ORDER 1. The petition arises out of the award dated 14.2.2013 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.2, Gwalior, in and by which, Labour Court dismissed the claim of the claimant/petitioner/workman. 2. Brief facts which led to filing of this petition are as under :-- i- Petitioner was appointed on the post of Pump Attender in Public Health & Engineering Department on 1/1/1990 and was working on the same post since then. Without giving show-cause notice to him or affording sufficient opportunity of hearing, authority removed him from the service. ii- Petitioner filed his claim before the Labour Court, which was contested by respondents denying the fact made by the petitioner and submitted that workman/claimant/petitioner was neither appointed on the alleged post nor he worked for the period as alleged nor he was given any salary / remuneration by the department. iii- After considering the entire facts and legal proposition, learned Labour Court rejected the claim of the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner mainly submits that Labour Court has erred in passing the impugned award / order in dismissing the claim. Workman/petitioner was appointed as a Pump Attender on 1.1.1990 and he was wrongly removed from the work on 1.3.1991 without issuing any notice. Removal from the work by respondents is against the provisions of law and similarly situated persons are still working in the department, but the petitioner has been wandering for the job for a long time. Workman/petitioner has filed the proof of his work, but Labour Court ignored it and wrongly dismissed the claim. 4. Per contra, learned Government Counsel appearing for respondents/department opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that petitioner was neither appointed in the department nor he has been given any remuneration. Petitioner did not work as a Pump Attender. Learned Labour Court discussed all the issues raised by the petitioner in its impugned award/order and there is no patent perversity in the order of Labour Court. There is no violation of any provision and principle of natural justice has not been flouted. Thus, this Court should not interfere with the award/order of Labour Court in exercise of superintendence power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. There is no violation of any provision and principle of natural justice has not been flouted. Thus, this Court should not interfere with the award/order of Labour Court in exercise of superintendence power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned Government Advocate further submits, as a primary objection, that this petition has been filed in the year 2017 while award/order of Labour Court has been passed on 14.2.2013. Thus, petition has been filed with an inordinate delay without explaining the delay and laches. Thus, it should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches without entering in the merit of the case. 5. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, (2015) 12 SCC 39 Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :-- 10. In the writ petition, while setting aside the award of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court passed in Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan [Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan, (2007) 9 SCC 86 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 668] and also another judgment of the High Court and observed that a person who practices fraud for securing employment cannot perpetuate on the ground of delay and the learned Single Judge faulted the Labour Court for exercising discretion under section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and interfering with the punishment of dismissal from service. In our considered view, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the tribunal, only, when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunal and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In our view, when the Labour Court has exercised its discretion keeping in view the facts of the case and the cases of similarly situated workmen, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the Labour Court. 11. In our view, when the Labour Court has exercised its discretion keeping in view the facts of the case and the cases of similarly situated workmen, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the Labour Court. 11. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 ] , the Constitution Bench of this Court considered the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities entrusted with quasi-judicial functions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench, Gajendragadkar, J. observed as under : (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7) “7. … A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. In Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. [Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd., (2014) 6 SCC 434 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 291] , it was held as under : (SCC pp. 440-41, paras 15-16) “15. We find the judgment and award of the Labour Court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the Labour Court in its award as it is well-settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate Court or reappreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower Court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well-reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well-reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice. 16. It is relevant to mention that in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 338] , with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that : (SCC p. 348) ‘49. (m) … The power of interference under [Article 227] is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High Court.’ It was also held that : (SCC p. 347, para 49) ‘49. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of the Court or tribunal subordinate to it.’” 13. Emphasising that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, the Courts are to keep in view the goals set out in the Preamble and in Part IV of the Constitution while construing social welfare legislations, in Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. [Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., (2010) 3 SCC 192 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1146] , this Court has held as under : (SCC p. 205, para 21) “21. [Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., (2010) 3 SCC 192 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1146] , this Court has held as under : (SCC p. 205, para 21) “21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that : ‘10. … The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.’ (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines [State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923 ] , AIR p. 928, para 10.)” 14. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion judicially, the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it is satisfied that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by any fundamental flaws. We do not find that the award passed by the Labour Court suffers from any such flaws. While interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the High Court did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and the impugned judgment [K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corpn., Writ Appeal No. 390 of 2008, decided on 3.9.2012 (KAR)] cannot be sustained. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja v. State of T.N. reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under : 11. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja v. State of T.N. reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under : 11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hardandfast rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8.10.1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit. 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 has held as under : 18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in R&M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and others reported at (2005) 3 SCC 91 held thus :-- "34. There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot disturb the third party interest created on account of delay. Even otherwise also why Court should come to rescue of person who is not vigilant of his rights." 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service reported at AIR 1969 SC 329 held thus :-- "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Even otherwise also why Court should come to rescue of person who is not vigilant of his rights." 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service reported at AIR 1969 SC 329 held thus :-- "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his Neutral Citation No. -- 2021: AHC:42162 conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 10. A similar sentiment was echoed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiv Dass v. Union of India and others reported at (2007) 9 SCC 274 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined as under :-- "8. ...The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction." 11. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction." 11. When the issue of delay and laches came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shankara Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar and ors. reported at (2011) 5 SCC 607 , Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated settled position of law and confirmed the well established criteria which has to be considered before exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion is extracted herein below :-- "54. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are : (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (2) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the Petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the Petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the Petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay." 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also noticed the ingenuous devices adopted by unscrupulous litigants to tide over the delay and laches on part of such litigants. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay." 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also noticed the ingenuous devices adopted by unscrupulous litigants to tide over the delay and laches on part of such litigants. One such commonly used device is by filing a representation to the authorities after a long delay. Such litigants then approach the Court with an innocuous prayer to decide the representation. Once such representation is decided in compliance of orders of the Court, it is claimed that a fresh cause of action has arisen. Stale wine does not become fresh in a new bottle. The Hon'ble Supreme Court saw through the designs of such litigants and foiled their intent in no uncertain terms. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered this issue in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology & Min. Indus. Est. and another reported at (2008) 10 SCC 115 . The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would guide the fate of the case. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference :-- "8. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. 9. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. The Courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. 9. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. The Courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any `decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored." 14. A similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported at (1989) 4 SCC 582 . The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference :-- "22. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform. Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal or representation provided by law is disposed of, cause of action shall first accrue and where such order is not made, on the expiry of six months from the date when the appeal was filed or representation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the Head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation." 15. Law has long set its face against delay in approaching the Court. The Courts have consistently declined to condone the delay and denied relief to litigants, who are guilty of laches. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the Head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation." 15. Law has long set its face against delay in approaching the Court. The Courts have consistently declined to condone the delay and denied relief to litigants, who are guilty of laches. Litigants, who are in long slumber and not vigilant about their rights, are discouraged by the Courts. Belated claims are rejected at the threshold. Rip Van Winkles have a place in literature, but not in law. 16. All this is done on the foot of the rule of delay and laches. Statutes of limitation are ordained by the legislature, rule of laches was evolved by the Courts. Sources of the law differ, but the purpose is congruent. Statutes of limitation and the law of delay and laches are rules of repose. 17. The rule of laches and delay is founded on sound policy and is supported by good authority. The rule of laches and delay is employed by the Courts as a tool for efficient administration of justice and a bulwark against abuse of process of Courts. 18. Having heard learned counsel for both the parties, perused the record and considered the entire facts and circumstances of the case and legal proposition discussed herein-before, I do not find any apparent error or manifest failure of justice in the impugned award/order. Learned Labour Court has exercised its jurisdiction judiciously. 19. In view of above, petition being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed.