JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 28.11.2014 passed by learned Additional District Judge-I, Shimla, vide which, the appeal filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant (plaintiff before learned Trial Court) was dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Court No. V, Shimla was affirmed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction. This suit was dismissed in default for want of appearance on 12.06.2003 and was not got restored. Hence, it is not necessary to notice the averments made in the plaint and the written statement filed to the same. 3. The defendant filed an amended counter-claim on 11.09.2000 asserting that a lease deed stated to have been executed by Niranjan Dass in favour of the plaintiff on 23.04.1996, which was registered with the Sub-Registrar, Shimla is wrong, illegal and the result of misrepresentation of facts, fraud, coercion and was got executed in active connivance with the concerned agency. No amount was received by the defendant nor was it paid to any person including Niranjan Dass, the executant. The defendant was appointed as a Manager of the temple property by Baba Kumbh Dass, the founder of the religious institution known as Baba Shri Chand Mandir, Ram Bazar, Shimla. The defendant was adopted as Chella of Baba Kumbh Dass Ji in a function of Rasam Mahanti. This fact was also published in a weekly newspaper, Mahatma, published at Amritsar on 22.06.1983. The lease deed dated 23.04.1996 registered on 30.04.1996 is null and void and does not bind the rights of the defendant. The defendant is not authorized to create any lease nor he could authorize any person to do so. The defendant does not know English and can only sign in Hindi. He can only read Punjabi. The lease deed is liable to be set aside. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed and the counter-claim be decreed. 4. The defendant is not authorized to create any lease nor he could authorize any person to do so. The defendant does not know English and can only sign in Hindi. He can only read Punjabi. The lease deed is liable to be set aside. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed and the counter-claim be decreed. 4. The plaintiff filed a written statement to the counter-claim taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability & better particulars, the defendant being estopped from filing the counter-claim due to his act, deed and conduct, the counter-claim not having been properly valued and the counter-claim being bad for the non-joinder of the necessary parties. It was admitted that the lease deed was executed and registered in favour of the plaintiff. The rest of the pleas taken in the counter-claim were denied. It was specifically denied that the lease deed was the result of fraud, coercion or misrepresentation of facts or that the defendant did not know Hindi or he could only read Punjabi language. Hence, it was prayed that the counter-claim be dismissed. 5. Learned Trial Court framed the issues based on the plaint and written statement on 25.02.1999 and composite issues on 04.05.2001: Issues framed on 25.02.1999: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for?OPP 2. Whether suit in the present form is not maintainable?..OPD 3. Whether suit is bad for want of non-joinder of necessary parties?…OPD 4. Where there exists no cause of action in favour of the plaintiff to file the suit?...OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped his acts and conduct to file the suit?...OPD 6. Whether the suit is mala fide one? …OPD 7. Relief. Issues framed on 04.05.2001: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for? ...OPP 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is estoppped by his own acts, deed and acquiescence? OPD. 6. Whether the lease deed dated 23.04.1996/30.04.1996 is null and void and is not binding upon the defendant? OPD 7. Whether the defendant has been adopted as Chela? OPD 8. Whether the counter-claim is not maintainable? OPP 9. OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is estoppped by his own acts, deed and acquiescence? OPD. 6. Whether the lease deed dated 23.04.1996/30.04.1996 is null and void and is not binding upon the defendant? OPD 7. Whether the defendant has been adopted as Chela? OPD 8. Whether the counter-claim is not maintainable? OPP 9. Whether the defendant is estopped from filing or maintaining the counter-claim on account of his own acts, deeds and conduct? OPP 10. Whether the counter-claim is bad for the non-joinder of necessary parties? OPP 11. Relief. 6. The defendant examined himself (CCW1), Yashpal Joshi (CCW2), Niranjan Singh (CCW3), Dhayan Singh (CCW4), and Mukesh Chander (CCW5). The plaintiff examined Gauri Shankar (DW1), Shamsher Singh (DW2) and Deepak Sood (DW3). 7. Learned Trial Court held that the opening lines of the general Power of Attorney mentioned that it was regarding the appearance before the Court. Only one paragraph was added regarding the lease, sale etc. This addition probabilized the version of the plaintiff that it was added without his knowledge. The version of the defendant that he never appeared before the Sub-Registrar was also probable from the evidence on record. Parties were known to each other and the defendant could have executed the lease deed in favour of the plaintiff. He had no necessity to execute a General Power of Attorney in favour of Niranjan Dass. Niranjan Dass was not examined by the plaintiff. The scribe and the Advocate who identified the executant before the Sub-Registrar were also not examined. There was insufficient evidence to prove the payment of the lease money, which probabilized the version of the defendant that no money was ever paid to him. Hence, Issues No. 6 and 7 were answered in affirmative, Issues Nos. 8 to 10 were answered in negative and the counter-claim was decreed. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was decided by learned Additional District Judge-I, Shimla. Learned First Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the execution of General Power of Attorney in favour of Niranjan Dass was not proved. The defendant cannot be termed as the owner of the premises and the premises belonged to Baba Shri Chand Mandir, a religious place. Learned First Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the execution of General Power of Attorney in favour of Niranjan Dass was not proved. The defendant cannot be termed as the owner of the premises and the premises belonged to Baba Shri Chand Mandir, a religious place. The defendant was appointed as a Manager with a specific condition that he had no authority to sell or lease the property of the temple. The reading of the general Power of Attorney shows that it was executed for a limited purpose regarding the Court case. Clause No.11 regarding the execution of the lease and the sale was not as per the rest of the documents. The defendant never appeared before the Sub-Registrar and the evidence of the witnesses to the contrary was not believable. Niranjan Dass’ identifier and scribe of the general Power of Attorney were the material witnesses who were withheld. The payment of the money to the defendant was not proved; hence the appeal was dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved from the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial question of law on 04.07.2016: “Whether on account of misreading, mis-appreciation and misconstruction of the law and facts as well as the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the judgment and decree under challenge in the main appeal being perverse and vitiated is not legally sustainable?” 10. The plaintiff also filed an application for leading the additional evidence. 11. I have heard Mr. Suneet Goel, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff. Since none appeared on behalf of the respondent/defendant; hence, none could be heard on behalf of the respondent/defendant. 12. Mr Suneet Goel, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submitted that the defendant filed a counter-claim seeking the declaration. The plaintiff is in possession and no consequential relief was sought by the plaintiff; hence, no declaration could have been granted to the defendant. The counter-claim is to be treated as a suit and it has to comply with the requirement of Order 7 of CPC. The counter-claim is not as per the requirement of Order 7 of CPC and could not have been entertained. The counter-claim is to be treated as a suit and it has to comply with the requirement of Order 7 of CPC. The counter-claim is not as per the requirement of Order 7 of CPC and could not have been entertained. Learned Courts below failed to appreciate that no averment of misrepresentation or coercion was made in the cancellation deed, which falsifies the plea taken in the counter-claim that General Power of Attorney was executed as a result of fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. The plaintiff could not produce the record regarding the payment of money as the record was not available. The plaintiff filed an application under the Right to Information Act and obtained the relevant record; therefore, permission be granted to prove the documents on record. He prayed that the present appeal be allowed and judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it is necessary to dispose of an application (CMP No. 9711 of 2017) for leading the additional evidence. It has been asserted that the dispute between the parties pertains to the lease deed dated 23.04.1996. During the pendency of the appeal; detailed inquiries were made from the bankers of the applicant-plaintiff and a record was obtained from UCO Bank, Ram Bazaar Branch, wherein the payment of Rs. 1,75,000/- was duly reflected. This establishes the version of the plaintiff that the amount was paid under the lease deed and a valid lease deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff. The documents are essential for the just and effective adjudication of the case. The documents could not be produced earlier because they could not be located despite the exercise of due diligence. The documents were located after great effort. No prejudice would be caused to the other side by the production of the documents. Therefore, it was prayed that the application be allowed. 15. The application is opposed by filing a reply taking preliminary objection regarding lack of maintainability and the application having been filed to delay the hearing of the appeal. It was asserted that the documents were available even at the time of the filing of the suit but they were not produced with the plaint. 15. The application is opposed by filing a reply taking preliminary objection regarding lack of maintainability and the application having been filed to delay the hearing of the appeal. It was asserted that the documents were available even at the time of the filing of the suit but they were not produced with the plaint. The documents could have been filed with the first appeal and they are being filed to fill up the lacuna. The plaintiff is interested in prolonging the litigation. No document was filed to show that the record of UCO Bank was not traceable. The plaintiff did not appear as a witness in the counter-claim and he cannot be permitted to produce the documents at this belated stage. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed. 16. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and affirming those of the application was filed. 