JUDGMENT : SUNITA AGARWAL, J. This intra-court Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 21.4.2023 passed by the learned single Judge, whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent has been disposed of with the direction to the respondents-the appellants herein to initiate appropriate proceedings under the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short ‘the Act, 2013’) for regularising the acquisition of land admeasuring 64750 Sq.Mtrs, which was allotted to the original petitioner in the year 1970, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. Further direction to the respondents-the appellants herein is that they shall complete the entire procedure of payment of compensation under the Act, 2013 within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order. 2. The instant appeal has been instituted on behalf of the State of Gujarat through the Secretary, Revenue Department. The Deputy Executive Engineer, Road and Building Division-1, Airport Authority of India and the Collector, Surat have been joined as the other appellants. The challenge to the order of the learned single Judge is based on the ground that Survey No. 230 paiki 1 is a Salt-marsh land, which was granted on lease to the original petitioner namely Mr. Dinkar Nathubhai Desai vide allotment order dated 23.12.1970 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 40 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972 read with the provisions of the Gujarat Khar Lands Act, 1963. 3. It is contended that the allotment order dated 23.12.1970 provided the terms and conditions of the allotment/lease with the clear understanding that such lease does not confer any right or title on the person, to whom the lease has been granted, as the sole purpose of the lease was to increase agricultural production and to earn livelihood from the agricultural income. One of the conditions of the allotment order, as incorporated therein based on sub-clause(e) of the provisions of Rule 40 the Land Revenue Rules, 1972, was “if the reclamation is not carried on with due diligence within two years, or if half the area is not reclaimed so as to be in a state fit for use for agricultural purposes at the end of ten years, and the whole at the end of twenty years, or if any land once reclaimed as aforesaid is not maintained in a state fit for use for agricultural purposes, the lease shall be liable to cancellation at the discretion of the Collector: Provided that the lessee shall at liberty during the first ten years to relinquish any area which he cannot reclaim.” 4. It is argued that as per the entries in Village Form No.12, which was not produced by the original petitioner, the land remained uncultivated during the period of initial 10 years of lease; only grass grown naturally on the land-in-question could be found until the year 1980; later during the period from 1980 to 1990, for which the records suggest that Juwar was growing. The government, however, did not receive any rent or land revenue. Since after the year 1991 the land-in-question has been shown as uncultivated (padtar) in the revenue records. The assertion made by the petitioner in the writ petition (para 3.2 thereof) that he had paid land revenue for the land in question from the date of allotment till 2016-2017, is without any evidence. Not a single proof of payment of lease rent has been brought on record. The learned single Judge has, therefore erred in ignoring the said aspect of the matter and assuming that since the petitioner has been put in possession of the land-in-question and his name was reflected in the Village Form No. 7/12, he is entitled for compensation and that the land-in-question has been illegally encroached upon by the Airport Authority without acquisition proceedings. The fact remains that the conditions of the allotment order dated 23.12.1970 has been completely overlooked by the learned single Judge and the writ petition has been decided ignoring the aforesaid aspect of the matter. 5. The fact remains that the conditions of the allotment order dated 23.12.1970 has been completely overlooked by the learned single Judge and the writ petition has been decided ignoring the aforesaid aspect of the matter. 5. It is, thus, contended by the learned AGP for the State appellants that since the land-in-question remained a government land and the original petitioner had not complied with the conditions mentioned in the allotment order, the government has resumed the land-in-question and transferred it to the Airport Authority under the category of “land to be transferred”, the land belonging to the State government. It is brought on record that the government remained owner of the land-in-question and possession was taken in the year 2003. Since after the year 1990, when the original petitioner had failed to reclaim the land in question by utilising it for agricultural purposes, a proposal was made wherein the entire Survey No. 230 admeasuring 2451 Hectare was transferred to the Airport Authority under the category “land to be transferred” of government land for the purpose of construction of Air-strip. The acquisition proceedings for acquiring some private lands in the vicinity for expansion of the Air-strip was carried out in the year 1999-2001 by following the due process of law. However, the said acquisition was for private lands and the land-in-question being the government land, the possession of it was handed over to the Airport Authority on 11.11.2003. 