JUDGMENT : In W.P.(C)No.25209 of 2020, the petitioners are employees of Unit Run Canteens (hereinafter referred to as ‘URC’) working at Mavelikkara extension counter functioning under the administrative control of Army Station Head Quarters, Pangode, Thiruvananthapuram. The URCs are run by the Canteen Stores Department (hereinafter referred to as ‘CSD’), is governed by the Board of Control of Canteen Services (BOCCS), is headed by the Minister of Defence and has members like the Defence Secretary, Secretary of Defence (Finance), the Quarter Master General (QMG). The present form of canteen came into existence in 1947 and the funds for CSD were met from the consolidated fund of India to purchase goods for the trade. Petitioners are either Ex-servicemen or dependent on Ex-Servicemen. They joined the canteens on the basis of a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) issued by the respondents. After a period of probation, the petitioners will be treated as permanent/temporary employees. 2. The petitioners submit that the respondents are trying to remove the petitioners from their office, and they are to be replaced by contractual employees. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners have filed this writ petition. The connected cases are W.P.(C)Nos.25202, 25209, 25213, 2517, 26222, 27386/2020, 22466, 23782, 27795, 29919, 30508, 30564, 30652, 30668, 30679/2021, 7461, 27478, 29383, 35026, 35173, 35231, 35246/2022 & 453, 456, 13827, 17289/23, in which the petitioners also have the same grievance and they are working at different extension counters, and the respondents are the identical persons. Except the above cases, W.P.(C)Nos. 1548 of 2023, 25814 of 2023, 25635 of 2023 and 16984/2023, the petitioners have different prayers. In W.P.(C)No.16984 of 2023, the petitioners sought the following prayers: A. Issue writ in the nature of mandamus commanding 5th respondent to assign duties and responsibility of Asst Manager to the petitioner forthwith B. Issue writ in the nature of mandamus commanding 5th respondent to relieve 7th respondent from the duties and responsibilities of Asst Manager forthwith C. Issue writ in the nature of mandamus commanding 4 respondent to institute an inquiry against 6th and 7th respondent on the Exhibit P5 complaint lodged by the petitioner D. Declare that applicant being appointed as Asst Manager is entitled to assigned with duties and responsibilities attached to the post of Asst Manager E. Such other relief that the Hon'ble Court feel deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case. In W.P.(C) No.1548 of 2023, 25814 of 2023 and 25635 of 2023, the petitioners challenge the termination and seek direction for reinstatement in service. 3. A counter affidavit is filed by the respondents. The 1st and foremost contention raised is that the writ petition is not maintainable as the Unit Run Canteens does not come under the definition of State. Three vital aspects and tests to determine whether an organization - institution, or body comes under the definition of other authorities are; i) Creation, ii) Finance, and iii) Control. As far as the first test is concerned, that is, creation, URCs are established in terms of provisions laid down in AO/19/2003/QMG. The canteen services directorate grants sanction to a unit to operate the URCs on the basis of recommendation of higher formation/CSD head office. The URCs are given sanctions on the basis of certain basic criteria. The creation of a unit run canteen arises out of the need for defense personnel posted in a particular unit /formation and not by any Act but by an order from the Quarter Master General branch of the Army. It is not the creation of the constitution or parliament or a State Legislature. AO/19/2003/QMG is an Army order and not a notification nor does it carry any statutory validity. Thus, it is not a State, coming under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable against the Unit Run Canteen. 4. As regards 2nd test finance, the URCs depend on regimental non-public funds for financial support. The regimental non-public funds are created through contributions from the defence personnel. URCs are not funded by the Government /Public funds or from the consolidated fund of India. URCs do not receive any direct pecuniary benefit from the Government of India, nor do the CSDs under any obligation to grant any financial assistance to URCs. Loans granted by CSDs to URCs are also repaid in full along with interest at 4% for the 1st loan and 6% for the 2nd loan for a maximum period of five years. There is no direct or indirect funding from any Government authority. Ext.R5(b) is a letter issued by the Ministry of Defence to the Chief of Army Staff, explaining the statutes of the Unit Run Canteen and their employees. There is no direct or indirect funding from any Government authority. Ext.R5(b) is a letter issued by the Ministry of Defence to the Chief of Army Staff, explaining the statutes of the Unit Run Canteen and their employees. It specifically states that CSD is a department under the Ministry of Defence, all its employees are Government employees. The funds of the department form part of the Consolidated Fund of India, but the unit canteens like the Army Head Quarters canteen are private undertakings of the unit concerned; their funds are non-government funds. CSD has no administrative control over the unit canteens or the personnel who are employed by the units under various terms and conditions mutually settled between the units and the employees, they are not Government servants, and therefore, the Ministry has no control over their service conditions and has no jurisdiction over the service conditions of such employees. Thus, there is no direct financial obligation by the State. 