JUDGMENT : Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the concurrent findings of the learned trial court and the first appellate court passed in Title Suit No. 83 of 1997 and Title Appeal No. 56 of 2013 respectively, whereby and whereunder the suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed. Factual Matrix of the Case 2. Factual matrix of the case is that appellant/plaintiff has filed the suit for a decree of declaring his right, title and interest over the suit scheduled property B land measuring an area 3 decimals fully described in Schedule B to the plaint and also for declaration that the Parcha issued under the BPPHT Act, 1947 (Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947) is infructuous and confirmation of possession over the suit property and alternatively, if plaintiff is found dispossessed for restoration of possession of suit property and also for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men and agents from disturbing the plaintiffs possession in any manner along with cost of the suit. 3. According to plaintiff, he is the owner of the Schedule-A property having right title and continuous possession which was purchased by him from right full owner Amrit Kaur who executed the sale deed nos. 4808, 4809 and 4811 in favour of plaintiff on 08.05.1985 being the mother and natural guardian of three minor sons, namely, Pupeendra Singh, Narendra Singh and Gurmeet Singh and at the time of sale the plaintiff was put in possession and thereafter the plaintiff is in continuous possession and enjoying the same. The plaintiff’s name is also mutated in the circle office (defendant no.3). Jamabandi has been opened in his name and plaintiff is paying rent to the State of Bihar and obtaining rent receipt. It is further alleged that plaintiff has also covered the scheduled A property by raising boundary wall within the knowledge of the defendant. It is further alleged that plaintiff is a Railway Employee and was residing at Gomoh and occasionally used to visit the Scheduled A land. In the month of May, 1989, the plaintiff went to his land and surprisingly found that defendant no. 4 has put a hutment over the portion of the Scheduled A land which is described as Scheduled B to the plaint. In the month of May, 1989, the plaintiff went to his land and surprisingly found that defendant no. 4 has put a hutment over the portion of the Scheduled A land which is described as Scheduled B to the plaint. Then plaintiff informed this matter to Jitpur village Panchayat on 04.05.1989 and sarpanch gave a report to the defendant no. 4 to look into the matter. Thereafter, the plaintiff came to know that scheduled-B land is settled to the defendant no.4 by the State Authority through defendant no.3., the Circle Officer, Topchanchi and the plaintiff thought that settlement was done wrongly and on wrong information of the land and on enquiry, he found that the plot of land bearing plot no. 1124 under Khata No. 193 of the same village and northern to the plot of the plaintiff belongs to the State of Bihar and is lying vacant. Accordingly, the plaintiff suggested the authorities through his application dated 02.08.1990 that the government land be settled to the defendant no.4 and wrongly the land of the plaintiff was settled to the defendant no. 4, be released to the plaintiff and the local authorities also supported the suggestion of the plaintiff by forwarding his application to the defendant no. 3 and lastly the defendant no.3 by his order dated 07.04.1986 in BPHT Case No. 1(II)/86-87 settled the land to the defendant no.4 and the plaintiff’s representation was never considered and in this way the defendants tried to grab the land of the plaintiff under Schedule B. The plaintiff also filed the representation before the defendant no.2 who without his jurisdiction advised the plaintiff to file an appeal against the order dated 13.01.1995 passed in Miscellaneous Case No. 42/94-95. Thereafter, the plaintiff went to the Hon’ble High Court but he was advised to move to the collector then the plaintiff has filed the regular suit, since the plaintiff has no faith in the State authority. The cause of action for the present suit arose on 04.05.1989 and is continue day by day, hence, this suit was filed. 4. Upon service of notice defendant nos. 1-3/State respondents appeared and filed their written statement challenging the suit on the ground of maintainability, cause of action, barred by law of limitation, barred by principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence, etc. 4. Upon service of notice defendant nos. 1-3/State respondents appeared and filed their written statement challenging the suit on the ground of maintainability, cause of action, barred by law of limitation, barred by principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence, etc. It was further pleaded that plaintiff never exercised any act of possession over the suit land from the date of final publication of the record of right and got no right, title, interest or possession over the land and the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief as claimed. The transaction of sale deed is alleged by the plaintiff is mere paper transaction as it is not mentioned that how his vendor Amrit Kaur was the rightful owner of the scheduled A land so that claim of plaintiff that the said Amrit Kaur in the capacity of natural guardian of her minor sons has sold the suit property in favour of plaintiff may be justified. It is further pleaded that mere mutation does not create any right, title and interest nor change the nature and character of the original land and the Circle Officer is being requested to take steps to cancel the thoka illegally and without title has been opened. Opening of Jamabandi or granting of rent receipt does not create title and the revenue court has no power to decide title. 