ORDER : 1. As common question of law and facts are involved in both miscellaneous criminal petitions, they heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioners have preferred this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (henceforth “CrPC” assailing the order dated 01.10.2022 passed by Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dabra District Janjgir Champa (C.G.) in un-registered Case/2022 whereby the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. filed by respondent No. 2/Income Tax Department has been allowed and directed the concerned SHO to register the FIR under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. against the petitioners and to investigate the matter in accordance with law. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class while issuing the direction for investigation has observed that as per the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari vs. State of U.P. 2014 (2) SCC 1 , if any cognizable offence is intimated to the police then registration of crime is mandatory. It has also been recorded that as per judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sakri Basu the magistrate has ample power for issuing direction for registration of FIR as per provisions of Section 156(3) CrPC and can also issue direction for investigation thus, learned Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and has allowed the application under Section 156(3) CrPC and directed the in-charge police Station to register the Crime number and after investigation final report be submitted. 3. The brief facts as reflected from the record are that Income Tax Department submitted a written complaint to the Station House Incharge Police Station Dabhara, District Janjgir Champa on 29.11.2021 mainly contending that a search and seizure was conducted under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act 1961 on 22.07.2021 in the Dainik Bhaskar Group, which is one of the entities covered under search operation in M/s. D.B. Power Limited. It has also been contended that D.B. Power Limited is setting up of Power Plant Projects of 1200 MW at village Badadhara, Tehsl Dabhara District Janjgir Champa and for establishment of a plant DB Power Limited has purchased/acquired lands from Tribals/Farmers. The details of the land would reveal that 545 acrers of land were purchased under lease hold and 655 acres of land were purchased under free hold. The details of the land would reveal that 545 acrers of land were purchased under lease hold and 655 acres of land were purchased under free hold. The details of the land further clarified that 444 acres of land has been acquired under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It has also been contended that 444 acres of land can be acquired either directly after obtaining permission from District Collector, as it is a tribal land or through CSIDC by paying money to CSIDC who in turn can pay money to the land owners and 101 acres of lands were acquired by them is Government lands. It has also been contended that during search it has also been revealed that Salim Sikandar Ekka had purchased 65.61 acres of lands in his name during the period from 2010 to 2014 and in 2019 for a consideration of Rs. 6,40,47,768/-, out of the total land acquired by the Salim Sikandar Ekka 65.61 acres, DB Power Ltd. has purchased/acquired the lands of 57.38 acres through CSIDC and Collector permission for a consideration of RS. 8,23,96,786/- and Salim Ekka has registered 8.24 acres of land on his name which is yet to be transferred back to DB Power. It has also been contended that 57.38 acres of land was originally purchased by Salim Sikandar Ekka for consideration of Rs. 4,99,73,657/-. It has been contended that M/s. DB Power Ltd and associates have received back the enhanced compensation for the land transfer paid to Shri Salim Ekka which he used to purchase land from Adivasis/Tribals/villagers at a lower price at the first hand. Thus, the provisons of law have been circumvented by using Mr. Salim Ekka as a front. Since the sellers of the land include vulunerable sections of society, it is seen that the company/its promoters/officials, have violated various sections of the IPC which include Section 120-B, 415,418, 420 IPC. It is further contended that on the complaint of Income Tax Department, SHO carried out the investigation against the petitioners and on 27.04.2022 submitted a closure report. Being dissatisfied with the closure report submitted by the Police, the respondent No.2/Income Tax Department filed the complaint under Section 156(3) before the Judicial Magistrate First Class- Dhabra which was allowed and directed the concerned SHO for registration of FIR. Being dissatisfied with the closure report submitted by the Police, the respondent No.2/Income Tax Department filed the complaint under Section 156(3) before the Judicial Magistrate First Class- Dhabra which was allowed and directed the concerned SHO for registration of FIR. Being aggrieved against the order dated 01.10.2022, this instant petitions have been filed under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing of order dated 01.10.2022. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that learned Judicial Magistrate failed to appreciate the statutory provisions and binding precedents which are mandating that on refusal of recording an information by the officer in charge of concerned police station in terms of Section 154(1) CrPC the substance of such information in writing has to be sent by post to Superintendent of Police in terms of Section 154(3) of the CrPC along with necessary documents prior to invoking the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC. There being non-compliance of the impugned order is rendered without jurisdiction as well as in violation of the law is liable to be set aside. He would further submit that learned Magistrate failed to apply its judicious mind for the purpose of Section 156(3) CrPC as also the allegation made in the complaint and had in a mechanical manner directed for registration of FIR even when the averments made in the complaint does not