17. O. 41 R. 27 of CPC deals with the additional evidence in appeal. It reads as follows: “27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court, But if— (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence that ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” 18. It was specifically asserted in the counter-claim filed by the defendant that no money was paid to anybody including Niranjan Dass. The plaintiff denied this fact in the written statement filed by him. Therefore, it was known to the plaintiff that the payment of the money was in dispute. It was specifically asserted in the counter-claim filed by the defendant that no money was paid to anybody including Niranjan Dass. The plaintiff denied this fact in the written statement filed by him. Therefore, it was known to the plaintiff that the payment of the money was in dispute. The defendant also stepped into the witness box as CCW1 and stated that he had not received any money from the plaintiff-Rajeev Goel or Shemsher Singh. The plaintiff did not appear in the witness box to assert that any money was paid by him in cash or cheque to any person. 19. The plaintiff claimed that he had paid the money, therefore, he was the best person to know about the payment of the money and the mode of the payment. His plea that the record could not be produced before the learned Trial Court despite the exercise of due diligence is not supported by the record of the learned Trial Court. The record does not show that the plaintiff had summoned any official from the UCO Bank to prove that he had paid the money to Niranjan Dass or the defendant. He could easily have produced any official from the bank to show that the record was not traceable, which would have corroborated his plea that the record was not available despite the exercise of due diligence. He could have produced his passbook or the statement of accounts to show the payment of the money to Niranjan Dass or the defendant. However, he failed to do so. Thus, his plea that he was unable to produce the record despite the exercise of due diligence cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779 : 2004 SCC OnLine SC 505 that a party is not entitled to produce additional evidence unless it is shown that evidence could not be produced before the learned trial court despite the exercise of due diligence. It was held: “The scope of Order XLI, Rule 27, CPC is very clear to the effect that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary unless they have shown that despite due diligence, they could not produce such documents and such documents are required to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.” 20. Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad vs. Shivnath 2019 (6) SCC 82 , wherein it was held: 28. Under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, production of additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, is permitted only under three circumstances which are: (I) Where the trial Court had refused to admit the evidence though it ought to have been admitted; (II) the evidence was not available to the party despite the exercise of due diligence; and (III) the appellate Court required the additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature. An application for the production of additional evidence cannot be allowed if the appellant was not diligent in producing the relevant documents in the lower court. However, in the interest of justice and when satisfactory reasons are given, the court can receive additional documents. 29. In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin & Another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 , this Court held as under:- "36. The general principle is that the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in the appeal. However, as an exception, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC enables the appellate court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The appellate court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this Rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, the provision does not apply, when on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the Rule itself. (Vide K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy AIR 1963 SC 1526 , Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham AIR 1965 SC 1008 , Soonda Ram v. Rameshwarlal (1975) 3 SCC 698 and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy (1979) 2 SCC 601 .) 37. The appellate court should not ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham AIR 1965 SC 1008 , Soonda Ram v. Rameshwarlal (1975) 3 SCC 698 and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy (1979) 2 SCC 601 .) 37. The appellate court should not ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohd. Iqbal and Mohd. Ali and Co. (1978) 2 SCC 493 ) ....... 40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this Rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal." "47. Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record, such application may be allowed." 21. Both the learned Courts below have adversely commented upon the failure of the plaintiff to produce the record regarding the payment of consideration. The sole purpose of filing of application for additional evidence is to get rid of the findings recorded by learned Courts below. This is not permissible. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N. Kamalam Vs. Ayyaswamy 2001 (7) SCC 503 = 2001 SCC OnLine SC 905 that the additional evidence cannot be led to fill in the lacuna left before the learned trial Court. It was observed: “19. This is not permissible. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N. Kamalam Vs. Ayyaswamy 2001 (7) SCC 503 = 2001 SCC OnLine SC 905 that the additional evidence cannot be led to fill in the lacuna left before the learned trial Court. It was observed: “19. Incidentally, the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 have not been engrafted in the Code so as to patch up the weak points in the case and to fill up the omission in the Court of Appeal - It does not authorise any lacunae or gaps in evidence to be filled up. The authority and jurisdiction conferred on to the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence is restricted to the purpose of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way. This Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 has been candid enough to record that the requirement of the High Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, this Court observed: ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . This provision does not entitle the High Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. The High Court does not say that there is any such lacuna in this case. On the other hand, what it says is that certain documentary evidence on record supports "in a large measure" the plaintiffs' contention about fraud and mala fides. We shall deal with these documents presently but before that, we must point out that the power under Cl. (b) of sub-r. (1) of R. 27 cannot be exercised for adding to the evidence already on record except upon one of the grounds specified in the provision". We shall deal with these documents presently but before that, we must point out that the power under Cl. (b) of sub-r. (1) of R. 27 cannot be exercised for adding to the evidence already on record except upon one of the grounds specified in the provision". Further in Smt. Pramod Kumari Bhatia v. Om Prakash Bhatia, AIR 1980 SC 446 this Court also in more or less in an identical situation laid down that since an application to the High Court has been made very many years after the filing of the suit and also quite some years after the appeal had been filed before the High Court, the question of interfering with the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to receive additional evidence at that stage would not arise. The time lag in the matter under consideration is also enormous and the additional evidence sought to be produced was as a matter of fact after a period of 10 years after the filing of the appeal. Presently, the suit was instituted in the year 1981 and the decree therein was passed in 1983. The first appeal was filed before the High Court in April 1983 but the application for permission to adduce additional evidence came to be made only in August 1993. Needless to record that the Courts shall have to be cautious and must always act with great circumspection in dealing with the claims for letting in additional evidence particularly, in the form of oral evidence at the appellate stage and that too, after a long lapse of time. In our view, a plain reading of Order 41, Rule 27 would depict that the rejection of the claim for production of additional evidence after 10 years from the date of filing of the appeal, as noticed above, cannot be termed to be erroneous or an illegal exercise of discretion. The three limbs of Rule 27 do not stand attracted. The learned trial Judge while dealing with the matter has, as a matter of fact, very strongly commented upon the lapse and failure on the part of the plaintiffs even to summon the attestors to the Will and in our view contextually, the justice of the situation does not warrant any interference. The learned trial Judge while dealing with the matter has, as a matter of fact, very strongly commented upon the lapse and failure on the part of the plaintiffs even to summon the attestors to the Will and in our view contextually, the justice of the situation does not warrant any interference. The attempt, the High Court ascribed it, to be a stage-managed affair in order somehow to defeat the claim of the respondents and having had the privilege of perusal of record we lend our concurrence thereto and the finding of the High Court cannot be found fault with for rejecting the prayer of the appellant for additional evidence made in the belated application. In that view of the matter, the first issue is answered in the negative and thus against the plaintiffs being the appellant herein.” 22. Hence, the present application does not satisfy the requirement of Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC and cannot be allowed. Hence, the same is dismissed. 23. The defendant initially filed a counter-claim as a part of the written statement. The defendant prayed in the written statement that the suit of the plaintiff be dismissed with the cost and the counter-claim of the defendant be decreed. The decree sought by the defendant was not specified. No Court fee was paid on this counter-claim. 24. Order 7 Rule 1 of CPC provides that the plaint shall contain the name of the Court in which, the suit is brought, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and defendant, the facts constituting the cause of action, the facts showing that the Court has jurisdiction, the relief which the plaintiff claims and a statement of the value of the subject matter of the suit for Court fees and jurisdiction. 25. It was laid down by this Court in H.P. State Forest Corporation Ltd. & another vs. Gurcharan Dass Sekhri 1991(1) Shim.LC 98 that a counter-claim has to be treated as a suit. It is governed by the provisions of Rule 6-A of Order 8 of CPC. It should contain all the particulars which are required to be given in a plaint and where no such particulars are mentioned, the counter-claim is liable to be rejected. It was observed: 23. The defendant has set up a counterclaim to the extent of Rs. It is governed by the provisions of Rule 6-A of Order 8 of CPC. It should contain all the particulars which are required to be given in a plaint and where no such particulars are mentioned, the counter-claim is liable to be rejected. It was observed: 23. The defendant has set up a counterclaim to the extent of Rs. 1,74,426.66 paise under Order 8, Rule 6-A, Code of Civil Procedure, vide his written statement dated 25.7.1993. Rule 6-A of Order 8, Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with a counterclaim by the defendant, reads: - "6-A. Counter-claim by defendant. - (1) A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under Rule 6, set up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not : Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. (2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. (3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Court. (4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints." Sub-rule (4) of Rule 64, quoted above, provides that the