JUDGMENT : 1. The instant appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (afterwards referred as ‘Act of 1988’) has been filed by the appellant against the judgment and award dated 18.10.2010 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sawai Madhopur (afterwards referred as ‘Tribunal’) in MAC Case No.46/2009, whereby, the Tribunal while allowing the claim petition awarded a sum of Rs.3,37,000/- as compensation alongwith interest @ 6% per annum in favour of complainants and while fastening the liability to pay the compensation upon the appellant - District Election Officer exonerated the Insurance Company to pay the compensation. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 05.12.2008 at about 05:00 PM deceased Giriraj Bairwa, after doing mechanical (mistri) work he was going to his village, when he reached opposite Police Line Jail, Dausa Road, Bajariya, Sawai Madhopur a Marshal Jeep bearing registration No. RJ29/T 0211, being driven rashly and negligently by its driver respondent No. 1, hit the deceased, as a result of which, he sustained injuries and became unconscious. The deceased while taking to the hospital succumbed to the injuries. 3. In pursuance of the said accident, an FIR was lodged at Police Station Mantown, Sawai Madhopur against respondent No.1 - driver of the erring vehicle and the police after investigation filed challan against respondent No.1. 4. A claim petition to this effect was filed by the claimants for award of compensation to the tune of Rs.22,62,200/- alongwith interest @ 18% per annum. 5. Respondent Nos.1 & 2 contested the claim petition by filing joint written statement and denied the averments contained in the claim petition. It was contested that the deceased fell down on account of his own mistake and no accident has taken place by the vehicle in question. It was also contested that since the vehicle in question had been requisitioned by appellant - District Election Officer and was insured with Insurance Company, therefore, respondent Nos.3 and 4 are liable to pay the compensation. 6. Respondent No.3 - Insurance Company filed its written statement and admitted that fact of issuance of insurance policy in the name of registered owner i.e. respondent No.2. 6. Respondent No.3 - Insurance Company filed its written statement and admitted that fact of issuance of insurance policy in the name of registered owner i.e. respondent No.2. It was contested that since the possession and control of the insured vehicle was given to the respondent No.4 by registered owner - respondent No.2, the insurance contract between the registered owner and Insurance Company had itself come to an end and there was no contract of insurance with the respondent No.4 under the insurance policy, therefore, Insurance Company is not liable to pay any compensation. It was further contested that the accident took place on account of negligence on the part of deceased himself. It was contested that the driver of the vehicle in question was not having valid driving licence at the time of accident. It was prayed that the claim petition may be dismissed. 7. The Tribunal after hearing the parties, vide judgment & award dated 18.10.2010 while allowing the claim petition awarded a sum of Rs.3,37,000/- as compensation in favour of the claimants alongwith interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing claim petition i.e. 11.02.2009 and while fastening the liability to pay the compensation upon the appellant - District Election Officer exonerated the Insurance Company to pay the compensation. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued that the Tribunal committed a grave error in fastening the liability to pay compensation for the alleged accident. He argued that on 05.12.2028 the vehicle in question was released at 11:00 AM and the accident had taken place much thereafter at 05:00 PM, thus, the vehicle in question was not being used by the appellant. He further argued that the ownership of the vehicle in question was never transferred in favour of the appellant and the insurance policy issued in the name of owner of the vehicle in question did not come to an end and even if the vehicle in question was under the control of the appellant but it cannot be said that the appellant had become owner of the vehicle. He argued that the vehicle in question was insured for carrying the passengers and thereby the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle in question was covered under the insurance policy, hence the Insurance Company cannot be exonerated from the liability to pay the damages covered under the insurance policy. 9. He argued that the vehicle in question was insured for carrying the passengers and thereby the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle in question was covered under the insurance policy, hence the Insurance Company cannot be exonerated from the liability to pay the damages covered under the insurance policy. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondents supports the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. As far as the factual element regarding the occurrence of an accident by rash & negligent act of the driver of the erring vehicle resulting in the death of deceased Giriraj is concerned, this fact was proved by the oral evidence of AW-1 Kailashi (wife of the deceased) and AW-2 Mukesh (son of the deceased) coupled with the documentary evidence Exhibits-1 to 10. 12. The Tribunal in its conclusion has given convincing reasons and scrutinized the evidence led by the parties at length in Issue No.1. The factum of the accident due to an erring vehicle and rash & negligent act of the driver Pappu Ram gets validated from the investigation conducted on the filing of the FIR Exhibit-1 resulting in the charge sheet against the Driver - Pappu Ram. This fact remained uncontroverted and unrebutted. The Insurance Company as well as the driver of the vehicle did not examine themselves to disavow the incident as narrated in the claim petition. Therefore, I don’t find any perversity in the findings arrived by the Tribunal. 13. The appellant has mainly disputed the findings arrived at by the Tribunal concerning Issue No.3, whereby the Tribunal after appreciating the entire evidence of NAW-1 - Bhagwati Prasad Prajapat and NAW-2 - Shambhu Dayal Meena coupled with documentary evidence Exhibit Article-1 disregarded the defence put forth by the appellant and dispelled the defence version that the erring vehicle was not in their effective control and released from the Election Duty. NAW-1 Bhagwati Prasad in his examination-in-chief has deposed that said vehicle was on Election duty from 30.11.2008 to 05.12.2008. He further stated that on 05.12.2008 the erring vehicle was released from election duty at 11:00 AM and at the time of the accident the vehicle was not in their possession. To validate the above fact the witness has relied upon the log book register Exhibit-A1. He further stated that on 05.12.2008 the erring vehicle was released from election duty at 11:00 AM and at the time of the accident the vehicle was not in their possession. To validate the above fact the witness has relied upon the log book register Exhibit-A1. He further deposed that in Exhibit-A1 log book the time of releasing the vehicle is entered as 11:00 AM, which is verified by the concerned in-charge Transportation Election. On confronting, the witness stated that he is ignorant to the fact that on 05.12.2008 precisely at what time the vehicle was released by the officer in-charge Transportation. The witness further demonstrated his obliviousness to the time of the accident. 14. AW-2 - Shambhu Dayal Meena was an officer in-charge of Transportation Election Sawai Madhopur for requisitioning and releasing the vehicles. He substantiated the version of AW-1 - Bhagwati Prasad Prajapat in his examination-in-chief that the vehicle was released at 11:00 AM on 05.12.2008. To substantiate this fact he took the support of Exhibit-A1 and Exhibit-A2. On cross-examining he admitted that the said vehicle was allotted to ACM, Khandar and he did not come to hand over the vehicle. He also acknowledged that he did not receive any letter from ACM, Khandar indicating the release of the vehicle on 30.12.2008 at 11:00 AM. He also conceded that in the vehicle log sheet cum hire bill Exhibit-A1 at A to B portion, some overwriting seems to exist. 15. After perusing Exhibit-A1 it is apparent that in the marked portion at "A to B", the release time of the vehicle has been mentioned as "08:00 AM" on 05.12.2008 and some interpolation on mark portion "08:00 AM" is noticeable and it seems that after writing PM "AM" has been done. Similarly, the time mentioned as "8" has also been interpolated. It seems that the vehicle release time was initially inserted as "08:00 PM" and later on at both places, some overwriting was executed. The above interpolation in the time itself creates suspicion and fortifies the defence plea that the erring vehicle was under the effective control of the officer in-charge Transportation Sawai Madhopur and the accident occurred during the election duty. 16. Similarly, Exhibit-A2 is the Register of Private Vehicles Requisitioned for poll duty. It bears the signatures of the owners or drivers in column No.11 which were released from Election Duty. 16. Similarly, Exhibit-A2 is the Register of Private Vehicles Requisitioned for poll duty. It bears the signatures of the owners or drivers in column No.11 which were released from Election Duty. Admittedly, Rajesh Kumar (Respondent No.5) and Pappu Ram (Respondent No.4) were the owner and driver respectively, of the erring vehicle. In Exhibit-A2 column No.11 is barren and the signature of either the driver or owner is missing. This circumstance also bolsters the plea taken by the Insurance Company that at the time of accident the vehicle was under the control of the officer in-charge of Transportation Election. 