5. With regard to the 3rd test, control is concerned, URCs are managed through a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), formulated by the URC management committee. The staff members are employed as per qualitative requirements formulated by the URC management. The procurement of stores/goods for the URCs can be done only from a CSD depot by making advance payment from their non-public (regimental) funds and the profits of URCs are distributed, utilised as regimental funds by the unit/formations, for the welfare activities of troops and their families after meeting the operational /running expenses of URCs. 6. Ext.R5(c) is another letter issued by the Deputy Dte., General Canteen Services, Army Headquarters, New Delhi, to all the headquarters of the Command. It specifically points out that all URCs are private undertakings of the unit, and their funds are non-governmental funds. The directorate or the CSD headquarters has no administrative control over the civilian employees of the URC, as they are employed under certain terms and conditions mutually settled between the unit and the employee. The URCs are covered under the Shops and Establishment Act of various States in which URCs are located. In view of the above, any representations concerning the employees’, URCs should not be referred to the directorate. At no stage of engagement does the staff of URCs translate into a permanent employee in the URCs. The URCs are covered under the Shops and Establishment Act of various States in which URCs are located. In view of the above, any representations concerning the employees’, URCs should not be referred to the directorate. At no stage of engagement does the staff of URCs translate into a permanent employee in the URCs. The individuals signed separate agreements for their engagement as staff URCs, and they are not given permanent employee status. The competent authority is permitted to amend/alter, and issue clarifications regarding the service conditions of the employees of the URC. It is the issue that confers the welfare of the organisation and protects the interest of the organisation. 7. The competent authorities are very well authorised to decide upon the tenure of a contract to be entered into with the person who is engaged purely on a contract basis. The petitioners are contractual employees of the ex-servicemen unit run canteens, and their function is under the administrative control of station headquarters at Thiruvananthapuram. The S.O.P. regarding the functioning of station canteen Thiruvananthapuram, ESM URC - Pathanamthitta, Kollam, Mavelikara, and Kottarakara, under the administration team control of station headquarters, Thiruvananthapuram are issued by the station headquarters, Thiruvananthapuram. The amendments are carried out by the station headquarters in Thiruvananthapuram by letter dated 20.05.2019, which mandate that all contractual employees, including the Manager and Assistant Manager, will be initially employed for 11 months and can be re-hired for 11 more months without conducting of interview. Therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 8. Since respondents have raised the contention that the primary question that requires to be considered is whether the Unit Run Canteen is under the State Government coming within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India or authority and whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable before this Court against the Unit Run Canteen. The said question has to be decided first. 9. In the decision reported in Sombir Singh v. Union of India, (2014 SCC OnLine Del 2769), the High Court of Delhi held that, 2. The said question has to be decided first. 9. In the decision reported in Sombir Singh v. Union of India, (2014 SCC OnLine Del 2769), the High Court of Delhi held that, 2. At the outset a preliminary objection is raised to the maintainability of the petition by learned counsel for the Respondents who contends that in terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3495/2005, R.R. Pillai (dead) through LRs v. Commanding Officer, HQ S.A.C.(U) wherein it was held that the employees of ‘Unit Run Canteens’ are not Government employees, the present petition cannot be entertained. 3. It may be noted that the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court was given on a reference to a three Judge Bench doubting the correctness of the earlier view of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Aslam, (2001) 1 SCC 720 . Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment which are relevant are reproduced hereunder:- “10. The question whether the URC can be treated as an instrumentality of the State does not fall for consideration as that aspect has not been considered by CAT or the High Court. Apparently, on that score alone we could have dismissed the appeal. But we find that the High Court placed reliance on Rule 24 to deny the effect of the appointment. From Rule 4 read with Rule 2 it is clear classification that all employees are first on probation and they shall be treated as temporary employees. After completion of five years they might be declared as permanent employees. They do not get the status of the Government employees at any stage. In Aslam’s case (supra) CAT’s order was passed in 1995. By that time 1999 Rules were not in existence and 1984 rules were operative. 11. It is to be noted that financial assistance is given, but interest and penal interest are charged. The URCs can also borrow from financial institutions. The reference is answered by holding that employees of URCs are not government servants.” 4. Subsequently a learned Single Judge of this Court (Hon’ble Mr. 11. It is to be noted that financial assistance is given, but interest and penal interest are charged. The URCs can also borrow from financial institutions. The reference is answered by holding that employees of URCs are not government servants.” 4. Subsequently a learned Single Judge of this Court (Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri as his Lordship then was) in the case of Layak Ram v. Quarter Master General, 1999 (81) DLT 395 has similarly held that employees of canteens in Army Headquarters cannot file a writ petition and such employees are not employees of a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Paras 9 and 10 of the said judgment which are relevant are reproduced hereunder:- “9. The Judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court referred to above deals with the case of employees of the same job of Army canteen and the High Court has held that this canteen is not instrumentality of the State on almost identical facts. Therefore, this Judgement is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. The cases which are decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal as noted above again deal with the cases of canteen workers of Army Headquarter canteens are in all these cases, it is held that employees of such canteens are not Central Government servants and, therefore, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with these cases. However, these may not have direct bearing on the question involved in this case namely; whether the canteen is ‘State’ or ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is well established law that employees of a particular body may not be civil servants under Article 311 of the Constitution of India but body may still be “another authority” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The case of Union of India v. Chottey Lal A.I.R. 1999 SC 396 also deals with the jurisdiction of Central Administrative Tribunal and it is held in the case of Dhobis (washerman) to wash clothes of cadets in National defence Academy are not holders of civil post and therefore, the Central Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the conditions of service of such Dhobis. 