6. It is contended that the continuance of the name of the petitioner in Village Form No.7 would not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the petitioner over the land in question. As the ownership of the land in question always remained with the State government, the said land cannot be directed to be acquired by initiating acquisition proceedings under the Right to Fair Compensation in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and, further as such there is no question of payment of compensation to the petitioner as he has failed to make any improvement in the land-in-question. 7. The learned counsel for the original petitioner, in rebuttal, would submit that the lease-in-question was in the nature of a perpetual lease and no proceedings of resumption of the land-in-question on the premise that the petitioner had not reclaimed the land after 1990, has been initiated by the State government. 7. The learned counsel for the original petitioner, in rebuttal, would submit that the lease-in-question was in the nature of a perpetual lease and no proceedings of resumption of the land-in-question on the premise that the petitioner had not reclaimed the land after 1990, has been initiated by the State government. The land-in-question remained in the possession of the petitioner and his name had been entered in the revenue records in Village Form No. 7/12 as owner/occupant of the land in question. The specific case of the original petitioner is that the possession of the land-in-question was handed over to the petitioner being a lessee by allotment made in the year 1970 and at no point of time, the allotment has been cancelled on the alleged breach of the conditions stated in the allotment order. The possession of the land-in-question, as such, could not be taken from the petitioner. There was no occasion for the petitioner to challenge acquisition proceedings, inasmuch as, the land in question was never made part of the acquisition process and no award has been declared. 8. The writ petition was filed in the year 2019 with the clear assertion that with the allotment order dated 23.12.1970 issued by the Collector, the petitioner had been put in possession of the land in question which is Survey No. 230 admeasuring 16 acres of village Gaviyar, Taluka Choriyasi, District Surat. The copy of the Village Form No. 7/12 extract dated 19.7.2011 has been appended with the writ petition. It was stated therein that the petitioner paid land revenue for the land in question from the date of allotment till the year 2016-2017. In the proceedings for acquisition of land for the purpose of construction of Air-strip, Survey No. 230 has been shown as ‘the government land’ and as such, was not included in the award declared on 22.6.2001 with respect to the acquisition proceedings conducted for private lands in the year 1999. On 16.10.2014, the petitioner sent a communication to the Airport Authority of India and Executive Engineer, Road and Building Department Division-I, pointing out that while constructing the boundary wall during airport development process, the land of the petitioner had been encroached by them. It was requested that the possession of the land in question be handed over to the petitioner. Inspite of repeated reminders were sent, nothing had been done. It was requested that the possession of the land in question be handed over to the petitioner. Inspite of repeated reminders were sent, nothing had been done. The Airport Authority of India, however, sent a letter dated 17.11.2014 to the Deputy Executive Engineer, Roads and Building Department Division-I enclosing the copy of communication dated 16.10.2014 stating therein that the lands in question allotted to the petitioner being of a private ownership, the authority was required to acquire the same immediately. 9. A communication dated 14.08.2015 was sent to the petitioner in reply to the application under the RTI Act that the land in question had never been acquired in the past. The contention, thus, is that the transfer of possession of the land in question, namely Survey No. 230 paiki 1 allotted to the petitioner was an illegal exercise on the part of the respondent. The lease of permanent nature granted to the petitioner has never been terminated and the leased land remained in the possession of the petitioner, could not have been treated as a ‘government land’. The handing over of the possession of the land-in-question to the Airport Authority in the year 2003 is an illegal exercise. As the petitioner has been deprived of his right to occupy the land-in-question, he is entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, inasmuch as, the land-in-question could not have been utilised by the appellants without conducting a proper acquisition proceedings. 10. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. Before proceeding further, we may record that from the averments made in the writ petition and the affidavit filed by the original petitioner in the instant appeal, at least, this much is admitted that the boundary wall over the land-in-question was constructed by the original respondent No.4, namely the Airport Authority in the year 2003. The writ petition has been filed in the year 2019 with the relief that the Airport Authority of India be directed to remove the illegal encroachment on the land in question. The writ petition has been filed in the year 2019 with the relief that the Airport Authority of India be directed to remove the illegal encroachment on the land in question. The assertion in the writ petition is that the land-in-question has not been acquired in the acquisition process conducted for a private land for the purpose of extension of the Surat Airport in the year 1999 and the award dated 22.6.2021 declared by the Land Acquisition Officer does not provide for compensation for the land-in-question. 11. The learned single Judge, while allowing the writ petition, simply issued direction to the respondents therein-the appellants herein to conduct acquisition proceedings and pay compensation to the petitioner and further complete the process for payment of compensation to the petitioner, on the premise that since the petitioner was put in possession of the land-in-question and his name has been reflected in the Village Form No. 7/12, he is entitled for compensation as the land-in-question was included in the expansion of the Surat Airport without acquiring the same. The direction was issued to regularise the acquisition by initiating the acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The question as to the nature of right, title and interest of the petitioner and possession thereof, however, has not been considered at all by the learned single Judge. The learned Single Judge has simply proceeded to record that since the land-in-question has not been acquired and no acquisition proceedings as per the intimation given in the letter the 14.8.2015 of the Deputy Executive Engineer, Road and Building Division-I had been conducted, the proceedings to regularise the acquisition of the land-in-question allotted to the petitioner in the year 1970, was to be undertaken under the Right to Fair Compensation in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. There is no deliberation in the order of the learned single Judge about the nature of right, title and interest of the petitioner in the land-inquestion vis-a-vis the right of the State government and the requirement of acquisition of the land, which was admittedly a Salt-marsh land allotted to the petitioner under the Rule 40 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972. 12. 12. The question before us, therefore, would be as to whether the land in question can be treated to be a private land belonging to the petitioner so as to require the State authorities to initiate acquisition proceedings for taking the possession of the land-in-question from the petitioner. To answer this question, at the outset, we are required to note the provisions of Rule 40 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972 whereunder the allotment letter dated 23.12.1970 was issued by the Collector. Rule 40 be reproduced herein for ready reference:- “40. To answer this question, at the outset, we are required to note the provisions of Rule 40 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972 whereunder the allotment letter dated 23.12.1970 was issued by the Collector. Rule 40 be reproduced herein for ready reference:- “40. Grants of salt-marsh lands for reclamations:- Salt land or land occasionally overflowed by salt-water, which is not required or likely to be required for salt manufacture, may, after consultation with the Commissioner of Salt, be leased for purposes of reclamation by the Collector, on the following maximum terms, and with such modifications in particular cases as may be deemed fit:- (a) no rent shall be charged for the first ten years: (b) rent at the rate of 60 paise per hectare shall be levied for the next twenty years on the whole area leased, whether reclaimed or not: (c) after the expiry of 30 years the lease shall be continued in the case of reclaimed lands at the rate at which they would be assessed to land revenue from time to time if they were subjected to survey settlement: and in the case of un-reclaimed lands, if any, at the average rate of reclaimed lands: (d) any portion of the land used for public roads shall be exempt from the payment of rent: (e) if the reclamation is not carried on with due diligence within two years, or if half the area is not reclaimed so as to be in a state fit for use for agricultural purposes at the end of ten years, and the whole at the end of twenty years, or if any land once reclaimed as aforesaid is not maintained in a state fit for use for agricultural purposes, the lease shall be liable to cancellation at the discretion of the Collector: Provided that the lessee shall be at liberty during the first ten years to relinquish any area which he cannot reclaim: (f) if the land reclaimed is used for any non-agricultural purpose, its rent shall be liable to be revised according to the rates under whichever of rules 81 to 85 has been applied to the locality notwithstanding that any of the periods specified above may not have expired: (g) Form G2 may generally be used in cases under this rule.” 13. A careful reading of Rule 40 indicates that Salt-marsh land, which is not required for Salt manufacturing, may be leased for the purposes of reclamation by the Collector prescribing the terms and conditions indicated therein, which