JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, J. This order of mine shall dispose of an application, filed under Rule 2(d) of Chapter VII of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh (Appellate Side) Rules, 1997, for leave to appeal, on behalf of the applicant. 2. Applicant Anil Kumar intends to prefer the third-party Regular Second Appeal, before this Court, against the judgment and decree, dated 30.11.2022, passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the First Appellate Court’), in Civil Appeal No. 13-13 of 2022, titled as, ‘Sunita Devi Versus General Public’, as such, the present application has been moved to get the permission to do so. 3. Vide judgment and decree dated 30.11.2022, the learned First Appellate Court has allowed the appeal, preferred by respondent No. 1, Sunita Devi, which was preferred, against the judgment and decree, dated 29.6.2022, passed by the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No. 1, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in Civil Suit No. 57/01 of 2022/2021, titled as ‘Sunita Devi Versus General Public’. 4. Respondent No. 1, is referred to in the same manner, in which, she was referred to, by the learned trial Court. 5. As per the record, necessary facts, leading to filing the present application may be summed up as under: Plaintiff Sunita Devi had moved an application before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., for registration of her marriage with deceased Prakash Chand, on the ground that her name be recorded in the Pariwar Register, Ration Card and Marriage Register, as wife of deceased Prakash Chand. 5.1 She has moved the said application on the ground that she is widow of deceased Prakash Chand. Her earlier marriage with one Bhim Singh is stated to have been dissolved, by way of decree of divorce. Thereafter, as per her stand, she had solemnized the marriage with Prakash Chand on 13.11.2017. Prakash Chand expired on 16.9.2019, but, according to the plaintiff, her name has not been entered in the Marriage Register, Pariwar Register and Ration Card, as such, she has prayed that her name be registered, as wife of deceased Prakash Chand in the relevant record/registers. 5.2 In those proceedings, the present applicant and his sister had filed the objections, denying the aforesaid averments. 5.2 In those proceedings, the present applicant and his sister had filed the objections, denying the aforesaid averments. The said objections have been filed on the ground that she was not married to Prakash Chand, S/o Shri Rattan Lal. 5.3 Those proceedings were culminated vide order dated 10.9.2021, passed by the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. by virtue of which, it has been held that the application is not maintainable, as such, the same was dismissed. 5.4 Thereafter, plaintiff Sunita Devi had filed Civil Suit No. 57/01/2022/21 for declaration, against the General Public, seeking declaration to the effect that she is legally wedded wife of deceased Prakash Chand, S/o Shri Rattan Lal. 5.5 The said suit was dismissed by the learned trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 29.6.2022. 5.6 Aggrieved from the said judgment and decree, dated 29.6.2022, plaintiff had filed Civil Appeal No.13-13 of 2022, before the learned First Appellate Court, which was allowed, vide judgment and decree, dated 30.11.2022. 6. Aggrieved from the said judgment and decree, applicant Anil Kumar has moved the present application, as he was not the party to the proceedings, initiated by the plaintiff, by way of Civil Suit No. 57/01 of 2022/21, before the learned trial Court. Admittedly, the applicant was also not made party in the Civil Appeal, preferred before the learned First Appellate Court, also. 7. By way of present application, the applicant has sought indulgence of this Court to allow him to file third-party Regular Second Appeal, before this Court, mainly on the ground that he is Class-II legal heir of deceased Prakash Chand, and estate of said Prakash Chand has been mutated in his favour, as well as, in favour of his sister, vide Mutation No. 2579 and Mutation No. 112, sanctioned on 21.7.2020. 7.1 Another ground upon which the relief has been sought is that the plaintiff has intentionally and deliberately not impleaded the applicant, as well as, his sister, as parties to the lis, instituted by her. 8. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the application. 9. 7.1 Another ground upon which the relief has been sought is that the plaintiff has intentionally and deliberately not impleaded the applicant, as well as, his sister, as parties to the lis, instituted by her. 8. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the application. 9. When, put to notice, the application has been contested by the plaintiff, who has been arrayed as non-applicant No. 1, in the present application, on the ground that the application is neither competent nor maintainable and the application lacks ingredients of Rule 2(d) of Chapter VII of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh (Appellate Side) Rules, 1997. Asserting the fact that plaintiff is the legally wedded wife of deceased Prakash Chand, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 10. In this background, question, which arises for determination, before this Court, is whether the application, so moved, by the applicant, seeking permission to file third-party Regular Second Appeal, is liable to be allowed? 11. Vide judgment and decree, sought to be impugned, before this Court, rights of the parties, with regard to matter in controversy, in the suit, have conclusively been determined. 12. The applicant and his sister were the persons, who had filed the objections, against the stand taken by the plaintiff, before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., where, she had moved application, seeking indulgence of that authority to enter her name, as wife of deceased Prakash Chand, in the Pariwar Register, Marriage Register, as well as, in the Ration Card. 13. From the admitted position, no inference can be drawn that the plaintiff was not aware about the applicant, as well as, his sister, who had filed objections, denying the status of wife of deceased Prakash Chand. Admittedly, both of them had not been impleaded in the Civil Suit, filed by the plaintiff, before the learned trial Court, nor they were impleaded in the Civil Appeal, filed by the plaintiff, before the learned First Appellate Court. 