10. It may be mentioned that Judgment of Madras High Court in the case of Babian v. Lt. Col. 10. It may be mentioned that Judgment of Madras High Court in the case of Babian v. Lt. Col. 1994 Lab.I.C. 245 on which petitioner relied also helds that such canteens are not covered by Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, I held that the respondent canteen is not ‘state’ or ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.” 5. Recently in the case of Rajesh Tiwari v. Union of India, W.P(C) No. 2768/2011 decided on 10th September, 2013 it has been reiterated that the CSD Canteen is not a State or an instrumentality of State for a writ to be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, we are inclined to uphold the preliminary objection raised by the Respondents. 7. Resultantly, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. 10. In the decision reported in Layak Ram v. Quarter Master General, (1999 SCC OnLine Del 531), it was held by the High Court of Delhi that, 6. The principal question to be decided in this case is whether the present writ petition is maintainable against the respondents. 7. It can safely be inferred that the canteen is not a “State” or other authority within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. The averments made by the respondent in the counter-affidavit in this respect are not refuted by the petitioner in the counter-affidavit. Admittedly the canteen is not the creation of any Statute Act, or legislation. The Ministry of Defence or Quarter Master General has nothing to do with the canteen or its employees. There is nothing on record to show that any funds are provided by the Government. There is no evidence of any control such as deep pervasive control of the Government in the running of the canteen. As stated by the respondent in the counter-affidavit canteen is private establishment to provide grocery items on cheaper rates as a welfare measure to armed forces personnel and ex-servicemen. Nominal profits are charged on sales and salaries, etc., to employees employed by the canteen and are paid out of these nominal profits. 9. As stated by the respondent in the counter-affidavit canteen is private establishment to provide grocery items on cheaper rates as a welfare measure to armed forces personnel and ex-servicemen. Nominal profits are charged on sales and salaries, etc., to employees employed by the canteen and are paid out of these nominal profits. 9. The judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court referred to above deals with the case of employee of the same job of army canteen and the High Court has held that this canteen is not instrumentality of the State on almost identical facts. Therefore, this judgment is sequarely applicable to the facts of this case. The cases which are decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal as noted above again deal with the cases of canteen workers of Army Headquarter canteens and in all these cases, it is held that employees of such canteens are not Central Government servants and, therefore, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with these cases. However, these may not have direct bearing on the question involved in this case namely; whether the canteen is “State” or “other Authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. It is well established law that employees of a particular body may not be civil servants under Art. 311 of the Constitution of India but body may still be “another authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. The case of Union of India v. Chotelal [ 1999 (1) L.L.N. 685 ] (vide supra), also deals with the jurisdiction of Central Administrative Tribunal and it is held in the case of Dhobis (washermen) to wash clothes of cadets in National Defence Academy are not holders of civil post and therefore, the Central Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the conditions of service of such Dhobis. 10. It may be mentioned that judgment of Madras High Court in the case of Babian v. Lt. Col. (Officiating Col.) Q Branch, H.Q., Tamil Nadu and Kerala, Sub-Area, Madras [1994 (1) L.L.N. 68] (vide supra), on which petitioner relied also holds that such canteens are not covered by Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, I hold that the respondent canteen is not “State” or “other Authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. Xxx xxxx xxx Xxxx xxx xxx 13. Therefore, I hold that the respondent canteen is not “State” or “other Authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. Xxx xxxx xxx Xxxx xxx xxx 13. Our High Court also has in various cases particularly relating to casual labourers, taken the view that appropriate course for such persons would be to raise industrial dispute under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. It would be sufficient to quote recent judgment of this Court (delivered by K. Ramamoorthy, J.) in C.W. No. 5066 of 1999 entitled Modern Food Industries Employees’; Union v. Modern Food Industries [ 1999 (3) L.L.N. 1011 ], decided on 18 May 1999. In the said case after considering the entire case-law on the issue the Hon’ble Judge held that writ petition was not maintainable and the petitioner was given liberty to raise industrial dispute. It may be sufficient to state that in the following cases this Court has taken the same view: (1) D.P. Singh v. Engineering Project India, Ltd. [1995 A.D. Delhi 478]. (2) Chet Ram v. Union of India [1998 (4) L.L.N. 583]. 