ORDER : N. SENTHILKUMAR, J. 1. The Civil Revision Petition has been filed challenging the impugned order passed by the learned Additional District Munsif, Valliyoor in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in O.S.No.80 of 2016, dated 04.01.2021. 2. The Revision Petitioner is the plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.80 of 2016.The suit was filed with the prayer to declare that the release deed, dated 30.09.2011 which was registered as Doc.No.6745, before the Sub Registrar Officer, Radhapuram, is not binding on the half of the share of the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff in O.S.No.80 of 2016 and further pleaded, that the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff is having the absolute right over the property and the defendant, namely, Arumuga Chettiar and others did not have any right and they shall not interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff in respect of the suit property. The subject matter of suit property is situated in ..... 3. Previously, the respondents herein, as plaintiffs, filed a suit in O.S.No.37 of 2012 against the Revision Petitioner and others for a declaration of title and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants in that suit and their men from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property and for other injunctions. 4. As the parties are one and the same and the suit schedule property is also one and the same, the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff in O.S.No.80 of 2016 filed an application before the District Court at Tirunelveli for conducting joint trial of O.S.No.80 of 2016 and O.S.No.37 of 2012. The District Court upon hearing all the parties to lis, ordered joint trial vide order, dated 19.06.2017, in Tr.O.P.No.92 of 2017. 5. When PW-1 was examined in chief and when the case was posted for examination of the Revision Petitioner as DW-1, the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff filed an amendment application in I.A.No.1 of 2019 under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to include the prayer to declare the release deed, dated 05.04.2011 is not binding on the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff. 6. 5. When PW-1 was examined in chief and when the case was posted for examination of the Revision Petitioner as DW-1, the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff filed an amendment application in I.A.No.1 of 2019 under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to include the prayer to declare the release deed, dated 05.04.2011 is not binding on the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff. 6. The trial Court had rejected the said application by holding when the Revision Petitioner was aware of the fact that the release deed, which was marked as Ex-A8 on 05.04.2011 and when PW-1 was fully cross examined by the plaintiff in O.S.No.80 of 2016, the question of the Revision Petitioner having no knowledge about the release deed, dated 05.04.2011, is nothing but of after thought, when the Revision Petitioner had complete knowledge about the said release deed. 7. The trial Court had also considered the point of limitation, since there is an inordinate delay by the Revision Petitioner to make an amendment application, by relying upon Article 58 of the Limitation Act. The trial Court had referred the the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Rajkumar Gurawara vs. S.K. Sarwagi and Company (P) Limited , 2008 (14) SCC 364 held that “It is settled law that the grant of application for amendment be subject to certain conditions, namely, (i) when the nature of it is changed by permitting amendment; (ii) when the amendment would result in introducing new cause of action and intends to prejudice the other party; (iii) when allowing amendment application defeats the law of limitation. The trial Court on the above reasons, dismissed the amendment application. Challenging same, the present Civil Revision Petition has been filed. 8. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that as the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff was not aware of the release deed, dated 05.04.2011, they came to know about the fresh act, only when PW-1 was cross examined and document was marked as Ex-P8 and therefore, this application was filed to amend the prayer. The learned Counsel further submitted that if the amendment application is not allowed, it will cause a serious prejudice to the main relief of the suit. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that if the application filed by the Revision Petitioner is barred by limitation, the delay should be condoned by considering the interest of justice and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that if the application filed by the Revision Petitioner is barred by limitation, the delay should be condoned by considering the interest of justice and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. 9. The learned Counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner had relied upon the following judgments: (1) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in L.J. Leach and Company Limited vs. Jardine Skinner and Company, AIR 1957 SCC 313 had had also follows: “16. It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice. In Charan Das v. Amir Khan, (1920) 47 IA 255 the Privy Council observed: “That there was full power to make the amendment cannot be disputed, and though such a power should not as a rule be exercised where the effect is to take away from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time, yet there are cases where such considerations are out-weighed by the special circumstances of the case.” Vide also Kisan Das v. Rachappa, (1909) ILR 33 Bombay 644. 