says that no rent shall be charged for the first 10 years; for the next 20 years, the rent at the rate of Rs. 60 paise per Hectare shall be levied whether land has been reclaimed or not; after expiry of 30 years the lease shall be continued in the case of reclaimed lands at the rate to be assessed as per the land revenue from time to time, if they were subjected to survey settlement; however, in case of unreclaimed lands, at the average rate of the reclaimed land. One of the conditions indicated in clause (e) contained in Rule 40 extracted above is that if the reclamation is not carried on with due diligence within two years and if half of the area of the land in question is not reclaimed to make it fit for agricultural purposes at the end of 10 years and whole at the end of 20 years, or if the land once reclaimed as aforesaid is not maintained as to make it fit for agricultural purposes, it would be open for the Collector to cancel the lease. However, the lessee shall be at liberty during the first 10 years to relinquish any area which he may not require. 14. In the instant case, the petitioner though asserted in a vague manner that he has paid land revenue for the land-in-question from the date of allotment till the year 2016-2017 and has been cultivating the land after it was allotted to him, but he did not produce any document of proof or evidence to demonstrate that he had actually reclaimed the entire land or a part of it by making it fit for use for agricultural purposes. There is nothing on record even in the affidavit filed by the original petitioner in the instant appeal to establish that he had reclaimed the land-in-question and paid the revenue taxes or lease rent as per the conditions of the allotment order. Not a single revenue receipt has been brought on record. 15. There is nothing on record even in the affidavit filed by the original petitioner in the instant appeal to establish that he had reclaimed the land-in-question and paid the revenue taxes or lease rent as per the conditions of the allotment order. Not a single revenue receipt has been brought on record. 15. We, therefore, find no reason to doubt the contention of the appellants that the land in question has not been maintained in a state fit for use of agricultural purposes after the year 1990. The condition of reclamation incorporated in the allotment order dated 23.12.1970 required reclamation of the allotted land by the petitioner by bringing it in a state fit for use for agricultural purposes. 16. The acquisition of the land-in-question has been taken in the year 2003, as is admitted to the petitioner, and handed over to the Airport Authority on 11.11.2003. The acquisition proceedings for the private lands for the purpose of expansion of Surat Airport was initiated in the year 1999 and the land in question had not been included in the said proceedings for the reason that the ownership of the land-in-question throughout remained with the State government, with the right of the Collector to cancel the lease, in case reclamation is not carried out with due diligence, i.e. the land-in-question is not maintained in a state fit for use of agricultural purposes. No infirmity, therefore, can be found in the decision of the State government not to acquire the land in accordance with the then Land Acquisition Act. The land-in-question, being a government land could very well be transferred without acquisition for expansion of the Surat Airport. 17. Admittedly, the ownership in the land in question has never been transferred to the petitioner and the petitioner remained a lessee of the land in question, the lease of which was terminable in the event of breach of the conditions of the allotment order. Though in the instant case, the lease of the land-in-question has not been terminated at any point of time by passing an order in writing on the ground of breach of the conditions of allotment, however, the facts remains that the petitioner remained a lessee of the land-in-question and did not acquire any ownership right over the same. Though in the instant case, the lease of the land-in-question has not been terminated at any point of time by passing an order in writing on the ground of breach of the conditions of allotment, however, the facts remains that the petitioner remained a lessee of the land-in-question and did not acquire any ownership right over the same. The result is that there was no question of initiation of acquisition proceedings to hand over the possession of the government land to the Airport Authority. At the most, in the proceedings conducted by the State government in handing over the possession of the government land allotted to the petitioner under Rule 40, the petitioner could have claimed compensation for the improvements made by him over the land-in-question during the subsistence of the lease, i.e. from the allotment in 1970 to the year 2003, whereafter the possession of the landin- question was transferred to the Airport Authority. In any case, the petitioner cannot resist the transfer of the land in question to the Airport Authority for expansion of the Surat Airport, which is admittedly a public purpose. 