14. In view of my aforesaid discussion i hold that the present writ petition is not maintainable and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to raise industrial dispute, if so advised. No order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed. 11. In the decision reported in M.G. Karuppaiah v. Canteen Officer (AQMG) Headquarters, (1998 SCC OnLine Kar 495), the High Court of Karnataka held that, 4. The primary question that requires to be considered and decided is whether the respondent-canteen is a “State” coming within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution or “other authority” as envisaged under Art. 226 of the Constitution and whether the respondent-canteen is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court? Normally, the discussion would begin in such matters from Ajay Hasia case [1981 (2) L.L.N. 613] (vide supra). Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court while considering the question as to whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act could be a State within the meaning of Art. 12 has culled out six tests from an earlier decision in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [ 1981 (1) L.L.N. 270 ]. XXXXX 5. Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court while considering the question as to whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act could be a State within the meaning of Art. 12 has culled out six tests from an earlier decision in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [ 1981 (1) L.L.N. 270 ]. XXXXX 5. In Chander Mohan Khanna case [ 1992 (1) L.L.N. 16 ] (vide supra), the Apex Court while considering the question as to whether National Council of Educational Research and Training is a State as defined under Art. 12 of the Constitution was pleased to lay down certain principles to determine whether a body is an instrumentality or agency of the Government. The Court was pleased to observe, in Paras. 2 and 3, at pages 17 and 18: “2. There are only general principles but not exhaustive tests to determine whether a body is an instrumentality or agency of the Government. Even in general principles, there is no cut and dried formula which would provide correct division of bodies into those which are instrumentalities or agencies of the Government and those which are not XXXXX 11. xxxx The object of the canteen is to provide canteen facilities only to Army Personnel not to the public at large. The unit is required to employ its own personnel for running its establishment and running of it also by its own funds or borrow money required through its own resources. Now applying the tests laid down in Ajay Hasia case [1981 (2) L.L.N. 613] (vide supra), and other decisions noticed above, it is not at all possible to hold that respondent-canteen can be termed as the instrumentality of the State, so as to bring it within the term “other authority” under Art. 12 of the Constitution. 14. In the result, petition deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed as respondent-canteen is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly. 12. In the decision reported in Sarasamma v. Union of India, (1995 SCC OnLine P&H 1139), the High court of Punjab and Haryana held that, 8. The canteen is not created by or under a statute. There is no law or statutory provision governing its affairs. There is nothing on record to show that any funds are provided by the Government. In the decision reported in Sarasamma v. Union of India, (1995 SCC OnLine P&H 1139), the High court of Punjab and Haryana held that, 8. The canteen is not created by or under a statute. There is no law or statutory provision governing its affairs. There is nothing on record to show that any funds are provided by the Government. Still further, there is no evidence of any control much less than of a pervasive control of the Government in the running of the canteen. It is true that the canteen stores department has issued a registration number to the respondent. It is also true that the department supplies various articles as required by the canteen. This is, however, no evidence of control by the Government. The registration number is allotted only for the purpose of regulating the supply of goods which in the very nature of things, is a purely commercial transaction. Furthermore, even the accounts of the canteen are not audited by any agency of the Government There is no control are regulation regarding the appointed of personnel. Taking the totality of circumstances into consideration, it cannot be said that the tests enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia case are fulfilled. 9. Accordingly, it is held that the respondent - canteen is not an instrumentality of the State. The first question is, thus, answered in the negative. 13. In the decision reported in Babian v. Lt. Col. (Officiating. Col.) Q Branch H.Q., ( 1993 SCC 10 ), the High Court of Madras held that, The next question to be considered is if the C.S.D. Canteen is not a State coming under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India, whether it will come under the expression “any person or authority” under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly, a power is vested in the Court to issue a writ against a private body or even an individual. Undoubtedly, a power is vested in the Court to issue a writ against a private body or even an individual. It has been held so by Krishna Iyer, J. in Rohtas Industries, Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union [1976 — I L.L.N. 165], as follows in Para 10, at page 169: “… The expansive and extraordinary power of the High Courts under Art. 226 is as wide as the amplitude of the language used indicates and so can affect any person — even a private individual — and be available for any (other) purpose, even one for which another remedy may exist. The amendment to Art. 226 in 1963, inserting Art. 226 (1A) reiterates the targets of the writ power as inclusive of any person by the expressive reference to ‘the residence of such person.’ But it is one thing to affirm the jurisdiction, another to authorise its free exercise like a bull in a China shop. This Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extraordinary remedy and High Courts will not go beyond those wholesome inhibitions except where the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate. The mentor of law is justice and potent drug should be judiciously administered. Speaking in critical retrospect and portentous prospect, the writ power has, by and large, been the people’s sentinel on the qui vive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril to human rights …” The Supreme Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvama Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudarni [1989 — II L.L.N. 281], has held as follows in Paras. 