14. Normally, the parties to the lis, who were adversely affected by the decree, including their representatives, may prefer the appeal. Here, admittedly, the applicant and his sister were not parties to the lis. They are claiming themselves to be the Class-II legal heirs of deceased Prakash Chand. 15. 14. Normally, the parties to the lis, who were adversely affected by the decree, including their representatives, may prefer the appeal. Here, admittedly, the applicant and his sister were not parties to the lis. They are claiming themselves to be the Class-II legal heirs of deceased Prakash Chand. 15. The learned First Appellate Court has declared the plaintiff as legally wedded wife of deceased Prakash Chand and once, this status has been granted by the learned First Appellate Court to the plaintiff, by declaring her to be the legally wedded wife of deceased Prakash Chand, certainly, she comes within the definition of Class-I legal heir of Prakash Chand. Being brother and sister of deceased Prakash Chand, certainly, the applicant and his sister are Class-II legal heirs. 16. The applicant, as well as, his sister, certainly, falls within the definition of ‘aggrieved persons’, as the judgment and decree, passed by the learned First Appellate Court, which is sought to be impugned before this Court, prejudicially affect their interest, regarding the estate left by their brother Prakash Chand. Although, mutation has been sanctioned in their favour, but, mutation does not confer any title, however, in case, permission is not granted to the applicant to file third-party Regular Second Appeal, then, in that eventuality, their interest would be adversely affected by the said judgment and decree. 17. Neither the provisions of 96 nor 100 of CPC enumerate the categories of persons, who could file an appeal. However, if a person is aggrieved from the judgment and decree, he can file the appeal with the permission of the Court. 18. Hon’ble Apex Court in a case titled as Smt. Jatan Golcha Vs. M/s. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd reported in 1970 (3) SCC 573 . held as under:- “It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment.” 19. Similar view has again been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a case titled as Banarsi and others Vs. Ram Phal reported in AIR 2003 SCC 1989. Relevant paragraph 8 of the judgment is reproduced, as under:- “8. Similar view has again been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a case titled as Banarsi and others Vs. Ram Phal reported in AIR 2003 SCC 1989. Relevant paragraph 8 of the judgment is reproduced, as under:- “8. Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC make provision for an appeal being preferred from every original decree or from every decree passed in appeal respectively; none of the provisions enumerates the person who can file an appeal. However, it is settled by a long catena of decisions that to be entitled to file an appeal the person must be one aggrieved by the decree. Unless a person is prejudicially or adversely affected by the decree he is not entitled to file an appeal (See Phoolchand and Anr. v. Gopal Lal, [1967] 3 SCR 153; Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha v. M/s Golcha Properties (P) Ltd., [1970] 3 SCC 573; Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and Ors., [1974] 2 SCC 393. No appeal lies against a mere finding. It is significant to note that both Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC provide for an appeal against decree and not against judgment.” 20. The term ‘aggrieved person’ has again been elaborated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent decision titled as AyaaubKhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2012 (11) Scale 39 . Relevant paragraphs 7 to 10 of the judgment are reproduced as under:- “7. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. Infact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. (Vide : State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 ; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728 ; Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1044 ; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2736 ; and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 784 ). 8. A “legal right”, means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719 ; and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1361 ). 9. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of Mumbai, AIR 2008 SC 1289 , a similar view was taken by this Court, observing that, if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved regarding the election or the selection of other persons. 10. 9. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of Mumbai, AIR 2008 SC 1289 , a similar view was taken by this Court, observing that, if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved regarding the election or the selection of other persons. 10. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of A.P., AIR 2011 SC 3031 , this Court held: “The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant.” 21. In a case titled as Hardevinder Singh Vs. Paramjit Singh and others reported in 2013 (9) SCC 261 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has again reiterated the earlier views. Relevant paragraphs 17 to 19 are reproduced as under:- “17. Presently, it is apt to note that Sections 96 and 100 of the Code make provisions for preferring an appeal from any original appeal or from a decree in an appeal respectively. The aforesaid provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal. If a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person, needless to emphasize, he can prefer an appeal. In this context, a passage from Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha v. M/s. Golcha Properties Private Ltd. is worth noting: - “3….It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate Court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment.” 18. In State of Punjab v. Amar Singh and another, Sarkaria, J., while dealing with the maintainability of an appeal by a person who is not a party to a decree or order, has stated thus: - “83. In State of Punjab v. Amar Singh and another, Sarkaria, J., while dealing with the maintainability of an appeal by a person who is not a party to a decree or order, has stated thus: - “83. Firstly there is a catena of authorities which, following the doctrine of Lindley, L.J., in re Securities Insurance Co., (1894) 2 Ch 410 have laid down the rule that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected by it. As a rule, leave to appeal will not be refused to a person who might have been made ex nominee a party [see Province of Bombay v. W.I. Automobile Association, AIR 1949 Bom 141; Heera Singh v. Veerka, AIR 1958 Raj 181 and Shivaraya v. Siddamma, AIR 1963 Mys 127; Executive Officer v. Raghavan Pillai, AIR 1961 Ker 114 . In re B, an Infant (1958) QB 12; Govinda Menon v. Madhavan Nair, AIR 1964 Ker 235 ].” 