ORDER: 1. This Criminal Petition is filed seeking anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Cr.P.C.’) to petitioner/A.2 in Crime No. 320 of 2023 of Pendurthy Rural police station, Visakhapatnam District, registered for the offence under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’). 2. In summary, the Prosecution alleges that Accused No. 1 approached the de facto complainant, claiming that Accused No. 3 possessed power of attorney from Accused No. 2 for a parcel of land measuring 7.744 square yards in Sy. No. 7-4A3C of Narava Village, Pendurthy Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, using falsified documents. Acting as a mediator, A.1 facilitated an agreement to sell the land at Rs.1,50,00,000/- per acre to the de facto complainant and their associate, Kalvakota Sarath kumar. On 22.01.2020, a cheque of Rs.25,00,000/- was provided as advance payment to A.1. Subsequently, Kalvakota Sarath kumar transferred Rs.1,15,00,000/- in separate installments to A.1's account. Additionally, the de facto complainant transferred Rs.43,50,000/- and paid Rs.11,50,000/- in cash to A.1, totalling Rs.1,70,00,000/- in payments. However, it later emerged that the land in question belonged to APIIC, and the accused fabricated documents to falsely depict the land in Sy. No. 7-4A3D of APIIC as the land in Sy. No. 7-4A3C. Consequently, they deceived the de facto complainant and his associate by presenting fake documents. Based on the complaint filed by the de facto complainant, the current case has been registered. 3. The learned counsel for the Petitioner contends that the Petitioner is a law-abiding citizen who has not engaged in any criminal activity; the Complainant failed to specify any particular offence or wrongdoing committed by the Petitioner in the complaint; the initiation of legal proceedings against the Petitioner is to be an abuse of the legal process, undertaken solely to harass and defame him; the complaint was filed with malicious and unlawful intentions, aiming to unlawfully acquire property that does not rightfully belong to the Defacto Complainant; the Petitioner owns landed property and has no intention of evading the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court and moreover, the Petitioner expresses readiness to fully cooperate with the investigation; consequently, the Petitioner prays to grant bail. 4. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the grant of bail to the Petitioner on the ground that the investigation is not completed. 5. I have heard both sides. 4. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the grant of bail to the Petitioner on the ground that the investigation is not completed. 5. I have heard both sides. Learned counsel on both sides reiterated their contentions on par with the submissions presented in the Petition as well as in the report. 6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contends that except for the offence under section 467 of I.P.C. all the offences are punishable with imprisonment for seven years or less than seven years and section 467 of I.P.C. is added apart from other sections, where punishment provided is less than seven years and the investigation officer is required to summon the accused for investigation. Section 467 of the I.P.C. provides for a sentence of imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and also fine; Section 41A of the Cr.P.C. puts certain restrictions upon the police to arrest an accused where the offence complained of attracts punishment for less than seven years. This Court finds substantial force in the submission of the Petitioner’s counsel that merely mentioning a penal section in the complaint to register the F.I.R. under Section 467 IPC is insufficient to preclude the scope of Section 41A Cr.P.C. 7. Considering the submissions made, now this Court is inclined to consider whether section 467 of I.P.C. has been added merely to make out a case against the Accused. 8. According to the grounds stated in the Petitioner's bail application, it is asserted that the Petitioner executed a General Power of Attorney (G.P.A.) in favour of the De facto Complainant on 02.11.2020. Subsequently, the De facto Complainant registered a development agreement, along with an irrevocable General Power of Attorney No. 524/2021, about the same subject property on a later date, 22.01.2021. Furthermore, the Petitioner has provided a copy of the General Power of Attorney document, dated 21.11.2020, executed in favour of Malla Sreenivasa Naidu, wherein the Petitioner is identified as the son of late Suryanarayana Murthy, also known as late Narasimha Murthy. It is asserted that the Petitioner's father acquired the said properties through inheritance, with his name duly recorded in the revenue records. However, the Petitioner has submitted a copy of his father's death certificate, indicating that Vedula Suryanarayana Murthy passed away on 02.11.2023. It is asserted that the Petitioner's father acquired the said properties through inheritance, with his name duly recorded in the revenue records. However, the Petitioner has submitted a copy of his father's death certificate, indicating that Vedula Suryanarayana Murthy passed away on 02.11.2023. This prima facie discrepancy suggests an erroneous reference in the Power of Attorney document regarding the death of the Petitioner's father. The Development agreement coupled with irrevocable General Power of Attorney dated 23.01.2021 executed between Kalavakota Rajeswara Rao and Malla Sreenivasula Naidu by Vedula Lakshmi Narasimha Murthy S/o Govinda Sharma and Vedula Suryanarayana Sharma S/o Govinda Sharma, is also placed. 9. The Victim/Defacto Complainant asserts that Malla Sreenivasula Naidu, relying on the Power of Attorney executed by the Petitioner herein, agreed to sell the property at a rate of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- per acre. He received an advance payment of Rs.25,00,000/- by cheque on 22.01.2020 and, in total, received Rs. 1,70,00,000/-. Furthermore, the De facto Complainant alleges that under pressure, Adari Srinivasa Rao, who initially held the Power of Attorney, cancelled the document in his name. Later that same day, he arranged for Vedula Yagveswara Chainulu to execute a new Power of Attorney in favour of the De facto Complainant. 10. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has placed a copy of the R.O.R. I.B. report, which indicates Pattadar's name is shown as Vedula Narasimha Murthy, Katha number is shown as 10005 and survey number/sub-division number is shown as 7-4A3C, 7-5 and the extent is shown as 3 and 0.31. Pattadar is shown to have got right by inheritance. It is printed from the Mee Bhoomi website on 20th March 2024 at 05.16 PM. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that prima facie, the revenue record indicates the Petitioner's family's right to the schedule property. Even according to the Petitioner's case, he executed a General Power of Attorney on 02.11.2020, and the Petitioner has also placed a copy of the General Power of Attorney document dated 21.11.2020 executed in favour of Malla Sreenivasa Naidu. The execution of the said document by the Petitioner is not disputed by the Petitioner by Malla Sreenivasa Naidu or the Defacto Complainant. 11. Reference has been made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 547 wherein, it has been stated as under: “16. The execution of the said document by the Petitioner is not disputed by the Petitioner by Malla Sreenivasa Naidu or the Defacto Complainant. 11. Reference has been made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 547 wherein, it has been stated as under: “16. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of “false documents” it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed.” 12. It will also be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sheila Sebastian vs. R. Jawaharaj and another, (2018) 3 MLJ (Crl) 39 (SC) : LNIND 2018 SC 265. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder: 19. A close scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that, Section 463 defines the offence of forgery, while Section 464 substantiates the same by providing an answer as to when a false document could be said to have been made for the purpose of committing an offence of forgery under Section 463, IPC. Therefore, we can safely deduce that Section 464 defines one of the ingredients of forgery i.e., making of a false document. Further, Section 465 provides punishment for the commission of the offence of forgery. In order to sustain a conviction under Section 465, first it has to be proved that forgery was committed under Section 463, implying that ingredients under Section 464 should also be satisfied. Further, Section 465 provides punishment for the commission of the offence of forgery. In order to sustain a conviction under Section 465, first it has to be proved that forgery was committed under Section 463, implying that ingredients under Section 464 should also be satisfied. Therefore unless and untill ingredients under Section 463 are satisfied a person cannot be convicted under Section 465 by solely relying on the ingredients of Section 464, as the offence of forgery would remain incomplete. 13. Thus, it is clear that when a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else, nor is he claiming that he is authorized by someone else. Therefore, such a document is not the execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of Cr.P.C. 14. As observed in the preceding paragraphs, the Petitioner executed a document claiming the right over the property through his father. Under such circumstances, the Petitioner cannot be held to have committed the offence of creating a false document under section 464 of the I.P.C. If the document executed by the Petitioner is not a false document, there is no offence of forgery, and without an offence of forgery, no offence under sections 467 and 471 of I.P.C. can be made out. This Court believes that when the Petitioner sold a property knowing that it does not belong to him and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, they may complain that the Petitioner committed the fraudulent act of cheating. 15. After reading the material on record, this Court views that even as per uncontroverted allegations, it is doubtful whether the ingredients of sections 467 and 471 of I.P.C. attract the facts of the case. This Court finds that the present case may relate to the alleged cheating offence, and section 467 of I.P.C. has been added merely to make out a case against the Accused. Apart from section 467 of I.P.C. other sections mentioned in the F.I.R. may attract a punishment of less than seven years, which gives the scope of section 41A of C.r.P.C. in the present case. In the absence of documents claimed to be forged, no arrest can be made; merely the allegation of section 467 of I.P.C. would not debar the police from applying section 41A of Cr.P.C. 16. In the absence of documents claimed to be forged, no arrest can be made; merely the allegation of section 467 of I.P.C. would not debar the police from applying section 41A of Cr.P.C. 16. Upon considering the nature of accusations made against the Petitioner, this Court is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to grant anticipatory bail. 17. As a result, the Criminal Petition is allowed by granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner/Accused subject to his surrender before the Station House Officer, Pendurthy Police Station, Visakhapatnam District, within two (2) weeks from today. On such surrender, the Petitioner shall be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond for Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousands Only) with two sureties for a like sum each to the satisfaction of the concerned Investigating Officer. Upon his release, the Petitioner is mandated to adhere to the following conditions: (i) On such release, the Petitioner/Accused is directed to appear before the concerned Investigating Officer, once in a week i.e. on every Sunday between 10.00 AM to 01.00 PM, for a period of three (3) weeks. (ii) The Petitioner/Accused shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any Investigating or Police Officer and shall cooperate with the investigating officer. (iii) Petitioner/Accused is further directed not to tamper with the prosecution evidence and not to influence the prosecution witnesses. 18. Before parting with the order, this court would like to place it on record by way of abundant caution that whatever has been stated hereinabove in this order has been so said only for the purpose of disposing of the prayer for bail made by the petitioner. Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as expression of a final opinion on any of the issues of fact or law arising for decision in the case which shall naturally have to be done by the Trial Court. 19. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.