17. In the present case, apart from the contents of the plaint already set out, there is the fact that the defendants cancelled the contract without strictly complying with the terms of clause 14. The ground on which they repudiated the contract was that the second plaintiffs had assigned his interests to the first plaintiffs; but the record shows that subsequent to the assignment the defendants had business transactions with both the plaintiffs and therefore the ground for cancellation appears to have been a mere device to deprive the plaintiffs of the benefits of the orders which they had placed. We are of opinion that the justice of the case requires that the amendment should be granted. We are of opinion that the justice of the case requires that the amendment should be granted. The plaintiffs will accordingly be allowed to amend the plaint as follows: “12(a) In the alternative and without prejudice to the claim on the footing of conversion, the plaintiffs say that by reason of the facts aforesaid, there was a contract between the parties whereby the defendants undertook to supply and deliver to the plaintiffs (or either of them) the goods ordered out by Government on their (the plaintiffs') account and included in the quotas PL. 1004-PL. 1007. The said goods arrived in Bombay, but the defendants failed and neglected to deliver the same though demanded, and in fact repudiated their obligation to deliver. The plaintiffs say that they were always ready and willing to pay for and take delivery of the same. The defendants at all material times well knew that the plaintiffs had purchased the same for resale and for fulfilment of contracts of sale and supply. The plaintiffs claim damages as per particulars.” This appeal must accordingly be allowed, the decree under appeal set aside, and the suit remanded for rehearing to the trial court. The defendants will file their written statement to the amended claim and the suit will be tried and disposed of in accordance with law.” (2) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in Smt. Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar and others , (1974) 2 SCC 393 had had also follows: “ 22. The preliminary decree had remained unchallenged since September, 1958 and by lapse of time a valuable right had accrued in favour of the decree-holder. The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the Court. The appeal in terms was originally directed against the finding given by the trial court that the partition was sham and colourable. “Being aggrieved by the finding given in the Judgment and the Decree ... The appeal in terms was originally directed against the finding given by the trial court that the partition was sham and colourable. “Being aggrieved by the finding given in the Judgment and the Decree ... it is humbly prayed that findings given by the learned Judge in Para 34 of his Judgment may kindly be set aside, and instead the partition deed dated January 11, 1956 may kindly be declared as genuine” — so ran the Memorandum of Appeal. Defendants 2 and 3 reiterated through their counsel by filing a note to explain the payment of fixed court fees of Rs 20 that they were “seeking the relief of declaration only”and therefore the court fee paid was proper and sufficient. Long years thereafter, the High Court allowed the Memorandum to be amended — not a reason was cited to explain the delay and not a reason was given to condone it. And it was not appreciated that in granting time to Defendants 2 and 3 to make up the deficit of the court fees 7½ years after the appeal was filed, an amendment was being allowed which had its impact not only on the preliminary decree but on the final decree which was passed in the meanwhile, the auction sale which was held in pursuance of the final decree and the sale certificate which was granted to the appellant who, with the leave of the Court and in full satisfaction of her decree, had purchased a joint ½ share in the mortgaged property. With the striking down of the preliminary decree, these proceedings had to fall but the error really lay in allowing the amendment so as to permit, without good cause shown, a belated challenge to the preliminary decree.” (3) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in Vineet Kumar vs. Mangal Sain Wadhera , AIR 1985 SC 817 had had also follows: “ 16. Normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the cause of action. But it is well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute an addition of a new cause of action, or raise a new case, but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on the record, the amendment would be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation. But it is well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute an addition of a new cause of action, or raise a new case, but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on the record, the amendment would be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation. The question in the present case is whether by seeking the benefit of Section 39 of the new Act there is a change in the cause of action. In A.K. Gupta & Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 : (1966) 1 SCR 796 : (1967) 1 SCJ 223 this Court dealing with the cause of action observed as follows: “The expression ‘cause of action’ in the present context does not mean ‘every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed’ as was said in Cooke v. Gill, (1873) LR 8 CP 107 : 42 LJCP 98 in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corporation Ltd. (1962) 2 All ER 24 : (1962) 1 WLR 520 and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile.” (4) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in B.K. Narayana Pillai vs. Parameswaran Pillai and another , (2000) 1 SCC 712 had had also follows: “ 4. This Court in A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 : (1966) 1 SCR 796 held: “The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred: Weldon v. Neal, (1887) 19 QBD 394 : 56 LJ QB 621 . But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation: See Charan Das v. Amir Khan, AIR 1921 PC 50 : ILR 48 Cal 110 and L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 : 1957 SCR 438 . The principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are, first, that the object of courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes [Cropper v. Smith, (1884) 26 ChD 700 : 53 LJ Ch 891 : 51 LT 729] and secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended (Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant, ILR (1909) 33 Bom 644 : 11 Bom LR 1042 approved in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363 : 1957 SCR 595 ). The expression ‘cause of action’ in the present context does not mean ‘every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed’ as was said in Cooke v. Gill, (1873) 8 CP 107 : 42 LJCP 98 : 28 LT 32 in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corpn. Ltd. (1962) 2 All ER 24 (CA) and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile. The words ‘new case’ have been understood to mean ‘new set of