20 and 22, at pages 287 and 288: “20. …The term ‘authority’ used in Art. 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Art. 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Art. 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. 22. …The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances …” 14. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. 22. …The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances …” 14. In the decision reported in Santha Nair v. Union of India, (2019 SCC OnLine MP 1899), the High Court of Madya Pradesh held that, 11. From the above finding rendered by the Apex Court the case of Chotelal (supra) it is obvious that the petitioner also does not hold any civil post and neither is discharging duties in connection with affairs of the State. More so, the institution (Canteen run by BSF) also is not State or it’s instrumentality u/Art. 12 of the Constitution due to absence of deep and pervasive control of the BSF over the canteen. Mere fact of the accounts of the Canteen being audited by BSF personnel or certain activities being supervised does not reveal financial, administrative or disciplinary control to the extent of assuming the characteristic of instrumentality of State to become amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court u/Art. 226 of the Constitution. 12. Consequently, the preliminary objection raised by the Union of India is upheld and the petition stands dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedy under the industrial law or civil court as the case may be. 15. In Ajay Hasia and others v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others [ (1981) 1 SCC 722 ], relying on the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and Others [ (1979) 3 SCC 489 ] have culled out six tests, and they are as follows: “(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 507, para 14) (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with Governmental character. (SCC p. 508, para 15) (3) It may also be a relevant factor ... (SCC p. 507, para 14) (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with Governmental character. (SCC p. 508, para 15) (3) It may also be a relevant factor ... whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (SCC p. 508, para 15) (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (SCC p. 508, para 15) (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 509, para 16) (6) ‘Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference’ of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.” (SCC p. 510, para 18) However, the above-mentioned test is not exhaustive. Each case has to be separately dealt with in order to get the answer as to whether the body comes under the instrumentalities or agencies of Government. The creation, finance, and control are a few factors that have to be taken to decide the issue of whether the body is a State or not. 16. In Zee Telefilms Ltd. And Others v. Union of India (UOI) and Others (2005) 4 SCC 649 , the Hon’ble Apex Court had occasion to consider the question of whether the Board of Control for Cricket of India will come within the definition of the State as contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. A five Bench Judge of the Apex Court considered all the earlier judgments regarding the inclusion of establishment under other authorities. When we apply the test to the facts of the present case, it can be seen that the Unit Run Canteens are not created under any statute or by the parliament or by the legislature; they are created by executive orders, and all the individuals are private individuals. There is no control over administration by the Central Government. 17. Relevant portions of the judgment in Zee Telefilms Ltd (supra) are extracted below: Article 12 65. There is no control over administration by the Central Government. 17. Relevant portions of the judgment in Zee Telefilms Ltd (supra) are extracted below: Article 12 65. Before adverting to the core issues at some length we may take a look at Article 12 of the Constitution which reads as under: “12. In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, ‘the State’ includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.” 66. In this article, “State” has not been defined. It is merely an inclusive definition. It includes all other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. It does not say that such other authorities must be under the control of the Government of India. The word “or” is disjunctive and not conjunctive. 67. The expression “authority” has a definite connotation. It has different dimensions and, thus, must receive a liberal interpretation. To arrive at a conclusion, as to which “other authorities” could come within the purview of Article 12, we may notice the meaning of the word “authority”. 68. The words “other authorities” contained in Article 12 are not to be treated as ejusdem generis. 69. In Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edn., the word “authority” has been defined as under: “1. the power or right to give orders and enforce obedience. 2. a person or organisation exerting control in a particular political or administrative sphere. 3. the power to influence others based on recognised knowledge or expertise.” 70. Broadly, there are three different concepts which exist for determining the questions which fall within the expression “other authorities”: (i) The corporations and the societies created by the State for carrying on its trading activities in terms of Article 298 of the Constitution wherefor the capital, infrastructure, initial investment and financial aid, etc. are provided by the State and it also exercises regulation and control thereover. (ii) Bodies created for research and other developmental works which are otherwise governmental functions but may or may not be a part of the sovereign function. are provided by the State and it also exercises regulation and control thereover. (ii) Bodies created for research and other developmental works which are otherwise governmental functions but may or may not be a part of the sovereign function. (iii) A private body is allowed to discharge public duty or positive obligation of public nature and furthermore is allowed to perform regulatory and controlling functions and activities which were otherwise the job of the Government. 