disclose any ingredient of cognizable offence. Learned Sr. Counsel would submit that the impugned order is without jurisdiction and void-ab-initio, as the complaint was enquired by the Officer-in-Charge of Police Station in terms of the mandate contained in the case of Lalita Kumari and the SHO has submitted its closure report, therefore, proceedings in terms of Chapter XV of the CrPC should have been taken by the learned Magistrate or proceedings could not have reverted back and exercise the powers under Section 156(3) as there was already an enquiry in terms of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that the impugned order is per-se-illegal as the complaint filed does not disclose any cognizable offence and the impugned order deserves to be quashed as it is in gross misuse of the process of law with an ulterior motive to harass the petitioner by setting up multiple proceedings and prosecuting on the same set of facts which would be violative of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India. They would further submit that the impugned order is bad-in-law and without jurisdiction because application under Section 156 (3) itself was not maintainable as the complaint was investigated in terms of law laid down in the case of Lalita Kumari and therefore remedy, if any, was only available under Chapter XV CrPC by filing complaint under Section 200 CrPC. Learned Sr. counsel would further submit that the complaint was also not maintainable the Deputy Director of Income Tax has no locus-standi to file complaint, as such learned Judicial Magistrate has committed illegality in entertaining the complaint and the orders thereupon are no-nest and liable to be set aside. Learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners would further submit that majority of the land was acquired by the State Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and thereafter Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation has leased out the said lands for the Industry much more than what was acquired from the petitioners by CSIDC, therefore, cheating or conspiracy on the part of the petitioners is not attracted. Learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners would further submit that it is admitted position that entire sale consideration was paid to the land owner(s) as per the prescribed rate fixed by the government and is no complaint was made by any other land owners by them or any misrepresentation leading to delivery of property, there being no element of wrongful gain to the petitioners or a consequential wrongful loss, as such no offence of cheating can be said to have been disclosed in the complaint. Hence, the consequential impugned order is illegal and liable to be set aside. They would further submit that there being no material to suggest any gain to the petitioner ordering registration of FIR against the company is illegal and liable to be set aside. Learned Sr. Hence, the consequential impugned order is illegal and liable to be set aside. They would further submit that there being no material to suggest any gain to the petitioner ordering registration of FIR against the company is illegal and liable to be set aside. Learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner would further submit that land purchased by the petitioners in bona-fide and in a transparent manner and good consideration was paid under the scrutiny of all authorities and stakeholders with no adverse observations or consequences from any parties involved; therefore no case of cheating has been made out against the petitioners even the compliant doesn't disclose any commission of cognizable offence. They would further submit that it is crystal clear that the impugned order dated 1/10/2022 is infested with gross infirmities - both on procedure as well as on merits and has no legs to stand upon. He would further submit that the entire proceedings are liable to be vitiated as there is noncompliance of mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 154(3) CrPC. He would further submit that sharing of information with the police without any affidavit under Section 138 of the Income Tax Act 1961 does not fulfill the requirement of Section 154 (1) CrPC. He would further submit that learned Judicial Magistrate First Class has passed the order without application of mind and non speaking order, as such also the impugned order is liable to be quashed. He would further submit that alleged violation pertains to Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code which is civil wrong and remedy under the Land Revenue Code is available, therefore, since no criminality is involved, the complaint was not maintainable and even the complainant has not disclosed the full facts of the case, as such the proceedings imitated against the petitioners are deserves to be quashed. To butters their submission, they would refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Sakiri Vasu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2008) 2 SCC 409 , Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2015) 6 SCC 287 , Babu Venkatesh and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Another (2022) 5 SCC 639 , Anjuri Kumar vs. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors. of NCT of Delhi and Ors. In WP(Crl) 1210 of 2023 decided on 29.11.2023 and in Prashant Vashishta and others vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others in WP(Cr) No. 177 of 2017 decided on 30.01.2023. 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel would opposes the submission and submit that complainant has made a complaint to the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes for enquiry thereafter on 19.04.2022 respondent No.1 send a detailed report to the Commission. He would further submit that the police authority has enquired the matter, as such there is no illegality on the part of the police authorities. He would further submit that this Court in CRMP No. 1724 has stayed the effect and operation of order dated 01.10.2022, therefore, the respondent No.1 has stopped the further proceeding in the matter. He would further submit that looking to the seriousness allegations against the petitioners, the matter has to be investigated by the investigating agency, as such the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate is legal, justified and in accordance with law which does not warrant any interference by this Court. 