Pavitar Singh S/o Gajanan Singh v. Paramjeet Kaur W/o Late Amarjeet
2024-01-09
NARENDRA KUMAR VYAS
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. This Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 30 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short “the Act, 1923”) against the award dated 02.03.2017 passed by the learned Commissioner, Employee’s Compensation Act, Labour Court, Durg (C.G.) in Case No. 86/WC Act/2012 Fatal in case of Paramjeet Kour and Others vs. Pavitar Singh and Others. 2. This appeal was admitted by this Court on 22.08.2023 on the following substantial question of law: “Whether learned Commissioner manifestly committed an error of law in holding that the deceased was an employee of appellant?” 3. The brief facts reflected from the record are that the respondent/claimant filed an application under Section 22 of the Act, 1923 mainly contending that the deceased Amarjeet Singh was working with the respondent who is a contractor and in compliance of the direction given by the respondent, the deceased was working on the site on 09.05.2012 and due to dilapidated structure of building, the deceased got buried and succumbed to death. It has also been contended that the deceased was working as Gas Cutter and he was getting Rs. 5000/- per month. At the time of incident, the deceased was aged about 55 years and as per the scheduled, the relevant factor for calculating compensation comes to Rs. 135.56 as such they are entitled to get compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,38,900/-. The claimants have demanded compensation from respondent, but the same has not been paid, as such they are entitled to get compensation @ 12% interest and 50% penalty. 4. Learned Commissioner taking cognizance of the application, issued notice to the respondents wherein the respondent has filed a written statement denying the allegations made in the application mainly contending that he is not aware whether the deceased expired in course of employment. He has also denied that he was getting salary from him as he was never employed by them and would pray for rejection of the application. It has also been contended that the property where the accident took place is purchased by Ms. Sama Enterprises, Dehradun, but he has not made party to them, as such the application deserves to be rejected for want of necessary party. 5.
It has also been contended that the property where the accident took place is purchased by Ms. Sama Enterprises, Dehradun, but he has not made party to them, as such the application deserves to be rejected for want of necessary party. 5. The appellant has also filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the C.P.C. on 16.12.2014 to implead one Ranjit Singh as the claimant in her deposition before the Commissioner, has stated that Ranjit Singh is employer. The claimants have replied to it that as per the statement and police record, the deceased Amarjeet Singh was working with non-applicant No. 1 only and prayed for rejection of the said application. 6. Learned Labour Court vide its order dated 11.03.2015 has rejected the same by recording its finding that burden lies upon the claimants to prove that who is the employer of deceased, as such, application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC deserves to be dismissed. 7. Learned Commissioner on the pleading of the parties, has framed as many as four issues. Issue No. 1 & 4 are relevant, therefore, they are extracted below: ^^1- D;k vkosfndk Øekad 01 ds ifr LoŒ vejthr flag dh e`R;q vukosnu ds v/khu dk;Z ds nkSjku nq?kZVuk ls fnukad 09-05-2012 dks gqbZ Fkh\ 4- D;k tokcnkok esa of.kZr dkj.kksa ds nkok fujLr ;ksX; gS\** 8. The claimants to substantiate their claim application have examined witness namely Smt. Paramjeet Kour, Ranjit Singh, Harmit Singh, Balvinder Singh and exhibited documents namely police enquiry report (Ex. P/1), merge intimation (Ex. P/2), FIR (Ex. P/3), Map (Ex. P/4 & P/5), application for post mortum with report (Ex. P/6). The appellant to substantiate his case, has examined Pavitar Singh. 9. The claimants' witness Paramjeet Kour has examined before the Commissioner by way of affidavit as provided under Order 18 Rule 4 of C.P.C. and exhibited documents. In the cross-examination, she has admitted that her husband’s employer is Ranjit Singh. She has also admitted that her husband was working with Ranjit Singh but he has not worked with Pavitar Singh, therefore, she has not produced any appointment order, payslip or any other certificates. She has also admitted that the deceased was taken for work by Ranjit Singh. She has also admitted that after the accident, M/s Bhagyanidhi Light Industry, Kalkatta has given Rs. 1 lac.