ideas’: Dornan v. J.W. Ellis and Co. Ltd., (1962) 1 All ER 303 (CA) This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile. The words ‘new case’ have been understood to mean ‘new set of ideas’: Dornan v. J.W. Ellis and Co. Ltd., (1962) 1 All ER 303 (CA) This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party by lapse of time.” Again in Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, (1974) 2 SCC 393 this Court held: (SCC p. 399, para 22) “The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far- reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the court.” In Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, (1978) 2 SCC 91 it was held: (SCC p. 93, para 4) “4. It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main rules of pleadings that provisions for the amendment of pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact situations resulting from amendments, are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them. Even if a party or its counsel is inefficient in setting out its case initially the shortcoming can certainly be removed generally by appropriate steps taken by a party which must no doubt pay costs for the inconvenience or expense caused to the other side from its omissions. The error is not incapable of being rectified so long as remedial steps do not unjustifiably injure rights accrued.” The principles applicable to the amendments of the plaint are equally applicable to the amendments of the written statements. The courts are more generous in allowing the amendment of the written statement as the question of prejudice is less likely to operate in that event. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment the other side should not be subjected to injustice and that any admission made in favour of the plaintiff is not withdrawn. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment the other side should not be subjected to injustice and that any admission made in favour of the plaintiff is not withdrawn. All amendments of the pleadings should be allowed which are necessary for determination of the real controversies in the suit provided the proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of action on the basis of which the original lis was raised or defence taken. Inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of facts should not be allowed to be incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings. Proposed amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs. No amendment should be allowed which amounts to or relates (sic results) in defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite party on account of lapse of time. The delay in filing the petition for amendment of the pleadings should be properly compensated by costs and error or mistake which, if not fraudulent, should not be made a ground for rejecting the application for amendment of plaint or written statement. (5) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in Ragu Thilak D. John vs S. Rayappan and others , (2001) 2 SCC 472 had had also follows: “ 6. If the aforesaid test is applied in the instant case, the amendment sought could not be declined. The dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimise the litigation. The plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is arguable in the circumstances of the case, as is evident from the perusal of averments made in paras 8(a) to 8(f) of the plaint which were sought to be incorporated by way of amendment. We feel that in the circumstances of the case the plea of limitation being disputed could be made a subject-matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for. (6) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in Vishwambhar and others vs. Laxmirayan (D) through LRs and others, (2001) 6 SCC 163 had had also follows: “ 10. We feel that in the circumstances of the case the plea of limitation being disputed could be made a subject-matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for. (6) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in Vishwambhar and others vs. Laxmirayan (D) through LRs and others, (2001) 6 SCC 163 had had also follows: “ 10. From the averments of the plaint, it cannot be said that all the necessary averments for setting aside the sale deeds executed by Laxmibai were contained in the plaint and adding specific prayer for setting aside the sale deeds was a mere formality. As noted earlier, the basis of the suit as it stood before the amendment of the plaint was that the sale transactions made by Laxmibai as guardian of the minors were ab initio void and, therefore, liable to be ignored. By introducing the prayer for setting aside the sale deeds the basis of the suit was changed to one seeking setting aside the alienations of the property by the guardian. In such circumstance, the suit for setting aside the transfers could be taken to have been filed on the date the amendment of the plaint was allowed and not earlier than that.” (7) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in Pankara and another vs. Yellappa (Dead) By LRs and others , (2004) 6 SCC 415 had had also follows: “ 14. The law in this regard is also quite clear and consistent that there is no absolute rule that in every case where a relief is barred because of limitation an amendment should not be allowed. Discretion in such cases depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. The jurisdiction to allow or not allow an amendment being discretionary, the same will have to be exercised on a judicious evaluation of the facts and circumstances in which the amendment is sought. If the granting of an amendment really subserves the ultimate cause of justice and avoids further litigation the same should be allowed. There can be no straitjacket formula for allowing or disallowing an amendment of pleadings. Each case depends on the factual background of that case. ..... 15. This Court in the case of L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 has held: (AIR p. 362, para 16) “16. There can be no straitjacket formula for allowing or disallowing an amendment of pleadings. Each case depends on the factual background of that case. ..... 