JUDGMENT : M.S. RAMESH, J. Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, praying to set aside the order dated 23.01.2024 issued in W.P. (MD) No. 19257 of 2022 and W.M.P. (MD) No. 14048 of 2022 and allow the Writ Appeal. 1. The present Writ Appeal has been filed challenging the order of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (MD) No. 19257 of 2022 dated 23.01.2024. 2. The respondent herein was implicated in a criminal case under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and ultimately, after due trial, he was acquitted from the criminal charges through a judgment passed in S.C. No. 16 of 2012 dated 27.02.2020 on the file of learned Special Judge, Madurai. After acquittal, through a charge memo dated 03.05.2021, charges under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules came to be levelled against him on the delinquency, which was the same criminal charges levelled against him in S.C. No. 16 of 2012. 3. When the respondent had challenged the charge memo before the Writ Court in W.P. (MD) No. 19257 of 2022, the learned Single Judge had allowed the Writ Petition on 23.01.2024 by placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.V. Mahadevan Vs. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 , as well as on a couple of decisions of this Court and by holding that when the charges and the evidences in both the criminal case and the departmental proceedings are one and the same, the departmental proceedings cannot be sustained. This order of the Writ Court dated 23.01.2024 is assailed in this intra-Court appeal. 4. The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the appellants submitted that the appreciation of the evidence before a criminal Court is based on strict appreciation of evidence, whereas, in a departmental proceedings, the preponderance of probability would be sufficient to hold the charges proved and therefore, the disciplinary authority would be well within their powers to proceed with the proposed departmental action against the respondent. He further submitted that the judgment of acquittal in the criminal case was on benefit of doubt and hence, it will have no influence on the proposed departmental action against the respondent. 5. He further submitted that the judgment of acquittal in the criminal case was on benefit of doubt and hence, it will have no influence on the proposed departmental action against the respondent. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that along with the respondent herein, a co-delinquent, namely, S.V. Muruganandam was also implicated in the criminal case and when similar charges were levelled against him for his involvement in the criminal case, a Coordinate Bench of this Court had quashed the charge memo by taking into account that the charges in both the departmental action and the criminal case are identical and also on the ground of delay in issuing the charge memo. He further submitted that the respondent had reached the age of superannuation on 30.04.2024 and serious prejudice would be caused to him if he is subjected to disciplinary proceedings at this stage. 6. Heard the learned counsels on both sides and perused the materials available on record. 7. It is not in dispute that the oral, documentary evidence let in before the criminal Court are the same as that of the proposed documents and list of witnesses in the proposed domestic enquiry. In a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan and others, (2024) 1 SCC 175 , it was held that when the charges in the disciplinary proceedings are identical to the criminal case, the same cannot be allowed to stand after acquittal in the criminal case. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: “30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 .” 8. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 .” 8. Thus, when it is not in dispute that when the evidence before the criminal Court and the departmental proceedings are one and the same, the entire exercise of a domestic enquiry would be fatal in view of the law laid down in Ram Lal's case (cited supra). 9. Likewise, when the co-delinquent, namely, S.V. Muruganandam, who was also acquitted from the criminal case and was also imputed with the delinquency akin to the criminal charges, had challenged the charge memo, a Coordinate Bench had quashed his charge memo through judgment passed in W.A. (MD) No. 1475 of 2022 dated 05.12.2024. When the charge memo against the co-delinquent has already been quashed, we fail to understand as to how the Department would be justified in proceeding against the other co-delinquent, namely, the respondent herein independently, without reference to the orders passed in the case of his co-delinquent. On this ground also, the appellants have no legs to stand in this appeal. 10. The learned Single Judge had rightly placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.V. Mahadevan's case and in view of the acquittal in the criminal case, had set aside the charge memo. We do not find any illegality or infirmity in such a finding. 11. It is now brought to our notice that the respondent had reached the age of superannuation on 30.04.2024. Now that the charge memo has been set aside, he would be entitled to receive his retirement benefits, for which purpose, the appellants can be directed to disburse the same within a stipulated time. 12. In the result, the Writ Appeal stands dismissed. Consequently, the appellants are directed to pass appropriate orders, retiring the respondent herein from his service with effect from 30.04.2024 and thereby, disburse all his retirement benefits, including the pensionary benefits, at least within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.