JUDGMENT : SATYEN VAIDYA, J. 1. The instant petition has been filed for the following relief: “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed and the respondents by way of appropriate writ, direction or order be issued against the respondents, directing therein to grant four tier pay scale to petitioner with effect from 01.01.1996 and the pay of the petitioner may be ordered to be re-fixed accordingly. The petitioner may also be held entitled to the grant of interest on the amount due @ 12% p.a. with effect from 01.01.1996 alongwith such other and further consequential benefits, as may be admissible to him. The cost of the petition may also be awarded to the petitioner and against the respondents and justice be done.” 2. The petitioner was appointed as Constable in the Police Department on 12.10.1957. He was promoted to the post of Inspector w.e.f. 31.08.1987 and was confirmed on said post w.e.f. 20.12.1990. 3. The petitioner retired on 31.07.1997. After his retirement, petitioner approached the erstwhile State Administrative Tribunal by way of O.A. No. 3571 of 2000 seeking direction to consider the petitioner for promotion to the post of Dy. S.P. on completion of two years’ service as Inspector. Learned Tribunal vide order dated 13.12.2006, allowed the Original Application of the petitioner. The challenge of respondents to the order passed by learned Tribunal by way of in CWP No. 2239 of 2007 also remained unsuccessful. Accordingly, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Dy. S.P. w.e.f. 21.08.1991. 4. The grievance of the petitioner as raised in the instant petition is that the State Government had made applicable four tier pay scale to its employees w.e.f. 01.01.1996. Since, the petitioner had completed four years of service as Dy. S.P. as on 01.01.1996, he was also entitled to higher pay scale. The petitioner submitted his representation to the competent authority on 04.12.2018 seeking benefit of four tier pay scale. He issued reminder on 12.01.2019. Having remained unsuccessful in getting positive response from the respondents, the instant petition was filed in the year 2022. 5. The respondents have contested the claim of the petitioner by alleging that in view of Clause 4 (b) of letter dated 09.08.2012, issued by the Department of Finance, the benefit of higher scale could be granted on assessment of work and conduct of the incumbent. 5. The respondents have contested the claim of the petitioner by alleging that in view of Clause 4 (b) of letter dated 09.08.2012, issued by the Department of Finance, the benefit of higher scale could be granted on assessment of work and conduct of the incumbent. It has further been submitted that as per Clause C (ii) of letter dated 23.06.2000 issued by the Department of Finance, the petitioner was required to pass the departmental examination and the assessment was also required to be done of his Annual Confidential Reports which were not available with the Department on account of having been destroyed after requisite period of five years. 6. In rejoinder filed by the petitioner, it has been submitted that the provisions of communications dated 09.08.2012 and 23.06.2000 could not be applied retrospectively to the detriment of petitioner as he had already retired on 31.07.1997. As regards the non-availability of ACRs of petitioner, it has been submitted that since the benefit of promotion had already been granted in his favour, there could not have been any inhibition in granting the benefit of four tier pay scale to him. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case carefully. 8. The factual position as has emerged is that the petitioner was ordered to be promoted as Dy. S.P. by creation of supernumerary post w.e.f. 21.08.1991 to 31.12.1997 vide notification dated 09.02.2010 issued by the State Government. Consequently, vide office order dated 17.03.2012, the actual orders promoting the petitioner to the post of Dy. S.P. w.e.f. 21.08.1991 to 12.05.1994 on ad hoc basis and w.e.f. 13.05.1994 on regular basis were issued. Thus, on 17.03.2012, the petitioner stood promoted as Dy. S.P. w.e.f. 21.08.1991. 9. The petitioner remained silent till 04.12.2018 when for the first time he raised the issue of grant of four tier pay scale in his favour by submission of representation. The respondents did not acknowledge the claim of the petitioner and in such circumstances, the instant petition came to be filed in 2022. 10. It is more than settled that the delay defeats equity. In State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri and Others, (2015) 15 SCC 602 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “27. The respondents did not acknowledge the claim of the petitioner and in such circumstances, the instant petition came to be filed in 2022. 10. It is more than settled that the delay defeats equity. In State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri and Others, (2015) 15 SCC 602 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim “Deo gratias” - ‘thanks to God’. 28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present.” 11. Similar exposition of law can be found in Union of India and Others vs. N. Murugesan and Others, (2022) 2 SCC 25 wherein it has been held as under: “DELAY, LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE: 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the Court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the Court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the Court. LACHES: 21. The word laches is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness.” It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the Court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy to a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the Court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.” 12. Recently, in Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and Others, (2024) SCC Online SC 551, it has been held as under: “11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal vs. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime [vide State of M.P. vs. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261 , Moon Mills Ltd. vs. Industrial Court, AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Bhoop Singh vs. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969 ]. This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right [vide Tilokchand Motichand vs. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110 , Durga Prashad vs. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185 and Rabindranath Bose vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84 ]. 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. vs. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad vs. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769 . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492 (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M.R. Meher, AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra SRTC vs. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329 . vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492 (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M.R. Meher, AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra SRTC vs. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329 . Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine - Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470 that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 13. Though, the petitioner has tried to explain the delay in filing the petition by alleging that he is an old person and being resident of Solan could not pursue his case before the respondent-authorities based at Shimla especially on account of COVID-19 conditions, but the explanation so rendered firstly does not appear to be plausible as the distance between Solan and Shimla is just less than 50 kilometers and secondly, it is not understandable as to how the personal presence of the petitioner before the authorities would have helped him. As regards the existence of COVID-19 conditions as detrimental for petitioner to approach this Court, it can be noticed that such conditions prevailed during 2020-2021, whereas the petitioner had got the cause of action, if any, to seek legal remedy on 17.3.2012 when the order of his promotion was issued. There is no explanation as to why petitioner remained silent from 2012 till December, 2018 when he submitted the representation for the first time to the authorities. Even the delayed representation of the petitioner could not revive the cause of petitioner which already had become stale on account of delay and laches. 14. In light of above discussion, the petitioner is held not entitled to the relief as prayed for by him. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. 15. The petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.