JUDGMENT : A.Y. KOGJE, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed essentially challenging an order of detention passed by the detaining authority Commissioner of Police, Surat City on 25.08.2023 detaining the petitioner as a “Dangerous person” on the basis of two offences under the provisions of Indian Penal Code. 2. Learned advocate for the petitioner has taken this Court through the contentions of both the FIRs. The first offence is private in nature whereas the second incident is arising on account of road accident. Learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that despite the petitioner was released on bail by the Court of competent jurisdiction in the month of July 2023, an order was passed in the month of August 2023 and therefore, there is delay in passing the detention order either in the order of detention or by separate affidavit. Lastly, learned advocate has submitted that the documents supplied by the detaining authority are illegible and therefore, petitioner could not make effective representation on the basis of such illegible documents. Learned advocate has therefore, relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of State of Manipur vs. Buyamayum Abdul Hanan @ Anand, 2022 (0) AIJEL-SC 69999, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “21. Thus, the legal position has been settled by this Court that the right to make representation is a fundamental right of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and supply of the illegible copy of documents which has been relied upon by the detaining authority indeed has deprived him in making an effective representation and denial thereof will hold the order of detention illegal and not in accordance with the procedure contemplated under law.” 3. Learned AGP has objected to the petition by submitting that the offences registered against the petitioner are falling in the category as specified in the definition of ‘Dangerous person’ in PASA. In fact the gist of the offences registered against the petitioner and produced in the grounds of detention clearly indicates conduct of the petitioner being anti-social and thereby disturbing the public order. Therefore, the detention order is justified. 4. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties and having perused the documents on record, petitioner has been detained as Dangerous person by an order dated 25.08.2023 passed by the Surat Police Commissioner. Therefore, the detention order is justified. 4. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties and having perused the documents on record, petitioner has been detained as Dangerous person by an order dated 25.08.2023 passed by the Surat Police Commissioner. 4.1 The grounds of detention indicates that the detaining authority has relied upon the two IPC offences registered against the petitioner. The details of which in tabular form are as under: S. No. Police Station FIR No. Sections Date of offence Arrested on Released on bail on 1. Dindoli Police Station C.R. No. 11210056231207 323, 504, 506(2), 294(B), 114 of the IPC r.w. Section 135 of the GP Act 17.05.2023 07.06.2023 07.06.2023 2. Dindoli Police Station C.R. No. 11210056231571 324, 323, 504, 114 of the IPC r.w. Section 135(1) of GP Act 30.06.2023 02.07.2023 26.07.2023 4.2 The chronology mentioned herein above would indicate that the petitioner was enlarged on bail in connection with the last offence in chronology on 26.07.2023 and thereafter the petitioner was detained by the impugned order on 25.08.2023. Therefore, there is a gap of 29 days in passing the order of detention during which the petitioner was not in custody. In opinion of the Court this delay of One month is fatal and the detaining authority was not prompt in passing the order of detention then the detention itself would stand vitiated. The Apex Court in the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik vs. State of Tripura, AIR 2022 SC 4715 has observed as under: “11. We are persuaded to allow this appeal on the following two grounds: (i) Delay in passing the order of detention from the date of proposal thereby snapping the “live and proximate link” between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention and failure on the part of the detaining authority in explaining such delay in any manner. (ii) The detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of passing the order of detention, the appellant detenu was ordered to be released on bail by the special court. (ii) The detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of passing the order of detention, the appellant detenu was ordered to be released on bail by the special court. The detaining authority remained oblivious as this material and vital fact of the appellant detenu being released on bail in both the cases was suppressed or rather not brought to the notice of the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority at the time of forwarding the proposal to pass the appropriate order of preventive detention. 12. We may recapitulate the necessary facts which have a bearing so far as the issue of delay is concerned. The proposal to take steps to preventively detain the appellant at the end of the Superintendent of Police addressed to the Superintendent of Police (C/S) West Tripura, Agartala is dated 28th of June 2021. The proposal in turn forwarded by the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Crime) on behalf of the Director General to the Secretary, Home Department is dated 14.07.2021. The order of detention is dated 12th of November, 2021. There is no explanation worth the name why it took almost five months for the detaining authority to pass the order of preventive detention. 