7. Respondent No.2 filed the reply mainly contending that permission of Collector was required to be obtained by petitioner Salim Sikandar Ekka while the land was transferred to M/s. DB Power Ltd as per provisions of 165(6) of the CG Land Revenue Code. But the permission was not taken by Salim Sikander Ekka from the Collector as per the provisons of Land Revenue Code before transferring the land by him in the name of company. He would further submit that petitioner Salim Sikandar Ekka did not have the capacity to purchase the land on his own. In fact M/s. DB Power transferred the money in the account of petitioner Salim Sikhandar Ekka, therefore, the money received from DBPL as loan or business advance is factually incorrect. Even, M/s. DB Power Ltd. did not have any transaction pertaining to loan. Learned Sr. counsel would further submit that Salim Sikhandar Ekka is Tribal person and has limited means which is clear from perual of Income Tax Return, therefore, it cannot be presumed that Salim Sikhandar Ekka had the requisite finances to purchase such a huge parcel of lands. Even, M/s. DB Power Ltd. did not have any transaction pertaining to loan. Learned Sr. counsel would further submit that Salim Sikhandar Ekka is Tribal person and has limited means which is clear from perual of Income Tax Return, therefore, it cannot be presumed that Salim Sikhandar Ekka had the requisite finances to purchase such a huge parcel of lands. He would further submit that local tribal persons cannot transfer land to another non-tribal without the permission of the Collector as per Section 165(6) of the CG Land Revenue Code, because of mischievous act of the petitioners the original land owner were deprived to gain rightful money of the compensation from the Government which does not negate the possibility of cheating with the landowners, therefore, the same falls within the ambit of cognizable offence and would pray for dismissal of the petitions. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners have filed the rejoinder mainly contending that order passed by learned Judicial Magistrate is infested with sever procedural and substantial infirmities and non-compliance of Section 154(3) of the CrPC. They would further submit that the learned Judicial Magistrate has not considered the Police inquiry report dated 27.04.2022 in its proper perspective which is mandatory obligation of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC. They would further submit that the order passed by the learned Magistrate in a casual and without application of mind which is non speaking order. They would further submit that learned Judicial Magistrate has not appreciated the fact that frivolous complaint was filed by the Income Tax Department to harass the petitioners based on the bald allegation despite that no such complaint has ever been registered against the petitioners. To substantiate their submission, learned counsel for the petitioners would rely on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme court in the cases of Ramdev Food Products Private Limited vs. State of Gujarat In C.A. No. 600 of 2007 and Anil Kumar vs. M.K. Aiyappa 2013 (10) SCC 705 . 9. To substantiate their submission, learned counsel for the petitioners would rely on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme court in the cases of Ramdev Food Products Private Limited vs. State of Gujarat In C.A. No. 600 of 2007 and Anil Kumar vs. M.K. Aiyappa 2013 (10) SCC 705 . 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the allegation levelled against the petitioners are taken to be true then there is violation of the Special legislation i.e. Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code would at the most constitute only a civil offence against which there already lies an alternate remedy by way of approaching the Sub Divisional Officer under Section 170 of Revenue Code even though respondents just to harass the petitioners with mala-fide intention has filed the complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC which is in-violation of principle of natural justice, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 11. This Court while hearing this petition on 12.10.2022 has stayed the effect and operation of the impugned order dated 01.10.2022 till the next date of hearing which is still being continued. The Income Tax Department has filed the application for vacating the interim stay passed by this Court on 13.09.2023. Accordingly, the matter was taken up on 02.01.2024 and heard finally on 24.01.2024. 12. From the above stated factual matrix of the case, following points emerge for determination:- (i) Whether Income Tax Authority has locus standi to file a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate First Class to register the complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC?. (ii) Whether the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class while issuing direction for registration of FIR and direction for investigation detailed reasoned order has to be passed or not?. 13. (ii) Whether the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class while issuing direction for registration of FIR and direction for investigation detailed reasoned order has to be passed or not?. 13. To determine the aforesaid query posed by this Court, it is expedient for this Court to extract relevant provisions of Sections 2(c) cognizable offence, 2(d) complaint and 156 and 190 of the CrPC;- Section 2(c) and 2(d) is extracted below:- 2(c) "Cognizable Offence" means an offence for which, and "cognizable case" means a case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant; (d) Complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Explanation.