-auction Sale Notice, dated 27.10.2023, issued by the 1st respondent under Rule 8(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (for short 'the Rules'), proposing to sell the mortgaged scheduled properties on 16.11.2023. The present writ petition is concerned only with Item Nos.2 and 3 of the impugned notification. 2. The respondent-Bank issued E-auction notice, proposing to conduct public auction for the subject properties on 12.09.2023. In the said auction, for Item Nos.2 and 3 of the notification, the petitioner herein emerged as the successful bidder and he paid 25% of the bid amount out of the total sum of Rs.1,50,32,000/- on 12.09.2023 and 13.09.2023. Vide letter, dated 13.09.2023, respondent-bank issued confirmation order and instructed the petitioner to pay the balance 75% on or before 27.09.2023. By way of representation, dated 27.09.2023, the petitioner herein requested the respondent-bank to grant extension of time by 45 days for depositing balance of 75% of bid amount. According to the petitioner, the respondents did not give any response to the said representation though the said representation was acknowledged. It is also stated that subsequently also a representation, dated 27.10.2023 was made with a request to grant time to deposit the balance amount. Vide letter, dated 31.10.2023, the respondent-bank cancelled the bid and forfeited 25% of the bid amount paid by the petitioner stating that as per the auction notice, the successful bidder ought to pay 75% of the bid amount within 15 days from the date of auction and despite 30 days extension i.e., till 31.10.2023, the petitioner herein did not pay the said 75% of the bid amount. Thereafter, the respondent-Bank issued impugned E-auction notice, dated 27.10.2023, proposing to auction the properties on 16.11.2023. In the above background, assailing the said E-auction Notice, dated 27.10.2023, the present writ petition came to be filed. 3. Resisting the writ petition, a counter-affidavit has been filed by the 1st respondent-Bank. 4. Heard Sri K. Satyanarayana Murthy, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Smt. V. Dyumani, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Bank, apart from perusing the material available on record. 5. 3. Resisting the writ petition, a counter-affidavit has been filed by the 1st respondent-Bank. 4. Heard Sri K. Satyanarayana Murthy, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Smt. V. Dyumani, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Bank, apart from perusing the material available on record. 5. It is contended by Sri K. Satyanarayana Murty, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the action impugned in the present writ petition is highly illegal, arbitrary, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and opposed to the very spirit and object of the provisions of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Act, 2002 (for short 'the Act') and the Rules framed thereunder. In elaboration, it is further contended by the learned Counsel that the questioned action is also contrary to Rule 9 of the Rules and despite the fact that the petitioner herein made representations on 27.09.2023 and 27.10.2023 with a request to extend the period for depositing 75% of the bid amount, the respondent-bank authorities did not respond and on 31.10.2023, the petitioner was informed about the cancellation of the bid and forfeiture of 25% of the amount deposited by the petitioner. 6. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the said intimation letter, dated 31.10.2023 is illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable. In support of his submissions and contentions, learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. and others, 2023 SCC Online SC 1209. 7. Strongly resisting the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is submitted by Smt. V. Dyumani, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Bank that there is absolutely no illegality nor there exists any infirmity in the impugned action and in view of the same, interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not warranted. It is the further submission of the learned Standing Counsel that in view of availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner under Section 17 of the Act, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. It is further submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that it is not obligatory on the part of the respondent-Bank authorities to grant three (03) months and it is purely within the discretion of the bank authorities. It is further submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that it is not obligatory on the part of the respondent-Bank authorities to grant three (03) months and it is purely within the discretion of the bank authorities. It is also the submission that the respondent-bank authorities forfeited the amount deposited by the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of Rule 9 of the Rules and Clauses 19, 20 and 21 of the auction notification, dated 27.10.2023, as such, the impugned action cannot be faulted. 8. To bolster her submissions and contentions, learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank places reliance on the following judgments : (1) Agarwal Tracom Pvt. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank and others, (2018) 1 SCC 266. (2) Authorised Officer, State Bank of India v. C. Natarajan and others, CA No.2545/2023. (3) The Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, CA Nos.235-236 of 2024. 