13. There is indeed a plethora of authorities explaining the purpose and the avowed object of preventive detention in express and explicit language. We think that all those decisions of this Court on this aspect need not be recapitulated and recited. But it would suffice to refer to the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar vs. Delhi Administration and Others, (1982) 2 SCC 403 , wherein the following observation is made: “Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing.” 14. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing.” 14. In view of the above object of the preventive detention, it becomes very imperative on the part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authorities to remain vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in passing the detention order at the earliest from the date of the proposal and executing the detention order because any indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining authority or executing authority would defeat the very purpose of the preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings. 15. The adverse effect of delay in arresting a detenu has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and this Court has laid down the rule in clear terms that an unreasonable and unexplained delay in securing a detenu and detaining him vitiates the detention order. In the decisions we shall refer hereinafter, there was a delay in arresting the detenu after the date of passing of the order of detention. However, the same principles would apply even in the case of delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the proposal. The common underlying principle in both situations would be the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention & the avowed purpose of detention. xxx xxx xxx 20. It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this Court, that the underlying principle is that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the detaining authority after the receipt of the proposal from the sponsoring authority was indifferent in passing the order of detention with greater promptitude. The “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention stood snapped in arresting the detenu. More importantly the delay has not been explained in any manner and though this point of delay was specifically raised and argued before the High Court as evident from Para 14 of the impugned judgment yet the High Court has not recorded any finding on the same.” 4.3 The Court has also taken into consideration the aspect with regard to the non-supply of legible documents particularly page nos. 35, 37, 97 on which the detaining authority is to be arrived at subjective satisfaction and non-supply of legible copies of relevant documents affected the right of the petitioner to make a proper representation against the detention before the concerned authority or make a proper representation before the advisory board. 5. The Apex Court in the case of State of Manipur (Supra) has clearly held as under: “21. Thus, the legal position has been settled by this Court that the right to make representation is a fundamental right of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and supply of the illegible copy of documents which has been relied upon by the detaining authority indeed has deprived him in making an effective representation and denial thereof will hold the order of detention illegal and not in accordance with the procedure contemplated under law.” 6. The Court has considered the fact that in connection with the two offences the Court of the concerned jurisdiction has enlarged the petitioner on conditional bail and therefore when there was time gap of approximately seven months after grant of bail in the first offence, the State had an option of resorting to the proceedings to the cancellation of bail. The Court has considered the fact that in connection with the two offences the Court of the concerned jurisdiction has enlarged the petitioner on conditional bail and therefore when there was time gap of approximately seven months after grant of bail in the first offence, the State had an option of resorting to the proceedings to the cancellation of bail. In the facts of the present case, there does not appears to be any procedures being initiated in that direction not only that in the impugned order of detention does not reflect application of mind to the fact that the detaining authority did considered the option of resorting to cancellation of bail and found sufficient reason to decide otherwise to pass the order of detention. 6.1 In recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shaik Nazeen vs. State of Telangana and Others in Criminal Appeal No. 908 of 2022 and SLP (Crl.) No. 4260 of 2022 and Syed Sabeena vs. State of Telangana and Others in Criminal Appeal No. 909 of 2022 and SLP (Crl.) No. 4283 of 2022 dated 22.06.2022, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made following observations in Para 17: “17. In any case, the State is not without a remedy, as in case the detenu is much a menace to the society as is being alleged, then the prosecution should seek for the cancellation of his bail and/or move an appeal to the Higher Court. But definitely seeking shelter under the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 7. No need to say when a citizen is deprived of his personal liberty by keeping him behind the bar under the provisions of the PASA law without trial by the competent court, the detaining authority is required under the law to justify its action and in absence of reply/counter affidavit, the averments made in the petition remain unchallenged and uncontroverted. 8. In view of above, we are inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIRs by themselves cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2) of the Act. 9. 8. In view of above, we are inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIRs by themselves cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2) of the Act. 9. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 25.08.2023 passed by the respondent-detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.