5. It was further pleaded by the State respondents that the plaintiff was never in possession of the suit land rather it is in possession of defendant no.4 who has constructed house over it and is in her peaceful possession. There is nothing wrong and illegal in the settlements of the land in question in favour of defendant no.4 which was made after giving notice for objection. Therefore, the suit of plaintiff is fit to be dismissed with cost. 6. Originally, defendant no.4, Murti Devi appeared and filed her separate written statement stating inter-alia that the land belonged to one K.D.H. Cook, who was the rightful owner of the land and this defendant was working in his house as maid servant, therefore, about more than 30 years ago the said portion of land was given in her possession and she after constructing the kutcha house started living therein along with her family members. Hence, story of purchase by the plaintiff through stranger is not tenable. Hence, story of purchase by the plaintiff through stranger is not tenable. It is further submitted that she has been settled on the aforesaid land and house by the competent officer under Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947 and its rules and rent receipt is also issued in her favour since the year 1986, which shall appear from the record of case no. 42/94-95 filed by the plaintiff before the C.O. Topchanchi for cancellation of settlement and the same was dismissed. It is further alleged that the said Cook died issueless sometime in the year 1982 who had put the defendant during his lifetime in the year 1967 into possession of suit land. She is residing therein without any objection from any corner including the plaintiff at any point of time. Since the State of Bihar has rightly settled the suit land in her favour, hence plaintiff has no locus standi to file any case for cancellation of settlement as the defendant is privileged lady. The plaintiff has never approached to proper forum, i.e. Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad against the order of C.O. Topchanchi, Distt. Dhanbad rather plaintiff took shelter before the Hon’ble High Court by filing a writ petition which was also dismissed with direction to appear before the proper forum, i.e. Dy. Commissioner challenging the settlement in favour of defendant but he has not obeyed the order of the Hon’ble High Court, as such the suit is not maintainable and the suit is liable to be dismissed. Original defendant no. 4 died and her legal heirs were substituted and noticed, in spite of valid service of notice they did not turn up to contest the suit. 7. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, following issues were settled by the learned trial court for adjudication:- (i) Is the suit maintainable in its present form? (ii) It the suit barred by limitation, acquiescence, waiver, etc? (iii) Is the suit barred by joinder, non-joinder of the parties? (iv) Is there any cause of action for the present suit? (v) Has the plaintiff his right, title, interest and continuous possession over the Scheduled-B land? (vi) Is the plaintiff entitled for a decree for confirmation of his possession over the Schedule-B land? (vii) Is the plaintiff entitled for a decree for permanent injunction against the defendants, their men, agents etc? (viii) Is the plaintiff entitled for the cost of the suit.? (vi) Is the plaintiff entitled for a decree for confirmation of his possession over the Schedule-B land? (vii) Is the plaintiff entitled for a decree for permanent injunction against the defendants, their men, agents etc? (viii) Is the plaintiff entitled for the cost of the suit.? (ix) Is the plaintiff entitled for any other or further relief or reliefs as per the law of equity and natural justice? 8. The learned trial court considering the issue nos. I and V to be prime issue of this case taken together for adjudication at first. While dealing with the above issues the learned trial court considered the exhibit 1 series which are rent receipts, exhibit 2 series which are the original sale deed nos. 4808, 4809 and 4811 dated 08.05.1985 executed by Smt. Amrit Kaur and another in favour of the plaintiff in respect to suit land. Exhibit 2(c) is the certified copy of sale deed executed by Harry Cooke in favour Shri Papindra Singh and others for the suit property. Exhibit 3 is the certified copy of order dated 18.01.1987 passed in mutation case no. 118(ii)/86-87 which shows that plaintiff’s name is mutated in respect of the suit property. Accordingly, Exhibit 4 correction slip was issued. On the other hand Ext.A series for the suit property which is issued in the name of original defendant no. 4, Smt. Murti