9. In the above background, the issue which this Court is called upon to consider and answer is : Whether the action impugned in the writ petition is sustainable and tenable and whether the petitioner is entitled for the relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? 10. The Parliament, to regulate the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto, brought in a legislation called "Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002". 11. The Central Government, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) and clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 38 read with sub-sections (4), (10) and (12) of Section 13 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (second) ordinance, 2002 (Ordinance 3 of 2002), framed the Rules called "The Security Interest Enforcement Rules, 2002" (for short 'the Rules'). 12. 12. Rule which is relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the issue in the present writ petition is Rule 9 of the Rules which reads as follows : Time of sale, issue of sale certificate and delivery of possession, etc.-[(1) No sale of immovable property under these rules, in first instance shall take place before the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the public notice of sale is published in newspapers as referred to in the proviso to sub-rule (6) of Rule 8 or notice of sale has been served to the borrower : Provided further that if sale of immovable property by any one of the methods specified by sub-rule (5) of Rule 8 fails and sale is required to be conducted again, the authorized officer shall serve, affix and publish notice of sale of not less than fifteen days to the borrower, for any subsequent sale.] [Substituted by Notification No.G.S.R.1046(E), dated 03.11.2016 (w.e.f. 20.9.2002). (2)The sale shall be confirmed in favour of the purchaser who has offered the highest sale price in his bid or tender or quotation or offer to the authorized officer and shall be subject to confirmation by the secured creditor : Provided that no sale under this rule shall be confirmed, if the amount offered by sale price is less than the reserve price, specified under sub-rule (5) of [Rule 8] [Substituted by Notification No.G.S.R.1046(E), dated 03.11.2016 (w.e.f. 20.9.2002).] Provided further that if the authorized officer fails to obtain a price higher than the reserve price, he may, with the consent of the borrower and the secured creditor effect the sale at such price. (3) [On every sale of immovable property, the purchaser shall immediately, i.e., on the same day or not later than next working day, as the case may be, pay a deposit of twenty five per cent. (3) [On every sale of immovable property, the purchaser shall immediately, i.e., on the same day or not later than next working day, as the case may be, pay a deposit of twenty five per cent. of the amount of the sale price, which is inclusive of earnest money deposited, if any, to the authorized officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit, the property shall be sold again;] [Substituted by Notification No.G.S.R.1046(E), dated 03.11.2016 (w.e.f. 20.9.2002).] (4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the authorized officer on or before the fifteenth day of confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended period [as may be agreed upon in writing between the purchaser and the secured creditor, in any case not exceeding three months] [Substituted by Notification No.G.S.R.1046(E), dated 03.11.2016 (w.e.f. 20.09.2002)]. (5) In default of payment within the period mentioned in sub-rule (4), the deposit shall be forfeited [to the secured creditor] [Inserted by Notification No.G.S.R.1046(E), dated 03.11.2016 (w.e.f. 20.09.2002).] and the property shall be resold and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claim to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may be subsequently sold. (6) On confirmation of sale by the secured creditor and if the terms of payment have been complied with, the authorized officer exercising the power of sale shall issue a certificate of sale of the immovable property in favour of the purchaser in the Form given in Appendix-V to these rules. (7) Where the immovable property sold is subject to any encumbrances, the authorized officer may, if he thinks fit, allow the purchaser to deposit with him the money required to discharge the encumbrances and any interest due thereon together with such additional amount that may be sufficient to meet the contingencies or further cost, expenses and interest as may be determined by him. (8) On such deposit of money for discharge of the encumbrances, the authorized officer may issue or cause the purchaser to issue notices to the persons interested in or entitled to the money deposited with him and take steps to make the payment accordingly. (9) The authorized officer shall deliver the property to the purchaser free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor on deposit of money as specified in sub-rule (7) above. (9) The authorized officer shall deliver the property to the purchaser free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor on deposit of money as specified in sub-rule (7) above. (10) The certificate of sale issued under sub-rule (6) shall specifically mention that whether the purchaser has purchased the immovable secured asset free from any encumbrances known to the secured creditor or not. 13. The issue in the present writ petition has to be examined in the light of the aforesaid provision of law. There is absolutely no dispute as regards the reality that for Item Nos.2 and 3 of the auction notice, dated 27.10.2023, the writ petitioner emerged as a successful bidder and he paid 25% of the bid amount out of total sum of Rs.1,50,32,000/- on 12.09.2023 and 13.09.2023. It is equally true that the respondent-bank authorities vide letter, dated 13.09.2023 confirmed the said sale and instructed the petitioner to deposit balance 75% on or before 27.09.2023. 