18. The crux of the matter is that there was no question of initiation of acquisition proceedings with respect to the land-in-question, the ownership of which remained with the State government inspite of grant of lease under Rule 40 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972, which was a lease for limited purposes for reclamation of the land in question to make it fit for the use for agricultural purposes and earn income out of the same. The lease in question was terminable at any point of time in case of breach of the conditions of the lease. In the instant case, though termination order in writing has not been passed, but the petitioner has failed to demonstrate before us that he has made improvements in the land and reclaimed it by bringing it in a state fit for use of agricultural purposes and utilised the land in question by cultivating the same and paid the revenue rent as per the conditions of the allotment order. In absence of these evidences, which were required to be brought on record by the petitioner, we are afraid to accept the contention of the petitioner that he has a right to claim compensation. In absence of these evidences, which were required to be brought on record by the petitioner, we are afraid to accept the contention of the petitioner that he has a right to claim compensation. The contention that the lease-in-question was a perpetual lease and the lessee has acquired right, title and interest as an owner of the land, which was granted to him on lease, is not acceptable, for the reason that the State government retained the right to determine the lease on violation of the terms and conditions of the covenant, that is in case of non-improvement of the Salt-marsh land to make it fit for agricultural purposes. The lease was granted for agricultural purposes on the payment of revenue, which was never paid by the petitioner. Though there is no order in writing of termination of the lease, but violation of terms and conditions of the lease/allotment order could not be disputed by the petitioner by bringing proof of cultivation of the land-in-question and payment of rent in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease/allotment order. 19. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the original petitioner on the decision of the Apex Court in Inder Parshad vs. Union of India [ (1994) 5 SCC 239 ] is of no help, inasmuch as, the appellant in the said case was a lessee of Nazul land and acquisition proceedings had been undertaken therein under the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that Nazul land was given on a perpetual lease by the competent authority and as per the lease deed, the lessee was entitled to retain the possession in perpetuity subject to fulfillment of the terms and conditions of lease deed. It was held therein that being an owner, the Government is not enjoined to acquire its own interest in the land or land alone for public purpose. When its land is granted on lease in favour of the lessee, its power to resume the land is subject to non-fulfillment of the terms and conditions of the lease of the lessee. So long as the lessee acts and complies with the covenants contained in the lease or the grant, the right to resumption in terms of the lease or grant would not arise. But when the land is required for public purpose, the Government should get absolute title thereof free from encumbrances. So long as the lessee acts and complies with the covenants contained in the lease or the grant, the right to resumption in terms of the lease or grant would not arise. But when the land is required for public purpose, the Government should get absolute title thereof free from encumbrances. The compensation is payable for the leasehold right or interest held by the lessee or grantee when the land is acquired. It is further observed therein that it would dependent upon the nature of the lease by giving illustrations, taking a case, where the Government granted lease of agricultural land on the annual payment of rent with the covenant that the Government is entitled to resume the land when needed for public purpose or when the Government finds that the land is required for public purpose. In terms of the covenant, the Government is entitled to exercise its option to determine the lease though the lessee has been complying with the conditions of payment of annual premium or rent and resume the land in accordance with the terms of the grant. In that event, the need to take recourse to acquisition and to make compensation does not arise. Similarly, where the Government granted a patta of its land subject to payment of land revenue. Later, the land is required for public purpose. The payment of land revenue is at par with the payment of land revenue payable by a private owner to the State. By grant of patta, the title has been vested in the grantee. Therefore, grantee is entitled to the full compensation of the acquired land. As regards the lease of the open land with permission to the lessee to construct and build for its quiet enjoyment with appropriate covenants and the lessee with permission constructed the building and by complying with the covenants of the lease was in quiet enjoyment. The selfsame property, when required for public purpose, the Government cannot unilaterally determine the lease and call upon the lessee to deliver the possession. In such case, the Government is required to exercise power of eminent domain by invoking the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for getting