71. There cannot be same standard or yardstick for judging different bodies for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of them fulfils the requirements of law therefor or not. 72. In Pradeep Kumar Biswas [ (2002) 5 SCC 111 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 633] a seven-Judge Bench held: (SCC p. 123, para 6) “6. That an ‘inclusive’ definition is generally not exhaustive is a statement of the obvious and as far as Article 12 is concerned, has been so held by this Court (Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. [ (1963) 1 SCR 778 : AIR 1962 SC 1621 ], SCR at p. 968). The words ‘State’ and ‘authority’ used in Article 12 therefore remain, to use the words of Cardozo (Benjamin Cardozo: The Nature of the Judicial Process), among ‘the great generalities of the Constitution’ the content of which has been and continues to be supplied by courts from time to time.” (See also Black Diamond Beverages v. CTO [ (1998) 1 SCC 458 ].) 73. What is necessary is to notice the functions of the body concerned. A “State” has different meanings in different contexts. In a traditional sense, it can be a body politic but in modern international practice, a State is an organisation which receives the general recognition accorded to it by the existing group of other States. The Union of India recognises the Board as its representative. The expression “other authorities” in Article 12 of the Constitution is “State” within the territory of India as contradistinguished from a State within the control of the Government of India. The concept of State under Article 12 is in relation to the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and the directive principles of State policy contained in Part IV thereof. The concept of State under Article 12 is in relation to the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and the directive principles of State policy contained in Part IV thereof. The contents of these two parts manifest that Article 12 is not confined to its ordinary or constitutional sense of an independent or sovereign meaning, so as to include within its fold whatever comes within the purview thereof so as to instil public confidence in it. 74. The feature that the Board has been allowed to exercise the powers enabling it to trespass across the fundamental rights of a citizen is of great significance. In terms of the Memorandum of Association even the States are required to approach the Board for its direction. If the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh [ (1975) 1 SCC 421 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 101 : (1975) 3 SCR 619 ] and development of law made therefrom is to be given full effect, it is not only the functions of the Government alone which would enable a body to become a State but also when a body performs governmental functions or quasi-governmental functions as also when its business is of public importance and is fundamental for the life of the people. For the said purpose, we must notice that this Court in expanding the definition of State did not advisedly confine itself to the debates of the Constitutional Assembly. It considered each case on its own merit. In Sukhdev Singh [ (1975) 1 SCC 421 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 101 : (1975) 3 SCR 619 ] Mathew, J. stated that even big industrial houses and big trade unions would come in the purview thereof. While doing so the courts did not lose sight of the difference between State activity and individual activity. This Court took into consideration the fact that new rights in the citizens have been created and if any such right is violated, they must have access to justice which is a human right. No doubt, there is an ongoing debate as regards the effect of globalisation and/or opening up of market by reason of liberalisation policy of the Government as to whether the notion of sovereignty of the State is being thereby eroded or not but we are not concerned with the said question in this case. No doubt, there is an ongoing debate as regards the effect of globalisation and/or opening up of market by reason of liberalisation policy of the Government as to whether the notion of sovereignty of the State is being thereby eroded or not but we are not concerned with the said question in this case. “Other authorities”, inter alia, would be there which inter alia function within the territory of India and the same need not necessarily be the Government of India, Parliament of India, the Government of each of the States which constitute the Union of India or the legislatures of the States. 75. Article 12 must receive a purposive interpretation as by reason of Part III of the Constitution a charter of liberties against oppression and arbitrariness of all kinds of repositories of power has been conferred — the object being to limit and control power wherever it is found. A body exercising significant functions of public importance would be an authority in respect of these functions. In those respects it would be same as is executive government established under the Constitution and the establishments of organisations funded or controlled by the Government. A traffic constable remains an authority even if his salary is paid from the parking charges inasmuch as he still would have the right to control the traffic and anybody violating the traffic rules may be prosecuted at his instance. 76. It is not that every body or association which is regulated in its private functions becomes a “State”. What matters is the quality and character of functions discharged by the body and the State control flowing therefrom. 77. In Daniel Lee [276 F 3d 550] it was held: “The OAC's functionally exclusive regulation of free speech within … a public forum, is a traditional and exclusive function of the State.” Development of law 78. The development of law in this field is well known. At one point of time, companies, societies, etc. registered under the Companies Act and the Societies Registration Act were treated as separate corporate entities being governed by their own rules and regulations and, thus, held not to be “State” although they were virtually run as departments of the Government; but the situation has completely changed. At one point of time, companies, societies, etc. registered under the Companies Act and the Societies Registration Act were treated as separate corporate entities being governed by their own rules and regulations and, thus, held not to be “State” although they were virtually run as departments of the Government; but the situation has completely changed. Statutory authorities and local bodies were held to be State in Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal [ (1967) 3 SCR 377 : AIR 1967 SC 1857 ] . 