--A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant; 14. Section 156:- Police officer‘s power to investigate cognizable case. (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned. 15. Section 190:- Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence- (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try. Finding on point No.1. 16. Learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioners would submit that Income Tax Department has no locus standi to file a complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC as the land owners have not approached the Judicial Magistrate First Class by filing the complaint and by any act or commission of offence alleged to have been done by the petitioners does not cause injury to the Income Tax Department to file a complaint for commission of offence as alleged in the complaint for Commission of offence under Sections 120-B and 420 of the IPC, thus the complaint itself deserves to be rejected. This submission was vehemently objected by the learned Sr. counsel for the Department and would submit that from perusal of the complaint it is quite vivid that petitioner Salim Sikander Ekka who is tribal and has no sources of huge finance which has been financed by the sister concern of the DB Power Limited, thus prima-facie cognizable offence is made out, therefore, they have locus standi to file a complaint. To substantiate his submission, he has referred to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra). 17. From perusal of the complaint it is quite vivid that the Income Tax Department in their complaint has categorically stated that the SHO has made mis-statements and factually incorrect facts. It has also been stated that the SHO report is silent on the issue whether Tribals who sold their lands and as to how much they have received compensation from the CSIDC and whether the consideration received by the triable was right or wrong or whether they are cheated or defrauded or not. It has also been stated that the SHO report is silent on the issue whether Tribals who sold their lands and as to how much they have received compensation from the CSIDC and whether the consideration received by the triable was right or wrong or whether they are cheated or defrauded or not. It has also been mentioned in the complaint that 65.61 acres of lands were purchased from petitioner/respondent No.3 in the complaint by the M/s. DB Power Ltd and tribales were not aware about starting of the power plant and have been deprived from their rightful consideration of the property, thus the manner in which land transactions have been done clearly speaks about cognizable offence and accordingly, the Income Tax Department has locus-standi to file a complaint in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumar vs Union of India reported in 2014(2) SCC 1 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 119. Therefore, in view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR. 120. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR. 120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold: 120.1) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. 120.2) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. 120.3) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further. 120.4) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence. 120.5) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence. 120.6) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes b) Commercial offences c) Medical negligence cases d) Corruption cases e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry. 120.7) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry. 120.7) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry. 120.8) Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above. 121) With the above directions, we dispose of the reference made to us. List all the matters before the appropriate Bench for disposal on merits. 18. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ratanlal vs. Prahlad Jat and Others reported in 2017(9) 340, the Hon’ble Court has held as under:- 8. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the meaning assigned to the term ‘locus standi’ is ‘the right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum’. One of the meanings assigned to the term ‘locus standi’ in Law Lexicon of Sri P.Ramanatha Aiyar, is ‘a right of appearance in a Court of justice’. The traditional view of locus standi has been that the person who is aggrieved or affected has the standing before the court, that is to say, he only has a right to move the court for seeking justice. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in India and the Constitutional Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hypertechnical grounds. It is now well-settled that if the person is found to be not merely a stranger to the case, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having locus standi. 9. However, criminal trial is conducted largely by following the procedure laid down in Cr.P.C. Locus standi of the complaint is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. It is now well-settled that if the person is found to be not merely a stranger to the case, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having locus standi. 9. However, criminal trial is conducted largely by following the procedure laid down in Cr.P.C. Locus standi of the complaint is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. Anyone can set the criminal law in motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. This general principle is founded on a policy that an offence, that is an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force, is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against the society. Therefore, in respect of such offences which are treated against the society, it becomes the duty of the State to punish the offender. In A.R.Antulay v. Ramdas Srinikwas Nayak and Anr. (1984) 2 SCC 500 , a Constitution Bench of this Court has considered this aspect as under:- 6………“In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force [See Section 2(n) CrPC] is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception”. 10. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception”. 