19. In Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma and others, a three Judge-Bench opined that an appeal under Section 96 of the Code would be maintainable only at the instance of a person aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree. In the said case, while dealing with the concept of ‘person aggrieved’, the Bench observed thus:- “15……A person aggrieved to file an appeal must be one whose right is affected by reason or the judgment and decree sought to be impugned. It is not the contention of Respondent 1 that in the event the said judgment and decree is allowed to stand, the same will cause any personal injury to him or shall affect his interest otherwise.” Be it noted, in the said case, the challenge in appeal was to the dissolution of marriage of the appellant therein and his first wife which, this Court held, would have no repercussion on the property in the suit and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in disposing of the civil revision with the observation that the revisionist could prefer an appeal.” 22. If the facts and circumstances of the present case are seen, in the light of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha Versus M/s Golcha Properties (P) Ltd., 1970 (3) SCC 573 , then, the applicant alongwith his sister, certainly fall within the definition of ‘aggrieved persons’,. Para-3 of the judgment is reproduced as under : “3. In the order of the High Court reference has been made to Rule 139 of the Companies (Court) Rules 1959 and it has been pointed out that since the appellant had not appeared before the Company Judge she was not entitled to maintain the appeal. It was conceded that no notice had ever been sent to her either by the Official Liquidator or the Company Judge before the order appealed against relating to appellant's property was made. The High Court was of the view that the only remedy of the appellant was by way of a suit after obtaining leave of the Company Judge under s. 446 of the Act. Now an appeal lies under s. 483 of the Act from any order made or decision given in the matter of finding up of a company by the court and it lies to the same court to which, in the same manner in which, and subject to the same conditions under which, appeals lie from any order or decision of the Court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction. There can be no manner of doubt that an appeal was competent against the order made by the Company Judge on July 21, 1969 in view of the terms of s. 483. The only question is whether because the Official Liquidator failed to discharge his duties properly by having a notice issued to the appellant, whose rights were directly affected by the order proposed to be made, the appellant was debarred from filing the appeal. In our opinion apart from Rule 139 to which reference has been made by the High Court the Official Liquidator as well as the learned Company Judge were bound by the rules of natural justice to issue a notice to the appellant and hear her before making the order appealed against. In our opinion apart from Rule 139 to which reference has been made by the High Court the Official Liquidator as well as the learned Company Judge were bound by the rules of natural justice to issue a notice to the appellant and hear her before making the order appealed against. If there was default on their part in not following the correct procedure it is wholly incomprehensible how the appellant could be deprived of her right to get her grievance redressed by filing an appeal against the order which had been made in her absence and without her knowledge. It would be a travesty of justice if a party is driven to file a suit which would involve long and cumbersome procedure when an order has been made directly affecting that party and redress can be had by filing an appeal which is permitted by law. It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment.” (self-emphasis supplied) 23. Even otherwise, the applicant, as well as, his sister were the persons, who had filed the objections in the petition, which was filed by the plaintiff, before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. Once, they have filed the objections, then, certainly, they are the persons, who fall within the definition of “any person denying or interested to deny his/her title, estate, character or right” as occurred in Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 24. The provisions of Section 34 of Specific Relief Act are reproduced as under: “34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.— Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.” 25. Admittedly, the applicant, as well as, his sister were not impleaded as party, in the civil suit, instituted by the plaintiff, before the learned trial Court, nor they were made party to the appeal, preferred against the judgment and decree, passed by the learned trial Court. The applicant, as well as, his sisters are aggrieved from the judgment and decree, passed by the learned First Appellate Court, against them. As such, requirement of Rule 2(d) of Chapter VII of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh (Appellate Side) Rules, 1997, is fulfilled. 26. No other point has been urged or argued. 27. Considering all these facts, the present application is allowed, and the applicant is permitted to file the third-party appeal, by impleading his sister Kamla Devi, as co-appellant in the present case. Let necessary correction be made in the cause title.