15. This Court in the case of L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 has held: (AIR p. 362, para 16) “16. It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice.” (8) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and another , (2022) 16 SCC 1 had had also follows: “ 71. Our final conclusions may be summed up thus: 71.1. Order 2 Rule 2CPC operates as a bar against a subsequent suit if the requisite conditions for application thereof are satisfied and the field of amendment of pleadings falls far beyond its purview. The plea of amendment being barred under Order 2 Rule2 CPC is, thus, misconceived and hence negatived. 71.2. All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is apparent from the use of the word “shall”, in the latter part of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. 71. 3. The prayer for amendment is to be allowed: 71.3.1. If the amendment is required for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties. 71.3.2. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided (a) the amendment does not result in injustice to the other side, (b) by the amendment, the parties seeking amendment do not seek to withdraw any clear admission made by the party which confers a right on the other side, and (c) the amendment does not raise a time-barred claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a valuable accrued right (in certain situations). 71.4. A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless: 71.4.1. 71.4. A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless: 71.4.1. By the amendment, a time-barred claim is sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be time-barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration. 71.4.2. The amendment changes the nature of the suit. 71.4.3. The prayer for amendment is mala fide, or 71.4.4. By the amendment, the other side loses a valid defence. 71.5. In dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, the court should avoid a hypertechnical approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs. 71.6. Where the amendment would enable the court to pin-pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for amendment should be allowed. 71.7. Where the amendment merely sought to introduce an additional or a new approach without introducing a time-barred cause of action, the amendment is liable to be allowed even after expiry of limitation. 71.8. Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the plaint. 71.9. Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for decision. 71.10. Where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is required to be allowed. 71.11. Where the amendment is sought before commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in mind the fact that the opposite party would have a chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such, where the amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. As such, where the amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the parties, the amendment should be allowed.” 10. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants 1 and 2 contended that the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff has chosen to file this application on 13.01.2019, though the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff was aware of the same on 03.09.2018 and when the release deed was marked as Ex-P8, the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff remained a mute spectator and if such an amendment application is allowed, then the character of the entire suit will be changed and the order passed by the trial Court by taking note of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court need not be interfered. 11. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents had relied upon the following judgments: (1) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in Gojabai vs. Gangabi Ramachandra Pawar and another , AIR 1980 1436 had had also follows: “ 2. Respondent 2 preferred an appeal to the High Court against the said remand order, but since the learned Single Judge of the High Court was doubtful whether an appeal lay against the impugned remand order he converted the appeal into a revisional application and proceeded to hear the same as such. The High Court felt that the learned Assistant Judge had erred in allowing the amendment sought by the appellant/plaintiff inasmuch as it converted the suit into an entirely new and inconsistent one than what had been instituted initially. On merits it found that the appellant relied upon the compromise decree passed in the partition suit to sustain the plea of agreement of sale and no separate agreement of sale as such was pleaded of which specific performance could be claimed but in its view the compromise decree did not constitute any agreement for sale but merely conferred a right of pre-emption on the appellant/plaintiff. The High Court also felt that the suit as initially filed for enforcement of the right of pre-emption was clearly barred by limitation inasmuch as the suit had been filed long after the expiry of one year from the date of delivery of possession of the land by Respondent 1 to Respondent 2 pursuant to the impugned sale. It was true that the plea of limitation had not been raised in the written statement initially and the same was allowed to be raised by way of amendment in the appeal. But obviously it would be the duty of the court to see that the suit if barred by limitation was dismissed irrespective of whether the plea about it was raised or not. In these circumstances the High Court set aside the order allowing the amendment sought by the plaintiff and proceeded to dismiss the suit on the ground of limitation. It is this order passed by the High Court on February 17, 1969 that is sought to be challenged by the appellant before us in this appeal. ..... 