10. In Manohar Lal vs. Vinesh Anand & Ors. (2001) 5 SCC 407 , this Court has held that doctrine of locus standi is totally foreign to criminal jurisprudence. To punish an offender in the event of commission of an offence is to subserve a social need. Society cannot afford to have a criminal escape his liability since that would bring about a state of social pollution which is neither desired nor warranted and this is irrespective of the concept of locus. 19. From the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ratanlal (supra) it is quite vivid, that locus-standi of complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. Anyone can set the criminal law in motion, except where the statue enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary and also an act or omission punishable by law for the time being enforce in not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against the society. In the present case, the complainant has lodged the complaint alleging that the petitioners have cheated or defrauded to the tribals thus, its offence to the society, as such submission made by the petitioners that Income Tax Department has no locus standi deserves to be rejected and accordingly it is held that complainant has locus standi to lodge complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC. Thus, point number No.1 is answered against the petitioners and is in favour of complaint/Income Tax Department. Finding on point No.2. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that learned Judicial Magistrate First Class while issuing direction for registration of FIR no reasoned order has been passed, as such committed illegality which warrants interference by this Court. 21. To substantiate his submission, he has referred to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramdev Food Products Private Limited vs State of Gujarat (2015) 6 SCC 439 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 20. 21. To substantiate his submission, he has referred to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramdev Food Products Private Limited vs State of Gujarat (2015) 6 SCC 439 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 20. It has been held, for the same reasons, that direction by the Magistrate for investigation under Sections 156(3) cannot be given mechanically. In Anil Kumar vs. M.K. Aiyappa, it was observed : "11. The scope of Section 156(3) CrPC came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. This Court in Maksud Saiyed case [ (2008) 5 SCC 668 ] examined the requirement of the application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 CrPC, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind, in such a case, the Special Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3) against a public servant without a valid sanction order. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be sufficient. After going through the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, what weighed with the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, should be reflected in the order, though a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted. We have already extracted the order passed by the learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated no reasons for ordering investigation." The above observations apply to category of cases mentioned in Para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari (supra). 21. On the other hand, power under Section 202 is of different nature. Report sought under the said provision has limited purpose of deciding "whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding". If this be the object, the procedure under Section 157 or Section 173 is not intended to be followed. Section 157 requires sending of report by the police that the police officer suspected commission of offence from information received by the police and thereafter the police is required to proceed to the spot, investigate the facts and take measures for discovery and arrest. Section 157 requires sending of report by the police that the police officer suspected commission of offence from information received by the police and thereafter the police is required to proceed to the spot, investigate the facts and take measures for discovery and arrest. Thereafter, the police has to record statements and report on which the Magistrate may proceed under Section 190. This procedure is applicable when the police receives information of a cognizable offence, registers a case and forms the requisite opinion and not every case registered by the police. 22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that 22.1- The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone instance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued. 22.2- The cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient ground to proceed". Category of cases falling under Para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari (supra) may fall under Section 202. 22.3- Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case. 22. The submission of the petitioners was vehemently objected by the Sr. Counsel for the Income Tax Department and would submit that from bare perusal of the order sheet, it is quite vivid that learned Judicial Magistrate First Class after going through the document annexed with the complaint has recorded its finding that prima-facie cognizable offence is made out, as such direction for investigation is justified unnecessary and accordingly it has allowed the application. Thus, there is sufficient reason assigned by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class and would pray for rejection of the petitions. 23. Thus, there is sufficient reason assigned by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class and would pray for rejection of the petitions. 