She has also admitted that the deceased was taken for work by Ranjit Singh. She has also admitted that after the accident, M/s Bhagyanidhi Light Industry, Kalkatta has given Rs. 1 lac. The other witness Ranjit Singh examined by claimant has stated that Pavitar Singh has told them to demolish the building and wages Rs. 30/- per day will be paid to them. He has admitted in the cross-examination that he has taken the deceased to work and also admitted that they are labourers and wherever the work is assigned to them, they used to work. The witness has further stated that he has taken the deceased on work as told by Pavitar Singh. He has also denied that deceased Amarjeet Singh was his employee. He voluntarily told that he is also labour. 10. The other witness Harmit Singh has also stated in the cross-examination that actual work of demolishing the building was given to Pavitar Singh and also shown the document to this effect. 11. The other witness Balvider Singh has also stated that he along with Amarjeet Singh, Ranjit Singh sustained injuries at the time of demolishing the building and the expenses were borne by Pavitar Singh. He has also stated that they were working in the contract of Pavitar Singh. The witness was cross-examined wherein he has stated that the deceased was not working regularly with Pavitar Singh. 12. The appellant examined himself and has stated that he has given the work to Ranjit Singh to demolish the Kediya building where the deceased succumbed to death on account of injuries sustained by him. He has also stated that deceased Amarjeet Singh, Loha Singh are employees of Ranjit Singh and they are working with him only. This witness was extensively cross-examined wherein he has stated that in the accident Loha Singh and Ranjit Singh were also sustained injuries. He has also admitted that he has done treatment of Ranjit Singh and Loha Singh. 13.
He has also stated that deceased Amarjeet Singh, Loha Singh are employees of Ranjit Singh and they are working with him only. This witness was extensively cross-examined wherein he has stated that in the accident Loha Singh and Ranjit Singh were also sustained injuries. He has also admitted that he has done treatment of Ranjit Singh and Loha Singh. 13. Learned Commissioner after appreciating the evidence, material on record has recorded its finding that on the basis of documents Annexure P/1 to P/6 and the evidence brought on record, it is quite vivid that the deceased Amarjeet Singh was working with the respondent and succumbed to death on account of fall of dilapidated structure on him as such, the respondents are entitled to get compensation accordingly, it has passed the award directing the respondent to pay Rs. 3,38,900/- with 12% interest from the date of accident till depositing the compensation. The record of the case would demonstrate that the appellant has only deposited the amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,38,900/- on 15.05.2017 but has not deposited the amount of interest. This award is being assailed by the appellant by filing appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1923. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the order is bad in law and based on perverse finding as the claimants have failed to prove the employee and employer relationship with the appellant. It has also been contended that they have already received Rs. 1 lac. from M/s Bhagyanidhi Light Industry, Kalkatta which has also not been adjusted. He would further submit that the learned Court below has not taken into consideration the evidence brought on record and has committed illegality in recording its finding that employee and employer relationship exits between the deceased and the appellant and would pray for quashing of the award. 15. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/ claimants would submit that the finding recorded by the learned Commissioner is legal, justified and does not warrant any interference by this Court and would pray for rejection of the appeal. 16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of lower Court with utmost satisfaction. 17.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/ claimants would submit that the finding recorded by the learned Commissioner is legal, justified and does not warrant any interference by this Court and would pray for rejection of the appeal. 16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of lower Court with utmost satisfaction. 17. To decide the question of law framed by this Court, it is expedient for this Court to extract Section 2(1)(dd) of the Act, 1923, which reads under: “(dd) “employee” means a person, who is: (i) a railway servant as defined in clause (34) of section 2 of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), not permanently employed in any administrative district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II. (ii) (a) a master, seaman or other member of the crew of a ship. (b) a captain or other member of the crew of an aircraft. (c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle. (d) a person recruited for work abroad by a company, and who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle, or company, as the case may be, is registered in India. (iii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union and any reference to any employee who has been injured shall, where the employee is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them.” 18. From bare perusal of the aforesaid definition and the evidence brought on record, it is quite vivid that the deceased was an “employee” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(dd) of the Employees’ Compensation Act. The definition of employee covers the workman who works even on oral contract also. The claimants' witness have clearly adduced the evidence before the Ld. Commissioner that respondent Pavitar Singh has told them to demolish the building and wages Rs. 30/- per day will be paid to them.
