JUDGMENT : (Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.) : 1. Invoking the Writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner herein, Suyash Kanti Ghosh, has called in question the legality, validity and correctness of the Order dated 31.1.2019 passed by learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, Circuit Sitting: Bilaspur, dismissing the Original Application No.203/00290/2016 titled as “Suyash Kanti Ghosh Vs. Central Silk Board and Others” finding no merit. 2. The Petitioner, while he was working on the post of Superintendent at Basic Seed Multiplication & Training Centre, Boirdadar, was considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee for grant of financial upgradation under the Central Silk Board’s Assured Career Progression Scheme (CSB-ACP Scheme) with effect from 1.9.2007 and accordingly the consequential benefit flowing from the said Scheme was paid to him. However, on account of certain audit/objection having raised by the office of the Accountant General, the CSB-ACP Scheme was withdrawn by Order dated 5.8.2009 from the date of its implementation itself i.e., w.e.f. 1.9.2007, and the financial benefits amounting to Rs.62,827/- granted to the Petitioner was directed to be recovered from the arrears of the Sixth Central Pay Commission due to him. 3. The Petitioner filed a representation on 15.9.2009 and ultimately, he filed Original Application No.203/00099/2015 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench (Circuit Court at Bilaspur), which was disposed of by the Tribunal vide its Order dated 26.10.2015 directing the Respondent Board to pass necessary orders after issuance of notice and affording an opportunity of hearing to the Applicant/ Petitioner within a specific period of time. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a representation which was rejected by the Respondent Board and therefore he again filed Original Application No.203/00290/2016 which stood dismissed by the impugned Order dated 31.1.2019 holding that there is a delay of almost four years after the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of “Rajinder Kumar Ganjoo and Others v. Central Silk Board and Others, Special Leave to Appeal (Civil), CC No.16603/2013, decided on 27.9.2013. (Arising out of OA No.691/JK/2009, decided on 17.10.2011 by CAT, Chandigarh Bench, Circuit at Jammu.)”, following its earlier in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others, (2015) 1 SCC 347 . 4. (Arising out of OA No.691/JK/2009, decided on 17.10.2011 by CAT, Chandigarh Bench, Circuit at Jammu.)”, following its earlier in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others, (2015) 1 SCC 347 . 4. Questioning the impugned Order dated 31.1.2019, the present Writ Petition has been preferred by the Petitioner stating inter-alia that the payment made to the Petitioner pursuant to the CSB-ACP Scheme has been recovered subsequently when there was no misrepresentation and fraud on the part of the Petitioner and, therefore, it could not have been recovered from the Petitioner, particularly when the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench partly quashing the recovery pursuant to the withdrawal of the CSB-ACP Scheme, has already been affirmed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No.644/2013 by Order dated 15.1.2013 against which an SLP was also taken by the Respondent Board but that was not entertained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and dismissed the SLP vide Order dated 27.9.2013. The declaration of law as such would operate as judgment in rem and therefore all similarly situated employees of the Respondent - Central Silk Board including the Petitioner would be entitled to retain the amount which has been paid pursuant to the declaration of CSB-ACP Scheme, in light of the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court rendered in the matter of K.C. Sharma and Others v. Union of India and Others, (1997) 6 SCC 721 . The impugned Order dated 31.1.2019 as such deserves to be set-aside directing the Respondent authorities to refund the amount of Rs.62,827/- along with interest from the date of its recovery till the date of actual payment. 5. Return has been filed by the Respondents opposing the Writ Petition inter-alia that the Petitioner was sitting in fence and did not pursue the remedy available right in time and the CSB-ACP Scheme was already withdrawn w.e.f. 1.9.2007 by restoring the Government of India’s ACP Scheme and the financial benefits amounting to Rs.62,827/- granted to the Petitioner has rightly been recovered from the Petitioner. The Petitioner as such is not entitled for any relief and impugned Order deserves to be affirmed dismissing the Writ Petition. 6. The Petitioner as such is not entitled for any relief and impugned Order deserves to be affirmed dismissing the Writ Petition. 6. We have heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the record of the case with utmost circumspection. 7. Admittedly and undisputedly, the Petitioner was paid the amount in question pursuant to the CSB-ACP Scheme floated by the Respondent - Central Silk Board, which was implemented w.e.f. 1.9.2007. However, the said CSB-ACP Scheme was sought to be withdrawn by Order dated 5.8.2009 w.e.f. 1.9.2007 itself i.e. the date from which it was implemented. The withdrawal of the CSB-ACP Scheme w.e.f. 1.9.2007, vide Order dated 5.8.2009, was subjected to challenge by the similarly situated employees vide Original Application No.691/JK/2009 titled as “Rajinder Kumar Ganjoo and Others Vs. Central Silk Board and Others” before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (Circuit at Jammu) which was ultimately decided by the said Tribunal by its Order dated 17.10.2011 holding that the action of the Respondent Board in withdrawing the CSB-ACP Scheme is perfectly legal and valid, and the relief as claimed by the Applicants therein cannot be granted. However, in paragraph-8, it was directed that no recovery may be made of the excess amount already paid to the Applicants and it was held as under:- “8. As far as the recovery is concerned, the same may not be effected since it was not due to the fault of the applicants that their pay had been fixed at a higher stage under the CSB ACP Scheme. The present position is that the ACP Scheme of 9.8.99 would be applicable to the applicants from that date upto the date of introducing of MACP Scheme. Under this broad application of schemes, the respondents would obviously be at liberty to refix the pay of the applicants in accordance with the same. Therefore, the impugned action of the respondents is upheld but no recovery may be made of the excess amount already paid to the applicants.” 