79. This Court, however, did not stop there and newer and newer principles were evolved as a result whereof different categories of bodies came to be held as State. 18. Merely because the Unit Run Canteens works under the CSD and the CSD are founded by the consolidated fund of India, it cannot be said that the Unit Run Canteens is directly controlled and financed by the Government of India, they have an independent stand and are working on separate SOPs, issued from time to time. Ext.R5(1)(b) and (c) filed along with the counter affidavit makes amply clear that there is a procedure for obtaining sanction to operate a Unit Run Canteen. Certain guidelines are prescribed, and the same is issued by the Quarter Master General’s Branch. Only if certain criteria are fulfilled, Unit Run Canteen is allotted by the competent authority. Ext.R5(b) makes it amply clear that the Defence Ministry has written to the Chief of the Army Staff explaining the steps of the Unit Run Canteen and their employees. The funds of the CSDs are not from the funds of the Government nor from the consolidated fund of India. They are private undertakings of the unit concerned, and they do not have any administrative control over the units or the personnel who are employed in the unit. The terms and conditions of employment are also settled between the unit and the employees; they are not Government servants either. When the test of public authority regarding the creation, finance, and control is applied to the Unit Run Canteens, the question of whether the Unit Run Canteens comes under the definition of State under Article 12 can be sorted. For this, the following tests are applied. i) As far as the creation is concerned, the Unit Run Canteens is established in terms of the provisions laid down in AO/19/2003/QMG issued by the CSD of the Army. For this, the following tests are applied. i) As far as the creation is concerned, the Unit Run Canteens is established in terms of the provisions laid down in AO/19/2003/QMG issued by the CSD of the Army. The said authority gives sanctions for unit formation and operation. It is an admitted fact that the creation of Unit Run Canteens is not by the act of parliament or by the legislature, but by an order from the Quarterm Master General’s Branch of the Army. So, the 1st test regarding the creation fails to hold that URCs will come under any statute by the parliament or by the State legislature. ii) The 2nd test regarding the financial control over the URC is concerned, the funds that the URCs obtained are from the regimental non-public funds, and not from the consolidated fund of India. The regimental non-public funds are created through contributions from the defense personnel. The URCs are not funded by the Government, and only loans are granted by the CSDs to the URCs, which are paid back with interest at the rate of 4% for 1st loan and 6% for 2nd loan. It is evidently clear that there is no direct financial control from the Government of India to the URCs. The distinction between URCs and CSDs is that, in CSD, the employees are Government employees and are funded from the Consolidated fund of India and therefore, there is direct control by the Government of India over CSD. URCs are concerned, the URCs are functioning under the CSDs, and they purchase the products from the CSD canteen, there is no direct funding either by the Government of India or the CSDs as stated above; only loans are sanctions to the URCs by the CSDs. Though the CSD funds are from the Consolidated Fund of India, merely because loans are granted from the funds of the CSDs, they cannot be taken as a fund from the Government of India under the Consolidated Fund of India. So, there is no direct control of finance also by the Government of India to the URCs. The funds are from the regimental non-public fund. Thus the 2nd test also fails to hold that the URCs come under other authorities. So, there is no direct control of finance also by the Government of India to the URCs. The funds are from the regimental non-public fund. Thus the 2nd test also fails to hold that the URCs come under other authorities. iii) As far as the 3rd test is concerned, regarding the control, separate SOPs are formulated by the URC management committee for the day-to-day affairs depending upon the strength of the staff of each URC. The appointment of the staff is done by the station head of each URC and not by the CSDs or by the Army. The URCs thus work as a separate unit under each station headquarters and there is no direct control either by the CSD or by the Ministry of Defence. This amply proves that there is no direct Government control over it. The petitioners have produced the Manual for Unit Run Canteens issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Canteen Stores Department on 12.01.2018, and argue that going by the said guidelines, it is a well-established fact that Unit Run Canteens are under the direct control of the Government of India and also the funds are from the Consolidated Fund of India. 19. Chapter 3 of the said guidelines deals with the URC-CSD interface. Sub Clause 3.2 deals with registration. It is stated in sub-clause 3.2 that units are required to obtain sanction for operating URC from the Sub-area Commander/Brigade Commander or Higher Formation Commander or their equivalents in the other two services. The formation Commander may sanction the opening of URCs of their formation headquarters after the sanction is obtained and a registration number is allotted to the URC by the CSD. In such cases, the URCs are authorized to purchase canteen stores from the CSD area depot on which they are dependent. 20. Clause 3.5 deals with financial assistance/loans to URCs. The formation Commander may sanction the opening of URCs of their formation headquarters after the sanction is obtained and a registration number is allotted to the URC by the CSD. In such cases, the URCs are authorized to purchase canteen stores from the CSD area depot on which they are dependent. 