JUDGMENT : MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI, J. 1. As per office report, there is delay of 98 days in filing this appeal against acquittal. 2. For the reasons indicated in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application (IA No. 1 of 2024), the same is allowed and the delay is condoned. 3. Vide impugned judgment & order dated 11.10.2023, rendered by learned Special Judge (POCSO Act)/District & Sessions Judge, Tehri Garhwal in Special Sessions Trial No. 34 of 2020, respondent (Raviraj) has been acquitted of the charges of offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 & 376(2)(n) of I.P.C. and Section 5(1)/6 of the POCSO Act. 4. Heard learned State Counsel on the application seeking leave to appeal against acquittal of the respondent and perused the impugned judgment. 5. In the present case, prosecutrix was examined as PW-4, who did not support the prosecution story and was declared hostile. she has deposed that the accused (respondent herein) had never made any forcible physical relation with her. She further stated that she was neither threatened nor molested by the accused. She further stated that she had gone to jungle with the accused on her own freewill, as she was in friendship with the accused. 6. Learned State Counsel urged that in her statement recorded under Sections 161 & 164 of Cr.P.C. prosecutrix had stated that the accused had sexually assaulted her and similar statement was given by her before the Medical Officer, who examined her, therefore, according to him, it is not a fit case to acquit the respondent of the heinous offences under Sections 363, 366 & 376(2)(n) of I.P.C. and Section 5(1)/6 of POCSO Act. 7. We are not impressed by the aforesaid submission. The trial court has discussed the evidence in great detail. In her testimony, prosecutrix has deposed before the trial court that the accused neither sexually assaulted her nor molested her in any manner. She has also stated that accused had not threatened her and she had gone to jungle with the accused on her own freewill, without there being any coercion or threat. Therefore, in view of such categorical stand taken by the prosecutrix before the trial court and also in view of the fact that there was no other evidence to bring home the charges framed against the accused, the trial court was justified in recording the finding of acquittal. Therefore, in view of such categorical stand taken by the prosecutrix before the trial court and also in view of the fact that there was no other evidence to bring home the charges framed against the accused, the trial court was justified in recording the finding of acquittal. Statements of PW-2 & PW-3, who are father and mother of the prosecutrix, also do not support the prosecution story in any manner. 8. We do not find any reason to take a view different from the one taken by the learned trial court. It is settled law that in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, ordinarily the finding of acquittal should not be upset unless it is found that the same is totally perverse and some important piece of evidence, which might have resulted in the conviction of the accused, has not been considered by the trial court. In the present case, no such evidence has been pointed out. It is also settled position of law that even if two views are possible, the view taken by the trial court acquitting the accused should be allowed to prevail. 9. In view of the above and for the reasons recorded above, we refuse to grant leave to appeal. Leave petition is dismissed. Government appeal also stands dismissed accordingly.