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2024 DIGILAW 306 (ALL)

(Juvenile) X v. State of U. P.

2024-01-30

JYOTSNA SHARMA

body2024
JUDGMENT : JYOTSNA SHARMA, J. 1. Heard Sri Atul Kumar Shahi, learned counsel for the revisionist and Sri L.D. Rajbhr, learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. This criminal revision has been filed with a prayer to quash the order dated 06.09.2023 passed by Special Judge, POCSO Act in Criminal Appeal No. 8 of 2023 arising out of case crime no. 183 of 2021 under sections 363, 366 and 376(3) I.P.C. and 3/4(2) of POCSO Act, P.S. Bewar, District-Mainpuri, whereby the order passed by J.J. Board dated 13.01.2023, by which accused was declared a juvenile, has been set aside and appeal has been allowed. 3. The relevant facts are as below: In the enquiry no. 34 of 2021 conducted for determination of age by the J.J. Board in crime no.183 of 2021, under sections 363, 366 and 376(3) I.P.C. and under section 3/4(2) of POCSO Act, on behalf of the accused, oral and documentary evidence was produced. The J.J. Board did not rely upon the statement given by father of the juvenile and also did not rely on the certificate as regard date of birth showing name of Kuldeep Kumar son of Harish Chandra, issued by Subedar Pandey Inter College, Pandey Nagar Kusumra, District Mainpuri. The J.J. Board instead relied upon the medical examination done by a panel of doctors constituted by C.M.O. Farrukhabad. It may be noted that the accused was medically examined on 30.09.2022 and as per doctors' opinion, he was between 20 to 21 years of age. The learned J.J. Board calculated the age of juvenile, taking him as minimum 20 years on the date of medical examination and therefore, 18 years 6 months and 9 days on the date of incident (i.e on 09.04.2021). The J.J. Board took a view that the age can be considered on the lower side by giving a margin of maximum one year therefore, declared him as 17 years 6 months and 9 days on the date of incident. 4. This may be noted that the said order by the J.J. Board was passed after the matter of age determination was remanded for adjudication afresh, by the appellate court to the J.J. Board. Notably the J.J. Board had passed a fresh order in compliance of earlier direction by the appellate court in Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 2023. 4. This may be noted that the said order by the J.J. Board was passed after the matter of age determination was remanded for adjudication afresh, by the appellate court to the J.J. Board. Notably the J.J. Board had passed a fresh order in compliance of earlier direction by the appellate court in Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 2023. The freshly passed order dated 13.01.2023 declaring him about 17 and half years, was challenged in Criminal Appeal No. 8 of 2023 and appeal stood allowed. Now, the revisionist is before this Court, challenging the order dated 06.09.2023, passed in appeal. 5. The contentions of the revisionist in nutshell are that the appellate court did not consider that his date of birth was recorded as 15.05.2006 in the certificate issued by Subedar Pandey Inter College. The appellate court committed gross illegality in not considering the aforesaid document. Further that medical age was found 20-21 years and as per settled law, a variation of two years is possible on both the sides. Therefore the benefit ought to have been given to the accused by lowering the same by a margin of two years and not by margin of one year. Hence, he was about 17 years even by medical standards. The appellate court has ignored provisions of law and has passed an order which is illegal and improper. 6. Learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed the contentions drawing the attention of this Court towards oral and documentary evidence in which date of birth of the revisionist has been mentioned as 05.07.2000. 7. I heard both the sides and perused the material on record. On behalf of juvenile, a High School certificate has been produced, which showed name of Juvenile ‘X’ son of Harish Chandra and Surajmukhi Devi and date of birth as 15.05.2006. This paper was admittedly produced before the appellate court for the first time. Another certificate dated 19.05.2021, issued by the Principal, Subedar Pandey Inter College, has been produced which mentioned his date of birth as 15.05.2006. Admittedly this certificate bears a date of issue as 19.052021 and it said that ‘X’ s/o Harish Chandra took admission in that Inter College in class 9th on 2.7.2019. It does not say that he has been studying there from class 6th. However, the Principal of that college, who was examined, says that he studied from class 6th. Admittedly this certificate bears a date of issue as 19.052021 and it said that ‘X’ s/o Harish Chandra took admission in that Inter College in class 9th on 2.7.2019. It does not say that he has been studying there from class 6th. However, the Principal of that college, who was examined, says that he studied from class 6th. At the same time says that no T.C. was given by him at the time of admission. On the other hand the first informant filed a written objection stating therein that in fact, date of birth of juvenile has been shown as 5.7.2000, when he took admission in Class I in Primary School, Saraichak, Govindepur. The first informant also produced an information obtained under Right to Information Act 2005. In this paper, it is clearly mentioned that ‘X’, son of Harish Chandra, took admission in the academic year 2006-2007 in Primary School, Saraichak, Govindepur and his name was mentioned at serial no. 1021 in the school records. Very interesting explanation with regard to two different dates of birth has come before the courts below that the elder son of Harish Chandra, who took birth on 5.7.2000, had the same name ‘X’ and that he died. Another son was born to him on 15.05.2006 and he was again named ‘X’ therefore, two different dates of birth have come on record. The