counterclaim is to be treated as a plaint and is to be governed by the rules applicable to plaints. Rule 1 of Order 7, Code of Civil Procedure provides for particulars which are required to be stated in the plaint. The provisions contained in Rule 1 of Order 7, Code of Civil Procedure, have been held to be imperative in Hans Raj Kalra v. Krishan Kalra and others, [AIR 1977 NOC 267 (Delhi)]. Rule 1 of Order 7, Code of Civil Procedure provides for particulars which are required to be stated in the plaint. The provisions contained in Rule 1 of Order 7, Code of Civil Procedure, have been held to be imperative in Hans Raj Kalra v. Krishan Kalra and others, [AIR 1977 NOC 267 (Delhi)]. A bare perusal of the written statement filed by the defendant raising the counter-claim shows that the necessary particulars required to be stated under Order 7, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, have not been pleaded therein. On the failure of the defendant to comply with the imperative provisions, his counter-claim is liable to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. To a similar effect, it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court, of which I was a member, in The Managing Director, H.R State Forest Corporation and another v. Ghinno Ram and others, (R.RA. No. 83 of 1991 decided on 11.6.1998). 26. This judgment was followed in H.P. State Forest Corporation and others vs. Achhar Singh & others 2001(1) Shim.LC 206 and it was held: “35. Under sub-rule (4) of Rule 6-A, quoted above, the counterclaim is to be treated as a plaint and is to be governed by the rule applicable to the plaintiffs. Sub-rule (2) lays down that a counterclaim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit. 36. Rule 1 of Order 7, Code of Civil Procedure, provides for particulars that are required to be stated in the plaint. A Division Bench of this Court in The Managing Director, H.P. State Forest Corporation and another v. Ghinno Ram and others [R.F.A. No. 83 of 1991, decided on 11.6.1998] has held that the provisions contained in Rule 1 of Order 7, Code of Civil Procedure, are imperative and the failure to state all the necessary particulars required to be stated would entail rejection of the plaint/counter-claim under Order 7 Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. 37. To a similar effect it has been held in The Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation Ltd. and another v. Gurcharan Dass Sekhri, 1999 (1) Sim. L.C. 98.”: 27. Thus, a counter-claim is required to contain all the ingredients of the plaint in the absence of which, the same is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected. 28. The plaintiff filed an application for amending the counter-claim. L.C. 98.”: 27. Thus, a counter-claim is required to contain all the ingredients of the plaint in the absence of which, the same is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected. 28. The plaintiff filed an application for amending the counter-claim. The application was allowed and an amended counter-claim was filed. Only one paragraph No.5 was added that the counter-claim of the defendant was assessed for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 190/- & Court fees of Rs. 19/- was affixed. The rest of the particulars as required under Order 7 Rule 1 were not mentioned; thus, the amended counter-claim does not satisfy the requirements of the plaint and could not have been entertained. 29. The learned Trial Court decreed the counter-claim and declared that the General Power of Attorney executed in favour of Niranjan Dass and the lease deed executed by Baba Niranjan Dass in favour of plaintiff Rajeev Goel are void documents. It is undisputed that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land. The defendants filed a reply to the application under Order 41 Rule 5 of CPC, in which, he stated that the plaintiff is in illegal possession and is a trespasser; hence, the counter-claimant is entitled to use and occupation charges @ Rs.10,000/- per month. Thus, the possession of the plaintiff was never disputed. The necessary consequences of declaring the General Power of Attorney and the lease deed executed in favour of the plaintiff would be the restoration of possession. However, the defendant failed to seek the consequential relief of restoration of possession. 30. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi, (1973) 2 SCC 60 that a civil suit for seeking declaration without praying for possession is not maintainable when the plaintiff is out of possession. It was held at page 60: - “2. The fact-finding courts, namely the trial court as well as the appellate courts have come to the conclusion that during the lifetime of Chhabili, she was in possession of a portion of the suit properties and the other portion remained in possession of the plaintiffs. The further finding reached by those courts is that after the death of Chhabili Kuer, Ganga Devi took unlawful possession of the properties which were in possession of ChhabiliKuer. The further finding reached by those courts is that after the death of Chhabili Kuer, Ganga Devi took unlawful possession of the properties which were in possession of ChhabiliKuer. They also found that Ganga Devi was not the heir of Chhabili but on the other hand, the plaintiffs were her heirs. 4. We are in agreement with the High Court that the suit is hit by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. As found by the fact-finding courts, Gange Devi is in possession of some of the suit properties. The plaintiffs have not sought possession of those properties. They merely claimed a declaration that they are the owners of the suit properties. Hence the suit is not maintainable. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to go into the other contention that the suit is barred by limitation.” 31. A similar view was taken in Vasantha v. Rajalakshmi, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 132, wherein it was observed: “47. We now proceed to examine whether the suit for declaration simpliciter was maintainable in view of Section 34 of the SRA, 1963. 