23. I have gone through with the impugned order very carefully, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class while allowing the application has mentioned the factual matrix by referring to the documents annexed with the complaint but it has nowhere mentioned as to how the cognizable offence is made out, at least the learned Judicial Magistrate should have given same reason in its order how the documents annexed with the complaint indicate cognizable offence is made out. It is true that no detailed reason is required but at least reasonable ground should be made out in the order which is essence of passing of the order. Learned Magistrates should pass speaking and reasoned orders while deciding applications under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is seen that the impugned order seems to have been passed by the learned Magistrate in routine and casual manner. The learned Magistrate ought to have given reasoned order while directing registration of FIR under section 156(3) Cr. P.C. Not only that, no reasons have been given, even it has also not been stated against whom and under what provision of law the FIR was to be registered. It is also well settled legal position of law that once a complaint/application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is filed, the Magistrate can exercise the option of applying his own judicial mind to the entire material on record and may direct registration of FIR. However, at times, the Magistrate also calls for a report from the police as to why no action had been taken on an earlier complaint filed by the complainant with the police, and thereafter, once a report is filed by the police, the Magistrate applies his mind to the material before him i.e. the complaint as well as the Action Taken Report which constitutes a preliminary inquiry conducted by the police. After this, the Magistrate may make up his mind to pass either order registration of FIR or otherwise. After this, the Magistrate may make up his mind to pass either order registration of FIR or otherwise. In case the police closes the complaint on the ground that no cognizable offence was made out, the Magistrate may again apply his mind disagreeing with the Action Taken Report and issue directions for registration of the FIR or may take into consideration the Action Taken Report and material on record vide the complaint filed before it and pass appropriate directions. 24. It is pertinent to note here that the enactment of Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. was to offer a recourse to citizens by providing a judicial remedy in situations where the police fails to take appropriate action upon a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence. This provision enables an ordinary individual to approach a criminal court, which, after carefully examining the contents and material placed before it by the complainant, can request a status report or an action taken report from the police. This mechanism serves to remind and question the police about their duty and inquire as to why no action has been taken on the complaint in question. Furthermore, it is evident from the scheme of Cr.P.C. that a police complaint should be first lodged by a complainant as per Section 154 before seeking recourse under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Therefore, directing registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is a serious judicial function. In case the Court is informed that the police has failed to do its duty and an application is moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. seeking direction to register an FIR, the concerned Court is duty bound to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case before it prior to directing registration of the FIR, as such it should be a reasoned order which means the Magistrate needs to apply judicial mind while deciding an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it is also imperative to highlight the necessity of passing a reasoned order so as to exhibit the application of judicial mind in unambiguous terms. It is also well settled legal position of law that importance of passing a reasoned order cannot be undermined when the order in question is challengeable in the higher Court and can be called into question by a petition seeking judicial review by way of a revision or appeal. It is also well settled legal position of law that importance of passing a reasoned order cannot be undermined when the order in question is challengeable in the higher Court and can be called into question by a petition seeking judicial review by way of a revision or appeal. When faced with an order which is passed without reasons, the higher Courts cannot decipher whether or not the concerned Judge has reached the decision after application of judicial mind or not. The application of judicial mind can be adjudged only by appreciating the reasons given to support the order in question. Whether the order in question lacks application of judicial mind, non appreciation of relevant provisions of law or incorrect application of law and judicial precedents, can also be judged only through the reasons given in the order. The higher Courts also will not know as to whether relevant or irrelevant considerations became the basis of passing the order in absence of sufficient reasons. Similarly, whether the discretion of the Court was exercised judicially or not, or was based on relevant or irrelevant considerations, will be revealed by the reasons discussed in the impugned order. Since the decision and discretion exercised by a criminal Court affects significantly an individual against whom such direction is being issued, procedural and judicial fairness will require reasons to be given for the same. 25. It is also well settled legal position of law that duty to give reasoned decisions is also an obligation which is in consonance with idea of institutional responsibility of judiciary to the public at large, since they are entrusted with judicial power of making decisions which affect the lives of the citizen of this country who have a right to know, through the reasoning given by the Judge, as to how and why an order has been passed against them. Reasons are expressions of a Court's judicial mind which is essential for judicial function. It is also well settled position of law that administrative decision making functions cannot be equated with judicial decision making function. It is the judicial decisions which distinguishes between a decision based on application of judicious mind as distinguishable from arbitrary decisions. Whether the reasons for decisions are adequate or inadequate, judicious or arbitrary thus can be decided by an appellate Court on the basis of reasons which become the basis of reaching a conclusion. It is the judicial decisions which distinguishes between a decision based on application of judicious mind as distinguishable from arbitrary decisions. Whether the reasons for decisions are adequate or inadequate, judicious or arbitrary thus can be decided by an appellate Court on the basis of reasons which become the basis of reaching a conclusion. The reasons, thus, disclose the journey of a case from filing of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to passing of a direction, a judgment or order. 