contention is that the instant accused was born on 15.05.2006, therefore, he should have been treated as juvenile. The thing which cannot be ignored is that the revisionist has no explanation as regard the reasons why no details have been given as to how and when did his elder son actually died. Actually no credible evidence as regard fact of death, when and how did he die, has been given. No documentary evidence like death certificate issued by Gram Pradhan or Gram Panchayat has been produced. No copy of pariwar register showing his death, has been produced. The story is that for some reason, the younger one, who was born in 2006 was also named as ‘X’. Very interestingly, paper no. 60, copy of information obtained through office of Block Education Officer proves that ‘X’ son of Harish Chandra had taken admission in 2006-07 in Primary School Saraichak, Govindepur. The story is that for some reason, the younger one, who was born in 2006 was also named as ‘X’. Very interestingly, paper no. 60, copy of information obtained through office of Block Education Officer proves that ‘X’ son of Harish Chandra had taken admission in 2006-07 in Primary School Saraichak, Govindepur. If the story set up by the revisionist is believed and presuming that this paper pertained to elder son only then it should also be presumed that elder one was alive at least till 2006-07. If that be so, there appears no logic in naming the second son as ‘X’ again when elder one was still alive. The story of younger son being named ‘X’ again is nothing but ill conceived and false. This inference is further fortified by another paper produced on behalf of juvenile which is a certificate issued by Principal, Subedar Pandey Inter College. This paper shows that the juvenile (the younger son) took admission on 02.07.2019 in class 9. There is no documentary evidence to demonstrate where did he actually receive education before taking admission in academic session 2019-20. All these facts are too incohesive to be believed. Only conclusion which can be drawn is that academic papers showing his date of birth as 15.05.2006 are not reliable at all. There appears strong probability that his actual date of birth is 05.07.2000. The appellate court committed no mistake in not relying upon the papers produced on his behalf. 8. Another question is whether the appellate court was wrong in determining the age as below 18 on the basis of medical opinion. Undisputedly, the juvenile was examined by the medical board constituted by CMO, and medical opinion said that he was between 20-21 years on the date of medical examination and with that being counted as the base line, his age may be inferred as 18 years 6 months 9 days on the date of incident. Notably date of birth as asserted by the opposite party i.e. 5.7.2000, gives almost same age, which is found by the doctors. 9. There is no strict law as regard lowering the age by two years from the medical age. Undoubtedly, the age determined on the basis of medical tests is merely an opinion. In view of probability of error, a general rule has evolved that there may be error of 2 year on either side. 9. There is no strict law as regard lowering the age by two years from the medical age. Undoubtedly, the age determined on the basis of medical tests is merely an opinion. In view of probability of error, a general rule has evolved that there may be error of 2 year on either side. This is not to say that in all the cases, 2 year have to be deducted or added. A mechanical adherence to such law may entail failure of interest of justice. The courts ought to apply the judicial mind when it decides to lower the age by certain margin. The law on probable error in determining age on the basis of medical evidence has evolved and has a general application but the question is whether the Court is expected to go mathematically? or is it mandatory to consider the age of accused 2 years less than the medical age? The answer must be 'No'. Possibility of error cannot be equated with actual error. Definitely in certain cases evidence might be available which may show the margin of error on the higher side rather than on lower side. This is well established that the medical age can act as a guideline only and not as a conclusive proof. This is an accepted fact that radiological age may not give precise or exact age. Other relevant facts and circumstances may assist the Court in arriving at the right conclusion. 10. The Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 175 of 2021 arising out of S.L.P. Criminal No. 2898 of 2020, Ram Vijay Singh vs. State of U.P. considered the question of reliance upon radiological age of a person. The Supreme Court observed in Para 9, 10, 12 and 14 as below: “9. The judgment in Abuzar Hossain considered Section 7-A of the Act and Rule 12 of the Rules. A perusal of Rule 12(3)(b) of the Rules shows that in the absence of documents as mentioned in clause (i), (ii) or (iii), the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. A perusal of Rule 12(3)(b) of the Rules shows that in the absence of documents as mentioned in clause (i), (ii) or (iii), the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was further provided that in case wherein the exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Juvenile Justice Board, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. However, it is to be noted that Section 94 of the Act does not have any corresponding provision of giving benefit of margin of age. 10. Admittedly, in the present case, there is no Date of Birth Certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate or a Birth Certificate given by a Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat. Therefore, clause (iii) of Section 94(2) of the Act to determine the age by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board comes into play. 11................. 