14. The submissions of representations, dated 27.09.2023 and 27.10.2023, by the petitioner seeking extension of time to deposit the balance amount is not in dispute. It is significant to note in this context that on 27.10.2023, the respondent-bank authorities issued impugned E-auction notice, proposing to hold public auction for the subject properties on 16.11.2023. It is also pertinent to note that only after issuance of the auction notice, dated 27.10.2023, the respondent-bank, vide letter, dated 31.10.2023, informed the petitioner that despite granting time till 31.10.2023, he did not pay the amount. This aspect of issuance of E-auction notice on 27.10.2023, proposing to hold auction on 16.11.2023 on one hand and informing about the cancellation of the earlier auction and forfeiting 25% of the amount paid by the petitioner on the other hand, in the considered opinion of this Court is highly arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India besides being opposed to the very sprit and object of the provisions of the Act and the rules made there under. 15. It is also noted that even prior to the date of auction, dated 16.11.2023, in terms of subsequent E-auction notice, dated 27.10.2023, the petitioner herein paid entire 75% of the bid amount on 10.11.2023 in terms of the earlier auction notice. 16. 15. It is also noted that even prior to the date of auction, dated 16.11.2023, in terms of subsequent E-auction notice, dated 27.10.2023, the petitioner herein paid entire 75% of the bid amount on 10.11.2023 in terms of the earlier auction notice. 16. In this context, it may be appropriate to refer to the judgment cited by learned Counsel for the petitioner in case of Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. and others (supra). Paragraph No.100 of the said judgment reads as follows : 100. Bank is duty bound to follow the provisions of the law as any other litigant. It is to be noted that the Bank i.e., the secured creditor acts under the SARFAESI Act through the authorised officer who is appointed under Section 13(2). Thus, the authorised officer and the Bank cannot act in a manner so as to keep the sword hanging on the neck of the auction purchaser. The law treats everyone equally and that includes the Bank and its officers. The said enactments were enacted for speedy recovery and for benefitting the public at large and does not give any license to the Bank officers to act de hors the scheme of the law or the binding verdicts. 17. Coming to the judgments cited by the respondent-Bank-in case of Agarwal Tracom Pvt. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank and others (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at Paragraph Nos.18 and 30 held as follows : 18. The short question that arise for consideration in this appeal is whether the High Court was justified in holding that the remedy of the appellant (auction purchaser) lies in challenging the action of the secured creditor (PNB) in forfeiting the deposit by filing an application under Section 17 of the Act before the DRT or the remedy of auction purchaser is in filing the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India to examine the legality of such action. 30. In our view, therefore, the expression "any of the measures referred to in Section 13(4) taken by the Secured creditor or his authorized officer" in Section 17(1) would include all actions taken by the secured creditor under the Rules which relate to the measures specified in Section 13(4). 18. 30. In our view, therefore, the expression "any of the measures referred to in Section 13(4) taken by the Secured creditor or his authorized officer" in Section 17(1) would include all actions taken by the secured creditor under the Rules which relate to the measures specified in Section 13(4). 18. In the case of The Authorized Officer, State Bank of India v. C. Natarajan and others (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at Paragraph Nos.19, 20 and 24 held as follows : 19. Though it is true that the power conferred by sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 of the Rules ought not to be exercised indiscriminately without having due regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, yet, the said sub-rule ought also not be read in a manner so as to render its existence only on paper. Drawing from our experience on the Bench, it can safely be observed that in many a case the borrowers themselves, seeking to frustrate auction sales, use their own henchmen as intending purchasers to participate in the auction but thereafter they do not choose to carry forward the transactions citing issues which are hardly tenable. This leads to auctions being aborted and issuance of fresh notices. Repetition of such a process of participation-withdrawal for a couple of times or more has the undesirable effect