Devi, Ext. B is the certified copy of order dated 20.03.1986 and 07.04.1986 passed by defendant no.3 in B.P.P.H.T. Record No.. 1(II)/86-87 from which it transpires that suit land as described in Scheduled B of the plaint is settled in favour of original defendant no. 4 and order to issue Form-G. Exhibit C is the Istehar notice before the settlement of the suit land (scheduled B) in favour of the original defendant no.4 by defendant no. 3. Exhibit D is form G in the name of original defendant no.4 issued by the defendant showing that suit land schedule B is settled to the defendant. Therefore, there remains no doubt that suit schedule B land was settled in favour of original defendant no.4 vide order passed by defendant no.3 in Misc. Case No. 42/94-95. Exhibit E shows that plaintiff has filed an objection against the settlement in favour of the original defendant no.4 passed by the defendant no.3 as Misc. Case No. 42/94-95 and the same is rejected on 13.01.1994. Case No. 42/94-95. Exhibit E shows that plaintiff has filed an objection against the settlement in favour of the original defendant no.4 passed by the defendant no.3 as Misc. Case No. 42/94-95 and the same is rejected on 13.01.1994. It further appears that plaintiff was directed to file an appeal before the competent court against the said order but he did not choose the right forum of appeal rather filed the suit. It was further observed that the plaintiff himself in his plaint at para 20 has admitted that when his application was rejected in the aforesaid miscellaneous case vide order dated 13.01.1994 he preferred a writ before the Hon’ble High Court, Patna, Ranch Bench but he was advised to move before the collector seeking his remedy in appeal but he didn’t file any appeal due to no faith in Government Officials rather filed this suit. The learned trial court quoted the provision of Section 18 of the BPPHT Act, 1947 which runs as follows:- “The orders passed under this Act shall be final. Subject to the provision of Section 21 all orders passed by the Collector in any proceeding under this Act shall be final and no suit shall lie to any civil court to vary or set aside any such order except on the ground of fraud or want of jurisdiction except on the ground of fraud or want of jurisdiction. In view of aforesaid provision, the learned trial court observed that order passed under BPPHT Act is final and no suit shall lie to vary or set aside the same except on the ground of fraud or want of jurisdiction. Since the plaintiff, himself has admitted that he was advised to move before the collector against Exhibit E, the plaintiff was also directed by the C.O. to file an appeal but the plaintiff has not moved any appeal before proper forum and has also not given any ground of fraud or want of jurisdiction in the settlement order. Since the plaintiff, himself has admitted that he was advised to move before the collector against Exhibit E, the plaintiff was also directed by the C.O. to file an appeal but the plaintiff has not moved any appeal before proper forum and has also not given any ground of fraud or want of jurisdiction in the settlement order. Therefore, from discussion of documentary evidence adduced by the party and specific bar created under Section 18 of the BPPHT Act and also in view of the clear cut admission of the plaintiff that defendant no.4 is in possession over the 3 decimal of land (Suit Schedule B Property) and also from the consideration of the oral testimony of the other witnesses in the light of their cross examination and also specific evidence of witnesses examined by defendant showing her possession since 1967 under K.D.H. Cook, who had given the land of homestead purposes to her since long before he purchase of said land by the plaintiff, the learned trial court came to following conclusion as stated at Para 18 and 19 of the Judgment. 18. “From above discussion, I find from Ext. B, the disputed land is settled by the defendant no.3 in favour of the defendant no.4 and from Ext. D, it is also found that a Form-G is issued for the disputed land in the name of the defendant no.4 then the plaintiff has filed an objection before the C.O. which is proved by Ext. E and the same is dismissed and the plaintiff has admitted in para-20 of the plaint that he went to Hon’ble High Court but he was advised to move before the Collector but the plaintiff has not moved before the Collector rather he has filed this case. Since the settlement order, Ext.B in favour of the defendant is challenged by the plaintiff before, C.O. Topchanchi, therefore, I find that there is no fraud and want of jurisdiction in the settlement order, thus this suit is hit U/s 18 of B.P.P.H.T. Act, 1947. 19. Since the settlement order, Ext.B in favour of the defendant is challenged by the plaintiff before, C.O. Topchanchi, therefore, I find that there is no fraud and want of jurisdiction in the settlement order, thus this suit is hit U/s 18 of B.P.P.H.T. Act, 1947. 