The definition of employee covers the workman who works even on oral contract also. The claimants' witness have clearly adduced the evidence before the Ld. Commissioner that respondent Pavitar Singh has told them to demolish the building and wages Rs. 30/- per day will be paid to them. He has again stated that he has taken the deceased on work as told by the Pavitar Singh. Even the respondent in his evidence has admitted that he has borne the medical expenses for the injury sustained to Ranjeet Singh and Loha Singh who worked with deceased on the date of incident. Thus the Ld. Commissioner after appreciating the evidence and material on record has recorded its finding that deceased was employee of the appellant. This finding is based upon appreciation of evidence and material on record which cannot be perverse or suffers from surmises or conjuncture. Thus, from the abovestated factual and legal position, it is quite vivid that the deceased has sustained injuries in course of employment and he was an employee of the appellant, as such, the learned Commissioner has not committed any illegality in recording the finding that the deceased was an employee of the appellant. 19. This appeal has been filed under Section 30 of the Act which indicates that existence of such question is prerequisite to the appeal being entertained. Even otherwise the Employee’s Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts and the Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of appeal only to the substantial question of law being a welfare legislature. The conclusion arrived at by the Commissioner was undoubtedly a possible view. From the material available on record, it suddenly will not be an improbable, much less and impossible conclusion that deceased was employed by the appellant Pavitar Singh, the presence of the deceased in the spot, work of demolishing the building executed by the Pavitar Singh, medical expenses incurred by Pavitar Singh and document exhibited P-1 to P-6 when considered together, point to the aspect of the deceased person being an employee of Pavitar Singh. Even otherwise it is well established that the Act is a social welfare legislature, therefore, it must be given the beneficial construction matters thereunder are to be adjudicated with due process of law and also with a keen awareness of the scope and intent of the Act.
Even otherwise it is well established that the Act is a social welfare legislature, therefore, it must be given the beneficial construction matters thereunder are to be adjudicated with due process of law and also with a keen awareness of the scope and intent of the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of K. Shivraman vs. P. Satish Kumar, 2020 (4) SCC 594 has held as under: “25. The 1923 Act is a social beneficial legislation and its provisions and amendments thereto must be interpreted in a manner so as to not deprive the employees of the benefit of the legislation. The object of enacting the Act was to ameliorate the hardship of economically poor employees who were exposed to risks in work, or occupational hazards by providing a cheaper and quicker machinery for compensating them with pecuniary benefits. The amendments to the 1923 Act have been enacted to further this salient purpose by either streamlining the compensation process or enhancing the amount of compensation payable to the employee.” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Phoolbati Dharmdev Yadav and Another vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. in Civil Appeal No. 4713/2023; (2023) INSC 790 decided on has considered the scope of Section 30 of Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 and has held as under: “It has also been observed by this Court that the Commissioner is the last authority on facts involved in a case. In Golla Rajamma and Others vs. Divisional Manager and Another (2- Judge Bench) it was observed that “under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.” 21. From the evidence adduced by the parties, it is quite vivid that the Ld. Commissioner while arriving his finding neither failed to take into consideration the relevant facts nor look into consideration irrelevant factor, which were not germane for the purpose of determining the issues.
From the evidence adduced by the parties, it is quite vivid that the Ld. Commissioner while arriving his finding neither failed to take into consideration the relevant facts nor look into consideration irrelevant factor, which were not germane for the purpose of determining the issues. Thus, the substantial question of law as framed by this Court deserves to be answered in negative against the appellant and in favour of the respondents. 22. Before parting to the case, it is necessary to pass direction regarding depositing of compensation. The record of the case would show that the Commissioner has directed for grant of compensation with 12% interest from the date of incident till it is actually deposited. The appellant has not deposited 12% interest from the date of incident till it is deposited which is deposited on 15.05.2017, as such, the appellant is also directed to deposit 12% interest on the amount from 09.05.2012 to 15.05.2017 @ 12% for this period which comes to Rs. 2,03,340/- within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order, failing which the claimants are entitled to take recourse for execution of the award passed by the Commissioner. 23. This Court while granting interim order on 22.08.2023 has directed to keep the amount in fixed deposit in any nationalized bank. The interest so accrued on the amount, if deposited, in fixed deposit, the interest will also be payable to the claimants. The interim order passed by this Court on 22.08.2023 is vacated. 24. The appeal deserves to be dismissed accordingly, it is dismissed.