of rigging of the valuation of the immovable property. In such cases, the only perceivable loss suffered by a secured creditor would seem to be the extent of expenses incurred by it in putting up the immovable property for sale. However, what does generally escape notice in the process is that it is the mischievous borrower who steals a march over the secured creditor by managing to have a highly valuable property purchased by one of its henchmen for a song, thus getting such property freed from the clutches of mortgage and by diluting the security cover which the secured creditor had for its loan exposure. Bearing in mind such stark reality, sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 cannot but be interpreted pragmatically to serve twin purposes first, to facilitate due enforcement of security interest by the secured creditor (one of the objects of the SARFAESI Act); and second, to prohibit wrong doers from being benefitted by a liberal construction thereof. 20. Bearing in mind such stark reality, sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 cannot but be interpreted pragmatically to serve twin purposes first, to facilitate due enforcement of security interest by the secured creditor (one of the objects of the SARFAESI Act); and second, to prohibit wrong doers from being benefitted by a liberal construction thereof. 20. In terms of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (for brevity "Contract Act", hereafter), a person can withdraw his offer before acceptance. However, once a party expresses willingness to enter into a contractual relationship subject to terms and conditions and makes an offer which is accepted but thereafter commits a breach of contract, he does so at his own risk and peril and naturally has to suffer the consequences. We are not oblivious of the terms of Section 73 and Section 74 of the Contract Act, being part of Chapter-VI thereof titled "Of the Consequence of Breach of Contract". These sections, providing for compensation for breach of contract and for liquidated damages, have remained on the statute book for generations and permit the party suffering the breach to recover such quantum of loss or damage from the party in breach. However, with changing times, the minds of people are also changing. The judiciary, keeping itself abreast of the changes that are bound to occur in an evolving society, must interpret new laws that are brought in operation to suit the situation appropriately. In the current era of globalization, the entire philosophy of society, mainly on the economic front is making rapid strides towards changes. Unscrupulous people have been inventing newer modes and mechanisms for defrauding and looting the nation. It is in such a scenario that provisions of enactments, particularly those provisions which have a direct bearing on the economy of the nation, must receive such interpretation so that it not only fosters economic growth but is also in tune with the intention of the law-makers in introducing a provision such as sub-rule (5) of Rule 9, which though harsh in its operation, is intended to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. If indeed Section 73 and Section 74, which are part of the general law of contract, were sufficient to cater to the remedy, the need to make sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 as part of the Rules might not have arisen. If indeed Section 73 and Section 74, which are part of the general law of contract, were sufficient to cater to the remedy, the need to make sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 as part of the Rules might not have arisen. Additionally, insertion of sub-rule (5) with such specificity regarding forfeiture must not have been thought of only for reiterating what is already there. It was visualized by the law makers that there was a need to arrest cases of deceptive manipulation of prices at the instance of unscrupulous borrowers by thwarting sale processes and this was the trigger for insertion of such a provision with wide words conferring extensive powers of forfeiture. The purpose of such insertion must have also been aimed at instilling a sense of discipline in the intending purchasers while they proceed to participate in the auction-sale process. At the cost of repetition, it must not be forgotten that the SARFAESI Act was enacted because the general laws were not found to be workable and efficient enough to ensure liquidity of finances and flow of money essential for any healthy and growth oriented economy. The decision of this Court in Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India, while outlawing only a part of the SARFAESI Act and upholding the rest, has traced the history of this legislation and the objects that Parliament had in mind in sufficient detail. Apart from the law laid down in such decision, these are the other relevant considerations which ought to be borne in mind while examining a challenge to a forfeiture order. 