ORDER : (Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa, J.) Factual Background 1. The brief facts of the case, as averred in the Writ Affidavit are; a. Petitioner was appointed as a Constable in CISF department on 02.09.2006 and was posted at Red Fort, New Delhi. b. A show cause notice dated 30.08.2016 is issued by the Respondent No.5 to the Petitioner framing two charges alleging that he contracted second marriage with one Ms.Prameela Pativada, who is a Mahila Constable in CISF during the subsistence of his first marriage with Ms. K. Nagalakshmi, which is against the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and CISF Rules, 2001. c. After the inquiry, Respondent No.5 passed order dated 11.01.2017 imposing punishment of compulsory retirement from service with 2/3rd gratuity. Challenging the same, the Petitioner filed an appeal before the Respondent No.4/Appellate authority, which was rejected on 01.06.2017. Questioning the same, the Petitioner filed a revision before the Respondent No.3, which was dismissed on 21.11.2017 confirming the orders passed by the Respondent Nos.4 and 5. Ultimately, he was discharged from service by compulsory retirement on 13.01. 2017. d. Impugning the same, the W.P. is filed seeking Certiorari for the following relief: “ … calling for records pertaining to final order dated 11.01.2017, passed by the Respondent No.5 and the subsequent orders dated 01.06.2017 and 21.11.2017, passed by the Respondent Nos.4 and 3 respectively by confirming the punishment of compulsory retirement and quash the same after declaring the same as illegal, arbitrary, violation of principles of natural justice, violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India and reinstate the Petitioner into service with all consequential and attendant benefits and continuity of services and pass such other order or orders may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice .” Version of the Respondents 2. Counter-affidavit filed by the Respondents contains the following averments, in brief; a. Marriage of the Petitioner with Ms.Prameela Pativada, who is a lady constable, was not accepted by his family and they forced him to get married to Ms. K.Nagalakshmi, his relative. b. No decree of divorce is filed by the Petitioner, according to Rule-21(2) CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and Rule 18(b) of CISF Rules, 2001. c. After due enquiry the punishment of compulsory retirement from service with 2/3rd gratuity is awarded against the Petitioner. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 3. K.Nagalakshmi, his relative. b. No decree of divorce is filed by the Petitioner, according to Rule-21(2) CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and Rule 18(b) of CISF Rules, 2001. c. After due enquiry the punishment of compulsory retirement from service with 2/3rd gratuity is awarded against the Petitioner. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 3. Heard Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the Petitioner and learned Assistant Solicitor General of India for the Respondents. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner in elaboration to what was stated in the Writ Affidavit, submitted that the Petitioner was appointed as Constable on 02.09.2006 and that while he was discharging duties as such, the Respondent No.5-Commandandent CISF, issued a show cause notice framing two articles of charges vide Order dated 30.08.2016 alleging that he contracted second marriage with one Prameela Pativada, during the subsistence of his first marriage with Mrs.K.Nagalakshmi, which is against the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and CISF Rules, 2001. 5. Learned counsel would submit that the Respondent No.5 imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement from service with 2/3rd gratuity vide order dated 11.01.2017, and both the appeal and revision were dismissed. It is also stated that Petitioner was discharged from service on compulsory retirement on 13.01.2017. It is also submitted that the Petitioner initially married Mahila Constable, Ms.Prameela Pativada, which was not considered by his family members. It is stated that due to pressure of his parents, he was forced to marry Ms. K.Nagalakshmi who is his relative. It is stated that after the marriage, disputes arose and Ms. K.Nagalakshmi lodged a criminal case against the Petitioner. Learned counsel further submits that due to the interference of the elders, Petitioner and Ms. K.Nagalakshmi entered a compromise and filed mutual consent divorce petition and obtained divorce as such on 04.11.2022. In the view of the matter, learned counsel seeks this Court to quash the impugned orders. To buttress his contentions, learned counsel would rely on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 and the decision of the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in Union of India and others v. Pranab Kumar Nath, W.A.No.357 of 2022 dated 18.01.2023. 6. Learned Counsel for Respondents while reiterating the version pleaded in the counter affidavit would submit that being a government servant in Army force, the Petitioner is not supposed to contract another marriage, when his spouse is alive. 6. Learned Counsel for Respondents while reiterating the version pleaded in the counter affidavit would submit that being a government servant in Army force, the Petitioner is not supposed to contract another marriage, when his spouse is alive. He would also submit that the action of the Petitioner runs contrary to the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and CISF Rules, 2001 and as such after due inquiry, the punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed. 7. Learned Counsel would also submit that if the Court is convinced with the contention of the Petitioner, the matter may be remanded to the concerned authority for modifying the punishment passed against the Petitioner because this Court under plenary jurisdiction cannot modify the punishment imposed against the Petitioner. 8. Perused the material available on record. Point for Determination. 