such land. The Collector shall have to determine the compensation towards the leasehold interest held by the lessee, if assessable separately and determine the compensation. In such case, the Government is required to exercise power of eminent domain by invoking the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for getting such land. The Collector shall have to determine the compensation towards the leasehold interest held by the lessee, if assessable separately and determine the compensation. The lessee being the owner of the superstructure and the Government being the owner of the land, if compensation is determined for both the components, then the same has to be apportioned between them. At what proportion the lessor and the lessee are expected to receive the compensation, has to be determined. 20. In all, three conditions of lease have been narrated by the Apex Court in Inder Prashad (supra). The case of the original petitioner does not fall in the 2nd and 3rd types of lease, where with the grant of patta, the title has been vested in the grantee or where the lease of the open land has been granted with the permission to lessee to construct building for his quiet enjoyment. In the instant case, the Government has granted the lease of Salt-marsh land with the condition that the lessee-the original petitioner would reclaim the land and make it fit for use of agricultural purposes. The enjoyment of the property by the lessee was for the agricultural purposes. As noted hereinabove, the original petitioner has failed to establish that he has complied with the conditions of the lease of reclamation and the payment of annual rent. We, therefore, do not find any error in the decision of the State Government in resuming the land for public purpose. The Government being the owner of the land, was not required to acquire its own interest in the land alone for public purpose. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Inder Prashad (supra) rather supports the view taken by us. 21. The Government being the owner of the land, was not required to acquire its own interest in the land alone for public purpose. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Inder Prashad (supra) rather supports the view taken by us. 21. Reliance placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Haryana Wakf Board vs. State of Haryana and Others [ (2019) 13 SCC 382 ] is also of no help to the original petitioner, inasmuch as, it has been held therein that the question with regard to apportionment of compensation between the owner and the lessee and where a person is in settled possession, can seek compensation on account of displacement and deprivation of the possession by virtue of acquisition of the land under lease, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each cases and nature of rights. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, where nature of right of the petitioner in the land-in-question was a limited right and he did not reclaim it by making it fit for agricultural use, he is not entitled for compensation for deprivation of the possession of the Government land. 22. Moreover, the dispute pertaining to transfer of possession was raised by the petitioner after a period of 16 years by filling the writ petition in the year 2019, when as per the own contention of the petitioner, the possession of the land in question was taken by the Airport Authority and boundary wall was constructed in the year 2003. There was no reason for the petitioner to wait for 16 years to agitate his claim and seek relief of recovery of possession of the land in question when it has been utlized for a public purpose for construction of the Air-strip. For the inordinate latches on the part of the petitioner, though the writ petition has been entertained, but no substantive relief can be granted to the petitioner, inasmuch as, he could not prove entitlement to compensation by bringing any material on record to demonstrate that he made improvements in the land-in-question which was a Salt-marsh land by reclaiming it to make it fit for use for the agricultural purposes. The revenue records clearly show that the land-in-question remained uncultivated land after the year 1990. 23. The revenue records clearly show that the land-in-question remained uncultivated land after the year 1990. 23. We therefore, do not find any error in the action of the State-appellants in transferring the land in question treating it as Government land for the purpose of expansion of the Surat Airport. The question of acquisition of the land in question by initiating proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act does not arise, as the ownership of the land in question remained with the State government throughout. There is no question of payment of compensation to the petitioner, who was admittedly a lessee of the land-in-question till the year 2003, as he has failed to demonstrate that he made any improvement in the land-in-question to make it fit for agricultural purposes and cultivated it for the period of occupation. 24. In view of the above, while quashing the judgment and order dated 21.4.2023 passed by the learned single Judge, we allow the instant Letters Patent Appeal and dismiss the writ petition being devoid of merits. The Civil Application for stay stands disposed of. No order as to costs.