24. The up-shot of the aforesaid discussion is that whenever a challenge is laid to an order of forfeiture made by an authorized officer under sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 of the Rules by a bidder, who has failed to deposit the entire sale price within ninety days, the Tribunals/Courts ought to be extremely reluctant to interfere unless, of course, a very exceptional case for interference is set up. What would constitute a very exceptional case, however, must be determined by the Tribunals/Courts on the facts of each case and by recording cogent reasons for the conclusion reached. What would constitute a very exceptional case, however, must be determined by the Tribunals/Courts on the facts of each case and by recording cogent reasons for the conclusion reached. Insofar as challenge to an order of forfeiture that is made upon rejection of an application for extension of time prior to expiry of ninety days and within the stipulated period is concerned, the scrutiny could be a bit more intrusive for ascertaining whether any patent arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the decision-making process has had the effect of vitiating the order under challenge. However, in course of such scrutiny, the Tribunals/Courts must be careful and cautious and direct their attention to examine each case in some depth to locate whether there is likelihood of any hidden interest of the bidder to stall the sale to benefit the defaulting borrower and must, as of necessity, weed out claims of bidders who instead of genuine interest to participate in the auctions do so to rig prices with an agenda to withdraw from the fray post conclusion of the bidding process. In course of such determination, the Tribunals/Courts ought not to be swayed only by supervening events like a subsequent sale at a higher price or at the same price offered by the defaulting bidder or that the secured creditor has not in the bargain suffered any loss or by sentiments and should stay at a distance since extending sympathy, grace or compassion are outside the scope of the relevant legislation. In any event, the underlying principle of least intervention by Tribunals/Courts and the overarching objective of the SARFAESI Act duly complimented by the Rules, which are geared towards efficient and speedy recovery of debts, together with the interpretation of the relevant laws by this Court should not be lost sight of. Losing sight thereof may not be in the larger interest of the nation and susceptible to interference. 19. In the case of the Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at Paragraph Nos.61, 62, 68, 70, 98, 104, 105, 109, 114 and 117 held as follows : 61. The Legislature through Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules, has made a conscious departure from the general law by statutorily providing for the forfeiture of earnest-money deposit of the successful auction purchaser for its failure in depositing the balance consideration within the statutory period. The Legislature through Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules, has made a conscious departure from the general law by statutorily providing for the forfeiture of earnest-money deposit of the successful auction purchaser for its failure in depositing the balance consideration within the statutory period. No doubt, the forfeiture is a result of a breach of obligation, but the consequence of forfeiture in such case is taking place not because of the breach but because of operation of the statutory provision providing for forfeiture that is attracted as a result of the breach. 62. If the consequence of forfeiture was purely a matter of breach of contract, then there would have been no occasion for the Legislature to specifically provide for forfeiture through the statutory provisions, and it would have simpliciter relegated the consequences of such breach to already existing general law under Section(s) 73 and 74 of the 1872 Act. 68. What can be discerned from the above is that the SARFAESI Act is a special legislation with an overriding effect on the general law, and only those legislations which are either specifically mentioned in Section 37 or deal with securitization will apply in addition to the SARFAESI Act. Being so, the underlying principle envisaged under Section(s) 73 and 74 of the 1872 Act which is a general law will have no application, when it comes to the SARFAESI Act more particularly the forfeiture of earnest-money deposit which has been statutorily provided under Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules as a consequence of the auction purchaser's failure to deposit the balance amount. 70. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the meaning of 'forfeiture'. The word forfeiture is derived from the French word 'forfeiture' which means the loss of property by violation of his own duty. The Black's Law Dictionary defines 'forfeiture' as follows [see : Henry Campbell Black on "Black's Law Dictionary", 1968, 4th Edition] : "the loss of a right, privilege, or property because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty." "something (especially money or property) lost or confiscated by this process; a penalty" "a destruction or deprivation of some estate or right because of the failure to perform some obligation or condition contained in a contract" 98. A similar view was reiterated by this Court in its decision in Calcutta Gujarati Education Society and another v. Calcutta Municipal Corpn. A similar view was reiterated by this Court in its decision in Calcutta Gujarati Education Society and another v. Calcutta Municipal Corpn. and others reported in (2003) 10 SCC 533 , wherein this Court observed that the rule of "Reading Down" is only for the limited purpose of making a provision workable so as to fulfill the purpose and object of the statute. The relevant observations read as under : "35. The rule of "reading down" a provision of law is now well recognised. It is a rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is resorted to smoothen the crudities or ironing out the creases found in a statute to make it workable. In the garb of "reading down", however, it is not open to read words and expressions not found in it and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. The rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute. It is to be used keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfill its purposes. ......" (Emphasis supplied). 