12. Mr. Goel, on the contrary, argued that procedure as provided under Rule 12(3)(b) of the Rules is not materially different from that contained in the Statute. In fact, the discretion given to the Court to lower the age by one year in the Rules has been omitted. He further relied upon a judgment of this Court in Mukarrab wherein it has been held that the Courts have observed that the evidence afforded by radiological examination is a useful guiding factor for determining the age of a person but the evidence is not of a conclusive and incontrovertible nature and is subject to a margin of error. Medical evidence as to the age of a person though a very useful guiding factor is not conclusive and has to be considered along with other circumstances. It was further held that the ossification test cannot be regarded as conclusive when the appellants have crossed the age of thirty years which is an important factor to be taken into account as age cannot be determined with precision. It was held as under: “26. It was further held that the ossification test cannot be regarded as conclusive when the appellants have crossed the age of thirty years which is an important factor to be taken into account as age cannot be determined with precision. It was held as under: “26. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, a blind and mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of the medical opinion by the radiological examination. At p. 31 of Modi's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 20th Edn. it has been stated as follows: “In ascertaining the age of young persons radiograms of any of the main joints of the upper or the lower extremity of both sides of the body should be taken, an opinion should be given according to the following Table, but it must be remembered that too much reliance should not be placed on this Table as it merely indicates an average and is likely to vary in individual cases even of the same province owing to the eccentricities of development.” Courts have taken judicial notice of this fact and have always held that the evidence afforded by radiological examination is no doubt a useful guiding factor for determining the age of a person but the evidence is not of a conclusive and incontrovertible nature and it is subject to a margin of error. Medical evidence as to the age of a person though a very useful guiding factor is not conclusive and has to be considered along with other circumstances. 27. In a recent judgment, State of M.P. vs. Anoop Singh, (2015) 7 SCC 773 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 208, it was held that the ossification test is not the sole criteria for age determination. Following Babloo Pasi vs. State of Jharkhand, (2008) 13 SCC 133 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 266 and State of M.P. vs. Anoop Singh, (2015) 7 SCC 773 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 208, we hold that ossification test cannot be regarded as conclusive when it comes to ascertaining the age of a person. More so, the appellants herein have certainly crossed the age of thirty years which is an important factor to be taken into account as age cannot be determined with precision. More so, the appellants herein have certainly crossed the age of thirty years which is an important factor to be taken into account as age cannot be determined with precision. In fact in the medical report of the appellants, it is stated that there was no indication for dental x-rays since both the accused were beyond 25 years of age. 28. At this juncture, we may usefully refer to an article “A study of wrist ossification for age estimation in paediatric group in Central Rajasthan”, which reads as under: “There are various criteria for age determination of an individual, of which eruption of teeth and ossification activities of bones are important. Nevertheless age can usually be assessed more accurately in younger age group by dentition and ossification along with epiphyseal fusion. [Ref: Gray H. Gray's Anatomy, 37th Edn. Churchill Livingstone Edinburgh London Melbourne and New York: 1996; 341-342]: A careful examination of teeth and ossification at wrist joint provide valuable data for age estimation in children. [Ref: Parikh C.K. Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 5th Edn. Mumbai Medico-Legal Centre Colaba: 1990; 44-45]: *** *** *** Variations in the appearance of centre of ossification at wrist joint shows influence of race, climate, diet and regional factors. Ossification centres for the distal ends of radius and ulna consistent with present study vide article “A study of wrist ossification for age estimation in paediatric group in Central Rajasthan “ by Dr. Ashutosh Srivastav, Senior Demonstrator and a team of other doctors, Journal of Indian Academy of Forensic Medicine (JIAFM), 2004; 26(4). ISSN 0971-0973]. 29. In the present case, their physical, dental and radiological examinations were carried out. Radiological examination of skull (AP and lateral view), sternum (AP and lateral view) and sacrum (lateral view) was advised and performed. As per the medical report, there was no indication for dental x-rays since both the accused were much beyond 25 years of age. Therefore, the age determination based on ossification test though may be useful is not conclusive. An x-ray ossification test can by no means be so infallible and accurate a test as to indicate the correct number of years and days of a person's life.” 13.................. 14. We find that the procedure prescribed in Rule 12 is not materially different than the provisions of Section 94 of the Act to determine the age of the person. An x-ray ossification test can by no means be so infallible and accurate a test as to indicate the correct number of years and days of a person's life.” 13.................. 