9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on both the sides, the point that would arise for determination is; “Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the punishment awarded to the Petitioner i.e., compulsory retirement from service with 2/3rd gratuity, warrants any interference of this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?” Determination by the Court 10. It is settled position of law that a High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in so far as disciplinary proceedings are concerned. The jurisdiction of the High Court in these matters are to be applied only in cases of non-observance of principles of natural justice; findings based on extraneous considerations, bias, perversity, or no evidence; disproportionate punishment, etc. The principles underlying the interference of the High Court under Articles 226/227 are discussed in a catena of judgments viz., State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao, 1976 (1) SCR 521 at paras 21-23, State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 at para 4, and Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 at paras 12 and 13. 11. As seen from the record, it is not in dispute that the Petitioner had been working as CISF constable. He has not denied about his relation with the Mahila Constable and his marriage with Ms. K. Nagalakshmi. Hence, there is no dispute on the allegation that he has contracted second marriage during subsistence of first marriage. 11. As seen from the record, it is not in dispute that the Petitioner had been working as CISF constable. He has not denied about his relation with the Mahila Constable and his marriage with Ms. K. Nagalakshmi. Hence, there is no dispute on the allegation that he has contracted second marriage during subsistence of first marriage. It is also seen from the record that due to the efforts made by the elders to reconcile the issue between the parties, they have filed a petition for divorce under mutual consent and it was obtained. The record further shows that the Petitioner was imposed a punishment of compulsory retirement and he retired as such on 13.01.2017. Though the Petitioner approached the appellate authority and as well as the revisional authority, his contention was negatived. Thus, in the present case, the question before this Court is in relation to the validity of the punishment imposed. To answer the question on hand, it is relevant to discuss the Doctrine of Proportionality. 12. Doctrine of proportionality in the aspect of imposition of punishment in service law comes into picture when on the analysis of material brought on record, it is found that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authorities shock the conscience of the court and is not commensurate with the wrong committed. 13. In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others, (2009) 15 SCC 620 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court having analysed the doctrine of proportionality observed that the award of punishment cannot be grossly in excess to the allegations to claim immunity from the scope of judicial review. Stating so, their Lordships devised a test to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment i.e., “would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances?” Further, it was stated that a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration “measure, magnitude and degree” of misconduct, while ignoring irrelevant considerations. This test developed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, embodies that the very crux of decision-making consists in the giving necessary importance to the factors and considerations in each case. 14. In Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative, (2007) 4 SCC 669 , while dealing with the Doctrine observed as follows; “21. The doctrine has its genesis in the field of administrative law. 14. In Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative, (2007) 4 SCC 669 , while dealing with the Doctrine observed as follows; “21. The doctrine has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without abuse of discretion. There can be no “pick and choose”, selective applicability of the government norms or unfairness, arbitrariness or unreasonableness. It is not permissible to use a “sledgehammer to crack a nut”. As has been said many a time; “where paring knife suffices, battle axe is precluded” **** 24. So far as our legal system is concerned, the doctrine is well settled. Even prior to CCSU [ 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL)] , this Court has held that if punishment imposed on an employee by an employer is grossly excessive, disproportionately high or unduly harsh, it cannot claim immunity from judicial scrutiny, and it is always open to a court to interfere with such penalty in appropriate cases.” (emphasis supplied) 15. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in B.C. Chaturvedi (referred supra), observed that; “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” (emphasis supplied) 16. In B. S. Hari Commandant v. Union of India & Ors., [2023] 3 S.C.R. 431, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows while holding the punishment awarded to a Commandant in Border Security Force as excessive and disproportionate; “36. In B. S. Hari Commandant v. Union of India & Ors., [2023] 3 S.C.R. 431, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows while holding the punishment awarded to a Commandant in Border Security Force as excessive and disproportionate; “36. We are quite conscious that in the armed forces of the Union, including the paramilitary forces, utmost discipline, unity of command et al are the sine qua non. That said, the doctrine of proportionality still holds the field” (emphasis supplied) 17. In Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 while enumerating the limited availability of judicial review on disciplinary proceedings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court enumerated the following principles, while dealing with the permissible scope; “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the codelinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of chargesheet in the two cases. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of chargesheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” (emphasis supplied) 18. Coming to the facts of the present case, the learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on Union of India and others v. Pranab Kumar Nath (referred supra). In this case, contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of first marriage for which dismissal from service which was awarded as punishment as being in violation of Rule 21 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and Rule 18 (B) of the CISF Rules, 2001 to a CISF constable was in question. A learned Single Judge while dealing with the W.P. relied on the Division Bench in Trilok Singh Rawat v. Union of India, 2000 (3) GLT 558 whereby a lenient punishment was ordered to be taken as opposed to punishment of dismissal. In the W.A. preferred thereafter, the Hon’ble Division Bench at paras-9 and 10 held as; “9. Dismissal is the most extreme form of punishment which can be imposed upon a Government employee, which has the effect of not only cutting off the source of income, thus depriving him and his dependants of the means of sustenance. Apart from it, he will be not eligible for re-employment in a public sector. Thus, the civil consequences it entails are of extreme nature which in our opinion, should not be ordinarily invoked unless the misconduct is of such nature that there is no other option but to impose such a punishment. There can be various other serious misconducts for which this most severe form of punishment can be imposed . 10. In the present case, in our opinion though this act of conducting of second marriage can be said to be an act of indiscipline, inasmuch as, contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage was in violation of rules, yet, it cannot be said that it is one of most heinous form of misconducts for which he must be necessarily visited with the punishment of dismissal. The records also do not indicate of any serious physical violence perpetrated upon the first wife or the daughter of the writ petitioner or any other act of cruelty, though there is allegation that the writ petitioner had beaten his first wife and daughter. The writ petitioner appears to have contracted the second marriage on account of not being happy in the marital life with his first wife .” (emphasis supplied) 19. There is some force in the argument of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the individual in the above-mentioned decision was placed on similar footing as that of the Petitioner herein. 20. Vide the precedential guidance discussed supra, quantum of punishment to be imposed is within the domain of the departmental authority. This principle is essentially rooted to develop discipline and uniformity within the system. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, a reasonable employer is expected to consider the measure, magnitude, and degree of the misconduct before deciding the punishment. In cases where, such punishment shocks the conscience of the Court for being disproportionate, this Court has every jurisdiction to review the same. The appropriate course of action in such cases thereafter is to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority, unless in extraordinary and rare cases wherein this Court can impose accordingly. 21. There cannot be any dispute about the fact that the Petitioner herein violated Rule 21 of the Central Civil Service Conduct Rules 1964 and Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules, 2001, which clearly prohibits any government in contracting second marriage during the substance of the second marriage. As such, the charges laid against the Petitioner are undoubtedly proved. At the same time, the Petitioner is also not disputing such facts. The act of contracting second marriage during the subsistence of the first one, which is prohibited under the law, is undoubtedly an act of indiscipline quite contra to the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and CISF Rules. The Petitioner submitted his explanation to the effect that he was in relation with the Mahila Constable even prior to his marriage with Ms.K.Nagalakshmi and in fact, he married the Mahila Constable, but he could not convince his family members and that due to family pressure, he got married Ms.K.Nagalakshmi. 22. It is not out of place to mention that as submitted by the learned counsel, the Petitioner herein obtained mutual consent divorce with Ms.K.Nagalakshmi. 22. It is not out of place to mention that as submitted by the learned counsel, the Petitioner herein obtained mutual consent divorce with Ms.K.Nagalakshmi. as such on 04.11.2022. Compulsory retirement has the effect of depriving not only the individual but also his family members, who are dependent on him. This Court is of the view that though the proven charge herein is inexcusable, the ramifications of imposing penalty of compulsory retirement are wide, in view of the specific circumstances placed. Such factors which are peculiar to a matter are relevant to be considered before imposing any punishment. On conglomeration of the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that the punishment of compulsory retirement to the Petitioner herein is harsh and excessive. Therefore, this Court is inclined to interfere with the same. 23. In that view of the matter, for the reasons discussed, the penalty of compulsory retirement from service with 2/3rd gratuity vide order dated 11.01.2017 is hereby set aside. The consequential rejection of the Appeal and the Revision in so far as upholding the penalty are also set aside. The matter is remanded back to the disciplinary authority for passing fresh orders imposing any other penalty on the Petitioner, keeping in view the specific facts and circumstances of the case. 24. With the above direction, this Writ Petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs. As a sequel, pending Interlocutory applications, if any, shall also stand closed.