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2024 DIGILAW 289 (AP)

Gadi Reddaiah Reddy v. State Of Andhra Pradesh

2024-02-27

VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA

body2024
ORDER : The instant petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[for short ‘Cr.P.C’] has been filed by the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 and 3, seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.118 of 2020 on the file of the Court of I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kadapa for the offences under Sections 420 and 506 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.[for short ‘IPC’] 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is as follows: a. Respondent No.2/Complainant while eking out livelihood through cultivation, has been doing business in groundnuts in the past 25 years by separating the groundnuts with Decaticador machine at his house and selling the same to the business people. As such, Respondent No.2 has been selling groundnut seeds to Petitioner No.1/Accused No.1 for the last 20 years. b. On 26.09.2012, Petitioner No.1/Accused No.1 took groundnut seeds from the complainant for Rs.8,46,000/- and for Rs.8,19,150/- on 15.06.2013 on credit basis, but despite repeated demands, he did not repay the same. When the complainant telephoned to Accused No.2, who is the son of Accused No.1 and asked for the said amount, he abused him and threatened to kill. c. Accused No.1 with deceitful words, took groundnuts worth Rs.16,65,150/- by giving promissory notes. Accused No.2 also cheated him by promising that he will pay the amount instead of his father. Accused No.3, who is another son of Accused No.1 also promised the complainant to repay the amount but he also threatened him. As such, the complainant lodged a complaint, registered as a case in Crime No.186 of 2019 for the offences under Sections 420 and 506 read with 34 IPC of Vallur Police Station against Accused Nos.1 to 3 and after due investigation, charge sheet was filed and the same was numbered as C.C.No.118 of 2020 on the file of the Court of I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kadapa. 3. Being aggrieved by the said case, Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 and 3 filed the present petition seeking quashment of the said case against them, on the following grounds: a. The facts mentioned in the complaint clearly show that there was business transaction between the complainant and the accused, which is purely a civil issue and any failure to pay the amounts cannot be treated as cheating as contemplated under Section 420 IPC. b. The allegations about the offence under Section 506 IPC are only cooked up and not supported by any material evidence. c. The statements of the witnesses and the charge sheet filed are nothing but replica of the contents of the complaint. d. Criminal case which is foisted basing on a business transaction, which is civil in nature cannot be sustained. e. Mere usage of words like cheating etc., would not make a case under Section 420 IPC and any allegation of threat without substantial basis would not make out a case under Section 506 IPC. f. The complainant is trying to implicate the Petitioners in criminal cases to recover his time barred debts and the said attempt is a sheer abuse of process of the Court. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 4. Heard Sri Karnam Ramesh, learned counsel for the Petitioners, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State/Respondent No.1 and M/s. Indus Law Firm for Respondent No.2. 5. Learned counsel for the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 and 3 would submit that the allegations leveled against the Petitioners would show that there are business transactions between the complainant and the Petitioners, which are of civil nature, as such, criminal liability cannot be fastened against the Petitioners. There are no specific overt acts attributed against the Petitioner, which would attract the offences under Sections 420 and 506 IPC. It is also stated that the Petitioners are falsely implicated in the present case to recover the time barred debts. Hence, prayed to quash the proceedings against the Petitioners. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, in unison, would submit that there are specific allegations against the Petitioners and Petitioner No.1 on the promise of repayment, procured groundnuts from the complainant on credit basis, and failed to repay the same, which amounts to cheating. Petitioners also threatened to kill the complainant, which attracts the offence sunder Section 506 IPC. It is also pointed out that a civil suit has been filed in 2017 and the complainant made several complaints before the District Collector in Spandana and those complaints were not considered. Hence, this is the only complaint lodged against the Petitioners. Therefore, there are no tenable grounds to quash the proceedings against the Petitioners. Hence, prayed to dismiss the petition. Hence, this is the only complaint lodged against the Petitioners. Therefore, there are no tenable grounds to quash the proceedings against the Petitioners. Hence, prayed to dismiss the petition. In support of his contention, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar v. The State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 2019 SC 847 . Point for determination 7. Now the point that would emerge for determination is: Whether there are any justifiable grounds for quashment of the proceedings against the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 and 3 in C.C.No.118 of 2020 on the file of the Court of I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kadapa for the offences under Sections 420 and 506 read with 34 of IPC? Determination by the Court 8. A bare perusal of Section 482 makes it clear that the Code envisages that inherent powers of the High Court are not limited or affected so as to make orders as may be necessary; (i) to give effect to any order under the Code or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or, otherwise (iii) to secure ends of justice. A court while sitting in Section 482 jurisdiction is not functioning as a court of appeal or a court of revision. It must exercise its powers to do real and substantial justice, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. These powers must be invoked for compelling reasons of abuse of process of law or glaring injustice, which are against sound principles of criminal jurisprudence. 9. Specific circumstances warranting the invocation of the provision must be present. The decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 is considered as the guiding torch in the application of Section 482. At paras 102 and 103, the circumstances are spelt out as follows; “102. 9. Specific circumstances warranting the invocation of the provision must be present. The decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 is considered as the guiding torch in the application of Section 482. At paras 102 and 103, the circumstances are spelt out as follows; “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” (emphasis supplied) 10. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioners that there are business transactions between the complainant and the accused and mere failure of repayment of the amount would not amount to cheating. 11. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to Sections 415 and 420 IPC which read as follows: “415. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioners that there are business transactions between the complainant and the accused and mere failure of repayment of the amount would not amount to cheating. 11. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to Sections 415 and 420 IPC which read as follows: “415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.— Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 12. Perusal of the above Sections would indicate that, to hold a person guilty of the offence of cheating, it must be shown that his intention was dishonest at the time of making the promise. Such a dishonest intention cannot be inferred from the mere fact that he could not subsequently fulfill the promise. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Archana Rana v. State of U.P and another, (2021) 3 SCC 751 and Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others, (2007) 12 SCC 1 and the judgment of High Court of Kerala in State of Kerala v. A. Pareed Pillai and another, (1972) 3 SCC 661 . 13. 13. In the instant case, the complaint would clearly show that Accused No.1 has been in the business in groundnuts with the complainant for the last 20 years and in view of the existing business transactions between them, Accused No.1 procured groundnuts from the complainant on credit basis, by executing the promissory notes and subsequently failed to repay the amount. Accused No.3, who is the son of Accused No.1 also promised to repay the amount due to the complainant. It clearly shows that Accused Nos.1 and 3 had no dishonest intention at the inception. Even if all the allegations in the complaint taken at the face value are true, in my view, the basic essential ingredients of cheating are missing. 14. So far as the offence under Section 506 IPC is concerned, it is alleged that when the complainant demanded for repayment of the amount due to him, Accused Nos.2 and 3 threatened him with dire consequences. The said allegation is baseless and the statements of the witnesses would also show that they are all hearsay. Based on the mere allegation of threatening without any substantial material, continuation of proceedings for the offence under Section 506 IPC would be an abuse of process of law. Further, there are no allegations with regard to the commission of offence under Section 506 IPC against Accused No.1. The allegations made in the complaint do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Petitioners. There are no tenable grounds to continue the proceedings against the Petitioners and as such, the same are liable to be quashed. 15. Accordingly, the criminal petition is allowed quashing the proceedings against the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 and 3 in C.C.No.118 of 2020 on the file of the Court of I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kadapa for the offences under Sections 420 and 506 read with 34 IPC. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.