19. Considering the case of both the parties in totality and discussing the evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties, oral as well as documentary evidence, I find and hold that the disputed land is settled in favour of the defendant no.4 by the defendant no.3 in compliance of procedure and the same is objected by the plaintiff before the C.O. and the plaintiff’s objection is not sustainable as per Ext. E, hence, this suit is not maintainable in its present form and the suit is barred U/s 18 of the Bihar Privileged Person Homestead Act, 1947, thus the plaintiff has got no right, title, interest over the suit, Schedule-B of the plaint, hence, these two issues are decided in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff. 9. As regards issue nos. VI & VII it was held that since the defendant no.4 is admittedly in possession of the suit property which was legally settled in her favour under the provisions of Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947, hence, plaintiff is not entitled for a decree of confirmation of possession and permanent injunction. As the plaintiff has got no right title and interest and continuous possession of the suit land. Accordingly, these two issues were also decided against the plaintiff and in favour of defendants. Other issues nos. II, III, IV, VII & IX have also been decided against the plaintiff in view of decision and findings recorded on main issues and the suit was dismissed on contest without cost. 10. The plaintiff/appellant has assailed the above judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit in Title Appeal No. 56 of 2013 before the Principal District Judge, Dhanbad wherein after hearing the rival contentions of the parties following points were formulated for determination of the appeal:- I. Whether the plaintiff has got any right, title, interest and continuous possession over the Schedule-B land and he is entitled for a decree for confirmation of his possession over the Schedule-B land? II. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for any other and further relief or reliefs as per law and equity and Natural Justice? III. II. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for any other and further relief or reliefs as per law and equity and Natural Justice? III. Whether the learned court below while passing the impugned Judgment has committed any material error, illegality or irregularity either in facts or law which warrants any interference by this Court? 11. All the above three points were taken together for adjudication and the learned Appellate Court after reconsidering the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced before the trial court concluded at para 11 of judgment as follows:- From perusal of Ext. B, certified copy of order dt. 20.03.1986 passed under B.P.P.H.T. Act, Record No. 1(II)/86-87, I find that the disputed land has been settled by the defendant no. 3, C.O. Topchanchi in favour of defendant No. 4, Murti Devi. Ext.-D, the original Form-G issued on 26.04.1986 shows that Form-G has been issued for the disputed land in the name of defendant No. 4, Murti Devi. Ext.-E the certified copy of Order Sheet dt. 13.09.1994 passed in Misc. Case No. 42/94/95, which shows that the plaintiff has filed objection before the C.O., which was dismissed and no appeal has been filed against the said order. As such, the order passed by the C.O. is final. From perusal of the plaint, if appears that the plaintiff has admitted in para-20 that he went to the Hon’ble High Court but he was advised to move to the collector but he has not moved before the collector rather he has filed this case. Ext.-B i.e. settlement order shows that the disputed land was settled by the C.O. in favour of the defendant no.4, Murti Devi, which was challenged by the plaintiff before C.O., Topchanchi which was rejected. As such, no fraud was played in obtaining the order which became final. 12. He has also relied upon Section 18 of B.P.P.H.T Act, 1947 as quoted earlier which bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain any suit before the Civil Court unless there is fraud or want of jurisdiction. 13. Consideration of the entire evidence both oral as well documentary, which has been elaborately discussed by the learned trial court. The appellate court concluded that there is no perversity in the findings recorded by the trial court which warrants any interference by this Court, accordingly, dismissed the appeal on contest. 14. 13. Consideration of the entire evidence both oral as well documentary, which has been elaborately discussed by the learned trial court. The appellate court concluded that there is no perversity in the findings recorded by the trial court which warrants any interference by this Court, accordingly, dismissed the appeal on contest. 14. Assailing the concurrent findings of both the court below, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that both the court below have recorded absurd finding in view of non-maintainability of suit in view of Section 18 of the B.P.P.H.T Act. The plaintiff/appellant has nowhere prayed in the suit for setting aside the order of settlement passed in favour of original defendant no.4 rather he is seeking protection for his right title and interest over the said schedule B land and confirmation of possession on the strength of valid purchase through registered sale deed from rightful owner. The question of title can only be decided by Civil Court and not by the Court of Collector. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code expressly provides 9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.