4. Counsel for the appellant further contended that in any event if the High Court were inclined to set aside the order granting amendment to plaintiff it should not have disposed of the entire suit on the ground of limitation, for by consent order of remand the parties had agreed that the issue arising between them should be sent to the trial court for disposal according to law. That undoubtedly is true but in our view if the plaintiff stood as it had been initially filed without the amendment it was purely a suit for enforcement of the right of pre-emption and under Article 10 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, such suit would be barred after a period of one year, the period commencing to run from the date when the possession is delivered to the vendee contrary to the right of pre-emption. Counsel urged that there was no clear material before the High Court as to when possession of the property had been delivered by Respondent 1 to Respondent 2. We are unable to accept this submission for, in our view, there was ample material on record to show that such possession was delivered by Respondent 1 to Respondent 2 immediately after the impugned sale deed had been executed on September 25, 1962. We are unable to accept this submission for, in our view, there was ample material on record to show that such possession was delivered by Respondent 1 to Respondent 2 immediately after the impugned sale deed had been executed on September 25, 1962. The impugned sale deed itself contains the recital about the delivery of such possession on the date thereof. Respondent 2 also deposed that such possession has been delivered to him and in fact he went on to claim improvements in case the plaintiff succeeded. In para 6 of the plaint itself the appellant/plaintiff also made averments suggesting that the property had been handed over by the first respondent to the second respondent soon after the document was executed on September 25, 1962. In that paragraph after referring to the sale deed which was executed on September 25, 1962, the plaintiff has proceeded to claim damages from the respondent (which would include the second respondent also) — damages which are said to have been suffered by her after the said date meaning thereby after September 25, 1962. In our view there was enough material for the High Court to come to the conclusion that possession of the property had been delivered by the first respondent to the second respondent immediately after the document had been executed, with the result that under Article 10 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, the suit was clearly barred. The High Court in our view was right in preventing incurring of further costs by the parties in the trial court, the District Court and possibly in High Court.” (2) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in T.N. Alloy Foundry Company Limited and T.N. Electricity Board and others , (2004) 3 SCC 392 had had also follows: “2. Shri T.L.V. Iyer, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, urged that the view taken by the High Court in rejecting the amendment of the appellant was erroneous. The law as regards permitting amendment to the plaint, is well settled. In L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 : 1957 SCR 438 it was held that the Court would as a rule decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. In L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 : 1957 SCR 438 it was held that the Court would as a rule decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the court to order it. 3. It is not disputed that the appellate court has a coextensive power of the trial court. We find that the discretion exercised by the High Court in rejecting the plaint was in conformity with law.” (3) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in L.C. Hanumanthappa vs. H.B. Shivakumar, (2016) 1 SCC 332 had had also follows: “ 29. Applying the law thus laid down by this Court to the facts of this case, two things become clear. First, in the original written statement itself dated 16-5-1990, the defendant had clearly put the plaintiff on notice that it had denied the plaintiff's title to the suit property. A reading of an isolated paragraph in the written statement, namely, Para 2 by the trial court on the facts of this case has been correctly commented upon adversely by the High Court in the judgment under appeal. The original written statement read as a whole unmistakably indicates that the defendant had not accepted the plaintiff's title. Secondly, while allowing the amendment, the High Court in its earlier judgment dated 28-3-2002 [L.C. Hanumanthappa v. H.B. Shivakumar, RFA No. 415 of 1999, decided on 28-3-2002 (KAR)] had expressly remanded the matter to the trial court, allowing the defendant to raise the plea of limitation. There can be no doubt that on an application of Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. (2011) 9 SCC 126 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 484, the right to sue for declaration of title first arose on the facts of the present case on 16-5-1990 when the original written statement clearly denied the plaintiff's title. By 16-5-1993 therefore a suit based on declaration of title would have become time-barred. By 16-5-1993 therefore a suit based on declaration of title would have become time-barred. It is clear that the doctrine of relation back would not apply to the facts of this case for the reason that the court which allowed the amendment expressly allowed it subject to the plea of limitation, indicating thereby that there are no special or extraordinary circumstances in the present case to warrant the doctrine of relation back applying so that a legal right that had accrued in favour of the defendant should be taken away. This being so, we find no infirmity in the impugned judgment [H.B. Shivakumar v. L.C. Hanumanthappa, 2015 SCC OnLine Kar 3860] of the High Court. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.” (4) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported Basavaraj vs. Indira and others , (2024) 3 SCC 705 had had also follows: “ 9. The law with reference to challenge to a compromise decree is well settled. It was opined in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 that (i) appeal is not maintainable against a consent decree; (ii) no separate suit can be filed; (iii) consent decree operates as an estoppel and binding unless it is set aside by the court by an order on an application under the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3CPC; and (iv) the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree is to approach the court which recorded the compromise as it was opined to be nothing else but a contract between the parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. Relevant part of para 17 thereof is extracted below : (SCC p.576) “17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus: (i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3)CPC. (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43. (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43. (iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A. (iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23. Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made.” 12. Heard the learned Counsels on either side and perused the material evidence on record. 13. Admittedly, the Revision Petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S.No.80 of2016. The defendants in the said suit have instituted a suit in O.S.No.37 of 2012, where, the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff was arrayed as the first defendant. When the suit was filed by the respondents herein in O.S.No.37 of 2012 much earlier and the release deed document, which was marked as Ex-A8 and which finds in list of documents annexed along with the plaintiff, in the written statement filed by the Revision Petitioner, he had not pleaded anything about the release deed. The Revision Petitioner having waited for four years, had filed an application for an amendment for inclusion of the release deed, dated 05.04.2011, which was marked as Ex-A8. 14. Admittedly, in a suit instituted by the respondents, who are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.37 of 2012, they had filed the release deed, dated 05.04.2011. The Revision Petitioner having waited for four years, had filed an application for an amendment for inclusion of the release deed, dated 05.04.2011, which was marked as Ex-A8. 14. Admittedly, in a suit instituted by the respondents, who are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.37 of 2012, they had filed the release deed, dated 05.04.2011. When the Revision Petitioner was aware of the said fact and having filed a written statement in that suit itself, the Revision Petitioner had not suspecting or questioning the release deed, dated 05.04.2011. If the Revision Petitioner had no knowledge about the document and when the Revision Petitioner had gained knowledge during the cross examination about the new fact, then the Revision Petitioner has a say to make an application in the suit instituted by the Revision Petitioner, whereas, the Revision Petitioner was a mute spectator and did not file any application and in the post trial, I.A.No.1 of 2019 was filed for making an amendment in the prayer. 15. The catena of judgments cited on either side would clearly speak that the amendment application has to be considered generously keeping in mind (1)if the amendment is sought to permit, which may lead multiplicity of litigations; (2)if the amendment is not allowed, the parties will be put to irreparable loss and inconvenience: (3)if the amendment is not allowed, it will cause great injustice to the relief claimed in the suit. 16. The judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner with regard to the scope of the amendment petition which has to be construed liberally is not in dispute keeping in mind that if amendment is not allowed, the same may result in multiplicity of litigations to the parties to the lis. The stage of trial assumes significance, when an amendment petition is made by the Revision Petitioner. Admittedly, the Revision Petitioner, who had cross examined PW-1 on 03.09.2018, had remained silent and had now filed an application to amend the prayer, which is not only motivated and without any reasons, but that of to protract and cause delay in the on going joint trial. 17. It is the contention of the Revision Petitioner that he was consequentially aware and had taken part in the trial and the documents which has now sought to be amended was a new fact, which came to light after cross examination of PW-1 by the Revision Petitioner. 17. It is the contention of the Revision Petitioner that he was consequentially aware and had taken part in the trial and the documents which has now sought to be amended was a new fact, which came to light after cross examination of PW-1 by the Revision Petitioner. This factum, which was available for the Revision Petitioner in the suit in O.S.No.37 of 2012 and the Revision Petitioner did not file an application to amend the prayer and filing of this application belatedly, which crosses the limitation, as contemplated under the Limitation Act. There could be no justification on the part of the Revision Petitioner in making a request to amend the prayer, which is only an afterthought and it is not going to do any injustice/substantial injustice to the Revision Petitioner. 18. In the interest of justice, the question of limitation has not been given strict interference, when the paramount interest of the case rests on the justice in the case and not with regard to the limitation, if the Revision Petitioner was able to demonstrate a case that the factum of amendment application made by the Revision Petitioner/plaintiff was a fact, which was discovered after the commencement of trial or after examination and cross examination of PW-1 or the fact which was came to light in the midst of the trial. On the other hand, as right rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents, it is absolutely manifested by the respondents that the document, which needs to be included in the suit prayer by way of amendment, was known to the Revision Petitioner in the suit filed in O.S.No.37 of 2012. 19. Admittedly, the learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner and the respondents had circulated the judgments explaining under what circumstances, the amendment has to be allowed. The law on the point of amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC and the question of limitation are settled down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. As far as the facts of the case, the plaintiff has not made out a case to justify the cause to allow the amendment application and in view of the same, the order passed by the trial Court needs no interference by this Court. 20. As far as the facts of the case, the plaintiff has not made out a case to justify the cause to allow the amendment application and in view of the same, the order passed by the trial Court needs no interference by this Court. 20. In view of the discussion above, the order passed in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in O.S.No.80 of 2016 by the learned Additional District Munsif, Vallioor, dated 04.01.2021 is confirmed and the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed . As joint trial has commenced, as per order in Tr.O.P.No.92 of 2017 by the Principal District Court at Tirunelveli, the suit in O.S.No.37 of 2012 and O.S.No.80 of 2016 shall be disposed of within a period of one year from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.