20. Clause 3.5 deals with financial assistance/loans to URCs. It states that “to assist the URCs to improve their canteen facilities and to keep sufficient inventory, some funds are made available in the CSD budget every year which are disbursed as loans to URCs.” Loans are sanctioned to URCs up to 2 lakhs by the General Manager of the CSD and if it is more than 2 lakhs, the board of administration is empowered up to 5 lakhs; beyond 5 lakhs to 25 lakhs, it is to be sanctioned by the QMG and beyond the said amount, it is sanctioned by the Executive Committee of the Board over control of canteen service. 21. Clause 3.13 of the guidelines deals with the units proceeding on the UN Missions. The said clause only deals with the establishment of the Units Run Canteen abroad on UN Missions. It only states that they are free to take additional interest-free loans from the Deputy Director General of Canteen Service Headquarters, and such loans should be paid and repaid with a deposit from where the URCs are availed service of credit within five years. 22 As far as the audit is concerned, it is mandatory that the accounts of the URC have to be audited by a Certified chartered accountant, and all URCs shall undergo an audit by B.O.O. by the 31st December of every year. 23. As per the order issued for the constitution of the Unit Run Canteens, it can be seen that the aim of the canteen is to provide canteen facilities to serving army personnel retired and widows of the army personnel, etc. The canteen is run by the unit head of the army. The subject is to provide canteen facilities for army personnel and not the public at large. The unit is to require employees of its own personnel to run the establishment and through its own fund or formal fund from the CSD. The canteen is run by the unit head of the army. The subject is to provide canteen facilities for army personnel and not the public at large. The unit is to require employees of its own personnel to run the establishment and through its own fund or formal fund from the CSD. Applying the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Ajai Haziya’s case cited (supra), culled out from Ramanna Dayaram Shetti cited (supra), it is not possible to hold that the Unit Run Canteens can be termed as instrumentalities of the State, so as to bring within the term ‘Other Authorities’ in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This writ petition is filed seeking a writ of mandamus or direction directing the respondents not to implement Ext.P3 amendments upon the petitioner who is employed before 05.07.2019, the date on which the amendments came into force. 24. The High Court of Karnataka in M.G Karuppaiah’s case cited (supra), in paragraph 7 relying on another judgment discussed the term ‘Authority under Article 12’, which is extracted below: 7. In Sri Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani [ 1989 (2) L.L.N. 281 ], highlighted the distinction of an “authority” for the purpose of Art. 226 of the Constitution and the Court was pleased to observe, in Para. 20, at page 287: “The term ‘authority’ used in Art. 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Art: 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Art. 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words ‘any person or authority’ used in Art. 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.” 12. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.” 12. The question to be considered now would be as to whether, in the light of the decision in Rudani case [ 1989 (2) L.L.N. 281 ] (vide supra), it will be permissible and appropriate to issue writ of mandamus. The Apex Court in Rudani case (vide supra), laid stress on the nature of duties imposed upon the body or on the functions being discharged by the body and not on the form of body. In case the nature of the duty being discharged can be said to be of a public nature, the Court has held that the mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be discharged is not imposed by the statute, since mandamus is of very wide amplitude which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Judicial control over the vast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water tight compartment. In the instant case, there is nothing on record even to suggest, even though the respondent-canteen is a private body, it has been constituted with the aim and object of performing public duty. In my opinion, since the Central Government has no administrative control and no finances are made available and since the respondent-canteen has no public duty to perform no mandamus can be issued to the respondent-canteen to reinstate the petitioner into service with effect from the date of termination with all consequential service and monetary benefits. 25. As far as the facts of this case are concerned, the Central Government has no administrative financial control over the Unit Run Canteens, and they do not have any public duty to perform. In such a case, no mandamus can be issued to the respondent canteen. 26. To summarise, it can be safely inferred that URC is not a state or authority with the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In such a case, no mandamus can be issued to the respondent canteen. 26. To summarise, it can be safely inferred that URC is not a state or authority with the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The canteen is not the creation of any statute or legislature. The Ministry of Defence has nothing to do with the canteen or its employees. The funds of the URCs are not provided by the Consolidated Fund of India, and they are from the Regimental non-public fund or by loans from the CSD departments. There is no pervasive control by the Government in the running of a canteen. As per the documents produced through the counter affidavit, it can be seen that the canteen is a private establishment that provides necessary items such as groceries at a cheaper rate to the army personnel, retired as well as widows. The salaries are paid from the profit earned from the sales. In view of the discussions made above, I am of the firm opinion that the writ petitions are not maintainable as URC does not come under the definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and therefore the writ petitions are dismissed as not maintainable. However, liberty is given to the petitioners to move to the appropriate forum for redressal of their grievance, if so advised.