—The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. [Explanation I].—A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. [Explanation I].—For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.] 15. Referring the above provision of the CPC learned counsel for the appellant submits that in view of aforesaid provision, there is no bar express or implied to institute a suit for declaration of right, title and confirmation of possession. The learned trial court as well as appellate court has failed to record any findings as to how the plaintiff did not got right, title and interest on the strength of sale deeds executed in his favour. The contents of the sale deed also shows the suit land was originally belongs to K.D.H. Cook which is also admitted by defendant no.4 in her written statement. The contents of the sale deed also shows the suit land was originally belongs to K.D.H. Cook which is also admitted by defendant no.4 in her written statement. Both the learned court below instead of deciding the main issue of title of the plaintiff have gone into extraneous question of settlement in favour of defendant no.4. and the question of rejection of application of the appellant for setting aside the settlement in favor of the defendant and bar of suit under Section 18 of the B.P.P.H.T. Act. Both the court below have committed perversity in not recording any finding as to for what reason the appellant has not get any title and possession of the suit property through valid purchase. The State officials who are defendants, in the case have also not filed any documentary evidence showing that the said land was belonging to Government or it was not belonging to the vendor of the plaintiff. There is no reason as to why in the simultaneous proceeding of mutation, Jamavandi was opened in favour of appellant and rent receipt was also issued and the Government has realized revenue from the appellant inspite of that “Basgit parcha” was issue in favour of defendant no.4. 16. The appellant has set out following substantial question of law for adjudication in this appeal. I. Whether the learned court below has rightly passed the judgment and decree against the appellant on the ground that the suit of the plaintiff/appellant is not maintainable under Section 18 of the said Act, although Section 18 relate to the suit filed for setting aside and to vary the order passed under the Act whereas the appellant in the suit did not pray for any relief for setting aside the order of settlement rather has prayed for granting of relief of right, title and interest over the Schedule B land and confirmation over the Schedule B land? II. II. Whether the learned court below have bye passed/ overlooked the provision of Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1974 while passing the Judgment and decree against the appellant/plaintiff in as much as under Section 5 and Rule 3(a) and Rule 5 (2) and Rule 5(5).A privileged tenant can file a petition for restoration of possession upon which after enquiry and notice a record of homestead will be prepared by the Collector in the form G but the original defendant no.4 was never been a privileged tenant according to her case rather she was privileged person? 17. While controverting the aforesaid points of argument raised on behalf of the appellant learned Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Jai Prakash, AAG IV and Ms. Omiya Anusha, Advocate appearing on behalf of the State have vehemently argued that the core issue surrounding in this case from beginning to end revolved on the question of validity of settlement under B.P.P.H.T. in favour of defendant no. 4 which was never properly challenged at proper forum by the appellant. Admittedly the defendant no.4 was in possession of the suit scheduled B property since 1967 much before the alleged purchase of land by the plaintiff/appellant. The said order of settlement could only by challenged under Section 21 of the B.P.P.H.T. and Section 18 bars any civil suit. Therefore, both the court below have recorded concurrent findings that the plaintiff is not having any right, title and interest over the schedule property and was never in possession of the same and the suit is also not maintainable. The substantial question of law raised by the plaintiff also revolves touching the core dispute about settlement of homestead in favour of defendant no. 4 (since deceased). So far as 3 decimal land is concerned both the court below have rightly concluded that settlement in respect of suit Schedule B property in favour of defendant no.4 has become final and never challenged before any proper authority and defendant is in possession since long to the knowledge of the plaintiff, therefore reliefs claimed by the plaintiff could not be granted and rightly dismissed the suit and the appeal. This appeal involved no substantial question of law and fit to be dismissed. 18. I have gone through the entire record and materials available on record in the light of contentions of the respective parties. This appeal involved no substantial question of law and fit to be dismissed. 