8. The legality, validity and correctness of the aforesaid Order dated 17.10.2011 of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal was assailed by the Respondent Board before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No.644 of 2013 (Central Silk Board and Others Vs. The legality, validity and correctness of the aforesaid Order dated 17.10.2011 of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal was assailed by the Respondent Board before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No.644 of 2013 (Central Silk Board and Others Vs. Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench and Others) which was dismissed by the said High Court vide its Order dated 15.1.2013 declining to interfere with the said order of the Tribunal and observed in paragraph-4 as under:- “4. The Board has challenged this part of the order as it is submitted that if amount was wrongly paid it has a right to recover. On the facts of this case we are not impressed with this submission of learned counsel for the petitioners. It is clear from the aforesaid narration of facts that if at all it was the fault of the Board itself in introducing the scheme without completion of appropriate procedure, in so far as the employees are concerned they have nothing to respond to the scheme which was introduced by the Board itself. On our query to the learned counsel for the petitioners we are informed that the amount paid approximately may be Rs.50,000/- to each employee. Thus, from eight employees the amount in question would be approximately Rs.4,00,000/-. For all these reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the Tribunal on this aspect, in exercise of our extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Dismissed. 9. Thus, the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal as well as the High Court of Punjab and Haryana both, in principle, upheld the decision of the Respondent Central Silk Board to withdraw its Order dated 20.11.2007 operational w.e.f. 1.9.2007 as perfectly valid but refused to permit the Central Silk Board to make the recovery of the amount already paid to its employees therein. 10. 10. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the Tribunal is justified in rejecting the Petitioner’s Original Application and holding it to be suffering from delay and laches ignoring the declaration of law made by the Tribunal, affirmed by the High Court and subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court having not entertained the SLP filed by the Central Silk Board, as the declaration of law by the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in the matter of Rajinder Kumar Ganjoo and Others (supra) would operate as judgment in rem. 11. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of K.C. Sharma and Others (supra) deserves to be noticed, wherein the railway employees retiring between 1980 and 1988 were aggrieved of the Notification dated 5.12.1988 whereby certain rules of the Indian Railways Establishment Code were amended. The employees could not challenge the said Notification which was adversely affecting them, within the limitation period. Their Lordships found that the Principal Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal (Full Bench) in an Original Application had already declared the said Notification invalid by its Judgment dated 16.12.1993. The benefit of the Notification dated 5.12.1988 was extended to the subsequently filed employees holding that the delay in filing the Original Application ought to have been condoned by the Tribunal and the Petitioners therein should have been granted the same relief as was granted by the Full Bench of Tribunal, and observed in paragraphs 4, 5 & 6 as under:- “4. The validity of the retrospective amendments introduced by the impugned notifications dated December 5, 1988 had been considered by the Full Bench of the Tribunal in its judgment dated December 16, 1993 in O.A. No. 395-403 of 1993 and connected matters and the said notifications in so far as they gave retrospective effect to the amendments were held to be invalid as being violative Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Since the appellants were adversely affected by the impugned amendments, they sought the benefit of the Full Bench of the Tribunal by filing representations before the Railway Administration. Since they failed to obtain redress, they filed the application (O.A. NO. 774 of 1994) seeking relief before the Tribunal in April 1994. Since the appellants were adversely affected by the impugned amendments, they sought the benefit of the Full Bench of the Tribunal by filing representations before the Railway Administration. Since they failed to obtain redress, they filed the application (O.A. NO. 774 of 1994) seeking relief before the Tribunal in April 1994. The said application of the appellants was dismissed by the Tribunal by the impugned judgment on the view that the application was barred by limitation. The Tribunal refused to condone the delay in the filing of the said applications. 5. The correctness of the decision of the Full Bench of the Tribunal has been affirmed by this Court in Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. V. C.R. Rangadhamaiah & Ors., Civil Appeals Nos. 4174-4182 of 1995 and connected matters decided today. 