JUDGEMENT 1. This is an application with a prayer for release of applicant- accused, presently facing trial before Principal Sessions Judge Shopian, for short trial court, in case FIR No. 55 of 2021 u/s 363, 376 IPC and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), on bail, on the grounds that he has already suffered incarceration for about 2 years and 6 months even though falsely implicated in the aforesaid case. 2. Per contra in the objections filed by the respondents the bail plea has been opposed on the count that applicant/accused is involved in a serious offence and the bail petition presented by him before the trial court has already been dismissed. During course of arguments, learned counsel have reiterated the contents of petition and memo of objections. 3. I have heard learned counsel and considered the matter. It appears that on 26th May, 2021 a complaint was received by the Police Station Haipora, Shopian from complainant Abdul Hamid Sheikh to the effect that his daughter aged 16 years was not available at home when he returned from his orchards and during the process of searches he came to know that she has been kidnapped by the accused Nawaz Ahmad Sheikh, Gulzar Ahmad and Adil Ahmad Sheikh who were riding a motor cycle bearing registration No. JK18-7798. A case FIR no. 55/2021 for the commission of offences punishable under sections 363, 109 IPC was registered. During the course of investigation the accused Nawaz Ahmad was arrested and the girl was recovered from his possession and the offence punishable in terms of Section 4 of the POCSO Act was added. The other two accused were dropped as they could not be connected with the crime. The investigation conducted ultimately culminated in institution of the case against the accused in the court of Principal Sessions Judge Shopian, where it is reported to be posted for recording the statement of the applicant under section 342 CrPC on 31.7.2024. A bail petition was filed by the applicant on 29th March 2023 before trial court and the same has been dismissed vide order dated 11th September, 2023 on various grounds. 4. A bail petition was filed by the applicant on 29th March 2023 before trial court and the same has been dismissed vide order dated 11th September, 2023 on various grounds. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to and relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court rendered in cases titled [1]Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra and others reported as (2021) 2 SCC 427 ; [2]Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another reported as (2022) 10 SCC 51 . Whereas the learned counsel for the respondents referred to and relied upon the Apex Court judgment rendered in cases titled [3]Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh and others; State of U.P. v. Naushad; Mandhari v. State of Chattisgarh; and [4]Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and another, reported as 2002 (2) Supreme 457 ; AIR 2014 SC 384 : AIR 2002 SC 1961 and 2004 (4) Supreme 84 respectively. 5. It is a fact that accused is involved in an anti social penal offence, but at the same time his involvement presently is at the stage of an accusation only though a serious one, the factum of alleged commission of crime- disputed by petitioners' counsel on various factual and legal pleas, notwithstanding. Law is well settled, that in any case bail cannot be withheld as a measure of punishment, and ordinarily with-holding it, should be an exception only, to be involved in exceptional circumstances attending a particular case. Nothing has been pointed out or brought on record to suggest that the case in hand has any such exceptional feature as could justify withholding bail, to the applicant, particularly because the applicant/accused has already suffered incarceration for around 2 years and 6 months and the case having already been instituted, evidence closed there is no scope for hampering the investigation. The applicant/accused is stated to be an ailing person, also deserves consideration for limited purpose of the bail & in overall circumstances of the matter particularly the prolonged incarceration of applicant, I feel his release on bail would be just fair and reasonable. 6. The Apex Court in case titled [5]Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another reported as (2022) 10 SCC 51 has laid down certain guidelines for the courts to be followed while determining the bail applications. 6. The Apex Court in case titled [5]Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another reported as (2022) 10 SCC 51 has laid down certain guidelines for the courts to be followed while determining the bail applications. The paragraphs 12 and a portion of paragraph 13 being relevant are taken note of herein, thus: “BAIL IS THE RULE 12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception has been well recognised through the repetitive pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This court in [6]Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 , held that: “19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [7][Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465], the purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows: (SCC pp. 586-88 , paras 27-30) '27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re [Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476 : 1924 Cri LJ 732], AIR pp. 479-80 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the “Meerut Conspiracy cases” observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In two other cases which, significantly, are the “Meerut Conspiracy cases” observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR 1931 All 504 : 1932 Cri LJ 94] it was observed, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the Court that there was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson [Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All 14 : AIR 1931 All 356 : 1931 Cri LJ 1271] , AIR p. 358 it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence. 28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. State [8][Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that: (SCC p. 242, para 1) '1.... A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence. 28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. State [8][Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that: (SCC p. 242, para 1) '1.... the issue [of bail] is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial process. ... After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of “procedure established by law”. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right.' 29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi) [9][Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that: (SCC p. 129, para 29) '29. ... There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail.' 30. In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2nd, Vol. 8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated: 'Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.' It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail.” ****** 24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India and other persons. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India and other persons. It is the only article in the Fundamental Rights Chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a vast number of substantive and procedural rights post Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [10][Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 ]. 13. Further this Court in [11]Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40 , has observed that: 21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.” 7. Before concluding the matter, however, I would like to observe that I have consciously avoided consideration of the rival contentions touching merits of the matter as the gravity of the offence that can be said to have been committed; and other technicalities attending the matter, deserve to be left for appreciation of the trial court. The only apprehension projected by the learned counsel for the respondent that the accused may try to win over the prosecution witness if bail is granted in his favour is unfounded as the learned counsel has herself submitted that out of 10 cited witnesses, 09 have already been examined including the prosecutrix. 8. For all that has been discussed above, the petition is allowed and the applicant/accused is admitted to bail subject to the following conditions: i) That he shall furnish personal bond in the amount of Rs. 8. For all that has been discussed above, the petition is allowed and the applicant/accused is admitted to bail subject to the following conditions: i) That he shall furnish personal bond in the amount of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court; ii) That he shall appear before the trial court on each and every date of hearing; iii) That he shall not leave territorial limits of Union Territory of J&K without prior permission of the trial court; iv) That he shall also undertake not to indulge in any activity similar to the one alleged against him. 9. The bail application shall stand disposed of on the above lines. 10. Registry shall furnish a copy of this order to the learned counsel for the applicant and also communicate it to the trial court.