18. I have gone through the entire record and materials available on record in the light of contentions of the respective parties. It is settled law that concurrent findings of fact could not interfered with lightly unless the judgment of both the court below suffers from perversity and not justified under law. In this regard reliance may be placed in the case C. Doddanarayana Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy reported in (2020) 4 SCC 659 . The relevant paragraphs are quoted below:- 25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises, has been a subject-matter of interpretation by this Court. In the judgment in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343 , it was held that findings of the fact could not have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as under : (SCC pp. 347-48, paras 12-15) “12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited solely to decide a substantial question of law, if at all the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact reached by the courts below without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on material on record. 13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu, (1996) 3 SCC 392 , this Court held : (SCC p. 393) ‘It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of trial court and first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did.’ 14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty, (1996) 6 SCC 166 , this Court held : (SCC p. 166) ‘Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. … Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material.’ 15. And again in Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N., (1997) 4 SCC 484 , this Court held : (SCC p. 486, para 5) ‘5. … The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon the appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and recording reverse finding of fact, which is impermissible.’” 26. In a judgment in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 , this Court held that from a given set of circumstances if two inferences are possible then the one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court. In the said case, the first appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court. It was held that the High Court can interfere if the conclusion drawn by the lower court was erroneous being contrary to mandatory provisions of law applicable or if it is a settled position on the basis of a pronouncement made by the court or based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. This Court held as under : (SCC p. 725, para 5) “5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court had given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable of its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon in inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 27. In another judgment in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 187-88, para 14) “14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law “involving in the case” there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 28. Recently in another judgment in State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal, (2019) 8 SCC 637 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 203, it was held that a concurrent finding of the fact is binding, unless it is pointed out that it was recorded dehors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or based on misreading of the material on records and documents. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 640, para 16) “16. When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded dehors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (See observation made by the learned Judge Vivian Bose, J. as his Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar, 1942 SCC OnLine MP 26 : AIR 1943 Nag 117, AIR Nag para 43).” 19. In the instant appeal, the question of title of the appellant in respect of suit land (Schedule B) has been decided by both the court below on the basis of oral and documentary evidence available on record and also the case of the defendants which is based on possession of defendant no.4 over the suit land given by original owner KDH Cook, who was a rightful owner and she was working as a maid in his house and was given small chunk of land for purpose of her resident. It is admitted position that defendant no.4 was residing in the said hutment house since 1967. Henry Cook has sold the said property to one Pupeendra Singh. The plaintiff claims to have purchased the suit property from one Amrita Singh mother of Pupendra Singh, although mutation has been effected in favour of plaintiff in respect of 21 decimal land in the impugned Khata and plot no., but so far three decimal land as described in Scheduled B is concerned, the same was already given to original defendant 4, who was in possession of the same by constructing hutment type house. 20. 20. In the substantial question of law as raised by the appellant indirectly the question of settlement is again traversed which cannot be permitted in the second appeal. 21. In my considered view the concurrent findings of fact recorded by trial court and the first appellate court, I don’t find any perversity in the impugned Judgment which warrant any interference on merits. Accordingly, I don’t find any merits in this appeal, which stands dismissed on merits but without cost.