48. Section 34 reads as: 34. Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right.- Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. 49. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has contended that it has been settled by the Courts below that the appellant has been in possession of the subject property since 1976. In view of the proviso to Section 34, the suit of the plaintiff could not have been decreed since the plaintiff sought for mere declaration without the consequential relief of recovery of possession. 50. In view of the proviso to Section 34, the suit of the plaintiff could not have been decreed since the plaintiff sought for mere declaration without the consequential relief of recovery of possession. 50. The learned counsel for the Respondent, in rebuttal, contended that since at the time of filing of the suit, the life interest holder was alive, she was entitled to be in possession of the property and therefore, the Plaintiff not being entitled to possession at the time of institution of the suit, recovery of possession could not have been sought. 51. We now proceed to examine the law on this issue. As submitted by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant, in Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra (2-Judge Bench)29, this Court while considering Section 42 of the erstwhile Specific Relief Act, 1877 to be pari materia with Section 34 of SRA, 1963 observed that the plaintiff's not being in possession of the property in that case ought to have amended the plaint for the relief of recovery of possession in view of the bar included by the proviso. 52. This position has been followed by this Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (2-Judge Bench) 2012 (8) SCC 148 , which elaborated the position of a suit filed without consequential relief. It was observed: “55. The section provides that courts have discretion as to declaration of status or right, however, it carves out an exception that a court shall not make any such declaration of status or right where the complainant, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. 56. In Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi [ (1973) 2 SCC 60 ] this Court had categorically held that the suit seeking for declaration of title of ownership but where possession is not sought is hit by the proviso of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and, thus,not maintainable. In Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra [1993 Supp (3) SCC 129] this Court dealt with a similar issue where the plaintiff was not in exclusive possession of the property and had filed a suit seeking a declaration of title of ownership. A similar view has been reiterated observing that the suit was not maintainable if barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. A similar view has been reiterated observing that the suit was not maintainable if barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. (See also Gian Kaur v. Raghubir Singh [ (2011) 4 SCC 567 ) 57. In view of the above, the law becomes crystal clear that it is not permissible to claim the relief of declaration without seeking consequential relief. 58. In the instant case, the suit for declaration of title of ownership had been filed, though Respondent 1-plaintiff was admittedly not in possession of the suit property. Thus, the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and, therefore, ought to have been dismissed solely on this ground. The High Court though framed a substantial question on this point but for unknown reasons did not consider it proper to decide the same.” 53. In Venkataraja v. Vidyane Doureradjaperumal (Dead) thr. LRs (2-Judge Bench) 2014 (14) SCC 502 , the purpose behind Section 34 was elucidated by this Court. It was observed that the purpose behind the inclusion of the proviso is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It was further expounded that a mere declaratory decree remains non-executable in most cases. This Court noted that the suit was never amended, even at a later stage to seek the consequential relief and therefore, it was held to be not maintainable. This position of law has been reiterated recently in Akkamma v. Vemavathi (2-Judge Bench) 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1146. 54. This Court in Executive Officer, Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust, Virudhunagar v. Chandran. (2-Judge Bench) 2017 (3) SCC 702 while reversing the High Court decree, observed that because of Section 34 of the SRA, 1963, the plaintiff not being in possession and claiming only declaratory relief, ought to have claimed the relief of recovery of possession. It was held that the Trial Court rightly dismissed the suit on the basis that the plaintiff has filed a suit for a mere declaration without relief for recovery, which is clearly not maintainable.” 32. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, a counter-claim seeking a declaration without the restoration of the possession was not maintainable and could not have been decreed by the learned Courts below. 33. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, a counter-claim seeking a declaration without the restoration of the possession was not maintainable and could not have been decreed by the learned Courts below. 33. Hence, both the learned Courts have proceeded in ignorance of the binding principles of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, the relevant provision of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and Order 7 Rule 1 of CPC; thus, the substantial question of law is answered in the affirmative and is decided in favour of the appellants. 34. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed and judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below are set aside. This counter-claim of the respondent/defendant is dismissed as not maintainable.