14. We find that the procedure prescribed in Rule 12 is not materially different than the provisions of Section 94 of the Act to determine the age of the person. There are minor variations as the Rule 12(3) (a)(i) and (ii) have been clubbed together with slight change in the language. Section 94 of the Act does not contain the provisions regarding benefit of margin of age to be given to the child or juvenile as was provided in Rule 12(3)(b) of the Rules. The importance of ossification test has not undergone change with the enactment of Section 94 of the Act. The reliability of the ossification test remains vulnerable as was under Rule 12 of the Rules.” 11. In Mukarrab vs. State of U.P. (2017) 2 SCC 2010, the Supreme Court gave an opinion that the radiological age may not be treated as conclusive proof of age. The Supreme Court observed as below: “22. It is well-accepted fact that age determination using ossification test does not yield accurate and precise conclusions after the examinee crosses the age of 30 years, which is true in the present case. After referring to Bhola Bhagat's case and other decisions, in Babloo Pasi's case, this Court held as under: “18. Nevertheless, in Jitendra Ram vs. State of Jharkhand, (2006) 9 SCC 428 the Court sounded a note of caution that the aforestated observations in Bhola Bhagat, (1997) 8 SCC 720 would not mean that a person who is not entitled to the benefit of the said Act would be dealt with leniently only because such a plea is raised. Each plea must be judged on its own merit and each case has to be considered on the basis of the materials brought on record. 22. It is well settled that it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. The date of birth is to be determined on the basis of material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties. The medical evidence as to the age of a person, though a very useful guiding factor, is not conclusive and has to be considered along with other cogent evidence.” 12. The date of birth is to be determined on the basis of material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties. The medical evidence as to the age of a person, though a very useful guiding factor, is not conclusive and has to be considered along with other cogent evidence.” 12. In Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar, (2000) 5 SCC 428, after considering the judicial opinions in many other precedents, the Supreme Court observed as below: “while dealing with a question of determination of the age of an accused, for the purpose of finding out whether he is a juvenile or not, a hyper-technical approach should not be adopted while appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile and if two views may be possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. We are also not oblivious of the fact that being a welfare legislation, the courts should be zealous to see that a juvenile derives full benefits of the provisions of the Act but at the same time it is also imperative for the courts to ensure that the protection and privileges under the Act are not misused by unscrupulous persons to escape punishments for having committed serious offences.” 13. It may be noted that where two views were possible, the Court, though is permitted to lean in favour of the accused, however this is not to be done, where there are definite indicators that benefit of provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act is being claimed to escape from punishment in cases involving heinous offence. The Supreme Court warned against misuse of law by unscrupulous litigant. In line with the above observations in Arnit Das case (supra), the Supreme Court in Parag Bhati vs. State of U.P. (2016) 12 SCC 744 observed in Para Nos. 26 and 27 as below: “26. It is no doubt true that if there is a clear and unambiguous case in favour of the juvenile accused that he was a minor below the age of 18 years on the date of the incident and the documentary evidence at least prima facie proves the same, he would be entitled to the special protection under the JJ Act. It is no doubt true that if there is a clear and unambiguous case in favour of the juvenile accused that he was a minor below the age of 18 years on the date of the incident and the documentary evidence at least prima facie proves the same, he would be entitled to the special protection under the JJ Act. But when an accused commits a grave and heinous offence and thereafter attempts to take statutory shelter under the guise of being a minor, a casual or cavalier approach while recording as to whether an accused is a juvenile or not cannot be permitted as the courts are enjoined upon to perform their duties with the object of protecting the confidence of common man in the institution entrusted with the administration of justice. 27. The benefit of the principle of benevolent legislation attached to the JJ Actwould thus apply to only such cases wherein the accused is held to be a juvenile on the basis of at least prima facie evidence regarding his minority as the benefit of the possibilities of two views in regard to the age of the alleged accused who is involved in grave and serious offence which he committed and gave effect to it in a well-planned manner reflecting his maturity of mind rather than innocence indicating that his plea of juvenility is more in the nature of a shield to dodge or dupe the arms of law, cannot be allowed to come to his rescue.” [Emphasis added] From the above decision, it is clear that the purpose of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 is not to give shelter to the accused of grave and heinous offences.” 14. The Apex Court in Rashipal Singh Solanki vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2021 (11) ADJ 489 decided on 18.11.2021, considered the judgments given in Parag Bhati vs. State of U.P. (2016) 12 SCC 744 , Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2019) 12 SCC 370 and Abuzar Hossain vs. State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489 , Ashwani Kumar Saxena vs. State of M.P. (2012) 9 SCC 750 , Babloo Pasi vs. State of Jharkhand, (2008) 13 SCC 133 , Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar; (2000) 5 SCC 488 , Jitendra Ram vs. State of Jharkhand, (2006) 9 SCC 428 and several others and in essence held that each case may be dealt with in the light of its own peculiar facts and circumstances while keeping certain principles as guiding factor in mind as described in concluding Para of the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court. In Para No. 29 the Apex Court in Rishipal Singh Solanki (supra) held as below: “29. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: (i) A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage of a criminal proceeding, even after a final disposal of the case. A delay in raising the claim of juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of such claim. It can also be raised for the first time before this Court. (ii) An application claiming juvenility could be made either before the Court or the JJ Board. (ii-a) When the issue of juvenility arises before a Court, it would be under sub-section (2) and (3) of section 9 of the JJ Act, 2015 but when a person is brought before a Committee or JJ Board, section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 applies. (ii-b) If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. (ii-c) When an application claiming juvenility is made under section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 before the JJ Board when the matter regarding the alleged commission of offence is pending before a Court, then the procedure contemplated under section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would apply. Under the said provision if the JJ Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Board shall undertake the process of age determination by seeking evidence and the age recorded by the JJ Board to be the age of the person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of the JJ Act, 2015, be deemed to be true age of that person. Hence the degree of proof required in such a proceeding before the JJ Board, when an application is filed seeking a claim of juvenility when the trial is before the concerned criminal court, is higher than when an inquiry is made by a court before which the case regarding the commission of the offence is pending (vide section 9 of the JJ Act, 2015). (iii) That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3) (a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. (iv) The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. (v) That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. (vi) That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. (vii) This Court has observed that a hyper-technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. (viii) If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. (ix) That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. (x) Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. (xi) Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. (xi) Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 15. In Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2019) 12 SCC 370 , the credibility and authenticity of the matriculation certificate was questioned. In the said case, the Juvenile Justice Board had rejected the claim of the juvenility but the High Court reversed the findings of the Juvenile Justice Board, however the Apex Court restored the order of the Juvenile Justice Board. The Apex Court observed that the records maintained by the C.B.S.C. were not dependable because there was no underlying documents to support the date of birth recorded therein. The Apex Court found that there was clear and unimpeachable evidence of date of birth which had been recorded in the records of another school, in which the second respondent therein had attended till Class 4th. The Apex Court held that the date of birth reflected in the matriculation certificate could not be accepted as authentic or credible. 16. In the instant matter, an implausible story has been set by the revisionist, which goes like that the parents gave same name to the younger son, who was born 6 years after the birth of the elder one. Name of the elder son i.e. ‘X’ was given to younger son as well because elder son had died. The revisionist could not even prima facie satisfy the courts below on this story. As observed earlier, no particular date of death of elder son has been given. No documentary evidence as regard his death has been furnished. On the other hand, if the story given by the revisionist is believed, the admitted document indicates that he was alive till at least 2006 i.e., the year in which the younger son was born. Coupled with this fact are the circumstances that no credible has been furnished to show where did the juvenile (the younger son) studied before be took admission in Subedar Pandey Inter College directly in Class-9th. The story is too imaginative to be a reality. Coupled with this fact are the circumstances that no credible has been furnished to show where did the juvenile (the younger son) studied before be took admission in Subedar Pandey Inter College directly in Class-9th. The story is too imaginative to be a reality. A strong probability appears that the actual date of birth of the juvenile was 05.07.2000, as is shown by the date of birth registered in a school where he had studied initially. Notably the age calculated on the basis of date of birth being 5.7.2000 matches with the radiological age and therefore a whimsical and mechanical approach to deduct two straight years from radiological opinion is nothing but uncalled for. All the evidence dissuade the Court from considering probable age on lower side. This is definitely not a case where age could be or ought to have been considered by lowering it by a margin of 2 years. No two views seem possible, therefore no question arises of leaning in favour of accused. The Juvenile Justice Board clearly committed an error which was corrected by the Appellate Court. 17. On the basis of above discussion, I do not find any good reason to interfere in the order passed by the appellate court. The revision lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.