26. It is pertinent to mention here that the reason assigned in an order or judgment articulate the factual and legal basis for the decisions. The principles of fairness and procedural and natural justice require reasons to be given for passing a judicial order of the nature as in the present case. When justifying an order, the concerned Judge conveys to the litigant and the appellate Court that the view taken by him is consistent with law and precedents. The cases where exercise of judicial discretion is involved, the requirement of giving reasons therefore assumes more significant importance. No rules or guidelines can be laid down as to which issue involved in a petition, complaint or application would require reasons to which extent. Whether the reasons be given in detail, in a given set of facts and circumstances, can be decided by the learned Trial Judge by application of judicial mind. However, the one rule to be scrupulously followed while directing registration of FIR is that such an order cannot be a cryptic and non-reasoned order, which at times may run into two pages, but still neither discusses facts in brief nor the details qua cognizable offence disclosed from the facts alleged which had persuaded the Court to order registration of FIR. Suffice it to say, the entire impugned order is completely silent on the facts of the case or reasons to reveal the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate that a cognizable offence of such serious nature, as alleged, was disclosed against the present petitioner from the complaint filed by respondent no.1. To have ordered registration of FIR under appropriate sections, considering the fact that the respondent no. To have ordered registration of FIR under appropriate sections, considering the fact that the respondent no. 1 had alleged commission of offences inter alia relating to provocation of riots, promoting enmity between different groups on ground of religion etc., and making imputations or assertions prejudicial to national integration, required recording satisfaction of the learned Magistrate and reasons thereof that such offences had been even prima facie committed by the proposed accused persons including the petitioner herein. 27. Thus the reasons in an order give reassurance in an open public justice system that the discretion vested in the Court has been judiciously exercised and is supported by judicial precedents and guidelines laid down the issue in question. Reasons cannot be cryptic or based on extraneous considerations or on irrelevant grounds or against the doctrine of natural justice. Neither can they be in the form of performa orders passed casually in similar kinds of cases or applications without having regard to the individualism and peculiarity of a case. Setting of criminal law into motion by directing registration of FIR against a person should not be mechanically ordered. One line orders stating that in a complaint cognizable offence has been disclosed against one named and another unnamed person, without application of mind to the complaint in hand which disclosed no offence committed by the present applicant, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Thus, non- existence of reasons in the order in question was against the judicial precedents and guidelines laid down for deciding applications under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kailash Vijayvargiya vs Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri reported in 2023 SCC online 569. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 80 to 85 has held as under:- 80. The State of West Bengal has drawn our attention to the judgment of this Court in Gopal Das Sindhi and Others vs. State of Assam and Another, AIR 1961 SC 986 to the effect that even when a private complaint is filed, the Magistrate is not bound to take cognizance under Section 190 as the word used therein is ‘may’, which should not be construed as ‘must’ for obvious reasons. The Magistrate may well exercise discretion in sending such complaint under Section 156(3) to the police for investigation. The Magistrate may well exercise discretion in sending such complaint under Section 156(3) to the police for investigation. However, when a Magistrate chooses not to proceed under Section 156(3), he cannot simply dismiss the complaint if he finds that resorting to Section 156(3) is not advisable. Reference in this regard can also be made to Suresh Chand Jain vs. State of MP and another, (2001) 2 SCC 628 which distinguishes between the power of the police to investigate under Section 156, the direction of the Magistrate for investigation under Section 156(3) and post-summoning inquiry and investigation after cognizance under Section 190 and Section 202 of the Code. When a Magistrate orders investigation under Section 156(3), he does so before cognizance of the offence. If he takes cognizance, he needs to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV.. 81. The decision in Mona Panwar vs. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad through its Registrar and Others, (2011) 3 SCC 496 is rather succinct. This Court held that when a complaint is presented before a Magistrate, he has two options. One is to pass an order contemplated by Section 156(3). The second one is to direct examination of the complainant on oath and the witness present, and proceed further in the manner provided by Section 202. An order under Section 156(3) is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation under Section 156(1). However, once the Magistrate has taken cognizance under Section 190 of the Code, he cannot ask for an investigation by the Police. After cognizance has been taken, if the Magistrate wants any investigation, it will be under Section 202, whose purpose is to ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the person accused of the offence and to prevent issue of process in a false or vexatious complaint intended to harass the person named. Such examination is provided, therefore, to find out whether there is or not sufficient ground for proceeding further. 82. We do not intend to go into the question of the merits of the allegations, and what procedure the Magistrate should follow as this is an aspect which the Magistrate must first consider and decide judiciously and as per the law. Such examination is provided, therefore, to find out whether there is or not sufficient ground for proceeding further. 82. We do not intend to go into the question of the merits of the allegations, and what procedure the Magistrate should follow as this is an aspect which the Magistrate must first consider and decide judiciously and as per the law. What is impermissible and contrary to law is an adjudication on merits of the allegations and determination of the facts as baseless, without further scrutiny and examination. Therefore, the High Court was correct in remitting the matter to the judicial magistrate for further examination. 83. We were informed that the Magistrate, on remand, has passed an order under Section 156(3) directing registration of the FIR. He has misread the order and directions given by the High Court. In terms of the judgments of this Court, the Magistrate is required to examine, apply his judicious mind and then exercise discretion whether or not to issue directions under Section 156(3) or whether he should take cognizance and follow the procedure under Section 202. He can also direct a preliminary inquiry by the Police in terms of the law laid down by this Court in Lalita Kumari (supra). 84. We would refrain and not comment on the allegations made as this may affect the case put up by either side. The accused do not have any right to appear before the Magistrate before summons are issued. However, the law gives them a right to appear before the revisionary court in proceedings, when the complainant challenges the order rejecting an application under Section 156(3) of the Code. The appellants, therefore, had appeared before the High Court and contested the proceedings. They have filed several papers and documents before the High Court and this Court. To be fair to them, the copies of the papers and documents filed before the High Court and this Court would also be forwarded and kept on record of the Magistrate who would, thereupon, examine and consider the matter. However, the complainant/informant would be entitled to question the genuineness and the contents of the said documents. 85. To be fair to them, the copies of the papers and documents filed before the High Court and this Court would also be forwarded and kept on record of the Magistrate who would, thereupon, examine and consider the matter. However, the complainant/informant would be entitled to question the genuineness and the contents of the said documents. 85. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, while affirming the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court remanding the matter back to the learned Magistrate, we set aside the subsequent order passed by the Magistrate on remand, pursuant to the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and remit the matter back to the learned Magistrate to examine and apply his judicial mind and then exercise discretion whether or not to issue directions under section 156(3) or whether he can take cognizance and follow the procedure under section 202. He can also direct the preliminary enquiry by the police in terms of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra). Copies of the papers and documents filed before the High Court and this Court could also be forwarded and brought on record of the Magistrate, who would thereupon examine and consider the matter. As observed hereinabove, the complainant/informant would be entitled to question the genuineness of the contents of the said documents. 29. The assigning of reason is essence of passing of the judicial order, as such it is incumbent on the part of learned Judicial Magistrate First class to record reason while passing the order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC which is missing in the impugned order. Accordingly, point No. 2 is answered in favour of the petitioners by quashing the order dated 01.10.2022 (Annexure P/1) and remitted back the matter to the learned Judicial Magistrate First to pass afresh reasoned order under Section 156(3) CrPC on the basis of material placed before it by the complainant. It is made clear that this Court has not commented anything on the merit of allegation made in the complaint as this may affect the case put up by the other side. 30. Thus both petitions are partly allowed. It is held that Income Tax Department has locus-standi to file a complaint under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. It is made clear that this Court has not commented anything on the merit of allegation made in the complaint as this may affect the case put up by the other side. 30. Thus both petitions are partly allowed. It is held that Income Tax Department has locus-standi to file a complaint under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. Since no reasoned order was passed, therefore, order datd 01.10.2022 is quashed and the matter is remitted back to learned Judicial Magistrate First Class to pass reasoned order before issuing direction under Section 15 6(3) of the CrPC. 31. Interim order passed by this Court on 12.10.2022 is vacated.