6. Having regarding to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that this was a fit case in which the Tribunal should have condoned the delay in the filing of the application and the appellants should have been given relief in the same terms as was granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside, the delay in filing of O.A. No. 774 of 199 is condoned and the said application is allowed. The appellants would be entitled to the same relief in matter of pension as has been granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal in its judgment dated December 16, 1993 in O.A. Nos. 395-403 of 1993 and connected matters. No order as to costs.” 12. The principle of law laid down in K.C. Sharma and Others (supra) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, the recovery of the amount already paid pursuant to the CSB-ACP Scheme was questioned by the other set of similarly situated employees vide Original Application No.691/JK/2009 titled as “Rajinder Kumar Ganjoo and Others Vs. The principle of law laid down in K.C. Sharma and Others (supra) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, the recovery of the amount already paid pursuant to the CSB-ACP Scheme was questioned by the other set of similarly situated employees vide Original Application No.691/JK/2009 titled as “Rajinder Kumar Ganjoo and Others Vs. Central Silk Board and Others” before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (Circuit at Jammu) and the Order dated 17.10.2011 passed by the Tribunal therein, was affirmed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by a reasoned and speaking Order passed on 15.1.2013 against which, the Respondent - Central Silk Board went up to the Supreme Court in an SLP which was also not entertained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and dismissed the said SLP on 27.9.2013. As such, if the Respondent - Board is allowed to retain the recovered amount, it would be against the declaration of law made by the Tribunal and affirmed by the constitutional Court. 13. Furthermore, in the matter of Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down the principles relating to treatment of identically situated persons and observed in paragraph 22 as follows:- “22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under: 22.1 The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2 However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2 However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3 However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.” 14. A careful perusal of the aforesaid observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court would show that exception has been culled out in paragraphs 22.2 & 22.3. A careful perusal of the aforesaid observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court would show that exception has been culled out in paragraphs 22.2 & 22.3. In the instant case, the identically situated persons in Rajinder Kumar Ganjoo and Others (supra) have been granted the benefit and the recovery of the amount already paid pursuant to the CSB-ACP Scheme has already been upheld by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the SLP filed by the Respondent – Board in that regard has also been dismissed by the Supreme Court. It is a dispute regarding recovery of the amount paid in a service matter and this will also in consonance with the public policy as extending the benefit would avoid unnecessary litigation by similarly situated persons. The judgment pronounced by the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court of the Punjab and Haryana and the dismissal of the SLP by the Supreme Court would be a declaration of law and which can be treated as judgment in rem (See: Shoeline v. Commissioner of Service Tax and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 104 . More particularly, the decision rendered by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court would apply uniformly to all the persons similarly situated. 15. The Supreme Court in the matter of Chairman/Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited and Others v. Ram Gopal, (2021) 13 SCC 225 has clearly held that the principle of application of delay and laches would not apply to the judgments which are delivered in rem and the State and its instrumentalities are expected in such category of cases to themselves, extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of the Courts, relying upon its earlier decision rendered in Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others (supra). 16. 16. Concludingly, we are of the considered opinion that the declaration of law made by the Tribunal that the recovered amount pursuant to the grant of CSB-ACP Scheme subsequent to withdrawal of the said Scheme, will not be recovered from the officers of the Central Silk Board, would be a judgment in rem and the Respondent - Central Silk Board was required to extend the same benefit of the said judicial pronouncement to the Petitioner also and it cannot be held that his Original Application was suffering from delay and laches, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in K.C. Sharma and Others (supra) followed in Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others (supra) and further followed in Ram Gopal (supra). Accordingly, the impugned Order dated 31.1.2019 passed by the Tribunal is set-aside/quashed and the Respondent authorities are directed to pay the amount of Rs.62,827/- to the Petitioner along with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of its recovery till the date of actual payment is made to the Petitioner. The Respondents are directed to pay the said amount with interest to the Petitioner within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this Order. 17. With aforesaid observations, the Writ Petition is allowed. No order as to cost(s).