104. Thus, the High Court committed an egregious error by proceeding to read down Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules in the absence of the said provision being otherwise invalid or unworkable in terms of its plain and ordinary meaning without appreciating the purpose and object of the said provision. 105. The High Court whilst passing the impugned order thought fit to reduce the extent of amount forfeited in view of the subsequent sale of the Secured Asset by the appellant bank at much higher price than the previous auction. This in the High Court's opinion meant that no loss had been caused to the appellant bank, as it had duly recovered more than its dues from the subsequent sale and as such was not entitled to forfeit the entire amount of deposit as doing so would amount to unjust enrichment, which is not permissible by the SARFAESI Act. 109. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is clear that the concept of 'Unjust Enrichment' is a by-product of the doctrine of equity and it is an equally well settled cannon of law that equity always follows the law. 109. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is clear that the concept of 'Unjust Enrichment' is a by-product of the doctrine of equity and it is an equally well settled cannon of law that equity always follows the law. In other words, equity cannot supplant the law, equity has to follow the law if the law is clear and unambiguous. 114. The last aspect which remains to be determined is whether any exceptional circumstances exist to set aside the forfeiture of the respondent's earnest money deposit? 117. Thus, this Court held that where extraneous conditions exist that might have led to the inability of the successful auction purchaser despite best efforts from depositing the balance amount to no fault of its own, in such cases the earnest-money deposited by such innocent successful auction purchaser could certainly be asked to be refunded. 20. In the instant case, the ground reality remains that though the petitioner herein sought extension of time vide representations, dated 27.09.2023 and 27.10.2023 in accordance with the provisions of the Rules, admittedly, vide letter, dated 31.10.2023, the respondent-bank cancelled the bid and forfeited 25% amount paid by the petitioner while stating that as per auction notice, the successful bidder failed to deposit 75% within 15 days despite granting extension of time till 31.10.2023. Admittedly, till the said date, there was no communication to the petitioner in response to his representations made for extension of time. Another crucial aspect which needs mention in this context is that though the respondent-bank in its letter, dated 31.10.2023 did not inform about the extension of time till the said date, the respondent-bank authorities issued impugned E-auction notice on 27.10.2023. This conduct on the part of the respondent-bank authorities is highly illegal, contrary to law and unreasonable. 21. Coming to the aspect of maintainability of the writ petition, it is true that as per the provisions of the Act any person aggrieved by the steps taken under Section 13 of the Act is entitled to file an application before the jurisdictional Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. This writ petition came to be instituted in the month of November, 2023 and it has undergone a number of adjournments till date as such, this Court does not propose to reject the writ petition on the said ground. This writ petition came to be instituted in the month of November, 2023 and it has undergone a number of adjournments till date as such, this Court does not propose to reject the writ petition on the said ground. Another significant aspect which needs mention in this context is that in view of abstinence of Courts by the learned Advocates in the State of Andhra Pradesh protesting about the Land Tilting Act, the petitioner has approached this Court. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the position of law narrated supra and the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. and others (supra), the judgments relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Bank would not render any assistance to the case of the respondents. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed, directing the respondent-Bank authorities to take further steps pursuant to the Sale confirmation made in favour of the petitioner vide letter, dated 13.09.2023 for the purpose of conveying the subject property in favour of the petitioner in terms of the earlier auction. This exercise shall be completed within a period of two (02) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The impugned E-auction sale notice, dated 27.10.2023 is declared as illegal, arbitrary and is hereby set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. 23. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this case, shall stand closed.