17. This fact is undisputed that the said vehicle was requisitioned by the appellant for Election purposes. The Tribunal has discussed the evidence led by the appellant in detail. The findings given by the Tribunal are based upon the sound principles of appreciation of evidence and have assigned strong and cogent justifications for discrediting the fact that the erring vehicle was already handed over and released to the owner/driver from the Election duties before the occurrence of the accident. 18. The Tribunal after scrutinizing the evidence of both the material witnesses and documentary evidence is also of the opinion that the appellant manipulated and interpolated the time in the document Exhibit-A1 to circumvent their liability. Therefore, I also concurred with the finding arrived at by the Tribunal about issue No.3. 19. The utmost question now hangs around before us is whether in the event the erring vehicle was requisitioned by the appellant, the Insurance Company is liable to pay the compensation? 20. Before Hon'ble Apex Court, in the matter of National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Deepa Devi & Ors. on 11 December 2007 : AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 735, an identical controversy was raised. After referring to precedential judgments Hon'ble Apex Court held that:- "We, therefore, are of the opinion that the State shall be liable to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants and not the registered owner of the vehicle and consequently the appellant herein." 21. In the matter of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation V. Kailash Nath Kothari and Ors. After referring to precedential judgments Hon'ble Apex Court held that:- "We, therefore, are of the opinion that the State shall be liable to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants and not the registered owner of the vehicle and consequently the appellant herein." 21. In the matter of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation V. Kailash Nath Kothari and Ors. : (1997) 7 SCC 481 Hon'ble Apex Court held that when an accident takes place when the bus was plied under the control of the Corporation, it was the Corporation alone who would be liable for payment of compensation, stating:- "Driver of the bus, even though an employee of the owner, was at the relevant time performing his duties under the order and command of the conductor of RSRTC for operation of the bus. So far as the passengers of the ill-fated bus are concerned, their privity of contract was only with the RSRTC to whom they had paid the fare for travelling in that bus and their safety therefore became the responsibility of the RSRTC while travelling in the bus. They had no privity of contract with Shri Sanjay Kumar, the owner of the bus at all. Had it been a case only of transfer of services of the driver and not of transfer of control of the driver from the owner to RSRTC, the matter may have been somewhat different. But on facts in this case and in view of Conditions 4 to 7 of the agreement (supra), the RSRTC must be held to be vicariously liable for the tort committed by the driver while plying the bus under contract of the RSRTC. But on facts in this case and in view of Conditions 4 to 7 of the agreement (supra), the RSRTC must be held to be vicariously liable for the tort committed by the driver while plying the bus under contract of the RSRTC. The general proposition of law and the presumption arising therefrom that an employer, that is the person who has the right to hire and fire the employee, is generally responsible vicariously for the tort committed by the employee concerned during the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority, is a rebuttable presumption of the original employer is able to establish that when the servant was lent, the effective control over him was also transferred to the hirer, the original owner can avoid his liability and the temporary employer or the hirer, as the case may be, must be held vicariously liable for the tort committed by the concerned employee in the course of his employment while under the command and control of the hirer notwithstanding the fact that the driver would continue to be on the payroll of the original owner. The proposition based on the general principle as noticed above is adequately rebutted in this case not only on the basis of the evidence led by the parties but also on the basis of Conditions 6 and 7 (supra), which go to show that the owner had not merely transferred the services of the driver to the RSRTC but actual control and the driver was to act under the instructions, control and command of the conductor and other officers of the RSRTC." 22. Thus in the light of the above, I do not find merit in the appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.